Leadership & Transport

A matter of Institutional Change

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Final version:
30th of April 2017

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If you think we can't change the world
It just means you are not one of those who will

Jacque Fresco

Acknowledgement

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30th of April 2017, Lisse

Abstract

With the rapid urbanization, the pressure on the urban transportation systems increases and leadership is often mentioned as a requirement for the development of new transport project. In this research, the role of local political leaders in the development of sustainable urban transport (SUT) systems is explored in the cases of Bandung (Indonesia) and Medellin (Colombia). It is analyzed of how the two local political leaders (LPL's) Kamil in Bandung and Fajardo in Medellin induce institutional change to transport planning. By means of semi-structured interviews, policy analysis and document analysis a comparative case study is conducted between the two cities. It was found that the leadership styles between in the two cities differ. Ridwan Kamil in Bandung was found to be a City-Boss whereby Sergio Fajardo's leadership style is a dynamic mix of a Visionary and City-Boss. It is concluded that the leadership style reflects the kind of utilized change mechanism for inducing change, as well as the complexity of the induced change.

Keywords: Local political leadership; Institutional Change; Sustainable Urban Transport; Medellin; Bandung

Summary

The first chapter of this thesis introduces the issue of leadership in transport planning. The research questions are presented as well as a short introduction of the two cases is given. To explore how leadership styles relate to the change of the institutional context in transport planning, chapter two provides the theoretical framework for this thesis.

Chapter two starts with a literature review of leadership in general and more specific, leadership in planning theory. Based on the understanding of Cervero (1998), the main ingredients for the development of sustainable urban transport are; leadership, governance and institutions. Eventhough the development of Sustainable Urban Transport is increasing globally, in many cases the institutional context requires *change* to accommodate the planning, construction and implementation of these kind of systems. In chapter two it is argued that the institutional context, consisting out of governance, formal institutions and informal institutions according to Willimamson (2000) can change, known as institutional change. This change can be induced by *change agents*, like local political leaders. Therefore, the theory of John & Cole (1999) on local political leaders is introduced, to analyse the kind of leaders. The analysis is based on two determents; power execution and leadership orienation. Finally, it is argued that leaders can induce change by means of three change mechanisms.

The research design for this thesis is presented in chapter 3. The thesis is a comparative case study of two international cases located in the Global South; Bandung (Indonesia) and Medellín (Colombia). In total three research methods are selected to ensure triangulation; semi-structured interviews, policy analysis and a document analysis.

Chapter 4 presents the data gathered for the case of Bandung. The data presentation in Bandung elaborates on the leadership style of Kamil for the period 2013 - february 2017. The chapter starts with a short elaboration of the problem of rapid urbanization and the follow-up issue of congestion and the transport developments introduced by Kamil in Bandung. Thereafter, the data regarding the leadership style of Kamil are presented before the chapter turns to the analysis of how the institutional context has changed under Kamil. In this chapter no research questions are answered, instead chapter 5 presents the analysis of the data. The leadeship style of Kamil is categorized as a City Boss and the institutional change is having a bottom-up tendency, which means the main changes are at the governance level. Kamil failed in changing the institutions on the informal level, instead Kamil turns to the mechanism of replacing institutions on the governance level.

Chapter 6 and 7 follow the same structure as chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 6 starts with an introduction of the main problems of Medellin when Fajardo was mayor from january 2004 – december 2007. The problem of inequality, poverty and violence are addressed by Fajardo through changes made based on information gathered through participatory instruments and a complet new team of experts. Data concerning the leadership of Fajardo, the governance, formal institutions and informal institutions of transport in Medellín are presented in Chapter 6. Fajardo's leadership style as a mix Visionary-City Boss is based on the fluctuation in power execution as analysed in chapter 7. As a Visionary- City Boss, Fajardo acknowledges the special momentum that arises after the peace negotiations held by the Colombian president in 2002. The society demands change and Fajardo is the first politican that does not follow the path of traditional politics in the city. Instead, Fajardo introduced several instruments to engage citizens in the plan and decision making but also takes unilateral decisions when needed. The change tendency in Medellín has a top-down tendency and the leader induces change through knowledge exchange and the introdution of new discourses.

The two cases are compared in chapter 8. The differences are found in the leadership style, eventhough both leaders have a City Boss element, the change tendency and the used change mechanisms differ. It is concluded that the location of the leader on the leadership matrix of John & Cole, consisting out of the power and leadership orienation determents, determine the utilized change mechanism and the range of induced change. A reflection on the research process, used theories and on the findings is given in the last chapter, chapter 9.

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Glossary

people live in the BMA of which Bandung is the cultural and economic centre.

BRT or **Bus Rapid Transit**
A customer oriented transit which combines vehicles, planning, stations and intelligence transport systems. The main characterist are: segregated bus lanes from other movement on roads, quick boarding, comfortable bus shelters and/or stations, clean bus technology

Bureaucratic-stratification
Refers to the societal structure in Indoneisia. It is considered to be the most hierarchical and status oriented structure of society worldwide. In this understanding, people distinguish between themselves and the rakyat (people) or wong cilik, "little people" or ordinary people

C

Cable Car
In this research the definition of cable car is referring to the use of a gondola for public transport purposes.

Colombian Constitution of 1991
The response of the Colombian government to the demand for more democracy. A point in time from which on decentralized powers got more independent authority, functions and tasks. 1991 is the turning point from which the mayors could be firstly elected directly on the local level and they needed to develop a Plan de Desarrollo or local development plan which pointed out the main areas of interference and were in office for a set period of time

Comunas
Spanish for communes or community (administrative districts). This is the third level of spatial organization in Colombia. The city of Medellín is divided into six main zones, these zones are sub-divided into Comunas. In total there are 5 rural and 11 urban comunas

Con el Alcalde or **With the Mayor**
Weekly TV show of Fajardo during his mayoralty in Medellín (2004-2007) every Thursday from 8:30 pm to 9:30 pm

CTP or **Conventional Transport Planning**
Planning which focusses on the development of infrastructure to facilitate movement with privates. In reality this is translated in the construction and implementation of roads and highways, as well as the additional supporting infrastructure, like toll gates and traffic lights. This transport paradigm dominated the second half of the 20th century in many parts of the world.

D

Del Metro Cable de Medellín
Spanish for the metrocable in Medellín. First cable car line was taken into operation in November 2004 during the mayoralty of Fajardo. The first cable car as a public transportation mode was developed in Medellín

DISHUB or **Dinas Perhubungan**
Indonesian for the Department of Transportation. In this research it always relates to the Transport Department of the city of Bandung. Dishub is the technical transport planning and policy authority of the city and has to report to the Bappeda

A

Accessibility
Defined in this research as the capacity of a place to be reached from, or to reach different places in the city.

ASI or **Alianza Social Indígena**
Spanish for Social indigenous alliance. The political party which Fajardo joined for the local elections in 2004

AGT or **Automated Guided Transit**
In this research the understanding of the APTA (American Public Transportation Association) is followed: *"it is an electric railway (single or multi-car trains) of guided transit vehicles operating without an on-board crew."* (APTA, 2017)

Angkot
The main form of public transportation in Bandung (Indonesia) and most other Indonesian cities. This paratransit type of public transportation are minivans which carry between 12 and 16 passengers. The word is a combination of the Indonesian term transportation (meng**ang**kut) and city (**kot**a). The angkot operation in Bandung is provided by private operators on semi-structured routes, which can fluctuate based on the personal wishes of the passengers. Bandung counts 38 semi-structured routes, served by 5436 minivans (Tarigan, et al., 2016; Kota Bandung, 2014)

ATCs or **Area Traffic Control**
A sort of ITS to control the traffic flow by means of traffic signals, lane control signals and message signboards above the lane.

B

BAPPEDA or **Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah**
Indonesian for the Regional Development Planning Agency of the city of Bandung. This agency is responsible for the development of the transport masterplan. The Bappeda is a multi- sector planning and policy authority which is coordinating all government institutions of the city.

Barrios
Neighborhoods in Colombia (administrative districts).
Neighborhoods are the fourth organizational level. The city of Medellín counts 249 neighborhoods or barrios.

BMA or **Bandung Metropolitan Area**
The metropolitan area consists out of the two cities Bandung and Cimahi, Bandung Regency and West-Bandung Regency and three kecamatan in the Sumedang Regency. In total around 8.5 million

E

EPM or Empresas Públicas de Medellín

Spanish for Public Companies of Medellín. Established in 1955, the EPM is a public owned company by the Municipality of Medellín. It is the provider of public services like water, sewage and telecommunication. The company operates national and internationally. Because it is a local company in Medellín, 30 percent of the profit is allocated to the municipality of Medellín to invest in projects according to the PD.

Estratos

Spanish for strata. Colombian cities are divided by sectors according to the general socio-economic profile of the citizens. The rank ranges from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest). It is meant to cause solidarity through a system in which the estratos 5 and 6 pay a surplus and the lowest 1 and 2 receive some reductions on the fees of the public services. However, the system causes social segregation in Colombian cities because people associate themselves with the strata level

F

Sergio Fajardo Valderrama

Mayor of the municipality of Medellín between January 2004 and December 2007. Thereafter, Fajardo became the governor of the state of Antioquia from 2012 till 2016

G

Guerrilla

Left-wing non-military fighters in Medellín and Colombia. Their main opponents, next to the formal system, are the paramilitaries. These groups turned streets into warzones in Medellín

I

Informalization

The formation of precarious neighbourhoods, often in complicated and dangerous territory

ITS or Intelligent Transportation System

are advanced applications which provide the use with information relating to transport and traffic to make smarter use of the networks. One of the most valued international example is electronic road price system in Singapore

K

Mochamad Ridwan Kamil

Is the elected mayor of the Municipality of Bandung (Indonesia) for the period 2013- 2018. Locally known as Pak Emil

Kota

Indonesian for city. Kota Bandung is located in the BMA and is a city of roughly 2.2 million inhabitants

L

Line J Metrocable

Metrocable line in Medellín, developed and planned by Fajardo, opened by Salonzo Salazar in 2008. It connects comunas 13 This development started during the administration period of Fajardo but was finalized by the succeeding mayor Alonzo Salazar

Line K Metrocable

First Metrocable line in Medellín. Opened in 2004 by Fajardo, the constructions have started under Luis Perez. This line connects the city centre with Santo Domingo (Comunas 1)

Line L Metrocable

Metrocable line in Medellín, planned by Fajardo, opened in 2010. The line connects Santo Domingo (Comunas 1) with the Arví Park in the north of the city. This is the line which is developed for recreational purposes.

LPL or Local Political Leadership

A theory developed by John & Cole (1999), which differs between four styles of local political leaders by means of two determents; power and leadership orientation. Local political leaders have a political background and operate in cities and municipalities. Most common types of these leaders are mayors, party leaders and department leaders.

LRT or Light Rapid Transit

Not one clear definition is formulated for LRTs. In this research the understanding of the APTA (American Public Transportation Association) is followed: "*It is a mode of transit service (also called streetcar, tramway, or trolley) operating passenger rail cars singly (or in short, usually two-car or three-car, trains) on fixed rails in right-of-way that is often separated from other traffic for part or much of the way. Light rail vehicles are typically driven electrically with power being drawn from an overhead electric line via a trolley or a pantograph; driven by an operator on board the vehicle; and may have either high platform loading or low level boarding using steps.*" (APTA, 2017)

M

Medellín La Mas Educada

Spanish for Medellín the Most educated. Slogan of Fajardo during his campaign for mayor 2003 and later also the main vision. During his governorship of the state Antioquia (2007-2011) the most educated remained the goal, but then for the whole state of Antioquia

Metro Company

The first and only metro company in Colombia, opened in 1979 under the name "Empresa de Transporte Masivo del Valle de Aburra´ Limitada", the company developed the metro lines A and B in the 1990s, which opened in 1995 respectively 1996. Strong actor in the development of public transport in Medellín

Metro Kapsul

The AGT system (see AGT) planned in Bandung (Indonesia), to connect the main square Alun-Alun with the central station (Stasiun). This is a pilot project in Indonesia.

Metroplus

The BRT (See BRT) planned by Fajardo in Medellín (Colombia). The first corridor of the BRT opened in December 2011.

Mobility

Defined in this research as the ability of movement. Mobility planning aims for maximizing the travelled distance by limiting the travel time (Litman, 2013).

N

NMT or Non-Motorized Transport

According to VTPI (2015), it is also known as Active Transportation or Human Powered Transportation. The most popular modes are walking and cycling. These modes combine recreation and transportation. In the Global South, the mode choice is often motived because of the low costs.

P

Paisas

Often used name for the ethnic group of Medellín and region. Derived from the Spanish word for countryman (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004).

Paramilitaries

Paramilitaries are semi-militarized forces or groups with an organizational structure, subculture, tactics and they often oppose the political or military power. They often function similar to the professional military but they are no formal armed force and do not have legitimate status (Oxford, 2011). In Medellín these are right-wing focussed groups

Paratransit

In this research the understanding of the APTA (American Public Transportation Association) is followed: "*Paratransit is a mode of transit service (also called demand response or dial-a-ride) characterized by the use of passenger automobiles, vans or small buses operating in response to calls from passengers or their agents to the transit operator, who then dispatches a vehicle to pick up the passengers and transport them to their destinations. The vehicles do not operate over a fixed route or on a fixed schedule. The vehicle may be dispatched to pick up several passengers at different pick-up points before taking them to their respective destinations and may even be interrupted en-route to these destinations to pick up other passengers.*" (APTA, 2017)

Paternalistic

A paternalistic relation indicates a relation in which the lower governments are restricted in their freedom by practiced authority of the higher government. This can also be described as a father- son relation (Oxford , 2017).

PB or Participatory Budgeting

Originates from Brazil. A participation approach in which citizens receive collective responsibility of a certain amount of the investment budget of a city. In Medellín, around 5% of the budget is decided by citizens during the administration of Fajardo

PD or Plan de Desarrollo

Spanish for Development Plan. A development plan is written by mayoral candidate in Colombian cities. This plan is considered to be the backbone of the interference and projects of the mayor during his/her (potential) legislative period. After the election the Plan de Desarrollo needs to be finalized. No big changes are allowed to be made, this is considered to be unfaithful towards the voters

Luis Pérez Gutiérrez

preceding mayor of Medellín between 2000 and 2003. Perez was the initiator of the construction of the first metrocable and a member of the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party). Currently, Perez is the governor of the state of Antioquia.

PKN or Pusat Kegiatan Nasional

Indonesian for National Strategic Area but also often referred to as National Activity Centres. The Bandung Metropolitan Area was assigned as a PKN in UU 26/2008 (Republik Indonesia, 2007)

Place-Making Governance

Developed by Healey (2010). Defined as a governance process which is an array of activities that are performed by actors which induce spatial changes. Governance is a joint responsibility of different actors and not only performed by the government.

POT or Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial

Spanish for Land Use Plan. The POT in Medellín was reviewed in 2006, addressing firstly the need for a polycentric urban model.

PUI or Proyectos Urbanos Integrales

Spanish for Integral Urban Projects. Consists out of three main elements: (a) physical; strengthen by public participation urban interventions like the construction of public spaces and sidewalks. (b) social; identifying problems and opportunities to approve and establish project through participatory practices of public workshops in combination with the strengthening of the internal community organization to restore the social fabric (c) institutional; all departments of the municipality are involved in coordinating the activities in an area. The cooperation with other actors from NGOs, the private sector as well with communities and are promoted.

R

Dada Rosada

Preceding mayor of Bandung from 2003-2013. Sentenced for 10 years imprisonment for bribing judge with public money (Wiyono, 2014).

RTRW or Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah

Indonesian for spatial plan or urban land use plan. This document is developed by the local government whereby the Bappeda (see Bappeda) is in charge. The latest RTRW in Bandung dates from 2011 (currently this document is under revision).

S

Silih asih, silah asah, silih asuh

Is a special trait of the Sundanese culture. It refers to Sundanese social codes of conduct, where people are advised to be kind and caring to each other.

Skywalk

An elevated pedestrian way in Bandung, around the most touristic area of Cihampelas. The narrow streets leave limited space for walking. On the Skywalk, citizens and visitors can walk between the touristic attractions and the parking garage (still in planning process). On the Skywalk, street vendors are selling their products.

Skybridge

The planned cable car for Bandung (see cable car). Connecting Dago area with the shopping and touristic area of Cihampelas.

Smart City

There is no formal definition available yet. In Bandung information collected through ICT and social media should provide new insights into the needs of citizens and become guidelines for further developments.

Social Media

Internet-based applications where users generate the content, which can be accessed by other users when these access a profile or visit a page. These social media platforms make interactive dialogues between physically remote users possible. In this research the social media platforms Facebook and Instagram are used.

Socialization

Defined as: a learning process, one that involves development or changes in the individual's sense of self (Stein, 2015)

SPK or **Subpusat Pelayanan Kota**

Indonesian for Services sub city centre. In the Transportasi Masterplan 2013, eight SPKs were assigned.

Sundanese

An Indonesian ethnic group of which Bandung is the capital of the Sundanese territory. It is the second most populous ethnicity of Indonesia. It is commonly known for its community-focussed culture, such as udunan or Silih asih, silah asah, silih asuh

SUT or **Sustainable Urban Transport**

Transport modes that provide efficient access to goods, services, activities, job opportunities as well to social and recreational activities. Social, environmental and economic aspects are equally important and need to be balanced. SUT is limiting the long- and short-term burdens in terms of social, economic and environmental consequences. SUT development is often intertwined with the shift away from car-dependent transport planning.

T

TPC or **Transporte Público Colectivo**

Spanish for Collective Public Transportation. TPC used to be the only public transport available in Medellín until the first Metro Line opened in 1995. TPCs are privately owned and operated bus services which differ in size and standard. In Medellín in 2011 more than 130 companies operate parallel, with a fleet of in total 4,000 vehicles.

TMB or **Trans Metro Bandung**

The BRT (see BRT) system in the city of Bandung (so far only city and not BMA). The first line opened in December 2004, connecting Cibeureum – Cibiru (16 KM). The TMB is supposed to reduce the number of angkots and ease the traffic congestion.

TMP or **Transportasi Master Plan**

Indonesian for Transportation Master Plan. The latest TMP of Kota Bandung dates from 2013. The preceding document of 2009 has a stronger focus on economic development, while road-based

U

Udunan

Is a special trait of the Sundanese culture.Indonesian for crowdsourcing. It is not only monetary but the term is commonly used to indicate shared-efforts or shared-contributions. This is one of the main traits of the Sundanese ethnic "crowdsourcing"; usually refers to crowdfunding when it comes to an event or something's similar. But more than money, it is also commonly used to refer to "shared-efforts", or "shared-contribution". For example, if the community decides that they need (or want) to repair the street in front of their houses, you can normally choose if you want to contribute financially, or by giving a hand on the execution.

Urban Acupuncture

Planning approach by which small-scale interventions should release the urban pressure and transform the urban context.

W

Window of Opportunity

Windows of opportunity are defining moments which can lead to drastic change caused by massive discontent which lead to an acute break with the established institutional context. Moments that can turn into windows of opportunities are civil wars, collapse of states, military coups, financial crisis.

1

Why leadership Matters

An Introduction

1

Chapter 1.

Why leadership matters

1.1 Transport and the Need for Leadership

Due to the trend of globalisation our attention shifted from local and regional success to the nation-state. However, decisions made on the national level do not necessarily lead to better local conditions. Indisputable, decisions made by local leaders have consequences for the cities we live in. Barber (2013) argues in *if mayors ruled the world*, that local political leaders actually already rule the decision making on the local scale. However, the question is how do these leaders rule our cities?

While the urbanization rate will continue to rise, the passenger numbers will increase as a side effect. However, most of the current transport systems will not be able to cope with these high numbers and the economic and health burdens for citizens will continue to manifest, see figure 1.1. The growing pressure on the systems and on the urban areas is a wake-up call to return to our cities and local leaders. In this research, two local political leaders in rapidly growing cities in the Global South and the local transport initiatives are explored to discover how local political leadership can induce change.

In theory, leadership is often mentioned as a success factor in planning (Vlek, 2000; Thomas, 2015; Asmu & Fitriati, 2014). It is mentioned that leadership will lead to more innovative projects and the lack of leadership can lead to unsuccessful projects. However, why and how leadership is crucial remains a mystery. This research aims to bridge the gap between leadership studies and transport planning by providing an overview of the different leadership styles and how these induce change in the institutional context of transport planning and development by means of a comparative case study of two cases in the Global South.

Figure 1.1 No space for the ambulance; congestion is becoming a real risk factor in Indonesia

1.2 Research Objectives & Questions

This study aims to analyse how leadership on the local level can influence the institutional context of transport planning which forms the framework for the development of new transport systems. This research analysis the practices of two local political leaders in Medellín (Colombia) and Bandung (Indonesia). The main question of this research is:

**How does the local political leadership style relate to the kind of change
of the institutional context of transport planning?**

This main research question will be answered by means of three sub-questions.

1. Which local political leadership styles can be distinguished based on the leadership criteria?

   The theoretical question focusses on the leadership styles in the two case studies. Based on the leadership practices, the theory is applied to the leadership practices in the cases to gain an understanding which style of leadership is most probable to be found in a transition towards more sustainable urban transport planning.

2. How did the institutional context of transport development change?

   In this question the change of institutions is analysed. It is reviewed how the institutional context of transport planning has changed which resulted into a new equilibrium in which the development of sustainable urban transport systems is taking place.

3. Which change mechanisms are used by the local political leaders?

   In this final sub-question, the institutional change is analysed based on how the change was achieved. The underlying mechanisms of change and how this facilitating itself in practice is based on a theoretical understanding of change mechanisms. The kind of mechanisms provides insights into the effectiveness of different mechanisms and leadership practices.

1.3 A Global Experiences: From East to West

Figure 2.2 The two case studies; Medellín & Bandung (QGIS, 2017; Edited by Wittig, 2017)

In this research an international comparative case study is conducted to examine the role of the leadership style on the institutional context. Both case studies are located in the Global South to add a new spatial perspective to the rather Western oriented discussion in the field of leadership studies.

The City of Flowers: Bandung (Indonesia)

Located in Indonesia, Bandung is the third biggest city of Indonesia. Located in the river basin between volcanic mountains in West-Java on the main Island, the current congestion problems in Bandung reached a point in which one can no longer speak of rush hours, instead congestion is an omnipresent problem all day long. A breeze of new wind in Bandung arrived with the new mayor Ridwan Kamil, who was elected in 2013 for the period until 2018. As an architect, Kamil aims for a Happy Bandung in which social media plays a crucial role.

The former murder capital: Medellín (Colombia)

The city of Medellín is located in the Aburra Valley, which is located in the western Colombian Andean mountains and was long known as the capital of the notorious Pablo Escobar. Due to the violence and poverty, many migrants settled on the slopes of the hills and where physically, economically and socially segregated from the city because of the lack of transportation (Betancur, 2007). The developments during the administration of Fajardo (2004-2007) are especially known for the social aspect in the transportation planning.

1.4 Structure of Thesis

In chapter two a theoretical framework for this research is established. The chapter starts with an introduction of the phenomenon of the institutional context. Furthermore, the chapter argues how different transport paradigms are reflected in the institutional context and what institutional change actually is. Thereafter, the method for identifying the leadership style of a local political leader is introduced. Finally, the chapter introduces three change mechanism which leaders can apply to induce institutional change. These elements are combined in a conceptual model. The methodology that has been applied in this research. Issues relating to the research design, research methods as well as ethical issues are discussed in chapter three.

Chapter four the collected data through the research methods discussed in chapter three are presented for the case of Bandung. This chapter presents the collected data for the local political leadership of Ridwan Kamil in Bandung (Indonesia) and how the institutional context changed. In the following chapter a leadership analysis for Kamil by means of the theoretical framework and the collected data. Chapter six and seven are structured similar to chapter four and five and present the data and analysis for the case of Sergio Fajardo in Medellín (Colombia).

In chapter eight the findings of both cases are discussed before conclusion about the leadership style and the institutional change are drawn. The research questions are answered and some recommendations for further research are made. The final chapter reflects on the methodology, the findings and the overall process of this research.

1

Institutions, Change & Local Political Leadership

A theoretical framework

2

Chapter 2.

Institutions, Change & Local Political Leadership

In this chapter, a theoretical framework regarding local political leadership and institutional change is established. It starts with a critical examination of how leadership is embedded in planning theory. Before zooming in on the local political leaderships styles, the institutional context or *action arena* of leaders is presented. To gain an understanding of how the institutional context of the two dominating transport planning paradigms differ, these aspects are outlined. In paragraph 2.5 the composition of the two determents are explored, which result into four different leadership styles. Finally, the last paragraph focusses on the mechanisms leaders can utilize to induce institutional change. Local political leadership, the institutional context and the change mechanisms of leaders come together as the backbone of this research in the conceptual model in paragraph 2.7.

2.1 To Lead, to be Led: Understanding Leadership

In the Ancient Greece, the guidance of city through leadership was considered as an act of balancing interests and power according to Aristotle (1869). Scholars like Barber (2013) and Khanna (2011) plead for the acknowledgement that cities are more important and local political leaders already rule our world. This first paragraph is devoted to the theoretical background concerning leadership in cities and exposes the theoretical gap of knowledge concerning the role of leaders in the development of. In the first section the most rudimental question is reviewed; what is leadership?

2.1.1 The first struggle: Defining Leadership

The attempts to define leadership are endless. It can even be said that there are as many definitions of leadership as there are authors who tried to define it (Stogdill, 1974). Hence, no consensus concerning a definition of leadership is reached, yet (Northhouse, 2013). Instead of one definition, the following six components collected to function as a guideline for what leadership is ought to be (Yukl, 2012). Leadership is;

- A process and not a goal;
- About influencing others;
- Taking place within a social context of a group;
- About goal attainment;
- Involving leaders and followers that share the same goal and
- Non existing without followers.

Besides the flexibility of the term of leadership, it is crucial to understand that leadership is no longer considered as a *type* of person, but rather as a *style*. Leadership *styles* refers to the enactment of the leadership executed by the leader – the way of doing things (Judd, 2000). Leadership *types* refer to the personal traits and position of a leader within the political spheres. The change of theory from type focussed theories to styles, is elaborated in 2.1.2

2.1.2. From Hero's to Common Goals

Early leadership theories evolved around the idea that a leader is a great man with specific traits and personalities (Bass, 1985). In these theories, leaders are exceptional personalities with distinguishing qualities and traits of a leader. Leaders were people that were born with the mission to lead, which was ought to be a personal gift and nothing what could be mastered by training (Bolden, Gosling, Marturano, & Dennison, 2003; Kirkpatick & Locke, 1991). What is known as the *"situational leadership"* of the 1970s was the start

of moving away from the trait or leadership *type* focussed theories, which plead that the situation determines the leadership.

In recent years, leadership theories neglect person-centred approaches, as they are found to be too narrow and they are ignoring influencing factors such as cultural or global trends (Winkler, 2010). Leadership is no longer understood as a predefined role of one single person with the right characteristics; it is more concerning the achievement of common goals led by various stakeholders in the process (Rondinelli & Heffron, 2009; Winkler, 2010).

Pointed out by Avolio (2007) and Yukl (2006), leadership on the local scale nowadays has become much more challenging compared to the 20th century. Through globalization, macro-trends are influencing the local level more than ever before. However, national leaders still receive most attention. The increasing importance of local leadership for citizens well-being in relation to the increasing urbanization and increasing mobility (Litman, 2002). How leadership is understood in planning theory is examined in the following section.

2.1.3 A View on the Role of Leadership in Transport Planning

In the recent years, the attention for the leadership issue in planning literature increased, but how and why leadership is crucial, remains unclear in planning theory (Balducci & Calvaresi, 2004; Crosby & Bryson, 2005). Based on the literature study, two general understandings about leadership in sustainable urban transportation planning can be made. First, several scholars mention leadership as a critical element for success, these scholars indirectly state that without leadership a transport project is unlikely to be successful (a.o. Asmu & Fitriati, 2014; Thomas & Bertolini, 2016). The second understanding is based on the theory of Cervero (1998), who states that leadership is closely related to the context. Underneath, these two kind of understandings are introduced.

Asmu & Fitriati (2014), Thomas (2015) and Vlek (2000) name leadership as an overall success element for sustainable transport developments. Thomas (2015) states even that their absence in the planning process will lead to decreasing success. Thus, this indicates that it is assumed that the presence of a leader will have positive effects on the success of sustainable transportation systems. As so, Vlek (2000) simply states that a change towards sustainable transportation requires leadership to guide and force change towards sustainable mobility. Schade and Schlage (2003) state that, *trust* between actors and the idea of sustainable transportation which has to be transferred to the public, requires leadership. Others, like Banister (2008) claim leaders to be nothing more than "*salesmen*" of the sustainable mobility idea. The majority of scholars remain vague about what leadership for transportation planning actually means. Nevertheless, an interesting statement is represented by Curtis (2007). In the article *Planning for Sustainable accessibility*, Curtis (2007) pleads for focussing on places with high accessibility for the development of effective public transport systems. Therefore, sustainable accessibility planning and public transportation development *"demands strong leadership and a proactive approach"* (Curtis, 2007, p. 110). Nevertheless, leadership seems only to be inevitable according to this scholar in the development of high accessible place.

Cervero (1998) states that there is a strong correlation between the context and leadership in sustainable urban transport. *Leadership*, efficient *governance and institutions* are the ingredients for the development of sustainable urban transport systems as stated by Cervero (1998). The development of sustainable urban transportation is a challenge but also seems inevitable for future success of urban places and transportation (Cervero, 1998). This second understanding represents a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the complexity of leadership and transport development and the interaction with governance and institutions; short for the institutional context.

Finally, Hambleton (2014) points out that that discussing planning theory without considering leadership is startling and undermines the usefulness of planning theory for planning practice. The understanding of Cervero (1998) forms the starting point for a deeper investigation of the action arena of leadership.

2.2 The Institutional Context

The underlying concept of the institutional context is the phenomena of institutions. Described by North (1990) as *the rules of the game*, institutions are vital for human interaction and providing structure and reduce uncertainty (Olsen, 2009). Embedded in interaction and action (also known as governance) by actors, institutions are not exogenous constraint. On the contrary, institutions are shaped by the social and political action and interaction, and therefore change over time (Kim, 2011). A frequent misunderstanding is that institutions are identical to organizations. In contrast to organizations, institutions structure and define relations between actors and organizations. Organizations on the other hand, are groups of actors which share a common goal or interest (Rietveld & Stough, 2007).

Before one can speak about institutions, actions, norms or legislations need to be *institutionalized.* Institutionalization refers to the embedding of conceptions, for instance certain behaviour or laws in society or organization (Olsen, 2009). Once these are embedded, they guide the decision making or policy making process.

Having established the understanding of institutions, the institutional context exists out of different levels of institutions which interact; the informal- and formal institutions and governance (action and interaction), see figure 2.1. The local action arena is thus shaped by the national legislative framework, the interaction and action by actors and the forces of the formal and informal institutions of the local level.

Figure 2.1 The institutional context: Informal institutions, formal institutions and governance *(Buitelaar, Galle, & Sorel, 2010)*

In the following three section the three elements of the institutional context is explored; governance, formal institutions and informal institutions.

2.2.1 Governance

Governance is considered to be one of the main components of the institutional context (Healey, 2010). Therefore, this paragraph develops an understanding of the phenomenon of *governance,* based on the definition proposed by Healey (2010).

With the increasing diversity between and within cities, the central government is no longer able to develop suitable plans and solutions for urban environments. This pressure and growing expectations encouraged a shift from government to governance (Klijn, 2008; Peters & Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1996). Since governance

in planning has a strong spatial component, the definition of Healey (2010) of place-making governance is adapted. Healey (2010) interprets the term governance as the *"overall deliberate collective activity in place making"* which takes place within and outside the formal government (p. 50). Put more simply, in a governance process an array of activities are performed by actors which lead to spatial changes. This definition thus sees governance as a joint responsibility of governmental and non-governmental actors. The governance structures are never static, similar to the institutions they are changing through practices and changing goals.

2.2.2 Formal Institutions

The second level of the institutional contest are the formal institutions. Understood as formal institutions are rules of the game which were established by the government and which are enforced by the legal system. Typical examples of formal institutions are laws, constitutions or land-use plans. However, Buitelaar et al. (2007) argues that legal instruments or legislation are not automatically formal institutions. The institutionalization is a gradual process which is highly influenced by the actor' interaction (governance), see 2.2. The main difference between formal institutions and informal institutions is the enforcement. While formal institutions are enforced by the national legal system, informal institutions are enforced by repetition (Högberg, 2009).

2.2.3 Informal institutions

The most complex institutions are the informal institutions. Informal institutions do not rely on a legal system but result from the repetition of behaviour within the social context. These rules are not codified, predominantly unwritten and created and communicated outside the official administrative bodies (Lauth, 2004; Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). Codes of behaviour, traditions, moral values, conventions or religious beliefs are examples of informal institutions and are a crucial part of a local culture (Buitelaar, Galle, & Sorel, 2010; North, 1990; Pejovich, 1999). The local cultures of communities are the most basic informal institution of urban areas, regions or nations and should not be underestimated (Hudalah, Firman, & Woltjer, 2014).

In this second paragraph, the three different levels of the institutional context have been introduced. Ranging from governance, formal institutions till informal institutions, these institutions tend to change over time. This will be explored in the following paragraph.

2.3 Institutional Change

In this third theoretical paragraph the phenomenon of changing institutions is explored. It starts with an exploration of institutional change. Thereafter the interconnectivity between the institutional levels and how institutional change can be promoted are discussed

2.3.1 Defining Institutional Change

Institutional change in the understanding of North (1990) is the accumulation of incremental changes rather than one big change. Change is understood as the transformation from one equilibrium into another. The omnipresence of institutions on every level of society and thus in transport planning can be summarized by the following quote of North (1990): "*The process of institutional change is also path-dependent because individuals learn, organizations develop, and ideologies form in the context of a particular set of formal and informal rules*" (P. 156). Often, formal institutions are changed within municipalities, with the hope that over time these formal institutions influence the informal institutions and indirectly change those.

A special feature of the institutional context is that the different levels are interacting and influence each other. However, the three levels change on a different pace of speed, see figure 2.2 (Högberg, 2009; Williamson, 2000). As the figure illustrates, informal institutions change at a much lower speed compared to formal institutions. Furthermore, governance is having the highest frequency in change. The fourth level, the daily planning encounters, is in this research not analysed as a separate category because the continuous flux is hard to grasp.

Figure 2.2 The pace of chance of the institutional levels *(Williamson, 2000)*

2.3.2 Interacting Change

Regardless the difference of pace of change, these institutions are interacting and influence each other which leads to institutional change. The governance changes on the highest pace and is influenced by the downwards force of the formal institutions and informal institutions. Formal institutions are influenced by the strong downwards force of the informal institutions, but the bottom-up force of governance should not be underestimated. Whereby informal institutions are influenced by all institutions that change more frequently, the change of informal institutions is most likely to happen without the influence of the other institutions, this is explained by Williamson (2000) as the *strength of institutions*. The institutional top-down influence is much stronger than the bottom-up influence argued by Williamson (2000). This means, that the influence of informal institutions on formal institutions and governance has more impact and change is more likely to happen compared to bottom-up influence. This top-down tendency is supposed to be more influential due to the longer period of consistency of the institution before change, see the right column of figure 2.2. This confirms the statement made by Högberg (2009), who claims that informal institutions are the most influential and crucial due to their consistency. Complicated by the sometimes intangible nature and the very slowly changing process and their close entanglement with the culture, informal institutions are hard to study and grasp into the last detail. Nevertheless, informal institutions are indispensable. However, the feedback process back upwards should not be underestimated and bottom-up institutional change tendency is possible.

In the third section, several elements which can enforce or speed up the process of institutional change are examined.

2.3.3 Change Enforcement

Most of the urban transportation problems occur due to the persistence of the existing institutions and following the existing path. Change does not automatically mean improvement, but acknowledgement of lock-ins could avoid situations in which path-dependency will lead to the enforcement of existing problems like congestion (Han, 2010; Liu & Smith, 2006; Reimer, 2013). These lock-ins are the result of rapid changing urban environments, in which the existing institutions are being maintained due to overwhelming unexpected developments and the leaders are not able to induce change of the institutional context. Therefore, it is important that a change agent, such as leaders, acknowledge windows of opportunity and can optimally exploit this window of opportunity for institutional change. Windows of opportunity are *defining moments* which can lead to drastic change caused by massive discontent which lead to an acute break with the established institutional context.

Thus, this paragraph has shown that planning outcomes are not only physical developments but are formed and shaped by the institutional context. (Parto, Ciarli, & Arora, 2005). Especially sustainable urban transportation, requires a change of the institutional setting, away from conventional transport planning (UN, 2011; STEPS, 2010; Banister, 1996). In the following paragraph, the difference between the institutional context of conventional transportation planning and sustainable urban transport will be discussed.

2.4 Institutions and Transport Planning

As Litman (1999) argues, a paradigm shift towards sustainable urban transport planning is taking place. Sustainable Urban Transport has become the new paradigm in transport development and it becomes globally more and more recognized and pursued (Hull, 2008; Mees & Dodson, 2007; Litman, 1999; Litman, 2006; Litman, 2007). In this research, it is differed between Conventional Transport Planning (CTP) and Sustainable Urban Transport (SUT). These two paradigms differ also in terms of the institutional context, this will be elaborated underneath.

2.4.1 CTP vs. SUT

As mentioned before, two paradigms of transport planning are used to differ between the institutional context. Conventional transport planning (CTP) focusses on private vehicle movement, which in planning is translated in construction and implementation of roads and highways, as well as the additional supporting infrastructure, like toll gates and traffic lights. This transport paradigm dominated the second half of the 20th century heavily in many parts of the world.

The new paradigm of Sustainable Urban Transport (SUT) is based on the term sustainable development, which is defined in the Brunland Report of 1987, as a "*Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 37). SUT developments aim for developments which balance social, environmental and economic aspects, see figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 The three elements of SUT (Litman, 2006)

In terms of social sustainability, it is aimed for equity in transportation between generations but also between different income groups. From an economic point of view, SUT developments aim to be most efficient and focus on local economic developments and transport should be the least-costly with the highest benefits. Finally, in terms of environmental sustainability, SUT focusses on reducing air, noise and water pollution as well as it protects resources and nature. Important to note is that in SUT planning car movement is not eliminated but reduced in favour for other modes. In contrast to CTP, which focusses only on economic development, SUT takes the direct surrounding and the impact of the transport into account. The institutional context of SUTs and CTP relate closely to these mentioned elements (Rietveld & Stough, 2007).

The institutional context for SUT developments reflects the aim of sustainable urban transport development to balance social, economic and environmental benefits (Haynes, Gifford, & Pelletiere, 2005; Liu & Smith, 2006). However, it is hard to generalize what capable institutions are, since institutions are highly context depended (Liu & Smith, 2006). Nevertheless, in the following sections, from a theoretical perspective the most suitable institutional contextual settings for the CTP and SUT paradigm are presented and the abbreviations of CTP and SUT will be used.

2.4.2 Changes of Governance in Transport Planning

The nature of governance in transport planning depends on three aspects which are illustrated in figure 2.4. These three aspects are presented underneath. These three spectra of criteria to differ between conventional

Figure 2.4 Spectrum of Governance in conventional transport (left) and SUT (right) (Kennedy, Miller, Shalaby, Maclean, & Coleman, 2005)

33

transport and SUT related governance are summarized in appendix 5. In section 2.4.3 eight generalized characteristics of formal institutions are presented.

2.4.3 Formal Institutions

Formal institutions in transport planning are policies or laws. In this section the eight generalized aspects or characteristics of formal institutions in the CTP and SUT paradigm are examined. Below in figure 2.5 the eight aspects are listed before each of the aspect is discussed.

Conventional Transport Planning   **Sustainable Urban Transport**

Mobility ⟷ *aim of transport policy* ⟶ Accessibility

Road construction & ITS ⟷ *Policy strategy* ⟶ TOD, New Urbanism, Smart Growth & telecommuncation

Road & parking network ⟷ *Network Developments* ⟶ Integrated multi-modal system

Maximizing road & parking capacity ⟷ *Policy Objectives* ⟶ Optimal plan and investment

Separated documents ⟷ *Integration of planning documents* ⟶ Integrated documents

Horizontal equity ⟷ *Equity* ⟶ Vertical equity

Specified investments for specific mode ⟷ *Investment policy* ⟶ Most cost-effective solution

Blueprint ⟷ *Policy type* ⟶ Adaptable and resilient

Figure 2.5 Spectrum of formal institutions in conventional transport (left) and SUT (right)
(Litman, 2006; edited by Wittig, 2017)

2.4.4 Informal Institutions

As mentioned in section 2.2.3, informal institutions are hard to grasp and they are highly context dependent. The five characteristics listed in this section relate to the mind-set of transport users and how transport developments are seen from an expert perspective. Decades of habits and discourses (informal institutions) determine the local culture of movement or the way how people move and live in urban areas (Arbury, 2010). In figure 2.6 these five spectra of informal institutions are illustrated.

Conventional Transport Planning		Sustainable Urban Transport
Private vehicle from origin to destination	← Understanding of transport →	Reached by a combination of modes
Car over public transport	← Perception about transport →	Public transport is for all income groups
Technological	← Kind of Improvements →	Technological and mind-set change
Local airpollution	← External effects →	Global trends
Lowest cost and time	← Effectiveness →	Reliability and reasonable travel time

Figure 2.6 The five elements of the institutional context (Wittig, 2017)

In the last three sections the differences between conventional transport planning and sustainable urban transport institutional contexts are reviewed. Figures 2.4 till 2.6 illustrate the generalized aspects for the three levels of the institutional context.

2.5 Local Political Leaders and Transportation

Aligned with the local focus of this research, local political leaders or LPLs operate on the local level and have a political background. Most of these leaders are mayors, party or department leaders. LPLs are constrained by the social and political institutional context, but simultaneously they are *local change agents* of the institutional context and provide political directions in a multi-level arena to *get things done* (Copus & Leach, 2014; Judd, 2000; Stone, 1995). Furthermore, LPLs face a multi-level context. Meaning, that the external influences on the leadership differ from the micro level (local context: e.g. traditions, history, planning culture) until the macro level (globalization).

The leadership on the local level is highly political and challenges the leader to represent the well-being of various societal groups with different needs, constrained by the city boundaries, institutions and the micro- to the macro-level context (Sweeting, 2009). Operating within the public sphere, LPLs have the executing power in decision making. The sort of decision making is the reflection of the leadership style and can therefore not be seen out of relation with the institutions and the governance mode (Milner & Joyce, 2005).

The cultural or informal institutional context of a city are defining the style of local political leadership tremendously (Leach & Wilson, 2000). Correlating with the statement made by Cervero (1998), local political leadership is highly complex due to the local polity and the multi-level interdependency, as well as the multi-contextually and the institutional context these leaders operate in (John & Cole, 1999; Judd, 2000; Sweeting, 2009). By means of two determents, a matrix is formed which makes it possible to differ between four leadership styles (John & Cole, 1999). The leadership matrix is illustrated in figure 2.7. In the following section the resulting four leadership styles are introduced.

Figure 2.7 The matrix of the four styles of Local Political Leadership *(John & Cole, 1999)*

2.5.1 The Four Leadership Styles

As in 2.1.2 already established, leadership *styles* are crucial for this research since this relates to the way of how things are being done, which indicates action and interaction with the institutional context (Judd, 2000). In total four leadership styles are introduced in this paragraph by means of international cases. For a full description of the leaders, see appendix 1. The description sequence starts at the right lower corner of the matrix, the caretaker as the most passive LPL in transport planning due to its negative leadership orientation is followed by the City Boss, the Consensual Facilitator and finally the Visionary.

CARETAKER (REPRODUCTIVE AND AUTHORITARIAN TRANSPORT PLANNING)

Since the caretaker leader is a rather conservative type of leader, it is more likely that this leader will be found in a city with a lack of strong political and cultural identity. A caretaker is an underdeveloped weak leader which cannot cope with complex coalitions which occur in the local context and within the local government (Svara, 1987). A caretaker might be an effective city manage or a party chief, however the complexity of the city level is too overwhelming for the caretaker. The complexity and the rapidity of policy making and decision taking highlights the inability of the caretaker (John & Cole, 1999). Therefore, these leaders are not big innovators and they prefer to maintain the status quo on every level, also in terms of an unsustainable transportation system since no long-term objectives will be formulated (Cheyne, 2004). For a compiled overview of the caretaker characteristics, see table A.1.2.

CITY BOSS (STRATEGIC AND AUTHORITARIAN TRANSPORT PLANNING)

The City Boss leader depends on a centripetal position in a dominating party and exclusive access to central authorities, like the central government. In the literature some contradictions can be found. Most scholars see the City Boss as one of the most prominent and most represented style of leadership (Getimis & Grigoriadou, 2005; Getemis & Hlepas, 2006; John & Cole, 1999). By contrast, Steyers et al. (2008) state that the required dominating party is becoming more complicated in the modern governance times, making the City Boss a very rare leader style. Nevertheless, the City Boss is one of the two leaders with a positive leadership orientation whom are change oriented. It is a leader who rules with an iron hand and decision making is an exclusive task. Focussing on mobilizing financial resources, charismatic personalities tend to be

the better City Bosses (Getemis & Hlepas, 2006; John & Cole, 1999). City Bosses are change oriented, but implement plans according to the development agenda of a small elite. Furthermore, it is most likely that a City Boss rules over a long period of time (Bäck, 2006). In table A.1.3 an overview of the characteristics of a City Boss can be found.

CONSENSUAL FACILITATOR (REPRODUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING)

The local needs and interests of the local citizens are very much connected with the actions of the consensual facilitator (John & Cole, 1999). Compared to the other leader with a negative leadership orientation (the caretaker), the consensual facilitator is much more adaptable to change and followership is generated through persuasion and decision making and policy development are mainly driven through powerful actors on the local level (Cheyne, 2004). A consensual facilitator has an open agenda and shares his power through participation. This however makes it almost impossible for this kind of leader to develop a long-term strategy. Sharing of power is leading to policy formulation that is often led by demands of other actors, such as businessmen, the central government or political parties (Getemis & Hlepas, 2006). The seven main characterisitcs are summarized in table A.1.4.

VISIONARY (STRATEGIC AND COOPERATIVE TRANSPORT PLANNING)

In cities with visionary leaders in transport planning, strong leadership is combined with capacity generation. The power of a Visionary leaders is, that they can break down walls between opponents (John & Cole, 1999; Sweeting, 2009). A Visionary is a classic change-agent, developing long term plans and changing direction by innovative policies and projects. These kind of leaders carefully build coalitions of powerful and effective people with different backgrounds. Instead of walking away from complex problems, the Visionary will face the challenge and will develop innovation and creative solutions. Since the Visionary is considered to be the most potent leader for sustainable developments according to theory, the awareness of the leader about the importance of sharing information and power is high on the agenda of the visionary. Aiming for capacity building, by executing *power to* participation of and interaction between actors is encouraged. A Visionary acknowledges issues on all levels and reacts with innovative strategies (Bäck, 2006; John & Cole, 1999). A local political leader tends to be a visionary when he/she is not using its charisma but instead puts the competitiveness of the city high on the agenda. The visionary sees improving the competitiveness of the city as the way to increase the amount of investments in the city which would also increase job opportunities (Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006).

In this section the four leadership styles are presented. To analyse the styles further, in the following two sections the two determents of the matrix in figure 2.7 are examined.

2.5.2 Determent A: Type of Power

The first determent is the *power* execution. This relates to how the leader executes power, in this research to this determent will be referred to as determent A. Based on the distinction made by Stone (1989) leaders are executing either "*power over*" or "*power to*". The "*power over*" refers to an authoritarian type of leadership, in which the leader is directing and controlling the behaviour of the followers, also known as command and control. The "*power to*" kind of leaders are cooperative leaders and are considered to be more sophisticated leaders since they empower the civil society through inclusive governance. That is why cooperative leaders have a higher possibility of solving the local problems of a city and have the ability to thrive (John & Cole, 1999; Stone, 1989; Sweeting, 2009). To analyse if the leader is either an authoritarian (power over) or cooperative (power to) kind of leader two criteria are defined (Getimis & Grigoriadou, 2005; Kotter & Lawrence, 1974; Leach & Wilson, 2000).

    A1 Do the leaders create support from the community: in an *inclusive approach* (power to), leaders' integration the public opinion and develops transparency through the sharing of information. In

contrast, the *authorial leader* (power over) determine the agenda and projects of the city unilateral without taking into account the public opinion

A2 How do the leader lead and coordinate partnerships; the *coordinator* (power to) puts effort into building a network of trust, while the *champion* (power over) exercise command and control practices. (John & Cole, 1999; Getimis & Grigoriadou, 2005; Getimis & Hlepas, 2006).

In terms of power execution, the leaders either provide power *to* the people, by means of participation. This is characteristic for visionary and consensual facilitator leaders. The power *over* kind of leadership, the caretaker and city boss, execute a more top-down power approach in which there is no space for participation and bottom-up involvement. The second determent regards the leadership orientation and is the final determent to divide the four leadership styles.

2.5.3 Determent B: Leadership Orientation

Determent B addresses the *leadership orientation*; this determent reflects the way how the leaders envisage their role. On the one side you find the *directive leaders* with a positive leadership orientation, which means that these leaders are strategical, change oriented and they pursue a long-term goal. The *reproductive leaders*, don't have long-term agendas and have a negative leadership orientation. This means that the status quo will be maintained as much as possible. The preposition of the leaders if they are either directive or responsive can be distinguished by means of the following five criteria.

B1. How do the leaders cope with policy change: it is differed between *proactive* (directive leadership) and *reactive* (responsive leadership). Proactive leaders engage in solving controversial issues while reactive leaders avoid complex issues.

B2. How do leaders solve problems and do they generate capacity: the *capacity builder* (directive leadership) attracts resources to solve problems while the *supervising* (responsive leadership) supervise the projects but does not engage in mobilising and attracting resources.

B3. The development of a personal urban agenda: the *programme politicians* (directive leadership) have formulated clear objectives with a long term perspective. The *Caretaker* (responsive leadership) practice inertia and no innovative projects or programs are developed because of the lack of a clear agenda and vision.

B4. How do the leaders cope with conflicts: while *negotiators* (directive leadership) aim for coordination in conflict situations and mediate between actors, the *confrontational* (responsive leadership) follow only their own political opinion and they do not lead to closer cooperation between politicians and the administration.

B5. How do the leaders execute action: *city managers* (directive leadership) guide the administrative staff and define new orientations while the *politicians* (responsive leadership) only engage in the policy design but not in the implementation (John & Cole, 1999; Getimis & Grigoriadou, 2005; Getimis & Hlepas, 2006).

By means of the combination of these two determents, four leadership styles can be identified. To conclude, the Visionary is having a positive orientation in terms of change and problems and integrated participation in the decision making for innovative solutions. The consensual facilitator follows the opinion of the citizens but has a negative leadership orientation. On the other side of the power spectrum, the City Boss and the

Caretaker execute a top-down power, with very limited to no space for citizen involvement. Nevertheless, he the leadership orientation of the City Boss indicates long-term improvement while the Caretaker protects the status quo.

2.6 Leadership as an Instrument for Institutional Change

In this paragraph, the different mechanisms used by leaders to induce institutional change are presented. Recalling the constraining and enabling influence of institutions mentioned in paragraph 2.2, the institutional context forms the action arena for leaders. As established before, institutional change refers to the institutional innovation of institutions. In this process, leaders can be *change agents.* Kraatz & Moore (2002) differ between three change mechanisms leaders can utilize to induce institutional change.

Hirsch (1986) and Leblebici (1991) have been the first to point out that institutional change can be *initiated* by leaders. Goodstein & Boeker (1991), Fligstein (1991) and Brint & Karabel (1991) have identified that the values of leaders, cognition and political interest are the most influential factors for initiated institutional change. Kraatz & Moore (2002) go further and distillate three mechanisms on how leadership leads to institutional change.

1. *Knowledge transfer and inter-organizational learning*:
   A new leader can share his experiences and knowledge within the organization, but he can also attract new knowledge. New expertise is sometimes needed to widen the horizon to take another stand. Some institutions might be outdated, such as the need for a police officer to manage the traffic at an intersection. New expertise of the leader can show that traffic lights are just as good and the officer does not have to face the daily pollution.

2. *The introduction of new discourses, assumptions and mental models*
   This encourages the involved actors (such as staff members) to re-evaluate their discourse and understanding about certain institutions. "*we have been doing this for ages*" is a typical respond to change (Porac et al, 1995). Nevertheless, new models will only be effective if old models are being *unlearned*. Leaders can import new and different concepts about what is supposed to be neutral or standard (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).

3. *Replacement or the attenuation of institutional values*:
   Probably the easiest form of institutional change. Simply degrading the institutions and their institutional value. This tends to be easier to achieve when the leader is not internally formed. Leaders that migrate into the institutional setting, have a better position to overrule the existing institutional context (Selznick, 1952).

These three mechanisms have shown how leadership can induce change of institutions. Since the institutional framework consists out of informal- and formal institutions as well as governance, these mechanisms can be applied by leaders on all levels.

2.7 The Conceptual Model of Institutional Change through LPL

In figure 2.8 the conceptual model of this research is shown. This research focusses on how leadership can lead to institutional change in transport planning. Therefore, the main research question is:

**How does the local political leadership style relate to the kind of change
of the institutional context of transport planning?**

Figure 2.8 the conceptual modal (Wittig, 2016)

The conceptual model consists out of three aspects which have been discussed in this chapter. To analyse how the institutional context is changing (paragraph 2.2), the leadership style (paragraph 2.5) and the applied change mechanisms (Paragraph 2.6) need to be analysed. Starting from the top, the conceptual model examines the leadership styles based on the two determents A (power execution) and B (leadership orientation). Furthermore, as *change agents*, LPLs can induce institutional change (paragraph 2.3) by means of three different change mechanism, the second level of analysis; knowledge exchange and inter-organizational learning (Change mechanism 1), the introduction of new discourses and mental modes (Change mechanism 2) and the replacement or attenuation of institution (Change mechanism 3). To analyse how the institutional context changes, paragraph 2.4 provides an insight into how the conventional transport planning (CTP) paradigm and the sustainable urban transport (SUT) paradigm differ.

3

Methodology

A research design for a
comparative case study

3

Chapter 3.

Methodology

This research focusses on the role of local political leaders (LPLs) on the institutional change and how institutions change. For answering the research question, the selected research design is presented in paragraph 3.1. Thereafter, the research methods, data analysis and semi-structured interviews as well as the data collection and analysis are examined.

3.1 Research Strategy

To analyse the role of local political leadership, in-depth knowledge about the leadership and the institutional context has to be gained. A research design in the form of a case study is applied, based on the definition of a case study as a "*detailed and intensive analysis of a specific case.*" (Bryman, 2008, p. 52). This is the case in the two selected cases; Kamil in Bandung and Fajardo in Medellín.

A multiple case study is preferred since a multiple case study will have more analytical benefits, a bigger substantial importance compared to a single case study and it is more robust and it strengthens the *external validy* (Yin, 2009). The multiple case study is having a positive effect on the generalizability of this research, compared to a single case study. Single case studies are poor to generalize; in this research the generalizability is increased by analysing two case studies.

Furthermore, Bryman proposes the "logic of comparison", which will be implemented in this multiple case study (Bryman, 2008, p. 58). According to this, a phenomenon can be better understood when a case is compared to another case. The purpose of a multiple case study can be either to predict replicated findings in the cases (literal replication), or to predict contrasting results which can be explained by predictable reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin, 2009). The two case studies that were selected for this research have different cultural and institutional backgrounds, which are of importance in this research. This cross-cultural characteristic reduces the risk of appreciating a finding as cultural specific (Bryman, 2008, p. 59). Finally, this multiple case study is of a holistic nature, since this research focusses on studying and comparing the cases in their holistic form or totality. The other possibility is the embedded multiple case study which studies various units within the different cases (Yin, 2009).

3.2 Case Selection

The cases were selected based on cities in which the transportation planning has faced or is facing an *extreme* change in transport planning. Understood as extreme is a reorientation from conventional transport planning to sustainable urban transport developments like BRTs, LRTs, MRTs, cable cars or the development of extensive NMT (Non-Motorized Transport) systems. Based on a set of five criteria the cases have been selected. In table 3.1, five formulated criteria are for the case selection are summarized in the first column. Based on these criteria, three have been selected: Bandung (Indonesia), Medellín and Singapore. However, due to complications to access information, the case of Singapore was dismissed. In the second and third column of table 3.1, the criteria for the two final cases are presented.

Table 3.1 selection criteria in extreme case selection

Selection criteria	Bandung (Indonesia)	Medellín (Colombia)
Traditional transport planning until leadership of LPL	Until the transport masterplan 2009, the expansion of the road system was the only field of transport intervention	Transport planning facilitated road development in the primary areas of the city
A new transport planning orientation can be detected which deprioritizes private vehicles and prioritizes SUTs.	In 2013 the transport masterplan prioritizes NMT as well as public transport	The transportation problem of accessibility was acknowledged by 2004 and accessibility through public transportation was implemented
New transport infrastructure implementation is planned or already realized	Sidewalks are extended, a LRT, monorail and a cable car are planned	A new system of cable cars has been built from 2004 onwards
The election of a new local political leader was the start of the transformation	Before the election of Ridwan Kamil in 2013, transportation planning focussed on the infrastructural side and not on the implications of the infrastructure on the movement in the city	The local elections of 2003 were won by Sergio Fajardo. The election program focussed on social transformation through education
Period of administration of LPL	2013- now (2018)	January 2004 – December 2007

3.3 Research Methods

In this research three research methods are used to combine multiple sources of evidence or triangulation. Triangulation is important to strengthen the construct validity of a research according to Bryman (2008) and Yin (2009). Triangulation is a way to cross-check the findings, by using more than one source of evidence, see figure 3.1 (Bryman, 2008). However, new information can also be found in the progress of triangulation, which can be an impulse for new directions of information gathering of one of the other two methods. Figure 3.1 illustrates the applied triangulation in this research per topic of interest.

Figure 3.1 Triangulation applied to the spectrum of required information. Made by: Wittig (2016)

In the following three sections of this paragraph, the applicability of the three research methods is discussed.

3.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews

In this research, the semi-structured interviews form the backbone of the data. Interviews are a method of in-depth data collection by which the research is able to collect a diverse understanding of opinions, experiences or meaning (Hay, 2010). The interviews have a semi-structured form with open-ended questions

which enable the interviewees to address certain points which are of importance according to their experience or add something that was not taken into consideration so far (Bryman, 2008; Yin, 2009). A benefit of the semi-structured interview is the flexibility, which enriches the researcher with unexpected relevant information or even new topics of interest.

Selection of Interviewees

In the interviews, an understanding of the institutional transport planning context was derived by interviewing experts involved in the transport planning and academics who have analysed the transport planning. For the case of Bandung, the interviews were held in January 2017 whereby the interviews for the case of Medellín were conducted in November and December 2016. To select the interviewees, 10 characteristics were formulated which function as selection criteria, see table 3.2. The criteria are divided into criteria for practical experts, such as civil servants, and for academic experts (researchers at universities or similar institutes). Some of the criteria cannot be met simultaneously by the experts like criteria a) and b). however, experts were selected based on the meeting of at least three criteria.

Table 3.2 overview of interviewee selection criteria

Criteria for practical experts	Criteria for academic experts
a) Civil servant of the municipality of Bandung/ Medellín	f) Research experience with transport planning in Bandung/Medellín
b) Civil servant of transport or planning department	g) Research experience with legal framework of (transport) planning of Bandung/Medellín
c) Direct experience with managing change in transport planning	h) Research experience with change of governance practices in terms of transport planning
d) Involved with policy making and/or implementation of transport (related) projects	i) Research experience concerning the influence of the transport change on society
e) Daily experience with the leadership of the LPL[1]	j) Researcher is/was affiliated with a university or research institute

Sampling of Interviewees

The first experts were targeted based on names mentioned in policy documents published by the municipalities of Bandung and Medellín. The key figures in terms of local transport planning (practical experts) in both cases were contacted. In several cases the researcher was introduced to the key figures by other contacts. This tactic is known as *snowball sampling* (Bryman, 2008). The sampling scheme for both cases can be found in figure 3.2 and 3.3, with information provided of the applicability of the selection criteria for each interviewee. All interviewees are mentioned anonymously based on the request of several experts. For more details, the research log is added in appendix 2. The decision not to interview the LPLs personally relates to the fact that this research does not aim for a presentation of the leaders based on their own interpretation.

The interview guide for the semi-structured interviews can be found in appendix 3. The four main topics that were addressed during the interviews relate to the three main levels of the institutional context (governance, formal institutions and informal institutions) as well as the leadership criteria of John & Cole (1999). The interviews were recorded in order to report as detailed as possible the outcome of the interviews when the interviewees agreed. In total, nine interviews were held for the case of Bandung and 12 for the case of Medellín. For reasons of reliability and transparency, the interviews are transcribed and are available upon request.

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[1] In Bandung Ridwan Kamil and in Medellín Sergio Fajardo

Figure 3.2 Scheme of snowballing process for the case of Bandung, Indonesia (Wittig, 2017)

Legenda

Not interviewed experts, provided contact about interviewee

interviewed academic experts

interviewed practical experts

Putrikanasih

BP1 (b,c,d,e)

BA4 (f,g,h,i)

BA1 (f,g,h,i)

BP2 (b,c,d,e)

Andry Heru Santoso

BP3 (b,c,d,e)

Taufiq Putra

Ira Irawati

BA2 (f,h,i,j)

BP4 (b,c,d,e)

BP5 (b,c,d)

Tristam

BA3 (f,g,h,i)

Figure 3.3 Scheme of snowballing process for the case of Medellín, Colombia (Wittig, 2017)

The selected analysis method for the semi-structured interviews is the Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis or CAQDAS, which uses transcripts from interviews as the input for the analysis. The analysis was conducted by means of the software ATLAS.ti. In this program, the transcripts of the interviews are coded according to the coding manual, see appendix 4. The codes in appendix 6 correlate with the power determents and criteria of the institutions relating to the different transport paradigms as mentioned in chapter 2. Furthermore, several codes were formulated based on the information found during the coding process, these codes are indicated with RK for Ridwan Kamil or SF for Sergio Fajardo.

The transcripts are imported into ATLAS.ti and grouped by the background of the expert, either academic, practical or a mix of both. These groups are helpful to understand the different kind of information provided by the different kind of experts. In these transcripts and notes, certain segments or sentences of the transcripts are coded. A code is a classification of information to create order in the amount of data (Friese, 2016). These codes are grouped and connections between the codes are shown in the network. The network visualizes the relationship of the different information. An example of the coding in one of the interviews is inserted below.

Figure 3.4 Example of coding in ATLAS.ti (Wittig, 2016)

Figure 3.4 illustrates how the transcripts are coded. This sentence is assigned to four codes. Two codes which relate to the leadership orientation, one of governance and one code which is a code formulated during the coding process, indicated with SF. This example shows that the coding of several sentences can hold a big amount of information about the leader as leader but also about the kind of actions and which transport institutions can be found in these actions.

In the following section the decisions concerning the policy analysis in the stages of policy sampling, collection and analysis are reviewed.

3.3.2 Policy Analysis

A policy analysis is a research method where the policies are reviewed based on their goals and their implications. The analysis of policies provides insights into how policies (formal institutions) have or haven't changed during the leadership (Bahn, 1981). In planning practice, the role of policy analysis is crucial due to the increasing complexity of urban issues, like congestion or mobility (Rondinelli, Urban Planning as Policy Analysis: Management of Urban Change, 1973). In this research, the policies are analysed in order to gain an understand of the meaning of different policies and plans and how over time, through different periods of leadership, the policies have changed (Bauer & Gergen, 1968; Rondinelli, Urban Planning as Policy Analysis: Management of Urban Change, 1973).

Sampling of Policy Documents

To analyse a change in policy documents, policy documents of different time periods are sampled. The first group of policies are published during the administration period of the two leaders. For the case of Bandung, the documents between September 2013 and February 2017 were sampled and for Medellín from January 2004 till December 2007. To compare these documents, the contrasting documents are policies from the periods before the leadership of the two selected leaders in Bandung and Medellín. Since the histories of the cities and the formulation of policies dates back for decades, the latest policies were analysed. For example, in Bandung one of the leading transport development policies is the Transport Master Plan (Masterplan Transportasi Kota Bandung). During the administration a new master plan has been formulated, the

Masterplan Transportasi 2013 and the preceding one was published in 2009. The changes made in this plan are compared to the latest version, the transportation plan of 2009. However, some policies were collected which were firstly formulated during the administration and therefore no comparison of change of the policy can be made. These policies are analysed from a standpoint where no preceding policy is available.

Collection of Policy Documents

Policy documents have been collected through the official websites of the municipalities of Bandung and Medellín and upon request to experts when these documents were no longer available online. The policy analysis is an iterative process of the research, since interviewees pointed out the importance of a policy, which are included in this research based on the recommendation.

Analysis of Policy Documents

Similar to the semi-structured interviews, the collected policies are analysed by means of ATLAS.ti, in the form of a CAQDAS analysis. Before the analysis, the documents were translated if needed into English from Indonesian or Spanish by means of google translate.

3.3.3 Document analysis

The third research method is the document analysis. According to Flick (2009), it is an instructive tool which is used to gain an understanding of social realities which also opens up new perspectives on certain topics. In this paragraph, the implications of data analysis for this research are discussed, as well as the data collection and selection are presented.

Document sampling

Document analysis is a method in which the researcher collects, reviews and investigates the information of secondary sources (Scott, 1990; Bryman, 2008). In this research, different kind of data for the document analysis have been collected: publications in academic journals, newspaper articles (online) and posts on social media. Several documents have been collected based on the suggestion of interviews with practical or academic experts, whereby most documents were found based on online search. Four quality criteria of Scott (1990) were taken into account for the sampling of the documents: Authenticity, credibility, representativeness & meaning. The authenticity refers to kind of document, the document is the original document and or the original post (in the case of social media). The credibility addresses the reliability of a document. This refers to the source, how reliable is the information. The representativeness refers to the act if certain information provided by a document is representing a level of information which could be found in other sources. Meaning relates to the fact that the content of the document is clear and easy comprehensible for the researcher. These documents are used to provide a view into the social and political reality in Bandung and Medellín to understand and illustrate the transport planning developments (Bryman, 2008).

Document Collection

Since different kind of data are collected, the first search terms that were used in the data collection are mentioned briefly. For the case of Bandung the search stared on the Instagram account and Facebook account of the leader Ridwan Kamil. Based on post relating to the transportation planning of the city, new search terms were used to identify especially news articles published by Kompas and Tribun Jabar, which are local based newspapers. The first key words were "Ridwan Kamil" & "transportasi", "LRT" and "Skywalk". In total 13 newspaper articles, 19 social media post which speak about transportation and 11 academic papers. The newspaper and social media information was searched for in Indonesian. For the case of Medellín, the search started with several key words: "Sergio Fajardo" & "transporte", "metrocable", "governance" and "metroplus". Since there is only one Colombian newspaper that is located in Medellín with an online archive of the news releases in the period of 2004-2007, most articles are from El Tiempo. This information was collected in

Spanish, whereby the academic papers were written in English and Spanish. In the case study of Medellín, 15 academic papers and 23 news articles and two recorded presentations were collected. No social media was used in the case of Fajardo because of the lack of postings during the period of 2004-2007.

Document Analysis

The document analysis of the collected data was done by means of ATLAS.ti. This decision was made to code the data according to the same coding manual for the semi-structured interviews as for the policy analysis. The reason for this decision was to limit the difference of valuation between the different types of data.

The frequency of the assigned codes is listed in appendix 6. Table A.6.1 provides an overview of the predefined codes. Table A.6.2 the codes which are formulated during the coding process for the case of Bandung are listed in A.6.2, respectively in A.6.3 for the case of Medellín.

3.4 Ethical Issues & Limitations of Research

In this last paragraph of the methodological chapter, the ethical issues and limitations which were found during the research are discussed. To avoid negative consequences for the interviewees by participating in this research, the interviewees were informed about the procedure and the transcripts are only available on request.

Originally a third case was selected, Singapore. During the months of September and October 2016, more than 25 people have been contacted. However, none of the contacted potential interviewees were willing to participate in the research. Due to this complication of access to information provided by experts, this third case was finally no longer included in this research.

In terms of limitations, the main problems were found in finding suitable and willing interviewees, especially in the case of Bandung. As mentioned earlier, the interviewees were contacted firstly through e-mail. In the case of Bandung, the interviewees were send an Indonesian letter of advice, provided by the RUG. However, in the snowball process, experts often provided contact data in the form of the phone number to establish contact via WhatsApp with experts. This way of communication seemed to be the best approach to reach a high level of response. Nevertheless, the fact that the interviews would be held in English seemed to be an obstacle. The interviewees that participated in the research pointed this also out as a potential obstacle based on the chosen language for the interview.

In the case of Medellín, the cultural influence was experienced as very positive and open. It seemed to be legit to send reminders for interview requests without being impolite. It was found to be of big help to mention in the first contact that some of the secretaries and department directors have been interviewed in the case of Medellín. Furthermore, it was found that the experts in Medellín were more likely to tell more about their personal experiences whereby in the interviews with the experts in Bandung more follow-up questions were asked.

4

Bandung & Transport Institutions

A data presentation from Indonesia

Figure 4.1 map of public transport in Bandung (Source: QGIS open access; Dinas Perhubungan, 2016. Edited by: Wittig (2017)

Legend

— BRT TMB
— School bus
— Angkot Routes

0   1   2   3 km

Chapter 4.

Bandung & Transport Institutions

In this first data chapter, the collected data for the case of Ridwan Kamil in Bandung (Indonesia) are presented for the period of his mayoralty starting from 2013 until respectively 2018, this research analysis the leadership until February 2017. This chapter starts with an introduction of the characteristics of the city and the status quo of the institutional context. The leadership style of Ridwan Kamil is explored based on the information presentation in paragraph 4.2 and the chapter is concluded with an exploration of the changes in the institutional context.

4.1 Bandung in Perspective
4.1.1 Bandung and Surrounding
Located on the most populous island of Indonesia, Bandung is the capital of West-Java, see figure 4.1 (Syabri, Pradono, & Soegijanto, 2013). Bandung is the economic and social centre of the Bandung Metropolitan Area (BMA), which is also known as *Cekungan Bandung* (OECD, 2016). The total metropolitan area counts around 8,6 million inhabitants of which 2,4 live in Kota Bandung (BPS Statistics Jawa Barat, 2015). Attracted by the cooler climate in the city due to the high elevation (768 meters above sea level), the creative sector, 80 universities and higher education and extensive textile industry, many migrants settle in the BMA. It is estimated by Winarso (2014) that the BMA daily expands with around two soccer fields of build-up area due to the migration.

The location of the city in the basin surrounded by volcanos and the emphasize of the plan Uitbreidingsplan Bandoeng-Noord or North Bandung Development Plan (1917) on the urban North led to a growing segregation between the European shaped areas with wide boulevards, mansions and green open space in the north and the dense populated, low-income areas in the South (Voskuilen, 1996). The urban form and focus on the north, provoked the formation of informal settlements in the city which resulted in high densities and low quality of infrastructure.

4.1.2 Main Transport Issues

> *"As a result, it is more complicated to make a trip in Bandung smooth and comfortable. Congestion effects the comfort of road users tremendously. Previously, congestion was limited to the peak hours. Nowadays however, this situation is omnipresent at every hour of the day"* (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2013, pp. 2-2; translated by author)

This quote out of the transportasi master plan 2013 sums up the problems of Bandung. Congestion in Bandung is increasing day by day since most travel take place by private cars and motorcycles and even public transportation is road focussed, currently around 80% is using private vehicles and only 20% public transport (Dinas Perhubungan Kota Bandung, 2016; Kamil, 2015a). The public transportation in Bandung and the whole BMA is dominated by providing paratransit modes like angkots (private operated mini busses), ojek (motorcycle taxis), becaks (cycling taxi) and delman but also taxis and bus services (Tamin, 2005; Tarigan, et al., Bandung City, Indonesia , 2016). The operation of the angkot service is in private hands which complicates the development of an integrated and reliable system with fixed routes because the operators aim for the highest numbers of passengers which results in long waiting times for passengers (BA2; Susilo, Joewono, & Santosa, 2009). In 2014 about 5436 angkots operated on 38 routes in Kota Bandung, see figure 4,1 (Syabri, Pradono, & Soegijanto, 2013). The angkots are characterized by changing routes based on passenger request and long waiting times while the driver waits for more passengers the use of motorcycles becomes interesting for the growing middle-income group (BA2; Susilo, Joewono, & Santosa, 2009);

"because the public transport is very poor, it is not only status but if we use the public transport it will be expensive compared to using a motorcycle. That is why there are now a lot of motorcycles in Bandung or Jakarta because it is really cheap compared to when we use public transport. The problem is, public transport in Indonesia is a gap. It is a sector for making money, making a living, it is not seen as public services." (BA2)

Figure 4.2 (left) from the back of the angkot, view on a vehicle of the same route St. Hall- Lembang; high frequency of vehicles (right) driver waits for more passengers to enter the vehicle; increases the total travel time for passenger (Wittig, 2015)

Furthermore, over the last years the population of private vehicles increased rapidly. Problematic is the ratio between road development and the growth of the private vehicle population in the city:

"explosion in the number of motor vehicles to be triggered due to the addition of transport problems roads (1.29% per year) is not proportional to the increase in the number of motor vehicles (9.34% per year)." (Dinas Perhubungan Kota Bandung, 2016, p. 8; translated by author)

The underlying institutional context in terms of transport planning and transport behaviour is explored in the following section to better understand the manifestation of the congestion problem in Bandung.

4.1.3 An overview: Institutions & Developments

In the case of Indonesia, it is important to understand the costumes and societal structures to analyse the changes in society in terms of transportation.

In the Indonesian archipelago the relationship within the governmental levels and between government and citizens is characterized as paternalistic (Hudalah, Firman, & Woltjer, Cultural Cooperation, Institution Building and Metropolitan Governance in Decentralizing Indonesia, 2014; Liddle, 1996). Paternalistic means that the higher government protects the lower government level like parents protect their children. Similar is the relation between government and citizen; the citizen obeys the authority of the government. The Javanese context is of great importance for Bandung. According to Hudalah (2006), the social structure on Java and thus Bandung can be best described as bureaucratic-stratification. As it was described by Liddle (1988) the role of "*the political elite are the most-status conscious and hierarchy-minded in the world*" on Java (p. 68). The status orientation in Indonesia leads to an aspiration of 63% of the population to purchase a car (Lubis, 2014).

"Indonesian consumers, and particularly emerging middle class consumers, are highly aspirational. As their income levels rise, these consumers are not only in a better position to buy the things they want and need, they are also looking to make purchases which demonstrate their rising social status. For many of these consumers, car ownership is the ultimate symbol of how far they have come and the success they have achieved." (Lubis, 2014)

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67% of Indonesians say that the car is a status symbol and it influences your social status. This is fuelling a perception that not owning a private vehicle, most preferably a car, is a sign of low status. The results of a study show that the majority of Indonesians, 93%, say that not owning a car is embarrassing (Lubis, 2014; van de Vliert, Schwartz, Huismans, Hofstede, & Daan, 1999). These perceptions are not unimportant to understand the institutions which steer the transport planning. Furthermore, due to the warm climate discourages walking or cycling, BA2 states in this regard;

> *"The behaviour, particularly in Bandung, for 100meter they don't want to walk. They use the motorcycle. That is the behaviour."* (BA2)

The paternalistic relation between the governmental levels has thus complicated the national attempt of decentralization. The hierarchy which is anchored in the Indonesian society fuels the believe that the government takes care of the citizen. In reality however, the hierarchy between lower level and higher officials lead to situations in which leaders exploit the hierarchical relationship and their superior position (Hiller, 2010; Silitonga, Anthonio, Heyse, & Wittek, 2016). In the case of the former mayor, Rosada, who misused his position by bribing local judges (Siswadi, 2013).

The former mayor focussed on economic growth and transport developments were considered as a tool to accommodate this growth (BA1; BA2). The only big development, the BRT Trans Metro Bandung (TMB) was developed by the national government (BP4; BP5). The local government focussed meanwhile on road developments;

> *"Before Ridwan Kamil there are no apparent policies made in transportation actually. The only development was the fly-over Pasupati. That was the only progress in Bandung, focussing on increasing the capacity of the road in Bandung. For the rest, there was nothing significant. The government [Rosada] back then was not good."* (BA1)

4.2 Kamil's Local Political Leadership

In chapter two, four different leadership styles are found based on the matrix of the power-axis and the leadership orientation-axis. In this paragraph, the data concerning the eight criteria and the four indicators are presented. The paragraph starts with an introduction of the leader Ridwan Kamil.

4.2.1 A Portrait of a Leader: Ridwan Kamil

After completing his master studies at the University of Berkeley (California), Kamil worked seven years in the U.S.A and Hong Kong as an architect. When Kamil returned to Indonesia in 2003, he established his own architecture and design company Urbane Indonesia. As an architect, Kamil has contributed new architecture in the city, inspired by his global experiences (British Council, 2014; Rakandhiya, et al., 2014; BA1; BA2; BP4; BP5). As a lecturer at Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) and a member of the Bandung Creative City Forum (BCCF) where he expressed his interests in the city and its well-being through bottom-up initiatives. His architectural and design background was mentioned to be an important source of inspiration for Kamil's plans and projects as a mayor:

> *"He came from the creative communities [BCCF] and he was a very, very famous global architect. He has hundreds of ideas, including about transport. And that colorizes his policies in Bandung."* (BP4)

The following two sections are dedicated to present the data concerning the two determents of the leadership style matrix in figure 2.7.

4.2.2 Power Determent

The data for the power execution of Kamil are presented in this section, the frequency of the detected codes (appendix 3) are summarized in table A.6.1.

A1. CREATING SUPPORT FROM THE COMMUNITY

The development of support was taking place through social media. Kamil utilizes Twitter, Instagram and Facebook to provide information. The underlying idea is the Smart City Movement, which should increase the transparency and reach more people, because of the high coverage of cell phone use in this young city (BP3; Jamilah, Akbar, Gunawan, & Marantika, 2016).

> *"His use of YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to engage with constituents also allowed them to share their ideas with him. This interactive strategy won him the election.*
>
> *Kamil: "Then I realized that social media is a revolution in communication. We only need our thumbs to feel close with others. Now, as a mayor, I still use it,"* (Rakandhiya, et al., 2014)

Through these online platforms, citizens could firstly directly report to the responsible departments and make complaints. However, the power execution remains power *over* and information does not always seem to be as transparent as claimed (BA1; BA2; BA4);

> *"Sometimes the social media and news from Ridwan Kamil they hide somethings. They don't tell the whole story. It is misleading. Just like he gets the credit, even when the national government is involved."* (BA2)

In the end, the agenda is shaped by Kamil and integration of citizens is only possible for few, referred to as *representative participation,* based on their societal status or position, such as local leaders (BP3; BP5). The most frequent found code is A1_a (providing understandable information) with 7 codes, while the other two power to codes were found both once, A1_d (unilateral agenda) and A1_e (not taking into account public opinin) were found 3 times, respectively 6 times.

A2. LEADING AND COORDINATING PARTNERSHIP

The development of trust is a critical issue. Kamil shares information to build trust but this information sharing is critical (see A1). Furthermore, negotiations remain fairly closed and decided by an exclusive group of officials as the following two statements illustrate;

> *"He has a circle in the decision making, he has certain people or connections that he builds the trust with and communicates with. But, there is also another cluster of community that try to access him and let him know that his decision is not correct or may need to be adjusted or something like that. For this cluster of community, it is very hard to break the wall of his circle."* (BA1)

The question if Kamil is integrating citizens and being transparent, BA4 answered the following;

> *"I don't think he keeps all his promises in that aspect. Some of the plans he just decided by his government and the people do not follow that very thoroughly, that what he has been deciding."* (BA4)

It has been found that for the lowest local levels (RT and RW) based on the Sundanese Udunan and Silih asih, silih asah, silih asuh (see glossary) local engagement and trust is generated, but this cultural developed trust remains within the community and Kamil has not been able to translated this to the local government (Jamilah, Akbar, Gunawan, & Marantika, 2016).

In terms of code count, the main information was found for the code A2_f (command and control), while no information was found for the characteristic of mediation (A2_e) and in total 3 codes regarding trust generation (A2_a; A2_b and A2_c) were assigned.

4.2.3 Leadership Orientation Determent

For this second determent, five criteria are presented by means of 25 codes. The frequency of the assigned codes can be found in appendix 6 table A.6.1.

B1. HOW THE LEADERS COPE WITH POLICY CHANGE

Kamil mentions that the main challenge of Bandung is providing public infrastructure, such as transportation (Kamil, 2015). Kamil mentions that improving transport issues in the city requires long-term projects, but in the meanwhile short-term projects should be developed. A crucial problem which Kamil addresses is corruption. Because he finds human-to-human contact the source for corruption, the Smart City Movement was introduced to decrease personal interaction between citizens and civil servants and increasing the process through online systems (BA4; Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2013; BP4; Dinas Perhubungan Kota Bandung, 2016; Jabar Tribun, 2016). However, it is criticised that the smart city movement only relates to making new smartphone application and is not increasing the cooperation between departments and with citizens (BP5).

Most codes were assigned to B1_e (short term decision) with 8 codes, which relates closely to the positive orientation towards controversial issues, in this case corruption, which was found 4 times.

B2. PROBLEM SOLVING AND CAPACITY GENERATION

Transport problem solving is a longitude process, but Kamil is determined to make improvements during his administration.

> *"He knows that every issue, every problem needs to be solved by some kind of a long process in terms of institution, in terms of budget, in terms of everything. But he also said that everything can be solved it has to be solved next year. I make an illustration here. To solve a certain problem, we need maybe two years but his principal it should be done in only 6 months and he will push us until the limit. unto the last limit and until everybody gives their potential. He will push us!* (BP4)

Problematic is the issue of funding. It was mentioned that Kamil tried several times to collect funds for the transport projects in Bandung from the national government and also from public private partnerships or PPPs. For the latter even a new *marketing* document was developed, the Bandung Urban Mobility Projects (BUMP) which compiles all transport developments and should attract new investors.

> *"Without PPP, you need nine mayors to finish the job. But with PPP, I think I can do it,"* Kamil states in an interview (Li Za, 2016)

Overall, code B2_A (attracting of new resources) and A2_b (problem solving) were both found 6 times, mentioned especially by practical experts.

B3. DEVELOPING A PERSONAL URBAN AGENDA

The urban agenda of Kamil is separated into long-term projects (AGT, LRT etc) and short term. While public transport projects are longitude projects, meanwhile happiness can be generated according to Kamil.

> *Kamil: "We created a slogan called 'Livable and Lovable' for the city. Bandung needs to be loved and taken care of beautifully. Besides pursuing modern infrastructure (which includes monorail and cable car systems), I also launched the Happiness Project, which is a series of programmes that can bring up the Happiness Index in Bandung."* (Li Za, 2016)

The slogan is indicating more beautification, which by several academic experts and a civil servant was criticised because of the need for more public transportation instead of NMT infrastructure (BA1; BA2; BA4 BP5). According to Kamil, urban transport is about having options, therefore projects like the Skywalk (figure 4.3), which opened in February 2017, see figure 4.3, to reduce the focus on private vehicles by

4

providing options (Kamil R. , 2015a). A special vision was created for the mobility in the city; *Better Mobility 2031 Bandung. This vision forms the base for the formulation of the transport policies and documents, such as BUMP and TMP 2013. (see section 4.3.2).*

The importance of the vision was found four times (B3_a), while some critical remarks about the lack of a

Figure 4.3 the Skywalk from above (left) and from the street (right) (Hotmaduma, 2017)

clear agenda (B3_d) and coherency between projects (B3_c) were mentioned sporadically by academic experts.

B4. CONFLICTS

It was found that in conflict situations, Kamil is experiencing some difficulties in coordinating effectively. It should be noted that the strong role of the national government is complicating the role of Kamil, because of the high dependence, as the following quote illustrates;

> *"He continues the initiative or the effort to implement a monorail right? But then it changed to LRT, so he tries to get financial support from national government as from private investors. But, it is seems that it is in a bottleneck of the development now because the central government decided not to prioritize Bandung for the LRT development this year. So, the project is suspended for now. He now he changed to develop a new system."* (BA1)

Furthermore, conflicts raised around the integration of the angkot services. Since these are private operators, the coordination of the angkot operation is a hard task. Kamil originally initiated an upgrading plan (BP1), however this was discontinued due to unknown complications (BA1; BA2; BP1). Later on, the new school bus was introduced which is overlapping with several angkot routes (figure 4.1), however these decisions were taken without discussing the routes with the angkot operators, which led to severe demonstrations in the city.

The two most found codes are B4_a (effective coordination), assigned four times, and B4_e (persistence of internal fragmentation), mentioned seven times, and difficulties in coordination (B4_f), nine times, because of the ignorance towards the angkot operators.

B5. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF TASKS CONCERNING EXECUTIVE ACTION

Kamil is found to be a leader that is guiding his staff, by means of his vision and agenda. Some changes occurred within the local government, because of the problem of corruption. He installed a bidding system through which the best candidate would be appointed for a high position to increase transparency and the importance of competence;

> *"Now, Ridwan Kamil made some kind of bidding for being the head of an agency. All civil servants have the right to apply for a position. So, there is a process like the qualification. Each candidate has to present their vision, mission and a program. Based on competition, the head is elected."* (BA1)

The aspect of the bidding system relates to B5_c (assigning staff), mentioned twice, while only BP1 mentions once that Kamil is leading the staff.

4.3 Change & Kamil

Over the following three sections the changes of institutions as a result of the leadership of Fajardo are presented. The data presentation starts with the lowest level of institutions according to Williamson (2010): Governance. For each change, the detected change mechanism is analysed under How.

4.3.1 Changes of Governance under Kamil

In this section the changes of the governance modes are presented according to the predefined three aspects of change in chapter 2.

G1. SPATIAL LEVEL

Regarding the spatial structure, it is differed between authority on the national level or on the local level. While the decentralization process had started back in the 1990s, the influence of the national government on local transport developments are still enormous and the decentralization process is not completed;

> *"The decentralisation process right now is **still** in the stage of decentralising the authorities, or responsibilities."* (BP5)

While the code for national involvement (G1_a) was found 19 times, the local aspect was found only 8 times (G1_b).
The metropolitan level is according to theory the best to allocate the transport responsibility, but in the case of Bandung this is challenging. Therefore, the code G1_Metropolitan was found 12 times, but this was often referred to by academic experts as desirable and a requirement for further developments. A report on governance in Bandung by the OECD (2016) states the following;

> *"Indonesia's decentralisation reforms since the late 1990s have empowered sub- national governments but at the same time resulted in fragmented development at the local level that, in the BMA, has led to uncoordinated management of transport."* (OECD, 2016)

Until now, the cooperation between the different local governments is challenging, also because of the national involvement. Furthermore, the fact that the whole BMA is assigned as a National Strategic Area (PKN), even though there are no metropolitan transport documents, this might be an indicator for future change, however induced by the national government (BP5; Republik Indonesia, 2007).

G2. STRUCTURE

In Bandung, the structure did not change towards an integrated structure but remained a system of hierarchical autonomous departments. Described by BP4 the structure of the governance in Bandung is as follows:

> *"The transportation department has to propose all the projects every year to this division of my office. This is the cooperation between the Bappeda and other departments."* (BP4)

Unfortunately, a change of structure has not occurred yet and the current separation between the authorities persists (BA1; BA2; BA4; BP1; Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2013). The code count represents that the hierarchy (G2_a) is more dominant, assigned 6 times, while the integrating code G2_b was assigned twice.

G3. DECISION MAKING

The third governance aspect relates to the decision making and it is differed between exclusive CTP decision making and inclusive decision making in SUT. An attempt to change the governance and increase the involvement in Bandung relates to the Smart City Movement.

Decision making in transport planning in Bandung was found to be rather exclusive according to BA1 and BA2. While BA1 and BP1 speak of the need for "socialization", BP3 and BP5 refer to the participation in Bandung as representative participation in which the community leaders are invited by the local government to discuss future projects and plans. The understanding of socialization is understood as "*a learning process, one that involves development or changes in the individual's sense of self*" (Stein, 2015). However, a clear inclusive decision making approach in transport planning was not found (BA1; BA2; BP5). The difference in understanding is reflected in the same number of assigning codes G3_a (exclusive) and G3_ b (including), of which the academics mention the exclusive approach and the practical the latter. Nevertheless, the level of transparency increased under Kamil, through the intense use of social media to provide information. However, the following illustrates the exclusive decision making approach in Bandung:

> "*Till now, the planning is made by the government. So the participation planning is not really existing in here.*" (BA2)

> "*So he has some kind of a very close circle around him in the decision making process. This is a very tight circle and they are the one that give inputs and are heard by the mayor. I am sorry to say that but it is crucial stage for his leadership.*" (BA1)

Kamil introduced as a holistic governance mode the idea of smart city. However, the inclusion in the decision making is not reaching all levels of society yet. On the level of representative participation, socialisation is needed within society to change further on the spectrum of participation. So far, Kamil changed the aspect of transparency and the possibility of speaking to the mayor directly. The introduction of the Smart City took place through the replacement of the old human-to-human governance, or change mechanism 3. The need for socialization relates to a change of mind-set, which Kamil addresses with meetings and hearings of the civil servants to inform about the importance of local knowledge and the harm of corruption (BP1; BP3; BP4; Kamil, 2013).

In the next section the five aspects concerning the formal institutions of transport planning in Bandung are presented.

4.3.2 Changed Formal Institutions under Kamil

To understand the formal institutional context, the main documents which were analysed to understand the situation in Bandung are; the Transportati Master Plan 2009 (TMP 2009), Transportasi Master Plan 2013 (TMP 2013), RTRW 2011 (land use plan) and the Bandung Urban Mobility Project 2016 (BUMP). Only RTRW 2011 is analysed because this version is currently revised and updated (BP5). The BUMP document is a new document which was found to be interpreted differently by practical experts and academic experts, but the document is considered as crucial by Kamil. While most academic experts mentioned that the BUMP document is a *marketing* document to present to potential investors, practical expert BP1 referred to the document as an extension of the TMP since this policy only focusses on transport infrastructure development and not on mobility and Kamil sees it as a comprehensive masterplan (Kamil, 2013).

I_1 AIM OF TRANSPORT POLICIES

A change from mobility (I_1a) to accessibility (I1_b) was found, even though the term mobility was newly introduced as a counterpart of the term *transportation*. It was mentioned that the TMP were focussing on the provision of infrastructure, while the BUMP should focus on the activity of movement: mobility.

In the TMP 2009, transport was a tool for accommodating economic growth of the city. Under Kamil, the TMP was reviewed and in the 2013 version the aim of the transport system should be developing optimal connections between city activities in the city and the metropolitan region, or access. Therefore, I_1b was mentioned 8 times (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2013).

HOW

The change from mobility to access is the result of replacement of the word transportation by mobility through the development of a new document, the BUMP.

I_2 POLICY STRATEGIES

In CTP the main strategies are road expansion and ITS (I_2a) while in SUT the focus is on TOD, smart growth and new urbanism (I_2b). The policy strategies in the TMP 2009 for future transport developments focus on the expansion of the ACT (Area Traffic Control), which is a form of ITS and the expansion of the road network (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2009; BA1; BA2; BP4; BP5). In comparison to TMP 2009, the TMP 2013 still features these elements, however the overall focus shifted towards TOD development. I_2a was found 20 times, out of which 7 in the TMP 2009 and RTRW 2011, I_2b was in total found 15 times out of which 12 in the TMP 2013 and BUMP. In total ten areas are assigned to be developed as TOD development (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2009; Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2013). Secondly, it is pleaded for a stronger enforcement of a strict land use planning in the TMP 2013. The awareness has shown that zoning is crucial. Unfortunately, this element cannot be further elaborated because the RTRW is under revision.

HOW

The change from only road-based strategies towards a mix of CPT and SUT strategies is a national movement as a result of a research conducted by the Japanese government, as one of the main funders of projects in Indonesia:

> *"There is a research or study from Japan. I forgot the year but we have to change to public transport. That is the background."* (BP2)

Knowledge exchange (change mechanism 1) between Indonesia and Japan has led to the change of the policy strategies and development orientation.

I_3 POLICY FOCUS CONCERNING NETWORK DEVELOPMENTS

In CTP the development of networks consists out of parking facilities and road space (I_3a). On the other side of the spectrum is the development of a SUT network, consisting out of different modes which are tailored to the local conditions (I_3b). while I_3a is only assigned three times, I_3b was mentioned 13 times equally by academics and practical experts. Already in the TMP 2009, the importance of a public transport network was mentioned. The objective of the TMP 2009 was on increasing the coverage of the road network in relation to the total urban area from 2,96% up till 5% (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2009, pp. 7-1). In the TMP 2013 the road network expansion remained a big component and was further specified, especially also to accommodate better roads for road-based public transport like the TMB and school bus, but a network out of different modes was proposed.

The mobility concept for the city, see figure 4.4, differentiates between road and rail based, but also emphasizes the need for a change in behaviour and the combination of different activities. The figure shows that rail-based transport is prioritized over road based.

Figure 4.4 Concept of Bandung Better Urban Mobility 2031 (Dinas Perhubungan Kota Bandung, 2016)

HOW

The plans made in the latest TMP point in the direction of a public transport network consisting out of cable car, LRT, BRT and NMT and paratransit for the last- and first mile. It was mentioned that these ideas came from Kamil based on his international experience and the existing plans, which he combined in these plans (BA1; BA2; BP4; BP1; BP3);

> "Well, there are new ideas in this project, including the cable car as well as it is more about sustainable mobility. I would say it is more comprehensive but it is not all new. He tries to combine all initiatives made by the transportation agency before his administration right? In this diagram he wrote all of the policy instruments that will contribute to the urban mobility in Bandung, so LRT, BRT, bike sharing, parking management systems and others. It is more comprehensive and more holistic. (BA2)

Therefore, the changes made are a combination of the knowledge from the Japanese research for Indonesian urban transport, the personal knowledge of Kamil and the exchange with the departments (change mechanism 1).

I_4 OBJECTIVES OF POLICIES

The objective in CTP is having a strong economic focus (I_4a) while in SUT the aim is to develop optimal plans in terms of social, economic and environmental aspects (I_4b). While in the TMP 2009 the meaning of the tree aspects of sustainable urban transport are mentioned (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2009, pp. 6-2), in the TMP 2013 plans which balance economic, social and environmental will provide suitable solutions (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2013, pp. 1-1). However, the economic aspect still dominates according to academics; I_4a was assigned 18 times (especially by practical experts), I_4b was found twice.

The ideology of SUT was already integrated in the TMP 2009, even though Kamil elaborated further on the meaning and the need for it, it is not a change initiated by Kamil. However, through inter-organizational knowledge exchange and learning (change mechanism 1), based on the Japanese research, change has been accelerated.

I_5 INTEGRATION OF PLANNING

The fifth element regards how spatial planning and transport planning are integrated. The two fields remain separated, also because of the separation between the agencies (BA1; BA3; BP1; BP4; BP5). Therefore only code I_5a (separated) was assigned three times and I_5b (integrated), was not found at all. In the Transportasi Master Plan 2013 (TMP) it was mentioned that a change of cooperation between DISHUB and Bappeda is required (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2013). So far, the transportation plans were developed to fit into the framework developed in the RTRW or land use plan (Kota Bandung, 2011).

I_6 EQUITY

It is differed between horizontal (CTP) or vertical equity (SUT). Kamil introduced vertical equity by developing a school bus, see figure 4.1. The code for horizontal equity (I_6a) wasn't found while the vertical equity was assigned twice (I_6b).

Already acknowledged in the TMP 2009, school children or students are the main users of the angkot service in the city. Pointed out in the TMP 2013 was the plan to introduce a school bus (bis sekolah) free of charge for school children which runs on scheduled times and routes (BandungAktual, 2016; Prakasa, 2016; Bandung Juara, 2013). However, the routes cover most of the angkot routes, of which school children are the main users of the angkot, around 52% of the total users (Bappeda Kota Bandung, 2009). The school bus was developed without taking into account the angkot operators;

> *"The school bus provides transportation opportunities for the children but without making an approach to the public transport, the angkot. So yesterday there was an appeal from the angkot operators, saying that their revenue and their passengers are decreasing because of the school busses. So far there is no response from the government."* (BA1)

HOW

The attempt to improve the transport situation by providing separate school busses in Bandung is a result of a change in which the not all involved stakeholders, especially the angkot providers (BA1; BA4). The value of the angkot service in the city is degraded and replaced by the school bus (IC_3).

I_7 INVESTMENT POLICY

It is differed between investments focused developments of modes (CTP), or code I_7a, and those who look for the most cost-effective solutions as in SUT, I_7b. The topic was nearly found, however code I_7b was found twice. In Bandung, Kamil did change away from investing only in road developments and instead favoured more rail-based projects. However, due to the high costs, additional funds are required. Since the LRT is a highly expensive project, Kamil prioritized the development of different rail-mode, the automated guided transit (AGT).

> *"The AGT is good and cheap because it is Indonesian technology."* (BP1)

It is questioned by some if the AGT is a suitable solution, because the added value for the future rail-based network is unclear (BA2; BA4), see figure 4.1 (comparing planned routes of LRT and AGT). Overall, no clear change towards a most cost-effective solution can be detected, it is rather considered as settling for a solution which is affordable.

I_8 POLICY TYPE

Blueprints are developed in CTP, adaptable and resilient plans are common in SUT planning. A clear element of blueprint can be detected in the TMP 2009. By 2013, this plans are more tailored to the local needs, while keeping in mind the national guidelines. The level of adaptability is only possible because of the decentralization (BA2), which made it possible for Kamil to adapt the plans for the AGT. The two codes

relating to this topic, I_8a (blueprint) and I_8b (adaptable and resilient) show a clear shift from the TMP 2009 as a blueprint to a more adaptable policy type in 2013.

HOW

The policy type is not changed drastically, but the content can be adapted if necessary. This is possible because of the decentralization according to BA2 and is thus not a result of the leadership of Kamil.

In this second section, the changes in the formal institutions were presented. In the last section, the findings regarding change of informal institutions in transport planning are reviewed.

4.3.3 Informal Institutions & Kamil

II_1 UNDERSTANDING OF TRANSPORT

In SUT transportation is a mix of modes while in CTP understanding (II_1a), transport is movement which is guaranteed by one mode, mainly private vehicles. In Bandung, Kamil developed programs and thematic days to change the understanding of transport. Therefore code II_1b was assigned more frequently compared to II_1a. Kamil introduced several thematic days; Senin Gratis Damri (free bus fare for students at damri bus, different bus from school bus), Jumat Bersepeda (Friday cycling day), and Car-fee on Sundays (Jamilah, Akbar, Gunawan, & Marantika, 2016; Kamil R. , 2015). Jumat Berpeseda is already the second theme for Fridays; Jumat Nangkot (Friday public transportation day) is already discontinued because of the lack of success and the very limited attention because of the comfort and quality of the public transport. Kamil especially focusses on changing the discourse of NMT under the younger generations, e.g. by promoting cycling to school programs.

> *"[H]e said "I am very concerned about the transport and especially go to the schools and make programs". It is not the planning stage anymore he says, it is time for implementation and changing the mind-set."* (BP1)

Unfortunately, the use of private vehicles remains a very prominent mode of transport due to the need of changing between several modes and the lack of willingness for walking (BA2; BP3; BP5).

> *"Here in Indonesia we can't walk anywhere and stop anywhere. So they think with motorcycle or with car is more simple. So, no culture of walk, people barely walk."* (BP3)

So far, no general change of understanding can be detected in Bandung. However, Kamil attempted to change the discourse (change mechanism 2) about especially cycling and public transport through the thematic days. Kamil had attempted to reduce the congestion by introducing Jumat Nangkot (Friday public transportation day). However, the broad public was not aware of the program and the program was discontinued as criticism like *"the program 'Friday Ngangkot' should be followed by improvement of urban transport services itself"* (Gunawan, 2016). Mentioned as a barrier for this change is the lack of a proper public transport system as the backbone for urban transport, because NMT is only a mode for the first and last mile (BA2; BA3; BP2; BP5). Instead, Kamil focusses on NMT, which is criticised;

> *"[T]hey have to build good public transport and bike sharing is next. The prioritization is wrong."* (BA2)

II_2 PERCEPTION ABOUT TRANSPORT

In Bandung, public transport has become an uninteresting mode of transport because of the growing middle-income group, motorcycles and cars are feasible to purchase. No change towards the perception that public transport is equal to private vehicles has been achieved. Mentioned as the underlying problem for the persistence of this understanding is the low quality of the angkot as public transport (BA1; BA2; BA3; BA4;

BP1; BP5). The codes II_2a about achieving the goal is mentioned three times, while the SUT code II_2b was not found at all.

The decreasing rate of the use of angkot and the discontinuation of the angkot upgrading plan, led to individual initiative of free books in the angkot, making public transport a place for education, see figure 4.5. Later on, this initiative was adapted by Dishub and expended, which is one of the few examples of projects which were adapted by the local government.

Kamil's approach focusses on making public transport exciting by introducing selfie competitions, which should be uploaded on twitter (BA2; Nurmatari, 2016)). The best photo will be rewarded with a price, a gift from the local government (BP1). Kamil attempted to introduce a new discourse by making public transport mentally accessible by making an online competition and by adding new options to the angkot in the form of books. However, the perception on transport persists so far because of the favourable economic developments and the low costs for motorcycles. The change mechanism 2 faced a lock-in situation, caused by the overall perception of Indonesian on the favourability of car ownership.

Figure 4.5 Free reading books at the angkot (Perdana, 2016)

II_3 KIND OF IMPROVEMENTS

It is differed between pure physical improvements in CTP (II_3a) and physical and social improvements in SUT (II_3b). It was found that in the case of Bandung physical and social improvements are made, however the problem is that these are not matched. Therefore, II_3a was assigned eight times, while II_3b mentioned 8 times as a requirement by only practical experts. This indicates the awareness of the combination of physical and social improvements can be seen as a starting point for future change.

While there are programs to increase cycling (bike2school) and hari angkutan, there is no program developed for the newest transport infrastructure, the skywalk (BP3). Mentioned is that a combination of these two is highly necessary (BA3). Instead, the understanding of physical and social change isn't understood two sides of the same coin yet, but rather applied separately;

> "Solving transport problems cannot be done only by providing infrastructure, such as physical development of Skybridge." (BA3)

Therefore, a change towards physical and social improvements as holistic solutions cannot be detected.

II_4 EXTERNAL EFFECTS

Differing between the local level and global level, the SUT approach takes into account the locally generated external effects for the global scale. So far, the consequences of the congestion in Bandung is reviewed on the local level and as a burden for the economic and social development of Bandung (OECD, 2016).

Furthermore, code II_4a (local consequences) was mentioned three times by academic experts, while the SUT code II_4b was also mentioned three times, however it was only found in the Transportasi Masterplans 2009 and 2013 as an objective. The reasoning behind the local perspective can be explained by the problems of law enforcement in terms of environmental burdens because of the high orientation on economic development in the last (BA4).

II_5 EFFECTIVENESS

In SUT effectiveness relates to reliability and reasonable travel time (II_5a) while in CTP effective transport is characterized by low cost and travel time (II_5b). Both codes were assigned 4 times, but only in the TMP 2009 and TMP 2013, demanding a balancing of both. Currently, public transport in the form of angkot is not an interesting mode of transport, because of the comparable high cost and long travel time and low quality vehicles; using public transport is estimated to be 18% more expensive and takes 2.2 times longer than with the motorcycle (Dinas Perhubungan Kota Bandung, 2016).

4.4 A Timeline of Change

Change is most of the time not drastic and can thus not always be linked to a certain date. In the timeline underneath, the main decisions and developments concerning transport developments in Bandung are summarized and presented chronologically. Since the administration period of Kamil continues till 2018, the last year is indicated with grey and only expected developments are listed.

Figure 4.6 timeline of Bandung (Wittig, 2017)

Local   National

Expected
Start construction LRT

2018

February 2017
Opening Skywalk

2017

Introduction AGT

Downgrading priority LRT

Angkot upgrading
(discontinued)

2016

BUMP

Presidential Regulation
regarding the Acceleration of
Integrated BMA LRT

October 2016
Start operating of free
school bus

2015

Jokowi becomes
president; increase focus
on infrastructure

2014

Start Smart City Movement

2013
Start thematic days

2013

TMP 2013

2012
2011

Opening Bike Sharing

RTRW 2011

2010
2009

TMP 2009

2008
2007
2006
2005

December 2004 opening
BRT Trans Metro
Bandung

2004
2003
2002
2001
2000

First decentralization
law UU 22/1999

1997
first studies about
feasibility monorail

1990

1980

1970

1960

Transport developments

Transport related events

67

4

5

A leadership analysis in Bandung

An analysis of Institutional Change
in the Indonesian case

5

Chapter 5

A Leadership Analysis in Bandung

5.1 An Illustration of Institutional Change in Bandung

In this chapter, the interaction between the leadership style determents and the change tendency are explored to analyse the use of the change mechanism. For the leadership of Kamil, figure 5.1 illustrates that Kamil is categorized as a city boss, which faced persistence in inducing change through the introduction of new discourses or mental modes. Also, the change tendency is having a bottom-up orientation and Kamil faced a lock-in situation on the level of informal institutions.

Figure 5.1 Conceptual model for the case of Kamil in Bandung (Wittig; 2017)

The following paragraph analyses the leadership style of Kamil. Paragraph 5.3 elaborates on the institutional change and the tendency. The applied and detected change mechanisms are analysed in 5.4. In the last paragraph the main findings are summarized.

5.2 Local Political leadership in Bandung

5.2.1 Ridwan Kamil as a City Boss

Based on the interaction with the context and based on the two determents, Kamil is categorized as a city boss. The allocation on the leadership orientation determent is quite centred, because of the negative orientation when it comes to coordination (B3) and the short term developments of NMT infrastructure (B1). The combination of the power over execution and the positive leadership orientation are forming a city boss. The two determents will be further elaborated underneath, see figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Applied leadership matrix for Kamil in Bandung (John & Cole, 1999. Edited by; Wittig, 2017)

5.2.2 Power Over

Power execution in Bandung is a complicated issue, influenced by the paternalistic relationship with the national government, which predetermines certain developments and the bureaucratic-stratification structure between citizen and local government. Given that these informal institutions influence the behaviour of citizens and civil servants. Therefore, representative participation is so far the only involvement, which remains on the level of selected citizens and academics plead for the need of socialization.

It must be recognized that the power execution of Kamil is influenced by the paternalistic structure in Indonesia. However, Kamil revolutionized the way how mayors communicate with the public, by using social media. The sharing of information is a critical point because the information provided was mentioned to be misleading, sometimes. Furthermore, the decision making remained in hands of a small group of experts and opponents were barely heard by Kamil.

5.2.3 A Positive Leadership Orientation

Kamil is allocated on the left side on the leadership orientation spectrum. However, Kamil features on two determent criteria a mix of positive and negative leadership orientation. The issue short term developments (B1) is a crucial aspect, resulting in new sidewalks and the Skywalk. However, it should not be forgotten that Kamil attempts to develop a LRT in the city. The issue of the long period needed to develop this infrastructure led to the development of projects which could be developed quickly. In relation to the development of projects like the LRT, the coordination of Kamil in Bandung is a crucial point. Originally plans were made to upgrade the angkot service in the city, however the program was discontinued without further explanation by Kamil. Furthermore, the new school bus service is an existence-threatening decision

for the angkot operators. Regardless the demonstration held by the angkot providers, the decision was taken by Kamil without coordinating the routes with the angkot operators.

Overall, the leadership orientation is categorized as positive, taking the earlier mentioned remarks into account, Kamil's leadership style moved further to the centre of the matrix.

5.3 A Changing Institutional Context in Bandung

This paragraph argues that the change tendency in Bandung is bottom-up, even though the changes on the governance level revolve around the decision making aspect. Furthermore, it is examined why a lock-in occurred on the level of informal institutions and how national Indonesian informal institutions, such as the paternalistic structure, restrained change on the governance level. Finally, it is argued that the formal institutions provide a fairly developed legal framework for the development of SUT.

5.3.1 Programmes of Change; Lock in

Aware of the need to change the travel behaviour, which is linked to the status of cars and motorcycles, Kamil introduced programs (e.g. bike2school) and thematic days (Friday bike day or Friday public transportation day). These programs should encourage the development of new travel behaviour and change daily patterns and habits. However, the growing economic prosperity in cities like Bandung not only increased the pressure on the road networks but also increases the social pressure to purchase a private vehicle, which is also anchored in the bureaucratic-stratification societal structure. The Indonesian culture is characterized is found to be one of the most hierarchical and status oriented societies, requiring an overall change of understanding of *status* to result in a reduction of car purchases.

A shortcoming of the attempt to change the travel behaviour of Bandung citizens through these programs is the lack of supporting infrastructure. Instead programs are installed for modes which are not updated or improved. The angkot as the backbone of the public transport network is insufficient for Bandung and needs replacement. It is argued that the newest infrastructure, The Skywalk, is in need of a program, which so far is non existing.

5.3.2 Change of Decision Making; Smart City

The lock-in on the informal institutional level led to the approach of Kamil to induce a discourse change through governance. However, the original soft approach by educating the civil servants about the thwarting effects of corruption did not led to the favoured results. Instead, Kamil replaced the human-to-human contact between civil servants and citizens to enforce a stop of corruption but also to lower the bar for citizens to raise a complaint or comment on a development. Regardless the intention, the information which is shared to the public should be reviewed carefully, since the information sometimes is misleading.

Interestingly, only one change on the governance level was induced during the period of Kamil, which reflects on the persisting strong paternalistic structure in Indonesia and the incomplete decentralization process. The spatial level and the structure did not change because this is also linked to national decisions and further decentralization of authorities to the metropolitan level. So far, the cooperation between Kota Bandung and the BMA in terms of transport is challenging, also a result of the unknown procedure and plans of the national government.

Keeping in mind the bureaucratic- stratification structure in the Indonesian society, the need for socialization in the decision making process is evident and it will increase the spectrum of participation away from simply representative participation. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that this bottom-up approach is a solution developed by Kamil due the persistence of informal institutions within society (e.g. bureaucratic-stratification) and the paternalistic relationship between the governmental levels, to tear down the wall between administration and citizens by using social media as a tool for communication.

5.3.3 Formal Institutions for SUT

Interestingly, the formal institutions form a very strong legal base for SUT developments. Furthermore, this development didn't start with Kamil but the acknowledgement that sustainable development is the future for cities was already laid down in the TMP 2009. The most evident change is the expansion of the planned public transport network with a cable car, LRT and AGT, while the angkot would get a less dominant role and instead would be a feeder mode. A second remark should be made about the policy strategies introduced by Kamil. Instead of continuing to pursue an approach of road expansion, TOD developments are planned in Bandung to spread out activities equally over the city to reduce the need for movement. Overall, this requires also a change of behaviour and discourse of the citizens.

Nevertheless, the persistence of institutions because of the tenacity of the mind-sets and habits, Kamil emphasised bottom-up change through replacement of structures within the local government, through social media to accelerate the process of socialization and by upgrading the formal institutions with new modes integrated with existing plans.

5.4 Change Mechanisms in Bandung

Taking the change mechanism into account, the process of institutional change illustrates that on different levels of the institutional context, different change mechanisms are used. Figure 5.3 illustrates how the different aspects changed through which change mechanism. Interestingly, Kamil aspired to change the understanding and perception of transport but the economic prosperity in Indonesia and the status oriented society thwart this change, which are the only two aspects which were approached by changing the mind-set or discourse.

Figure 5.3 Change mechanisms according to element of change in Bandung (Williamson, 2000; edited by Wittig, 2017)

Even though it is mentioned that the change tendency is bottom-up, there is only one change on the governance level detected, regarding the decision making. This can be explained by the paternalistic structure in Indonesia and the ongoing decentralization. As mentioned, the decentralization in Indonesia is not completed and thus limits the autonomy of LPLs like Kamil. Instead, the only field Kamil could influence as a change agent is the level of decision making, since the spatial level and structure are partly decided by the national government. Intriguing is the introduction of the Smart City.

The Smart City movement is a new mode of governance which should increase the integration of citizens in the planning and decision making process. More important, Kamil diminished the contact between civil servants and citizens, which was found to be the breeding ground for corruption. One of the main problems in the local government is the problem of corruption. The original approach of Kamil was campaigning within the government against corruption, stating it requires a change of mind-set of the civil servants. However, acknowledging the limited impact and the persistence of the behaviour, Kamil took a rigorous approach by replacing the system.

Finally, on the level of formal institutions a mix of replacement of institutions (change mechanism 3) and the inter-organizational knowledge exchange and learning (change mechanism 1) are found. The importance of international research conducted by Japan as well as the knowledge within the government are the main sources for change. However, the own experience of Kamil in urban developments were mentioned frequently as the source for inspiration or projects, which were decided top-down and leading to replacement.

5.5 Final Remarks about Kamil in Bandung

As the theoretical framework stresses, institutional change does not necessarily occur top-down, also bottom-up orientations can induce change. One remark is however, that the top-down force is stronger and is more likely to face institutions which are persistent to change. In the case of Bandung, the changes made on the governance level appeared through the replacement of existing institutions (change mechanism 3) and inter-organizational learning (change mechanism 1) is closely linked to the national and provincial government. However, the exchange of knowledge did not take place with non-governmental actors, such as the angkot providers.

Furthermore, the paternalistic structure of Indonesia requires a change of discourse on the national level, which is necessary to complete the decentralization process in Indonesia. Therefore, it is stressed that the culturally rooted hierarchy remains an issue which constraints local political leaders such as Kamil, which results in bottom-up oriented change, because of the persistence of informal institutions. in the end however, the bottom-up approach also reaches its limits because of the persistence and top-down force of informal institutions.

Taking all aspects into account, Kamil as a city boss is enacting power over which relates closely to the top-down replacement of institutions (change mechanism 3), which is the only change mechanism in which the role of other actors (in this case citizens or angkot operators) play an insignificant role. Rather, the opinion of Kamil and an exclusive group take the main decisions and when interference is possible and not restricted by the paternalistic structure or bureaucratic-stratification, the easiest tool for change is used. However, this can be linked to the persistence of informal institutions and governmental structure, which made more complicated change mechanisms hard to implement.

The main conclusions from this case study are summarized in the concluding BOX.BDG underneath.

BOX.BDG

- The institutional change has a bottom-up tendency
  - Lock-ins occur when it comes to changing the mind-set because of the strong hierarchy in the Indonesian society. Breaking down this hierarchy on the local level was unsuccessful on the informal level of the context
  - The content of the formal institutions is having a SUT character
  - Kamil induced change on the governance level by introducing the Smart City. This results from a lock-in situation on the informal level
- Kamil is a City Boss who executes power *over* and has a positive leadership orientation.
  - The power execution is exclusive besides the strong use of social media. However, it was found that the information provided via social media was sometimes misleading and it was not an instrument to engage citizens in the process. Bandung is now in the phase of socialization, in which the Smart City and social media are important.
  - The Leadership orientation of Kamil is positive but his strong focus on short-term NMT transport projects moves Kamil's orientation further to the centre.
- Kamil induced change on the governance level especially through replacement of institutions (change mechanism 3) in combination with knowledge transfer (change mechanism 1).
  - Change mechanism 2 (introduction of new mind-sets or discourses) is not effective because of the persistence of the political and societal hierarchy.
  - The formal institutions already featured some elements of SUT, Kamil accelerated this process.
- As a City Boss Kamil utilizes the most top-down change mechanism (replacement of institutions, change mechanism 3) most frequently.

Medellín & Transport Institutions

A data Presentation from Colombia

Figure 6.1 map of public transport in Medellín (Source: QGIS open access; Municipal de Medellín, 2007. Edited by: Wittig (2017)

Chapter 6.

Medellín & Transport Institutions

This second data presentation chapter is the report of the findings in Medellín during the period 2004-2007 during the mayoralty of Sergio Fajardo. The first paragraph provides insights into the situation of Medellín before Fajardo became mayor. In 5.2 the nature of the change on the three levels of the institutional context are presented. The chapter is concluded with the data presentation relating to the criteria of the leadership determents.

6.1 Medellín in Perspective

6.1.1 Medellín and Surrounding

Located in the valley of Aburra in the Andes, Medellín is the capital of the state of Antioquia, see figure 5.1. Located in the valley, ten *Municipio* (cities) form the *Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá*, of which Medellín with nearly 2,22 million inhabitants (census 2005) is the economic and social centre of the metropolitan area (Betancur, 2007). The topography of the city and the high altitude differences characterize the city and the segregates parts of the city from the basic infrastructure like public transportation. Medellín is divided into 15 *comunas* or communities. These comunas are divided into *barrios* or neighbourhoods, of which each is assigned to a level of *estratos* or strata (Alcalde de Medellín, 2007; MP3; MP4).

Once the industrial city of Colombia, the national wave of violence during the mid 20th century catalysed the rural to urban migration stream to Medellín (Betancur, 2007; Blanco & Kobayashi, 2009; Correa Lopez, 2004d). The developments of *informalization,* led to the settlement of millions at the slopes of the city in precarious slums, especially in the comunas 1 and 2 (Blanco & Kobayashi, 2009; Echeverri & Orsini, 2010). These areas account for 30 percent of the city territory and is occupied by 90% of the population of which 77% belong to the lowest socio-economic group of Medellín.

6.1.2 Informalization and Stigmatization

By the 1990s the streets of especially comunas 1 and 2 in the northeast of Medellín have become warzones of paramilitaries. During the time of Pablo Escobar, violence, human and narco trafficking dominated daily live in Medellín. By that time, Medellín was the global murder capital, which peaked in 1991 with 381 murders per 100.000 inhabitants (Brand & Davila, 2011; Maclean, 2014; Romero, 2007). When the drug cartel of the notorious Pablo Escobar after his death in 1993 fell apart, the power vacuum was filled by guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Leading to invisible borders and compartmentalization of Medellín between the different operating groups, the dominance reached from narco- and human trafficking to the "*collective public transportation*" (traditional bus providers) or TPC, which was the oly public transport until the opening of the first metroline in 1995 (Betancur, 2007; Brand & Davila, 2011; Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014; MP4). A high level of informalization and the involvement of local politicians led to political ignorance in terms of physical and social isolation of these areas because of the lack of proper public transport (Coupe, Brand, & Davila, 2013; Echeverri & Orsini, 2010). In the end, these developments led to a separation between the formal city in the city centre and the *informal* city at the slopes of the mountains.

The violent situation persistent in Medellín. When in 2002 President Uribe reopened the peace negotiations with the paramilitaries, the situation in the city improved, see figure 6.9 (Dávila, Brand, Acevedo, & Bocarejo, 2012). These negotiations calmed the rather tense and brutal atmosphere in the city, especially in the barrios of the low-income comunas 1 and 2. To understand the transport developments in Medellín, the following paragraph elaborates on the institutional background.

6.1.3 The Institutional Background

In this paragraph, an overview is given of the institutional transport context when Fajardo came into office. Plagued by the violent history, the importance of local policies is more important for the reduction of uncertainty and local conflicts (Hofstede, 2016; MA2; MA3; MP1; MP2; MP3; MP4). With the New Constitution of 1991, mayors got elected directly   and to shift away from the centralized blue-print planning made in Bogota, to the local government. Mayors were elected from 19991 onwards for a set period of four years, in which their *Plan de Dessarollo (PD)* or development plan is the guideline for developments and investments (MA1; MA2).

In Medellín, the first Metro line opened in 1995. Until that point, public transportation was provided by the 130 TPC operators, which operated without fixed routes and tariffs in the city (Brand & Davila, 2011; MA3; MA4). The TPC sector is a very lucrative business and many politicians, guerrilla and paramilitaries extended their reach through the transport business (MP3; MP4; MP5; MP6; MP8). The representation of the TPC providers in politics thwarted the development of national programs to develop SUT systems;

> *"Until the late 1990s, the traditional transport sector had a senator in the national congress of Colombia. So, the laws that regulate public transportation in Colombia were created with large influence of the people of the business behind the public transportation, so traditional busses."* (MP4)

The Metro Company is a crucial actor in the transport development in Medellín. The company was established in 1979 as a local initiative. However, the TPC provider's (see figure 6.2) representation in the national and local politics remained a strong counter voice. A national decision in the 1960s to withdraw from urban transport planning and leaving it to the private sector, had serious consequences. When the Metro Company was established, the national government refused to get involved. This was a free pass for the Metro Company to claim their position in the city. By the early 2000s, the Metro Company had become one of the most powerful transport actors in Medellín (MA2; MA3; MA4; MP2; MP3; MP5; MP8).

Figure 6.2 many different TPC providers in Medellín (Ospina Zapata, 2013)

Medellín has a very special position in Colombia because of its relatively high financial independence. The *Empresa de servicios públicos de Colombia* (EPM) or the public services company of Colombia, is a public service provider which transfers annually 30 percent of the benefits to the city hall of Medellín. This money can be allocated according to projects formulated in the PD, like in transport developments (MA2, MP1; MP4; MP5; MP8).

> *"Medellín has the EPM, which is a huge company so the budget of the city compared to the other cities is 10x or 15x as high."* (MA3)

With the financial back-up from EPM, the Metro Company developed the first Metrocable, which opened in the administration of Fajardo in 2004. A project which original intentions was to increase the ridership of the Metro lines, to get out of the red numbers.

6.2 Fajardo's Local Political Leadership

As argued in the theoretical framework, two determents form the leadership style of a local political leader. In the following two sections the collected data in regard to the criteria mentioned in paragraph 2.5. In the three tables of appendix 11 the frequency of the information concerning the leadership style can be found.

6.2.1 A Portrait of a Leader: Sergio Fajardo

In the previous section the status quo of the institutional context before the leadership of Fajardo was briefly described. In this paragraph the leader Sergio Fajardo and the main developments are introduced.

Fajardo, as a professor in mathematics at the most prestigious Colombian university, La Universidad de los Andes (Bogota), joined the Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) because of his independent candidacy (Correa, 2003; OAS, 2013; MP8). At his first attempt in 2000 he was defeated by his liberal opponent Luis Perez, the initiator of the first cable car (Davila & Brand, 2012; MA2;). At his second attempt in November 2003, Fajardo won the local elections in Medellín with a historical result voting for an independent candidate (Correa, 2003; Delaurbe, 2015).

Elected for the period January 2004 till December 2007, Fajardo's period is marked as the beginning for urban transformation in leading to transport developments of two new Metrocables, the metroplus (BRT) and electric escalators in combination with new social and cultural infrastructures like schools, libraries and public spaces. The main projects developed during his administrations are known as Proyectos Urbanos Integrales (PUIs) or Integrated Urban Projects, which are infrastructural developments around the axis of new transport infrastructure, like libraries and parks, see figure 6.3 (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; Echeverri & Orsini, 2010; Fajardo, 2014). During his administration, Fajardo emphasized in his period areas which struggled with the consequences of poverty, inequality and violence. The first PUIs were developed in comunas 1 and 2, see figure 6.1 (Brand & Davila, 2011; Coupe, Brand, & Davila, 2013; MP1; MP8).

In the following paragraph, the changes of the institutional context in Medellín are presented according to the theoretical framework.

Figure 6.3 Scheme of the components and related actions of PUIs (Blanco & Kobayashi, 2009)

6.2.2 Power Determent

The collected data regarding the power execution of Fajardo are presented in this first section. In total 15 codes for two criteria are formulated to collect the data for this first determent (see appendix 3).

A1. CREATING SUPPORT FROM THE COMMUNITY

Fajardo was found to provide information to the public through opening meetings to the public (MP1; MP4) and through a TV-show "*Con el Alcalde*" or "*With the Mayor*" (El Tiempo, 2004a; MA1; MP1; MP4). In this show, Fajardo presented half of the time the progress of the projects and during the other half, people had the opportunity to ask questions and raise concerns (El Tiempo, 2004a; MA1; MP1).

> *"It was on the one side the idea of creating hope and telling the people how the projects were going, but also the TV show was a symbol of transparency."* (MP5)

Through this channel, people were informed about the progress of the projects and which new plans or projects were planned and had the possibility to raise their concerns or make a remark about planned interventions (MP8).

By providing information about projects and speaking openly about participation, citizens were invited to express their opinion or stress a problem. For example, citizens gained the possibility to point out where the traffic situation was dangerous for pedestrians and where new sidewalks should be developed. Furthermore, citizens were empowered to take a leading role in the developments of their neighbourhoods and comunas through the PB and by the mechanism of imaginary workshops, the public opinion was heard at the planning table (MA1; MP5).

It was found that in regard to the construction of Metrocable line J in Comuna 13, citizens from different urban areas were relocated around this station. This is a top-down decision in which the public opinion was not taken into because the areas where these people used to live were considered as hazardous and isolated (MA3). Fajardo relocated these people around the station to increase accessibility and ensure a safe living environment without landslides. This planning intervention was heavily criticised because the citizens did not want to leave their neighbourhoods and social structures. The two most frequent assigned codes are A1_a (providing understandable information) and A1_c (empowerment of citizens) of the power to codes. The

first is assigned 9 times, respectively 11 times. Regarding the power over code A1_d (taking independent decisions), was assigned four times.

A2. LEADING AND COORDINATING PARTNERSHIP

Frequently mentioned by the interviewees are the communication skills of Fajardo. Due to his background as a mathematics professor, Fajardo presented the information in an understandable, repetitive equation, see figure 6.4. Every message was transferred to the citizens by this strategic method. The repetitiveness of these structured messages created societal recognition and increased the level of understanding in society (Echeverri & Orsini, 2010). Simultaneously, the TV-show and open meetings were the possibility for the citizens to negotiate issues in person (MA1; MP4; MP5). The three codes A2_b (trust by sharing information; mentioned 9 times), A2_c (generating relationships and trust; mentioned 7 times) and A2_d (Taking into account interests of actors; mentioned 7 times) were found very frequent while the two codes of A2_f and A2_g are not found at all.

Figure 6.4 Equation used by Fajardo in communication
(Fajardo , 2016)

6.2.3 Leadership Orientation Determent

For this second determent, five criteria are presented by means of 25 codes. The frequency of the assigned codes can be found in appendix 6 table A.6.1.

B1. HOW THE LEADERS COPE WITH POLICY CHANGE

In regard to controversial issues, Fajardo focussed on highly complex societal problems and formulated *policy cures* for problems of poverty, inequality and violence, see figure 6.5. These problems especially occurred in remote and inaccessible areas, such as comunas 1 and 2. In combination with the construction of public services related to education, Fajardo changed the policy design from a highly centralized focussed land use plan into a plan which represented a hierarchy of centralities (see I_2). Problematic was that especially these areas were characterized by high levels of informality and lack of proper transport infrastructure, e.g. streets (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; MP1; MP3). Fajardo officially acknowledged informally developed settlements,

Figure 6.5 Illustration made by Fajardo to illustrate the root of the problem (Fajardo, 2016)

which so far has been unimaginable. Since these areas are characterized by high levels of informality, the provision of social, cultural and transportation infrastructure which leads to a more structured urban form, was a way of acknowledging the problems and providing solutions according to MA4, MP6 and MP7. This is illustrated by the following quote:

> *"So yes, the government is aware of the fact that it is a very difficult situation and we have different programs, trying to legalize those settlements. So not all of them illegal! So there where the cables and [later the] escalators are, those areas are becoming legal, they are politically recognized."* (MP7)

The two most frequent found codes relate to the positive and open attitude towards controversial issues (B1_a) and innovative plans are proposed to solve the issues (B1_b). The codes with a negative leadership orientation are not assigned.

B2. Problem Solving and Capacity Generation

In terms of attracting new resources, Fajardo could rely on EPM. EPM is a locally public-owned public service provider, of which 30 percent of the profit is received by the local government of Medellín (MA2, MP1; MP4; MP5; MP8). In 2004, the city hall received 156,000 million pesos (approximately 50 million euros) from EPM (El tiempo, 2004b). Through this scheme, the city has a big budget available for urban projects and programs, which by Fajardo was invested in PUIs and the new Metrocable line L.

Due to experiences of disappeared public money, Fajardo emphasized transparency to develop a sense of sacredness concerning the public money (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; MP5).

In terms of problem solving, Fajardo developed solutions on different levels. Movement within the city before the period of Fajardo was dominated by the TPC. Soon after the inauguration of Fajardo he started a dialogue with the public transport providers; the metro and the TPC (El Tiempo, 2004c; MP3). The aim was integrating these two parallel operating system into one holistic public transport system. Improvements were made, but until today several TPC providers remained on operating independently.

Furthermore, when Fajardo came into office, accessibility was developed on the city level and on the neighbourhood level, through the idea of centralities (Municipio de Medellín, 2006a; MA2; MP1; MP5; MP8). By connecting these centralities through the Metrocables and the other infrastructure developments, known as PUIs, isolated comunas were reconnected with the city. On the more local level, new parks, libraries or school became internal destinations, reducing the need for travel and providing services close to the people.

> *"We said we have public transport. Because we have the metrocable that connects the city with the metro, connecting the formal and informal city. What we needed to foster was much more infrastructure to leverage the level of physical condition of the neighbourhoods."* (MP1)

These parks, schools and libraries became the tool to develop new internal routes and connections. Mentioned by several was that the underlying idea of providing public transport and the construction of sidewalks was a way of reconquering the land from illegal gangs to regain control, which was the underlying problem of the violence, inequality and poverty (Fajardo, 2016; MA4; MP1; MP2; MP4; MP7).

> *"As I told you, I think they used the infrastructure as an excuse to reconquer these territory, coming with a whole set of intentions and elements to develop in that area".* (MA4)

Code B2_b is assigned ten times in the case of Medellin. This relates to the amount of time Fajardo invests in solving existing problems.

B3. Developing a Personal Urban Agenda

Fajardo developed a strong and easy understandable vision, which was translated in his agenda. The vision

of Fajardo relates to the slogan *Medellín le mas Educada*. Figure 6.6 shows the influence of education on the mind-set of the people and on their ability to engage in PB as well as in personal interaction (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; Fajardo, 2016). Code B3_a is assigned eight time and is the most frequent found code. The vision is translated into clear objectives which should be reached.

Figure 6.6 illustration made by Fajardo of education as the cure (Fajardo, 2016)

The improvements made through education would have a long-term affect, what through the changed made by Fajardo in the POT 2006 was illustrated by a long-term development plan for transportation in the city (Municipio de Medellin, 2006). The POT designed by Fajardo represented a system of different modes like the electric escalator, the BRT Metroplus and more Metrocables, connecting a hierarchy of centralities (Municipio de Medellín, 2006; Municipio de Medellín, 2006a; MP3).

Most of the practical experts mentioned that it is almost impossible to explore the transport development without taking into account the urban and social developments, because these reinforced each other (MP1; MP2; MP4; MP5; MP6; MP7; MP8). Therefore, the PUIs are crucial to take into account. Fajardo started to give incentives through PB and the bank of opportunity to communities and individuals to decide about their own needs or start a local business (MA1; MA2; MP1; MP8).

Furthermore, Fajardo made day-to-day decisions because programs and projects were not predefined but were rather flexible and adaptive, in case of new (local) knowledge would steer the projects in a different direction. A frequent and quick decision making led to the repetition of doing things differently or in a new way, through which new ways of planning were institutionalized (MP2; MP3; MP4). It was mentioned by experts that these day-to-day decisions were very valuable because this showed the citizens that the promised change was practiced (MP1; MP2; MP6). This is what Fajardo mentioned as a crucial instrument for developing trust (MP2; MP3; MP4):

> *"People get used to see indeed real transformation in its sectors. Works, physical answers, not promises. Fajardo started with small improvements in the areas. This builds trust. People believed that he [Fajardo] will really change the city and their neighbourhood."* (MP3)

B4. CONFLICTS
Starting already during his candidacy, Fajardo had a strong focus on the illegal comunas 1 and 2. This resulted in a big conflict between the city administration and the local council (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; MP1; MP8). The city council was dominated by conventional politicians, partly involved in the TPC operation, others simply disliked the focus on the deprived areas. The council however, was dominated by conventional politicians. At the beginning of the administration period, the council did not support Fajardo. Later on, this changed and the local council supported Fajardo. However, how this conflict was resolved remained for many experts unclear and is most likely to be a result of the high followership of Fajardo in the local society (MP6; MP8). In terms of code count, the codes for B4 are less frequent assigned than for the other aspects. Overall, B4_a till B4_c are found four times each.

B5. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF TASKS CONCERNING EXECUTIVE ACTION

To execute the task of a leader, Fajardo formed a team of experts based on the principle of meritocracy. Which was necessary to make an end to nepotism and corruption (MA2; MA3; MP7):

> *"He decided not to ask which person should cover which position in the local government, he decided it himself."* (MP7)

Furthermore, to increase the coordination of the PUIs, the EDU was assigned as the *"director of the orchestra"* (Blanco & Kobayashi, 2009; Echeverri & Orsini, 2010; MP1; MP2; MP3; MP8). Before, the departments operated autonomously. Under Fajardo, the members of the specialized departments worked together under the EDU to streamline the PUIs (Betancur, 2007). Code B5_c is found most frequent, in total 8 times for the case of Medellin. The appointment of the civil servants is based on their knowledge and work ethic, which is known as meritocracy.

6.3 Change & Fajardo

In this paragraph, the changes of the institutional context are explored. The data are presented according to the three levels of Williamson (2010). It is started with the governance level, followed by the changes in the formal institutions and the informal institutions.

6.3.1 Changes of Governance under Fajardo

In this section, the detected changes of governance in and relating to transport planning during the leadership of Sergio Fajardo are presented. The findings are presented according to the three aspects of governance from chapter 2.

G1. SPATIAL LEVEL

Before 1991, transport planning was a top-down blueprint economically oriented approach, executed by the national government. The New Constitutions relocated authorities and tasks to the local government, known as decentralization (MA1; MA2; República de Colombia, 1991). The code referring to the organization on the local level (G1_b) was found 9 times.

The preceding mayors in Medellín and their PDs focussed mainly on the economic acceleration of the city. The economic centre is located around the river, see figure 5.1. When Fajardo came into office, Fajardo disengaged this economic approach and instead focussed on the areas which were not recognized as part of the city because of their informal character;

> *"The former mayors only focussed on the city centre, which was also problematic and detoriated. Their vision was, as long as the city centre is good, it is good for the whole city."* (MA1)

A shift from centre to the deprived areas in the North-East (comuna 1 and 2) and later North-West (Comuna 13) was the actual change of the spatial reorientation (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; Brand & Davila, 2011; Correa Lopez, 2004c; Echeverri & Orsini, 2010; El tiempo, 2004d; MA1; MA2; MA3; MP1; MP2; MP5; MP6; MP7).

HOW

The spatial reorientation or decentralization occurred in 1991. However, Fajardo changed the understanding of the expanse and the affiliation of the informal settlements as part of the city. This is a change of discourse or change mechanism 2.

G2. Structure

Regarding the structure, data were found confirming a shift towards an integrated structure (G2_b), away from a hierarchical autonomous operating structure (G2_a). The code count for G2_b was 18, while G2_a was found 8 times. Fajardo did not change the internal structure but instead developed a need for close cooperation between different local departments. As mentioned in 5.1.4, the PUIs consist out of three elements, out of which the first is the coordination of the departments. The PUIs are characterized by their holistic approach, in which housing, environment, public space, recreation, education and transport are developed in synergy. Therefore, these plans require a merge expertise from different departments. MP4 mentioned that the already existing Empresa de desarrollo urbano (EDU) or Urban Development Authority became the *director of the orchestra*, by integrating all departments around on table, see figure 6.3.

How

Fajardo used the PUIs as an instrument to increase the cooperation. This was a new mind-set, relating to the changing mechanism IC_2 (MP1; MP6; MP8). It was found that this mind-set was developed by the city hall:

> *"That is a new mind-set but it didn't come from the EDU it was developed by the city hall."* (MP8)

The idea of the cooperation of the different departments was steered by Fajardo but the EDU was found to be the most suitable department, because that public institution works like a company with less regulations. Through this, quicker results and decisions could be taken (MP8).

G3. Decision making

Concerning the decision making aspect, in theory it is differed between inclusive decision making (G3_b) and exclusive decision making (G3_a). Code G3_b was found clearly more frequent, 11 times, compared to the code regarding exclusive decision making. The interviewees pointed out that public engagement before Fajardo was impossible and decision making was exclusive, because of the hard ruling of the political elite (MA1; MA2; MP1);

> *"It was a big change, before that there was no connection between the high spheres of the politics and the communities. Not at all! Politicians only listened during the elections, but as soon as they got into power, they decided autonomously how to deal with the city. He [Fajardo] introduced participatory planning and budgeting in order to let community to come into the planning process."* (MP1)

Three main different participatory instruments Fajardo introduced. These were either linked to the PUIs, such as participatory planning and imaginary workshops (see figure 6.7) or to empower communities to decide independently which projects should get funding through Participatory Budgeting (PB). PB links participation with financial responsibility, citizens collectively decide about the investment of 5% of the total investment funds (MA1; MP5). As the former head of the EDU stated;

> *"The PB had opened a very important space within the community. It gave us the opportunity to develop confidence and the feeling of responsibility within the community to prioritize some solutions. The PUI worked together with the PB but also developed itself in those strategic territories different processes of participation. The processes were simultaneously and in complementary logic."* (MP2)

Furthermore, meetings were open to the public. Furthermore, negotiation tables were introduced to enable different actors from different sectors to discuss issues like transport development (MA4; MP6; MP7). To ensure that all the involved stakeholders would be able to discuss the issues and solutions, a negotiation table was developed. By developing this room for discussion, Fajardo functioned as a mediator between the actors:

Figure 6.7 Imaginary workshop in Medellín (Blanco & Kobayashi, 2009)

HOW

The participation or the integration in the decision making, already started during the election period in 2003 (MA1; MP1). Further, the different instruments of participation were introduced in the PD 2004 (Alcalde de Medellin, 2004; Alcalde de Medellin, 2007; El Tiempo, 2004g). By 2007, Fajardo issued a local law, acuerdo 43/2007, which obligated every new mayor to give citizens the opportunity to participate through PB (Municipio de Medellin, 2007).

The establishment of these participatory instruments resulted out of inter-organizational learning and knowledge exchange with experts on informal settlements, which state that local knowledge and involvement is inevitable in fighting poverty, inequality and violence (MP1; MP2; MP8). Based on this, the induced change is a mix of inter-organizational learning, IC_1 and a new mind-set or IC_2 which breaks the walls between politicians and citizens.

This section has shown that many changes on the governance level occurred during the period of Fajardo. In the next section, the formal institutions developed and changed under Fajardo are presented by means of the characteristics of the transport paradigms.

6.3.2 Changed Formal Institutions under Fajardo

This section presents the detected changes in the formal institutions. Data relating to the eight aspects of formal institutions are presented. It was pointed out several times by academic and practical experts that local projects are more crucial for urban transport developments than national laws and policies (MA2; MA3; MP1; MP2; MP3; MP4; MP5; MP8);

"The autonomy of the municipal authority is high. There is a lot of need for local initiatives, with or without national government support. In fact, the most interesting things that happened in Colombia are local initiatives and then became national policies. (MA2)

The formal institutions reviewed in the case of Medellín are the PD 2000 and 2004, as well as the Plan de ordenamiento Territorial (POT) or land use plan 2000 and 2006. The first POT was issued in 2000 and no separate transportation plans like in Bandung are developed, since these are integrated documents.

I_1 AIM OF TRANSPORT POLICIES

Differences between the aim for developing mobility (I_1a) or accessibility (I_1b) were found. Code I_1b was found more frequent, in total 25 times, while I_1a was only assigned twice. While the Metro Company originally had only economic objectives, the focus was on mobility and increasing the travel distance;

> *"It was not focusing on developing an integrated public transport system but to safe the metro. The metro was in a financial crisis because they didn't get any income."* (MA2)

When Fajardo came into office in January 2004, Line K was near to completion and opened in august 2004. However, the stations of Line K remained rather inaccessible because of the narrow streets due to the topographical complexity. By defining the Metrocable and PUI projects as *urban acupuncture,* the impacts were meant to be spread out in the area. For Fajardo this meant that the access of the stations as such needed to be improved. Sidewalks and local destinations, in the form of PUIs, were constructed to develop within the community's connections and destinations (Alcalde de Medellin, 2004; Blanco & Kobayashi, 2009).

HOW

The change from mobility to accessibility is the result of the growing influence of the local government in the transport planning, compared to the old situation in which the Metro Company planned and operated this sector independently. The local government had gained an understanding of the urban issues and acknowledged that the lack of access to education and job opportunities was an underlying problem. This is the result of knowledge transfer from experts on informal settlements and the unlearning of the idea that these areas do not form part of the city. This change is a combination of change mechanism 1, knowledge transfer, and mechanism 2, unlearning of mind-sets and the introduction of new discourses.

I_2 POLICY STRATEGIES

In chapter 2 it is stated that in SUT policies the combination of smart growth, TOD development and new urbanism (I_2a) can be found while in CTP road developments and ITS systems are dominant (I_2a). Also for this formal institution criteria, SUT code I_2b was found more frequent; 12 times I_2b and 5 times I_2a. The era of CTP peaked in the 1970s, when highway developments characterized the city form (Ospina Zapata, 2013). Nevertheless, these developments only took place in the *formal* city. Until the development of the first Metro line in 1995, the development was car-oriented;

> *"I don't know if it was just before Fajardo, but before the start of the metro, it was mainly road development, not in public infrastructure or public transport."* (MP7)

Reviewing the PD 2000 and POT 2000, it can be found that the local government focussed on road development because the Metro Company had such an independent role in the developing and managing public transport (Alcalde de Medellín, 2000; Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; MA4; MP8). The POT developed under Fajardo also features elements of road based developments, which however no longer was the main focus (Municipio de Medellín, 2000; Municipio de Medellín, 2006). Instead, the POT 2006 illustrates a great adaptation of TOD strategies and smart growth. The TOD aspect is translated in a *hierarchy of centralities*, see figure 6.6 (Municipio de Medellín, 2006a). In this plan, specific areas on the barrio, comuna and city level were assigned to develop multi-functional areas, which are connected by different modes, like metro, metrocable, bus and NMT (Municipio de Medellin, 2006). The idea of centres was not completely new, but in the POT 2000, the focus was not on developing a hierarchy of centres, but developing one centre

around the river (Municipio de Medellin, 2000). Through the PUI, new infrastructure in the form of schools, public space and libraries were developed in these centralities comunas, centralities were developed.

ESQUEMA DE INTERCONEXIÓN DE CENTRALIDADES

Figure 6.8 To be developed system of centralities in Medellín (Municipio de Medellín, 2006a)

HOW

The change towards more SUT related policy strategies is a result of the knowledge transfer within the local government and the inter-organizational learning with the local universities. It was mentioned several times by practical experts that the interaction with local universities formed the foundation for interventions. The research *workshop of the North* provided especially insights into informal settlements and how these should be restructured by providing public services, like schools. The change of the strategies can thus be traced back to inter-organizational learning or change mechanism 1.

I_3 POLICY FOCUS CONCERNING NETWORK DEVELOPMENTS

It can be differed between integrated multi-modal networks (I_3b) and the prioritization of one specific mode and network (I_3a), mostly road-based. I_3b was the most frequent assigned code of the whole research with 29 times. I_3a was only assigned 7 times. In combination with the hierarchy of centralities (I_2) Fajardo differentiated in the PD 2004 between three levels of Urban Mobility. The primary system, consists out of the Metro and Metrocable. The secondary system is the BRT as well as the TPCs. As mentioned in section 5.1.3, public busses known as TPC remained an omnipresent provider of transport after the opening of the Metro in 1995, especially in the *informal* city (Brand & Davila, 2011; Correa Lopez, 2003a; MA2; MA3; MP3; MP4; MP5; MP6; MP7; MP8). Fajardo aimed for an integration of these two parallel systems in one tariff and one card. He succeeded to integrate several of the TPC routes in the public transport system of Medellín. However, until today most of the TPC busses operate independently because of the profitability and the gap between the systems remains. Public spaces and sidewalks were mentioned separately. Local destinations of public spaces should function as hubs for different modes coming together like a hub with the opportunity of interaction of different social groups to reduce the segregation in the city, see figure 6.9 (Alcalde de Medellin, 2004).

Figure 6.9 Before the Pedestrian bridge Puente Mirando, people had to walk through the valley (left) and surrounding public space in comuna 2 after the construction of bridge (right) (Echeverri & Orsini, 2010; Ospina Zapata, 2013)

HOW

The integration of the TPC busses in the Metro system was started by Fajardo at the beginning of his administration. However, the negotiations with the TPC providers were complex because the private public transport business is highly profitable and was sometimes owned by rivalling gangs or politicians (MP6; MP8). Fajardo was not able to integrate all TPC busses in the same ticket system as the metro system (Brand & Davila, 2011; MP3). The first attempts to integrate the was not long after the opening of Line K of the Metrocable (MA2). This led to the decisions to integrate several routes in September 2004, only several weeks after the opening of Line K 30th July 2004. The change of heart of the bus providers is described by MA2 as follows:

> *"The public in Medellín owns the core of the system, the metro. It doesn't move as many people as the busses but it has an incredible prestige and strategic importance. The bus companies realized after a while that it was best to go along with the metro, but negotiating the best conditions possible rather than oppose it." (MA2)*

It was not possible to enforce (Change mechanism 3) an integration of the provide bus providers because the issues were discussed at the negotiation table and because an integration relies on cooperation. The local government represented a new discourse about the transport network in the city, integrating all existing and new modes. Still, a lock in for the change of mind-set was the concurrency between the Metro Company and the TPC providers.

I_4 OBJECTIVES OF POLICIES

The theoretical framework differs between the objectives of CTP (I_4a) and SUT (I_4b). I_4b was mentioned only three times and I_4a nine times. While in CTP the objective is economic benefit, the objective in SUT policies balance social, environmental and economic aspect into account. the PD 2000 and the POT 2000 were focussing on the economic competitiveness of Medellín (Alcalde de Medellin, 2000; Municipio de Medellin, 2000). Also the development of the first Metrocable was initiated as a mean to increase the ridership of the Metro and increase the economic profit (MA2; MA3; MP1; MP2). In terms of the policy objective, the PD 2004 and the POT 2006 have a strong focus on the social aspect of transport. The DP and POT focussed more on the social and economic aspect and the environmental aspect was less evident (Alcalde de Medellín, 2004; Municipio de Medellín, 2006; MP8).

The three aspects of the SUT criteria are not balanced, however Fajardo added the social aspect by introducing local laws (acuerdo) to legally back-up the need for participation and instead of economic benefit, the aim was to solve the problems of poverty, inequality and violence.

HOW

The change is not completed under Fajardo, but a tendency of change through the unlearning of the economic focus led to a growing awareness and understanding of the social aspect (change mechanism 2). This was due to the change of the ideology withi the local government and the meritocracy.

I_5 INTEGRATION OF PLANNING

The integration of planning relates to the combination of strategic urban planning and transport planning. In conventional planning, these tend to be two separate documents while SUT-oriented formal institutions tend to be more integrated. In the case of Medellín, these two have been integrated in the POT (Municipio de Medellin, 2006). Fajardo modified the first POT of 2000 but strategic urban planning and transport planning have been integrated since 2000. For this aspect, only the CTP code I_5a was assigned. In total 11 times, while the SUT code I_5b wasn't found at all.

I_6 EQUITY

The aspect of equity relates to the funding for certain societal groups. While in CTP (I_6a) funds are generally assigned to reduce the travel costs for all users equally, in SUT planning groups of special needs get financial support (I_6b). Only code I_6b was assigned, in total 5 times. Fajardo build a strong vision around education to develop hope. Simultaneously, the access to these kind of services was crucial to ensure success (Alcalde de Medellin, 2004). To encourage students to go to school, the Tiquete Estudiantil or student ticket was introduced, providing local students living in the three lowest estratos with reduced tickets for the public transportation (Alcalde de Medellin, 2004; Alcalde de Medellin, 2007; El Tiempo, 2007; Municipio de Medellin, 2004; El Colombiano, 2005). These plans have been discussed before Fajardo, but only led to an unfavourable plan to reduce the travel cost for all students. Fajardo led the negotiations which resulted in Acuerdo 35/2004 to subsidise students of low-income areas with reduced public transport tickets. (Municipio de Medellin, 2004).

> *"The 'Students ticket' was very important to reinforce the concept of EDUCATION as the main project of Sergio Fajardo."* (MP3)

HOW

According to MA3, the first negotiations regarding subsidies for students were already held before the administration of Fajardo. However, these negotiations before were on reducing the price of the tickets in general (equality), whereby the decision under Fajardo focussed on students living in poor areas (equity). This relates to the main program of Fajardo, which focusses on education as the cure for the urban problems. This change was achieved by negotiations and thus the interaction between different stakeholders (change mechanism 1).

I_7 INVESTMENT POLICY

In more conventional investment policies or schemes, the investments are focussing on one favoured mode, most often road development. In SUT planning, it is more likely that investments are made in favour of the most cost-effective solutions. However, this was not change made by Fajardo. Medellín is the only city in Colombia with a metro system. Starting already in 1979, the Metro Company started to undertake feasibility studies for the development of a metro system in Medellín (MA1; MA2; MA4; MP1).

I_8 POLICY TYPE

It is differed between blueprint plans (I_8a) on the one hand and adaptive and resilient plans (I_8b) which react to a change of the environment. The codes were not assigned much both, one time I_8b respectively three times. While the first POT of 2000 was still led by the national plans on economic development (Alcalde de Medellin, 2000), the approach of Fajardo drastically changes this. The aspect is translated into

practical day-to-day planning decisions made by Fajardo. Instead of predefining everything from the start, the input from participatory meetings in combination with the negotiation meetings lead to tailor-made plans and programs;

> *"he adapted an interdisciplinary approach instead of a blueprint. The components of transport, sports, security and education were part of this."* (MA1)

How

The character of an adaptive policy is a consequence of the inclusion of participation in the planning process. This local knowledge is not predefined at the planning table and is thus an aspect of uncertainty which disables blueprint projects. Therefore, this changed character is a result of a synergy of knowledge exchange (change mechanism 1) and the introduction of new mind-sets and discourses (change mechanism 2).

In this section, the changes in the formal institutions were reviewed. It was shown that nog all institutions changed but matured under Fajardo. In the following section, the changes relating to the five generalized fields of informal institutions in transport planning are reviewed.

6.3.3 Changed Informal Institutions under Fajardo

II_1 Understanding of Transport

While in the conventional way of travel one mode from beginning to end is involved (II_1a), most of the time by a private vehicle. In a sustainable understanding, changing modes during the travel is favourable (II_1b). Code II_1b was assigned five times in comparison to two times of II_1a. In the case of Medellín, the multi-modal way of travel an objective of Fajardo, as the attempt to integrate the TPC with the Metro in one system and one tariff shows (MA2; MA3; MP3). Nevertheless, it was found that due to the lack of integration of the tariff, people tend to either use the Metro system or use the TPC because otherwise they need to buy two tickets (Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014; MA4).

A crucial change within society was the development of trust in politics (see also B3). Furthermore, the integration of several of the TPCs increased the ability for many to use one ticket from and to walk without walking to a station. However, this process is not finalized under Fajardo.

How

A change occurred in the understanding that the most suitable mode should be developed according to the local circumstances. This resolves from a changed mind-set, also aiming to reconquering the transport sector. This change started under Fajardo as a result of a changed discourse (change mechanism 2).

II_2 Perception about transport

In the conventional understanding public transport is for the lower income groups (II_2a) while in SUT planning, public transport is for all income groups (II_2b). II_2b was assigned twelve times and II_2a only twice. In the case of Medellín, the extension of the Metro system with the Metrocable and NMT infrastructure was a valuable tool for changing the mind-set about the segregation between the formal and informal city. It was pointed out that Fajardo developed a bigger consciousness in society concerning movement. This was the result of among others, the development of centralities:

> *"Fajardo's administration introduced this vision of transport and trying to promote another way of transportation but more related to consciousness".* (MA3)

It was found that walking is the most dominate mode of movement in Medellín with nearly 30% of the mode share (Ospina Zapata, 2013). Especially in the communities located at the slopes of the hills, limited roads

were developed. These roads used to be occupied by the TPC busses to provide transport to and from these areas (Betancur, 2007; Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014). However, walking was often the only affordable mode for low-income households, like in comunas 1 and 2. (MA4; MP1; MP2; MP4; MP7). By providing the sidewalks in the city, the right of the pedestrians increases and the space is assigned to NMT, see figure 6.10. However, in the high income comunas, it was mentioned that the domination of the car remains a problem because of the lack of proper public transport. This is a result of the spatial reorientation on the most problematic comunas.

How

The start of the change can be traced back to the local community's involvement in the planning and PUIs. The change started with the request of the citizens for more public space and sidewalks. (MP3; MP6; MP8). Through the participation, PB or imaginary workshops, citizens visualized the lacking connection (see figure 6.7 on the right side). In fact, the change of the use of space started with the citizens, but the planning interventions of figure 6.10 institutionalized this change physically in the areas. Therefore, it was found that this change is a result of knowledge exchange (change mechanism 1) with the society and negotiations (change mechanism 2) about where and how and where the connections should be developed (MA1).

Figure 6.10 Pedestrian lanes before (left) and after the planning intervention (right) in comuna 2 (Ospina Zapata, 2013)

II_3 Kind of improvements

It is differed between physical improvements in CTP (II_3a) and holistic improvements, consisting out of physical and social improvements (II_3b). The importance of the holistic approach comes apparent in the difference of code count. II_3b was found 13 times and II_3a only twice. In the case of Medellín, the character of the PUIs focussed on the interplay between physical and social improvement. It was found that before Fajardo the public transport development, initiated by the Metro Company, was focussing on physical improvements of the infrastructure. The project was originally criticized as the "toy" of Perez (Coupe, Brand, & Davila, 2013; MP1; MP4).

> *"Perez build up different infrastructure like the Metrocable the first time, it was only infrastructure nothing else."* (MP1)

With the administration of Fajardo, the objective of this transport infrastructure came a new orientation, described by the private secretary as followed:

> *"At the end, it is not moving from one place to another, it is about connecting citizens among each other and giving dignity to an area of a city, building trust and deploying integral opportunities on different matters, such as health, education, public space to improve the quality of life. So yes, we build upon what was built but we gave the transportation system its soul and sense."* (MP4)

The Metrocable became a valuable asset for areas because of the combination of physical improvements of the transport infrastructure, public space and social programs which educated people about how to start a business and through the participation the developments became *their* improvements. It was mentioned several times that the transportation developments could not be understood autonomously, but must be seen as one holistic approach, consisting out of the PUIs, programs and physical infrastructure.

How
Fajardo represented the understanding that the urban problems can only solved in a combination of infrastructure improvements and through social programs. Education was found to be the main cure for all urban issues in Medellín, which could be found in all sectors of urban development, also in transportation. This change was introduced by the introduction of this new discourse (change mechanism 2) which is the redline in the leadership of Fajardo.

II_4 EXTERNAL EFFECTS
In conventional transport, the effects for the direct surrounding are considered to be the main burden which should be resolved instead of considering the problem on the global scale. In the case of Medellín, it was found that the external effects were mainly considered to be a burden on the local level, which relates to the limited role of the environmental aspect in the formal institutions (MP7; MP8).

II_5 EFFECTIVENESS
In CTP effective transport has high travel speed (II_5a) while in SUT effectiveness is understood as reliable and has reasonable travel time (II_5b). Only II_5b was found, in total 5 times. Since Fajardo's approach focussed on developing a hierarchy of centralities, the planning points in the direction of developing reasonable travel time instead of prioritizing fast connections. In return, the communities in the *informal* city depended on walking for 1.5-2 hours or using TPC connections which were unreliable (Brand & Davila, 2011; EAFIT, 2011; Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014).

> *"There is a bus route (...) but how often? There is no constant transport there, the bus passes from time to time, you have to wait until the bus passes maybe."* (interview partner in Heinrichs & Bernet, 2014)

How
Even the waiting time accumulates at the stations of the Metrosystem, the system provides citizens with reliable travel times and schedules. It was mentioned that the waiting time is part of the commute but the fact that the system runs based on a schedule changed the opinion. In fact, the change of the mind-set is a result of the implementation of the infrastructure and can therefore not be linked to change mechanism of leadership.

6.4 A Timeline of Change
In the timeline underneath in figure 6.9, all major changes in terms of transport planning which are mentioned in this chapter are ordered according to the chronology of the changes. Since these changes are fluent and cannot always be pinned down to a specific date, the information is ordered into years. Since several changes before the leadership of Fajardo are crucial to understand the changes, the timeline starts at 1960, due to the start of the public transportation provision in Medellín. The administration period of Fajardo is marked purple.

Figure 6.11 a timeline of Medellín (Wittig, 2017)

Local   National

December 2016
Opening Metrocable line H

2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008

December 2011
Opening Metroplus 2

Opening Metroplus 1

February 2011
Opening Metrocable Line L

March 2008
Opening Metrocable Line J

Transport authority to
Metropolitan level

Con el Alcalde

2007
Acuerdo 43/2007: PB becomes legal
obligation

POT 2006

2006
Financial negotiations
with national government
for Metroplus

2005

Start integration TPC

March 2004
Opening Metrocable line K

2004
EDU in charge of the
PUIs

PD 2004

2003
2002
2001

Reopening of Peace negotiations

December 2004 opening
BRT Trans Metro
Bandung

2000
PD 2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
Death of
Pablo Escobar
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

Establishment of Metro
Company

1980

1970
National decision to
privatise bus operation

Transport developments

1960

Transport related events

96

A leadership analysis in Medellín

An analysis of Institutional change
of the Colombian case

7

Chapter 7.

A Leadership Analysis in Medellín

7.1 An Illustration of Institutional Change in Medellín

Institutional change in transportation planning can occur on different levels, as presented in chapter 2. It was seen that in Bandung the institutional change especially took place on the level of governance and formal institutions while these do not correlate or reflect the planning culture (informal institution). For the case of Medellín however, a different picture is painted. Figure 7.1 illustrates the process in Medellín.

Figure 7.1 Conceptual model for the case of Kamil in Bandung (Wittig, 2017)

7.2 Window of Opportunity

In the case of Medellín, a window of opportunity was found which made drastic change possible. In the case of Medellín, the peace negotiations enabled institutional change with a top-down tendency. Colombia, and especially Medellín, have suffered over two decades under the domination of violence and narco-traffic

(paragraph 5.1). To reduce the tension between the government and the non-governmental groups, the Colombian president Uribe reopened the dialogue with the paramilitaries since the first negotiations had failed. This second round of peace negotiations were successful and led to an armistice and in return the paramilitaries were officially recognized by the government. No peace negotiations were held with their opponents, the left-wing guerrillas. Nevertheless, the violence on the streets reduced and the former street-warzones became accessible for policemen or even politicians. The window of peace with the paramilitaries forms the foundation for the development of trust in politics.

7.3 Local Political Leadership in Medellín

7.3.1 Fajardo as a Visionary-City Boss

Out of the four leadership styles, Fajardo is categorized as a Visionary with elements of a City Boss. A Visionary like Sergio Fajardo combines an inclusive power execution (power to) with a positive or directive leadership orientation which indicates a strong orientation towards change in transport planning. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Fajardo executes power over in situations in which the involvement of society most likely would complicate the development, like relocation. The analysis has shown that Fajardo executed power to when it comes to improving the living environment and power over in situations of hazardous and dangerous living circumstances.

Figure 7.2 Applied leadership matrix for Fajardo in Medellín (John & Cole, 1999. Edited by; Wittig, 2017)

Based on this, a clear differentiation should be made when it comes to power execution. During the administration of Fajardo transport developments were made on different levels; connections between centralities (see figure 6.8) and comuna internal connections. Fajardo developed a BRT connection in Medellín and a second Metrocable (Line J in comuna 13). These developments were found to have a higher degree of power *over* compared to the development of internal connections. Therefore, Fajardo is covering a wide range of the leadership matrix, see figure 7.2.

7.3.2 Power To

The development focus on the *informal city* is crucial in his approach and only possible because of the window of opportunity. This means that the transport developments in the comunas and neighbourhoods are characterized by a higher degree of power *to*. PB, imaginary workshops and participatory planning practices characterize the development of local developments, ranging from sidewalks, public spaces to schools and libraries. Important to note at this point is that the participation should be understood as organized participation, because in complex projects, options are predefined to limit the range or suggestions from the public. These local interventions were developed quickly and experts referred to this as *quick wins*. The quick wins were crucial for the development of trust. Trust in Fajardo and the local government, that nepotism and corruption are no longer the standard of the local government.

7.3.3 Power Over

The other side of the coin are the developments of new living environments. Fajardo was found to execute strong power *over* in relation to the development of the Metrocable Line J and the relocation of several thousand inhabitants to the area around the station of Line J in the west of the city to improve the living conditions. A side objective of this power *over* is reconquering power over certain urban areas; showing the illegal groups the presence of the local government, strengthening the control over the streets and avoiding new street wars.

7.3.4 A Positive Leadership Orientation

In terms of the leadership orientation, Fajardo was found to have a very positive orientation, which even managed to turn the negative leadership orientation criteria of day-to-day decisions into an instrument of creating trust. Fajardo was the first mayor which approached the underlying problems of poverty, inequality and violence or problems which are rooted in society; informal institutions. Furthermore, the clear agenda with the vision of *Medellín la mas Educada* was short and easy to understand for all citizen groups. To ensure that the problem of corruption would no longer persist and public money disappear, Fajardo assigned civil servants based on the principle of meritocracy. Important to note further, Medellín within Colombia has financial independence to some extend because of the EPM. Nevertheless, Fajardo faced conflicts by opening a dialogue between competing actors, as between the Metro Company and the TPC.

7.4 A Changing Institutional Context

The top-down tendency of institutional change in figure 7.1 already indicates the top-down force of changes made on the highest level of the institutional spectrum of Williamson (2000). As introduced in 7.2, this was only possible because of the window of opportunity which Fajardo exploited and started the unlearning of informal institutions of mistrust and violence and illegality as the only possible future. The developments on the three levels are analysed by means of the main changes. In terms of informal institutions, the development of trust is closely related to the power execution (determent A) of the leadership style of Fajardo. Secondly, Fajardo mediated between the formal and informal system to increase the understanding of one integrated system. Finally, the ideology of the government changed and the awareness of the need for close cooperation changed the structure, the decision making process and the spatial orientation. Overall, the formal institutions developed after changes were made in the governance and the PUIs were already developed. This shows the duration of the institutionalization into legally binding institutions.

7.4.1 Trust in Politics and Movement; A change of heart

As a country with a violent history and especially as the former murder capital, Medellín's politics was characterized by corruption and nepotism and the streets were dangerous places. Movement in the *informal city* was only possible through walking or using the TPC providers. By the return of peace after the negotiations with the paramilitaries made the development of internal connections of the neighbourhoods

according to the centralities plan possible and the Metrocable. The demand came from society, to develop better NMT infrastructure, especially in the *informal city*. The Metrocable fuelled the new developed feeling of appreciation in the *informal city*, which by the new governance mode of inclusive plan and decision making was accelerated.

The leadership style of Fajardo as a visionary-city boss, is a crucial element in this change. It was found that the elements of his positive leadership orientation, the vision of *Medellín la mas Educada* and the clear agenda in combination with the *power to* aspects of empowerment and development of support from society created a powerful set of tools to introduce centralities to encourage walking within neighbourhoods.

In combination with the window of opportunity after a period of terror, informal institutions such as the living culture, trust in politics and social confidence was possible through the drastic renouncement from violence and the acknowledgement of illegal groups on a national level! These informal institutions have a rather complex nature, but correlate closely with the power execution of Fajardo (power to) and the positive leadership orientation.

7.4.2 TPC & Metro; Fajardo aims for one integrated system

A crucial aspect to understand is the high inequality between citizens and certain areas within the city. The segregation of the city into formal and informal is also present in the transport sector; the Metro system and the TPC providers. While in most informal areas only TPC provided transport services, the extension of the public owned system into these areas was a sign of acknowledgement as part of the city. The acknowledgement of the areas by the local government and the development of access and centralities led to a change of the use of space and the interaction between the systems. The gap between the two system remains to a certain extent until today, but some of the TPC routes are integrated in the Metro system and operate as feeders. Nevertheless, Fajardo managed to mediate between the two systems by organizing a table of discussion which should integrated both systems. So far, these are still divided because of the lucrative business of the TPC operation. In the POT 2007, plans for an integrated system were made, aiming also for one ticketing and pricing system.

7.4.3 EDU as the director of an Urban Orchestra; change of governance

The corner stone is the spatial reorientation which led to a reorganization of the departments and responsibilities for the formulation and implementation of the PUIs. The acknowledgement that problems in certain comunas are city problems, started as an internal change within the local government, driven by the knowledge of several new civil servants which were recruited by Fajardo based on meritocracy. This spatial reorientation changed the role of the EDU into the *director of the orchestra.* Since the PUI plans are holistic approaches social programs and physical projects depend on local knowledge. Instruments like imaginary workshops, PB or participatory planning were introduced by Fajardo as the fundamental source of understanding for. Since the PUIs consists out of many small interventions which all relate to different departments, the EDU was assigned as the most appropriate authority in which all departments would work together.

The extend of the change that occurred in society and on the governance level overshadows the change of the formal institutions. Nonetheless, these changes shouldn't be underestimated. The institutionalization of several planning practices into formal institutions require longer time.

7.5 Change Mechanisms in Medellín

Reviewing figure 7.3, the change mechanisms applied by Fajardo are twofold; inter-organizational learning and knowledge exchange (change mechanism 1) and the introduction of new discourses and mental modes (change mechanism 2). Interestingly, on the informal institutions and governance level, change mechanism

two dominate the change process, while the formal institutions are mainly changed through knowledge exchange and inter-organizational learning.

Reflecting on the leadership style of Fajardo, it is striking that change mechanism 3 or the replacement of institutions, was not found at all. Instead, the power *over* element of Fajardo's leading, is only reflected in the decision making relating to complex topics. Even though a remarkable change was taking place, the relocation of citizens is an act of replacement, however did is not reflected in the measured criteria.

Criteria	change mechanism
Informal Institutions	
II_1 understanding of transport	#2
II _2 perception about transport	# 1 & 2
II _3 kind of improvements	# 2
II _4 external effects	-
II_5 effectiveness	-
Formal Institutions	
I_1 aim of transport policies	# 1 & 2
I_2 policy strategies	# 1
I_3 policy focus concerning networks	# 1
I_4 objectives of policies	# 2
I_5 integration of planning	-
I_6 equity	# 1
I_7 investment policy	-
I_8 policy type	# 2
Governance	
G1 - Spatial Level	# 2
G2 - Structure	# 2
G3 - Decision making	# 1 & 2
daily planning encounters	

Figure 7.3 the change mechanism found according to the institutional criteria (Wittig, 2017)

Furthermore, it should be recognized that Fajardo introduced new mental modes and discourses (change mechanism 2) in synergy with knowledge exchange with the local community and inter-organizational learning (change mechanism 1) by a closer cooperation between different local departments and the staff assigned through the concept of meritocracy (change mechanism 1). This change mechanism relates closely to the *power to* execution of Fajardo, in which citizens in Medellín could engage in the plan making process through PB, imaginary workshops and participatory planning. The knowledge exchange mechanism is dominant on the level of formal institutions and decision making, because the knowledge provided by the citizens is crucial in developing projects and programs which respond to the local needs.

The leadership style of Fajardo as a Visionary-City Boss is reflected in the balance of knowledge transfer and the unlearning and introduction of new discourses and the ability of Fajardo as a local political leader to acknowledge and exploit a window of opportunity, like a change agent. This exploitation was especially crucial for the change of the informal institutions through a change of mind-set about politics, the understanding and perception of transport. The underlying and most crucial change was the unlearning of the mistrust in politics, which was enforced by the behaviour of Fajardo and the changes on the governance level, allowing citizens to witness direct change also in the execution.

7.6 Final Remarks about Fajardo in Medellín

Remarkable about the period of Fajardo's leadership was the proximity of two events; the start of the administration of Fajardo and national peace negotiations. It should be kept in mind that a window of opportunity does not automatically lead to a drastic change or improvement. It is crucial to acknowledge this window and exploit it through a *change agent.* Therefore, it can be stated that the change of the governance in Medellín is closely linked to a changed mind-set (informal institution) is the direct manifestation of a new discourse, which is taking an inclusive approach because of the power to execution of the leader. People started to speak out for a more transparent government and a reclaim of the streets as living environment. The visionary part of Fajardo's leadership led to the most striking changes in society; the reconquering of the streets by developing a network of centralities of public space and other public services, to encourage walking. The integration of the new developed Metrocables by constructing sidewalk networks in the neighbourhoods decreased the social fragmentation and the transport infrastructure became a landmark of the social rise of a former informal warzone. In BOX.MED the main findings of the case of Fajardo in Medellín are summarized.

BOX.MED

- The peace negotiation is a window of opportunity which Fajardo as a change agent exploited.
- Fajardo is a hybrid mix of a Visionary and City Boss.
  - The power execution in Medellín is characterized by mix of power to and power over. However, the power to elements are dominating. Fajardo uses systematic messages and visits to the neighbourhoods to gather information and provide information to the citizens. In situations in which the lack of access in combination with threats of natural hazards are combined, Fajardo executes power over and relocates citizens.
  - The leadership orientation of Fajardo is positive, which is translated into a strong vision to solve the societal problems of poverty, inequality and violence. Interestingly, categorized as a negative leadership character the day-to-day decisions were a strategic instrument to develop repetitiveness which enforced the development of trust (A2).
- The institutional change has a top-down tendency
  - The underlying problem of mistrust was resolved by Fajardo through developing a repetitive pattern of communication and taking action.
  - The formal institutions showed a change towards SUT.
  - On the governance level Fajardo combined not only strategic planning and transport planning in the EDU, but all local departments and decision making became inclusive
- Fajardo induces change by inter-organizational learning (change mechanism 1) and the introduction of new discourses (change mechanism 2)
  - the inter-organizational learning and knowledge exchange is accelerated by the working together of all experts in the EDU.
  - The introduction of trust through into politics was crucial (relating to the power *to* element of Fajardo's leading)
- As a Visionary- City Boss, Fajardo does have the capacity to introduce new discourses without needing to replace institutions (change mechanism 3).

Discussion & Conclusions

An empirical research comparison between Bandung and Medellín

8

Chapter 8.

Discussion & Conclusion

This research revolves around the issue how different leadership styles can induce institutional change. Before answering the main research question in 8.2, the first paragraph discusses the findings of the two case studies. Thereafter, some remarks about further research are made.

8.1 Discussion

The discussion follows the structure of the conceptual modal, figure 2.8, which based on the findings of BOX.BDG and BOX.MED are discussed. Based on the structure of the conceptual modal, firstly the findings regarding the leadership styles of the two leaders are discussed. Thereafter, the change mechanisms utilized in the process of change are analysed. The final comparison is made based on the change tendencies found in the institutional context.

Leadership styles in Bandung and Medellin

Starting with the categorization of the two leaders according to the matrix of John & Cole (1999), Kamil is categorized as a City Boss in this research, while Fajardo is found to be a Visionary-City Boss. Both leaders have a positive leadership orientation (horizontal axis) and there is some overlap in the power execution, these two are allocated closely together on the matrix, see figure 8.1. Interestingly, both leaders are allocated on the left site of the leadership spectrum. Change orientation, or positive leadership orientation, is crucial for developing SUT networks in cities. Therefore, this research has shown that a LPL which induces change will not have a negative leadership orientation, because inertia executed would thwart the change process.

Figure 8.1 Comparing leadership styles; Kamil and Fajardo (John & Cole, 1999; edited by Wittig, 2017)

As illustrated in 8.1, the range of power execution differs between the two leaders while their leadership orientation is quite fixed throughout their whole administration. In terms of power execution, both leaders

have power-to and power-over elements, while Ridwan Kamil is categorized as a pure City Boss, Fajardo is a hybrid mix of Visionary and City Boss. The difference lays in how the leader copes and adjusts its power execution according to the situation, such as Fajardo in the case of the Metrocable in comuna 13. Kamil does seem to execute power-to at first sight, but it was mentioned frequently that the information provided through social media is misleading or incomplete. Furthermore, when the empowerment of citizens in relation to transport or urban development are taken into account, the bureaucratic- stratification of society withholds this so far. Participation is still in the phase of socialization and ranges to the exclusive engagement of local representatives or community leaders. The main differences between these two leaders can be illustrated with the code count of code A1_c (empowerment of citizens) and A2_b (development of trust by sharing information). While in the case of Fajardo the codes are assigned 11 times, respectively 9 times, in the case of Bandung, these are mentioned 0 and 1 time.

It should be noted that even though both leaders have a positive leadership orientation, they differ in range. This can be best discussed by means of the leadership orientation criteria B1 till B5 (see paragraph 2.5). In quantitative terms, the code count shows some similarities but the interpretation demands some differentiation. Code B2_b (big amount of energy invested in solution development) and B3_a (clear objectives) are mentioned 6 times in Bandung and 10 time in Medellín, respectively 4 and 8 times. The code count shows that the extend of the issues differs between the cases. In Medellín meritocracy became the standard for the staff selection, in the Bandung a bidding system as a new selection tool was introduced (B5). However, this bidding system doesn't prevent nepotism within the local government. Both leaders formulated an easy and relatable vision. While *Medellín le mas Educada* is measurable through the level of illiteracy or school graduates, the vision of *Bandung the happiest city* is abstract and hard to quantify and measure. However, both visions (B3) have general relatable theme with a positive emphasize on the future. One final differentiation should be made between the kind of projects proposed by the leaders to cope with the problems. Fajardo developed the PUIs which have a holistic approach, which see transportation as an indispensable element of urban improvement, the projects developed and proposed by Kamil are criticised as beautification projects and are less comprehensive (B1). Nonetheless, the NMT and AGT projects cause a change in the network, even though these changes aren't comparable to the changes made in the network of Medellín.

Utilized Change mechanisms by Kamil and Fajardo

The utilized change mechanism by the two leaders shows some remarkable differences. As figure 5.1 illustrates, the attempts of Kamil to utilize the change mechanism 2 of introducing new mental modes failed due to the persistence of the informal institutions which are enforced by the national government and anchored in the Indonesian society. Consequently, it was attempted to change the mind-set by social programs and competitions, which were not necessarily linked to physical improvements which might be an indication why this failed. In the end, the change towards the replacement of institutions might be a consequence of the failed attempt to induce change through the introduction of new discourses.

In the case of Medellín, the introduction of new discourse on the informal level was found to be a very frequent used change mechanism by Fajardo. Interestingly, it was found in combination with change mechanism of inter-organizational learning and knowledge exchange or change mechanism 1, on all three institutional levels. Interestingly, the role of knowledge transfer and inter-organizational learning plays a relative big role on the level of formal institutions, while governance and informal institutions are most likely effected by new mental modes or a combination of change mechanism 1 and 2.

Both leaders executed change through change mechanism 1 throughout the process of institutional change. Fajardo often combined this with the introduction of new discourses (change mechanism 2), see figure 7.3. In Bandung on the other hand, Kamil instead utilized change mechanism 3 (replacement or attenuation of institutions), see figure 5.3.

Change Tendencies induced in Bandung and Medellin

Finally, this all reflects in the change tendencies of the institutional contexts of Bandung and Medellin. The institutional change in Bandung has a bottom-up tendency (figure 5.1), which means that the main changes which should induce change are made on the governance level. In the case of Medellín, the change tendency is top-down. As was mentioned by Högberg (2009) and Williamson (2000), the top-down influence is stronger than bottom-up. However, a drastic change of institutions only occurs after the exploitation of a window of opportunity (Buitelaar, Lagendijk & Jacobs, 2007). Fajardo came into office just when new peace negotiations were held with paramilitary groups. Through this peace negotiations, a *break* with the former practice of politics could be obtained by Fajardo, by filling the vacuum of the former war zones in the streets by going into these areas and reconquering the trust of the people by presenting the opposite of the elitist leadership and developing access within the neighbourhoods. Understood as a different kind of leadership was that Fajardo broke the wall between citizens and politicians. In this regard, Fajardo had a much stronger focus on the improvement of solving societal issues (poverty, inequality and violence) or issues of *informal institutions*, which in return is linked to the position of Fajardo on the axis leadership orientation far left compared to Kamil. A window of opportunity is lacking in the case of Bandung, making a drastic change impossible, resulting in a bottom-up approach. On the contrary, informal institutions relating to corruption and the paternalistic relation between the governmental levels are thwarting the process of institutional change on the local level because of their strong top-down force, which is also practiced by the national government.

8.2 A Leadership Conclusion

The previous paragraph discussed the differences and similarities between the two leaders and the institutional change in transport planning. In this paragraph, final remarks regarding the relation between leadership styles and institutional change are made. Starting with the fact that transport developments heavily rely on the institutional context which frames the developments, this research has identified institutional change in Bandung and Medellín. What this change say about the leadership style, is answered underneath. Arising from this issue, the following question is addressed in this research:

> **How does the local political leadership style relate to the kind of change**
> **of the institutional context of transport planning?**

Taking both leadership determents into account, this research has found that the power execution relates to the kind of change mechanism utilized by the leaders, while the leadership orientation implies the complexity of the problems addressed; ranging from problems of governance, formal institutions or informal institutions.

This means, leaders whom execute power *over* are likely to induce change by the replacement or alienation of institutions. In Bandung this was found in the governance level and formal institutional level, of which the former is the main focus of Kamil. This said, the formal institutions are considered to be less important for SUT developments in Bandung, instead issues of lacking law enforcement and insufficient budgets, all relating to governance and informal institutions, were found crucial. The action arena or institutional context Kamil is operating in is, still highly dominated by the forces of the national government (on the level of governance) and the hierarchical and status oriented society (informal institutions). Therefore, the complex context can be seen as an explanation for obtaining change mechanism 3, which is considered to be the easiest mechanism to use by Kraatz & Moore (2002). Kamil is executing more power *over* while in Medellín Fajardo adjusts the power execution according to the situation, while he prioritizes power *to* execution. In Medellín, the shift to power *to* and including citizens in combination with the window of opportunity developed a new momentum to induce change through inter-organizational learning and knowledge transfer as well as the introduction of new discourses and the unlearning of old and outdated institutions. The introduction of a

new discourse was only possible because of the interaction with citizens and knowing about their needs and responding to these with the PUIs.

Furthermore, the horizontal axis of the matrix is a spectrum of the leadership orientation and reflects the complexity or level of problems addressed by the leaders. As figure 8.1 illustrates, Fajardo is located further to the left on the spectrum of leadership orientation compared to Kamil, which is a result of the mix of positive and negative aspects in Kamil's leading and the high level of positivity in Fajardo's. In this regard, the role of the window of opportunity in Medellín should also be taken into account.

Given that in Bandung the institutional change is having a bottom-up tendency relates to a more centred location on the leadership orientation spectrum, the induced change is less far reaching as the change induced by Fajardo. Based on these two cases this means, the further the leadership orientation is located on the left side of the leadership orientation spectrum, the higher the emphasize is on complex and social problems which should be solved by innovative projects. In the case of Bandung, the complexity of the institutional context in terms of the paternalistic and bureaucratic-stratification, Kamil was not able to interfere on the informal level, resulting in more short-term projects and changes. Fajardo on the other hand addressed the underlying problems of Medellín and answered with holistic projects which were fuelled by new knowledge through meritocracy.

All in all, the analysis of the two leaders in this research has shown that, the leadership style does relate to the kind of change mechanisms used to induce institutional change and gives an indication of the level of interference of the institutional context (governance, formal institutions or informal institutions). A leader with a power *to* execution is most likely to induce change through inter-organizational knowledge exchange and learning (change mechanism 1) and the introduction of new discourses (change mechanism 2), while a power *over* leader uses the approach of replacement (change mechanism 3). Furthermore, change mechanism 3 is unlikely to be found as a change mechanism of informal institutions, because the complexity of societal structures. The change will be less far-reaching through replacement, which means that the change is most likely to occur on the governance level. Important to note is that the role of a window of opportunity should not be underestimated. Taking into account the allocation of both leaders on the left side of the leadership matrix, this means that, a negative leadership orientation will not lead to institutional change in transport planning. Nevertheless, both determents are not black and white and the interplay of these two determents and a mix of criteria determent the location of a LPL in the matrix which may differ in extend.

8.3 Returning to Aristotle

For planning theory, this research contributed to the understanding of how different leadership styles influence the kind of change taking place in the institutional context of transport planning in the Global South through the kind of change mechanisms utilized. Planning theory so far has not identified why and how leadership is a crucial element for successful projects and in the field of leadership science a wide range of leadership theories, categorizations and criteria are mentioned. The wide variety on information about leadership may be an underlying aspect why the discussion about the need for leadership remains on such a superficial level. However, this research has shown that the understanding of leadership of Aristotle regarding the balancing of power and interests, also proves applicable for transport planning. Furthermore, the importance of how change is induced relates closely to the leadership *style*, reflecting how the LPL executes powers to change the institutional context.

8.4 Recommendation

The cases of Bandung and Medellin differ not only in terms of travel behaviour, legal framework and the type of administration, but also the induced change coloured by the leadership styles differ. Regarding the fact that leaders are shaped by the institutional context they operate in, it was mentioned that LPL's operate in a multi-context which is influenced by several forces, ranging from global, national, regional till local,

where the political and social constraints play a crucial role. However, some recommendations for further developments led by LPLs in the two cities can be made.

Generally, change requires a *change agent* or a leader with a positive leadership orientation. For the case of Bandung, the change which took place was less far-reaching as the change in Medellin. This does not mean that a different leadership style would be more suitable for Bandung. The underlying reason for this is the lack of a window of opportunity to induce change on the informal level because of the strong persistence of political forces of the national government. For further SUT developments in Indonesian cities like Bandung, the recommendation regards the decentralization which is not yet completed by the national government. A change of the hierarchical thinking in terms of politics and society is crucial. Until this changes, a City Boss is the most appropriate leader for Bandung and the change will remain to feature a bottom-up tendency. This means, the socialization process needs to take place in Indonesia, not only in Bandung. Recommendations for future LPL's in Bandung relate especially to the change mechanisms. Kamil's attempt to induce change through change mechanism 2 has failed, but informal institutions are unlikely to change towards the new sustainable equilibrium when forced to change, meaning changed through replacement. Therefore, it is recommended that follow-up LPL's in Bandung with a City Boss leading style extend the progress made by Kamil towards more inclusive plan-making and power *to* execution. Nevertheless, so far the City Boss leadership style is considered the most suitable until further developments in terms of socialization are made. However, this can only be successful if on the national level several societal changes occur.

In Medellin, Fajardo represents a mix of Visionary and City Boss, in which the power *over* element only dominate in decision making concerning hazardous or dangerous situations, like in the case of the Metrocable in Comuna 13. Even though John & Cole (1999) mention that a Visionary is the most capable leader, see page 35, this will not say that a mix of Visionary and City Boss is unfavourable. On the contrary, this Fajardo managed to execute top-down institutional change in which through knowledge exchange, inter-organizational learning and the introduction of new discourses changes occurred on the informal level. It is recommended for further leaders to follow the line of reasoning of Fajardo in Medellin to induce change through change mechanism 1 and 2 and not change mechanism 3, because the Colombian case shows a much higher level of socialization relating to involvement and willingness to change, as a result of the narcotraffic history.

8.5 Further Research

Based on the results of this research, a future research opportunity could be the examination of how leadership styles in one city change based on the comprehensiveness of the transport network in the city. In both examined cities in this research the informal transport providers have been the main public transport mode for a long period of time. However, in Medellín already a rail-based system was available while this wasn't the case in Bandung. It would be interestingly to examine how the stage of development of the transport and the complexity of the issue would be reflected in the leadership style, demanding different leading.

Secondly, it would be interesting to explore leadership on the metropolitan level since this would be more challenging in terms of coordination and conflict management. It would be interesting to explore if leaders with a power over execution would be able to rule on the metropolitan level since there are so many stakeholders involved with actual legal and financial influence, such as local governments.

8

Reflection

Some final remarks about the research and research process

9

Chapter 9.

Reflection

This last chapter reflects on the process of this research, reviews challenges and develops suggestions how these issues could be avoided if this research would be conducted again in the future. In total six aspects of this research are reviewed. The first two relate to the utilized theories and sources, thereafter the three main issues of the research design and methods are reflected upon. Finally, some remarks about the findings are given.

9.1 Research process
Leadership Styles

John & Cole (1999) present four leadership styles. This research has shown that leaders cannot always be allocated pure to one style. Instead, Fajardo was found to have features of power *over* and power *to*. Furthermore, it is stated by the scholars that a Visionary is the most potent leader out of the four. However, this statement indicates the strong focus of these scholars on the Global North. In terms of the Global South and the typical challenges of cities like Bandung and Medellin, face a complete different societal and political context. Compared to the Global North, it can be generally stated that the process of socialization of participation is overall more advanced compared to the Global South. Therefore, it is impolitic to state that a Visionary is more potent than a City Boss. On the opposite, it can be argued that especially issues like rapid urbanization or social inequality require a certain level of power *over* and therefore a City Boss is just as potent as a Visionary.

Institutional contexts of transport paradigms

Several codes were derived from theory (see coding manual in appendix 4). However, the formulation of clear codes for the institutional aspects for the two transport paradigms was challenging. While a wide variety of publications about sustainability and sustainable mobility or transport are available, only few scholars formulated criteria and made clear statements about differences. In the end, the publications of Litman were found very useful and the most holistic and understandable, however it was found that a clear differentiation is a gap in theory and could be a potential field of follow-up studies.

Furthermore, some aspects were found to be more applicable to understand the change of transport from conventional transport to sustainable urban transport. As such, the aspect of investment policy (I_6) was hard to analyze because not all financial data were available. Overall, the aspects of the informal institutions were more complex to analyze and further research about how transport understanding and perspective change provides an interesting angle for further research.

Case Selection

Originally, it was aimed to conduct a comparative case study between Bandung, Medellín and Singapore. However, after multiple attempts to contact different experts for potential interviews regarding leadership in Singapore, the case of Singapore was relinquished because of the lack of willingness of contacted interviewees. Unfortunately, the lack of access to information derived from semi-structured interviews, it was ineluctable to continue the research with two cases. Nevertheless, a third case in the Global South of a higher development level would have been an interesting addition for this research.

Interviews

Because of personal circumstances, a visit to both case studies was not possible, which made it necessary to conduct the semi-structured interviews via Skype. Beforehand, barriers in the form of language and

willingness of interviewees to conduct an interview via Skype were expected. However, these problem seemed to be less significant than expected beforehand, especially for the case of Medellín. For the case of Bandung this was slightly more problematic since the time difference between the Netherlands and Indonesia seemed less fortunate for making appointment compared to Medellín. Even though the language barrier was taken into account, the approached contacts and interviewees were very cooperative and could be overcome. In one case, the interviewee organized a translator in case his English wouldn't be sufficient to understand or answer the questions.

Since the two cases are culturally very diverse, the approach to contact interviewees and conducting the interviewees required some trial-and-error. For future research, contacting experts via WhatsApp would be prioritized because this speeds up the process. Furthermore, the snowball approach was found to be very effective and is recommended. Through this method, experts could be contacted for an interview whom would have a high level of knowledge on the research topic. Finally, interviewees were given the opportunity to elaborate on issues or topics based on their knowledge. This proved to be fruitful in most cases, enriching the research with new insights which based on the interview guide would not be taken into account. Nevertheless, sometimes this led to extended discussions which were difficult to steer back to the main topic. Especially in the phase of transcription this proved to be time consuming.

Document analysis

Since all of the policy documents and documents from media were digital, the translation from Spanish and Indonesian was less problematic because the documents could be translated by means of Google Translate when the personal language knowledge wasn't sufficient. However, since sources from social media were used, especially for the case of Bandung, the use of slang and local languages on online platforms complicated the process of analyzing. Through personal contacts these text could be translated but were not found problematic but personal contacts with Sundanese language knowledge were very helpful.

9.2 Research Findings

The outcome of this research categorizes Kamil as a City Boss in Bandung, inducing bottom-up change through inter-organizational learning, knowledge exchange and replacement of institutions. This outcome was experienced surprising, especially because it was mentioned by most academic experts that this information should be reviewed carefully since the provided information was not always comprehensive but misleading. Secondly, the persistence of the informal institutions and the role of the national government was found to be still extraordinary, even though the process of decentralization is going on since the 1990s.

The categorization of Fajardo as a mix of City Boss and Visionary was also quite surprising, since only three academic experts pointed out the top-down decision making in regard to the Metrocable in Comuna 13. The importance of the peace negotiations held by the Colombian president quite quickly proved to be of high importance, which simultaneously became very important to understand the differences in change tendency between the two cases.

The research process provided me with the possibility to discuss complex transport issues with department leaders, academics and civil servants. The amount of information provided by the experts in the interviews and the information derived from academic publications, policy documents, newspapers and social media gave me the opportunity to further develop my analytical skill and critically reflect on the different sources of information. Overall, I experienced the thesis process as a great opportunity to compare the practices of two great leaders which dedicate great parts of their lives to improve the cities *we* live in. Therefore, I hope that this thesis will inspire others to engage more on the local level. Furthermore, this thesis aims for increasing the awareness about the threat of focusing only on national politics and avoiding the manifestation of post-truth discussions but instead addresses the need for local *change agents*.

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Appendix

A

Appendix 1

Leadership style cases

Table A.1.1 overview of leadership styles and criteria (John & Cole, 1999)

	Caretaker	**City Boss**	**Consensual Facilitator**	**Visionary**	**Reference to indicators**
Power Type	Power over	Power Over	Power To	Power To	**A**
Creating support from the community	Authoritarian	authoritarian	Cooperative	Cooperative	A1
Leading and coordinating partnership	Command & Control	Command & Control	Building trust	Building trust	A2
Leadership orientation	Responsive	Directive	Responsive	Directive	**B**
How the leaders cope with policy change	No need for policy change, status quo is to be maintained	Develops new institutions to achieve her/his goal	No policy change is only needed when the change is demanded by citizens	Developing new institutions and authorities to deal with change	B1
Problem solving and generating capacity	Good manager but not a leader, fearing complexity	Requires political back up by domination of party	Solves problems that are addressed by the public	Functions as a mediator between opposing sites	B2
Developing a personal urban agenda	Maintaining status Quo; no own vision & agenda. Executing already made decisions.	Long-term strategy (useful for marketing of plan) and economic progress	Short term plans, no agenda and own vision	Long-term vision and strategies, focus on social and environmental issues	B3
Conflict	Ignores issues that are too complex, unable to face the challenge	Exclusive, alone or with a small group of experts	Inclusive, seems to forget the long-term needs, cannot deal with other viewpoints when different than what he already represents	Functioning as a coordinator for decisions, based on public engagement and shared information	B4
Accomplishment of tasks concerning executive action;	Not involved with actual implementation	Give guidance to staff and new administrative direction	Not involved with actual implementation	Give guidance to staff and new administrative direction	B5
Leadership example (see appendix 1 for full report)	J. Arnold (Southampton, UK)	W. Schuster (Stuttgart, Germany)	Ryszard Grobelny (Poznan, Poland)	N. Goldschmidt (Portland, Oregon, USA)	

Table A.1.2 Criteria of a Caretaker (John & Cole, 1999)

Caretakers	John Arnold (Southampton; UK)
Power execution	Over
Leading and coordinating partnerships	Champion style
Leadership orientation	Responsive
Community involvement	Exclusive
Policy change	Avoiding innovation
Problem solving & capacity generation	Supervising
Personal agenda	Caretaker style – inertia & short term
Cohesiveness	Confrontational
Accomplishments of executive action	Politician – no implementation

Caretakers are most likely executive leaders. Furthermore, leaders of smaller cities tend more often to be caretakers since the financial resources (e.g. out of taxes) will be lower which reduces the opportunity for high investments in transportation projects. The competitiveness of smaller cities is also of limited importance and will therefore be not the first priority of the community since the amount of medium or large size companies is very limited. The bigger the size of the city, the more complex the situation becomes and the less the leader will attempt. No changes will be made; maintenance of the status quo is the way to go according to the caretaker. Their political orientation is mostly conservative, being members of regional or nationalistic parties which represent special aims which often should protect certain local or regional values. These leaders have reproductive orientation and an authoritarian way of power execution since they have a high interest in maintaining the existing situation instead of innovation (Getemis & Hlepas, 2006).

In terms of Southampton, John Arnold was mayor from 1994 until 1999. Southampton is considered to be a small city with a population of around 190.000 inhabitants during Arnolds' legislation period. As a member of a conservative party, John Arnold faced the challenge of a growing city, in which the cooperation with surrounding municipalities was necessary to accommodate the travel demand of commuters from and to the port. The interest of Southampton was crossing the physical borders of the city. This challenged Arnold to interact with surrounding municipalities, the port and its domestic situation. With the Port of Southampton being one of the biggest employer of the city with a big interest in improvements of the congestion of the city, cooperation between the local government and the board of the port were facing the indifference of Arnold (John & Cole, 1999). Being involved in almost all urban decision making, the lack of charisma, ignorance and its fairly conservative approach led to small interventions, but no long-term strategy was developed. Requiring an innovative approach in cooperation with the surrounding municipalities to conquer the congestion of the city, Arnold worsened the situation by ignoring the problems. Found was that as a very conservative leader, the maintenance of the status quo and the blocking of new cooperation's (as with the port of Southampton) and no innovative approaches, the lack of charisma of the leader is the key for weak leadership. The lack of willingness to cooperate and the ignorance towards the congestion problem characterize a caretaker leader (Getemis & Hlepas, 2006)

Overall, Arnold discouraged developments that were needed for further urban economic development and due to the lack of a strong identity of Southampton, the engagement of citizens in local politics was missing. Arnold was a LPL who did not add any value to the city and is not seen as a successful leader. Characteristic for Caretakers is their inconspicuousness. Last but not least, Caretakers are likely to focus on issues on the micro level. The meso and macro level are more or less ignored, due to the complex character of interconnectivity with other cities, regions or even the global character, the caretaker refuses to take on these issues.

Table A.1.3 Criteria of a City boss (John & Cole, 1999)

City Boss	Wolfgang Schuster (Stuttgart; Germany)
Power execution	Over
Leading and coordinating partnerships	Champion style
Leadership orientation	Directive
Community involvement	Exclusive
Policy change	Enabling innovation
Problem solving & capacity generation	Capacity builder
Personal agenda	Programme politician – long term coherent program
Cohesiveness	Confrontational
Accomplishments of executive action	City Managers

A City Boss is ruling with an iron hand and the most important matters will be decided by the leader himself and a small number of trusted officers (John & Cole, 1999). There is little space for public involvement and decisions are made by the city boss who feels very distant from reality. In cities with populations exceeding 500.000, LPLs tend to be either City Bosses or Visionary. Both are taking a proactive stand; the difference lays in the personal character. City bosses in bigger cities tend to use their charisma to attract and mobilize financial resources, in which the Visionary leader is focussing on the competitiveness of the city for investments and jobs (Getemis & Hlepas, 2006). Moreover, political orientation varies strong and it is most likely that a City Boss is a Ceremonial leader.

As a member of the Christen Democratic (CDU), centre-right party, which dominated the politics of the federal state of Baden- Württemberg for 58 years until 2011, the political situation was optimal for Schuster in Stuttgart (Stuttgart, n.d.). Being in office from January 1997 until January 2013, Schuster rules the 600.000 inhabitants' strong city with political back up from the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, governed by the CDU party. Considering the change of colour of the Federal State of Baden-Württemberg from black (CDU) to green (die Grüne) in 2011, Schuster announced in 2012 not to run for elections in 2013. This is one indication for the city boss behaviour, since the back up from the overall political situation became more environmental focussed (Homoki, n.d)

In terms of transportation planning, Schuster has been the most influential proponent of the Stuttgart 21 project. The Stuttgart 21 (S21) railway and urban development project with a new train station as the centre piece of the project. The new cross in Stuttgart which should replace the old terminus station, is part of the Trans European Transport Networks (TEN-T) Priority project # 17. Having a certain macro importance, connecting European cities to increase the connectivity and economic developments, the spatial implications on the micro level were considered by many as intolerable (Breitinger, 2016; EC, 2013). Due to the reunification of Germany, the national projects (Verkehrsprojekte Deutsche Einheit) were highly prioritized on the national level (Brettschneider, 2013). However, Schuster stood by Stuttgart 21. The project was highly disputed which led to protests but due to the exclusive ruling of Schuster, S21 won over the environmentalists. Determined to improve the livability and economic opportunities of Stuttgart due to S21, Schuster ruled with an iron hand.

When in 2011 the emotions about the impact of the construction of S21 ran high, Schuster made high expenses to change the public opinion about the project. In the earlier process of the project, this was done very limited. However, due to longitudinal environmental protests against the cutting down of trees, Schuster had to acknowledge that the public could thwart his prestige project. With a persuasive letter, Schuster changed to the citizens. He spared no (public) costs to write his citizens and stating:" *I want to help you to make the right decision*" (Issenberg, 2011). This fairly persuasive letter had an emotional touch, which later

was declared by the speaker of the Mayor as informative since the mayor was politically neutral. In retrospect, it was questionable if his personal interest exceeded his competence as Lord Mayor and used his charisma last-minute to prevent a disaster (Issenberg, 2011; Müller, 2016). The official public referendum was therefore not powerful because of strategic timing of decision making and S21 proceeded. Strategic project management is one of the strengths of a city boss.

The DB had a big stake in the project and had announced to back up the candidate for the elections of 1996 who would support S21. Due to this strong back up from the DB and the political sphere, Schuster was confident enough to sign the financial commitment for S21 one day after the city council had voted against the citizen covet. Highly criticised was that Schuster signed binding papers with the Deutsche Bahn, knowing that a petition would follow to stop the project. Due to the new legal arrangements, the 60.000 signatures for the petition were declared as invalid (Müller, 2016). These strategic arrangements throttled public interference on a legal way. Furthermore, the economic importance of a better regional, national and international rail connection was mentioned repeatedly by Schuster. The job opportunity for later generations would be secured by Stuttgart 21 (Brettschneider, 2013; Pro Stuttgart 21 Tiefbahnhof, 2010)

Nevertheless, during this highly political urban discussion, the charismatic Wolfgang Schuster remained a beloved leader, getting convincing public support for the re-elections of 2004 (SALS, 2004). Seen as down to earth, he emphasized that all critical decisions were in favour of the citizens of Stuttgart and the local economic developments (Wörner & Raidt, 2013). His charisma and his concern about the future of Stuttgart and his strategic manoeuvres make Wolfgang Schuster a city boss.

Table A.1.4 Criteria of a Consensual Facilitator (John & Cole, 1999)

Consensual Facilitator	Ryszard Grobelny (Poznan; Poland)
Power execution	To
Leading and coordinating partnerships	Coordinator
Leadership orientation	Responsive
Community involvement	Inclusive
Policy change	Reactive
Problem solving & capacity generation	Supervising
Personal agenda	Caretaker style – no long-term focus
Cohesiveness	Confrontational
Accomplishments of executive action	Politician – no implementation

Poznan is one of the oldest cities in Poland, where Ryszard Grobelny was mayor from 1998 till 2014. Typical for a consensual facilitator is that the actions in transport planning closely follow the requests from the citizens. In the 16 years of mayoralty of Grobelny in Posnan, the direction of transport changed. The two most important changes are strong indicators for the leadership style of Grobelny. The public transport planning in Poznan was born with the opening of the fast tram Poznański Szybki Tramwaj in 1997, one year before the new elections. Directly, plans were made to further expand this system. As so, by 2013 a new route was officially opened. Through out the period, Poznan faced a decline. Many people moved out of the city. In 2003 the city counted still 575.000 inhabitants, whereby in 2014 this number declined to 540,000 (Urzad Statystycnya w Poznaniu, 2015). In the early 2010s, the focus of the mayor adapted to the current needs and developments of his city. High unemployment rates and the demands from the citizens to increase job opportunities from the late 2000s onwards, became the main focus of Grobelny over the last years. Further developments of the fast tram were no longer the first priority and new programs were started to encourage the export of SMEs of Poznan and improve road conditions (Polska, 2014)

To encourage the economy of Poznan, Grobelny invested in road interventions and decided took the request by many serious to incorporate the public transport (especially bus services) with the surrounding municipalities (Kubiak, 2016). Many projects were started to encourage walking and especially also cycling (Lada, 2013). Grobelny stated that the quality and safety of the streets should be a priority and the integration of the existing public transport with the neighbouring municipalities of Poznan. Compared to the second responsive leadership style, the caretaker, a consensual facilitator like Grobelny are able to react and adapt to changing demands. This explains the reorientation of the transport development from the expansion of the fast tram system to road developments.

The reliability of a consensual facilitator on the public opinion is evident in the project of Grobelny to develop a multi-story park & ride. The public opinion expected that he would invest time and money in projects to counter the unemployment, instead he developed a plan for a Park & Ride. This failed due to the lack of local investments and validation (Polska, 2014). A consensual facilitator is a leader which is likely to end up with problems that occur because of a lack of powerful decisions. In the case of Poznan and Grobelny, new shopping mall developments and unclear ownership became a thorn in the side of many citizens. Being one of the reasons for the loss of trust as a leader of the people (TVN24, 2014)

Grobelny was a loved leader who knew how to persuade, but also knew the value of public approval. He got re-elected in 2002, 2006 and 2010. In 2014 he lost the elections, the lack of trust because of unpopular decisions meant the end for Grobelny. Also persuasion could not fix what has destroyed the trust.

A

Table A.1.5 Criteria of a Visionary (John & Cole, 1999)

Visionary	Neil Goldschmidt (Portland; USA)
Power execution	To
Leading and coordinating partnerships	Coordinator
Leadership orientation	Directive
Community involvement	Inclusive
Policy change	Embracing innovation
Problem solving & capacity generation	Capacity builder
Personal agenda	Programme politicians
Cohesiveness	Negotiator
Accomplishments of executive action	City manager

From 1973 until 1979 Neil Goldschmidt served in Portland (Oregon) as Mayor. As the American Dream came along, Downtown Portland turned into a patchwork of parking spaces, accompanied by rising congestion and pollution levels, new plans for road development were made. Thankfully, Goldschmidt puts a halt to further highway and road developments (Wollner, Provo, & Schablitsky, 2001). Goldschmidt revitalized Portland's character by developments combining vibrant neighbourhood planning with integrated sustainable transportation plans (Oregon, 2015). For this purpose, he had what some called, formulated an idealistic vision; a city of very low car dependency and better air quality. Setting targets is indispensable for the development of sustainable transport so is stated during The Vancouver Conference of 1996, in which requirements for sustainable transportation have been discussed (OECD, 1996). Achieving this would improve the living environment for the citizens of Portland, institutionalized by Goldschmidt as a new measure for city developments was public participation.

To encourage the institutionalization of public participation to shift away from the expert-driven planning approach, Goldschmidt established several associations, e.g. Office of Neighbourhood Association. The developments that were supposed to take place should integrate the neighbourhoods for better profiling of needs and shortcomings of transportation and the overall living environment (Abbot & Lowry, 2010). Before the leadership of Goldschmidt, citizens had been protesting against new highway constructions but remained unsuccessful. With Goldschmidt stepping in and sharing its power with the community, the voices were heard and the highway construction could be stopped. Goldschmidt and the Oregon Transport Commission issued a petition to translate federal funds from the Highway Trust Fund for construction of public transit instead. Based on the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973, the States were not allowed to construct what was called "unpopular urban interstate". Before the congestion became real acute in Portland, Goldschmid succeeded in transferring federal funds, meant for road development, into funding for a rail system (Bocci, 2010).

Plans had been made to extent the highway system towards Downtown Portland. The denunciation of the road construction plans through the voice of the citizens and the transparency that was created by Goldschmidt, were the starting point for a new future of the city (Wollner, Provo, & Schablitsky, 2001). The early transit development attempts of the late 1960s and early 1970s, demanded new institutions and organizations. However, the lack of leadership, the federal pressure for highway developments and the unheard voices out of the community thwarted these attempts. With the new leadership and the long-term vision for the city within Greater Portland, especially no new highway should connect the city with Vancouver. On September the 5th 1986, the TriMet was opened. The light rail system currently exists out of five lines, serving 96 stations over a length of approximately 100 kilometres (Thompson, 2006; Wollner, Provo, & Schablitsky, 2001)

Goldschmidt is a member of the Democratic Party. According to the theory, due to its political colour, Goldschmidt would on the first sight be categorized as a City Boss. However, this is a case in which the bigger picture (meso, the Federal level) of the political system of the United States of America should be reviewed. The political arena in the USA is dominated by two parties, the Republican and Democratic parties. Nevertheless, not being a member of an environmental parties (e.g. the Green Party), Goldschmidt was representing environmental consciousness during his legislation period. The personal cognition should not be underexposed. Over the last decades, the population city of Portland had grown from around 430,000 in the 1980s to over 630,000 in 2013, being the most liveable American city due to its air quality, neighbourhood developments, green developments and public transportation (Mesh & D'Auria, 2016; USCB, 2014).

A

Appendix 2

Research Log

When not mentioned differently, experts were contacted via e-mail. Experts for the case of Bandung were provided an Indonesian letter of advice from the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
S= interview via skype

Table A.2.1 Research Log (Wittig, 2017)

Date	Case	Event/action	Remark
07.09.2017	B	1) Contact Tristam (personal contact) 2) Contact Andrey (personal contact)	1) Provides several contact data (no response) 2) provides several contact data (no response) & sends TMP2009
14.09.2016	M	Contact MA1	Open for interview
21.09.2016	M	Interview MA1 [s]	Provides contact data of MP2 and MP3 after talk on 27.09.2016 and advices to contact MA2
28.09.2016	M/B	1) Contact MP2 (M) 2) Contact MP3 (M) 3) Receives mail from pak Taufiq about potential interview (B)	1) Open for interview but in November after return from Harvard; 2) Open for interview 3) forwards Ibu ira
29.09.2019	M/B	1) Contact MP4 (M) 2) Contact Ibu Ira (B)	1) Contact data found in presentation given at Toronto planning department Response on 10.10.2016 open for interview 2) forwards to BA2
01.10.2016	B	Contact Putrikanashi (personal contact)	Provides contact data of BP1
05.10.2016	M	Contact MA1 for contact data of technical coordinator of PUI	Response 26.10.2016 with contact data of MP1
06.10.2016	B	Contact BP1	No response to e-mail, contact later via WhatsApp
09.10.2016	M	Contact MA2	Open for interview
26.10.2016	M	1) Contact MP1 2) Contact MP5 (Facebook) 3) Contact Sonia Velez	1) Open for interview 2) Contact found via LinkedIn, contacted via Facebook; Open for Interview 3) Forwards to MA6; open for interview
28.10.2016	B	Contact BA1	Open for interview. Provides contact data of BP1
03.11.2016	B	Contact BP1	Contacted via WhatsApp; Open for interview
08.11.2016	M	Interview MP1 [s]	Highly suggests to interview MP2
19.11.2016	M	Interview MP2 [s]	Provides contact data of MA4
22.11.2016	M	Interview MP3 [s]	Sends documents and answered questions via email in January 2017.
24.11.2016	M	1) Interview MP4 [s] 2) Phone call with Prof. Davilo (UCL)	2) provided contact data of MA3

Date	Type	Activity	Outcome
25.11.2016	M	1) Interview MP5 [s] 2) Interview with MA2 [s] 3) Contact MA3 4) contact MP7	3) Open for interview 4) Open for interview
26.11.2016	M	Interview MA7 [s]	
28.11.2016	B	Interview BP1 [s]	
01.12.2016	M	Interview MA3 [s]	Provides contact of MP6
02.12.2016	M	1) Interview MA4 [s] 2) Contact Diego Zapata	1) Recommends to contact Diego Zapata; provides contact data after interview 2) forwards to MP8
05.12.2016	M	Interview MP6 [s]	
08.12.2017	M	Contact MP8 [s]	Open for interview
09.12.2016	M	Interview MP8 [s]	
15.12.2016	B	1) Interview BA1 [s] 2) contacts BP2 via WhatsApp	1) Provides contact of BP2 after interview 2) Open for interview
05.01.2017	B	Interview BP2 [s]	
10.01.2017	B	1) Contact Putrikanasih (personal contact) for contact recommendation 2) Contact Tristam (personal contact) 3) Contact Andry (personal contact)	1) Provides contact of BA4 2) provides contact of BA3 3) provides contact of BP3
12.01.2017	B	1) Contact BP3 via WhatsApp 2) Contact BA3 via WhatsApp	1) Open for interview 2) Open for interview
24.01.2017	B	Interview BA2 [s]	Provides contact of BP4 after interview
25.01.2017	B	1) Interview BP3 [s] 2) Contact BP4 via WhatsApp	2) open for interview
28.01.2017	B	Contact BA4 via WhatsApp	Open for interview
30.01.2017	B	Interview BA3 [s]	
31.01.2017	B	Interview BA4 [s]	
02.02.2017	B	Interview BP5 [s]	
15.03.2017	M	Personal interaction with Sergio Fajardo	Visiting conference at King's College in Cambridge University

Appendix 3

Interview Guide

General Information Interviewee: Case: B / M

Type of Expert: A / P

Date Interview:
Name Interviewee:
Prefers to be mentioned anonymous:
 Yes / No
Agrees with recording of Interview:
Yes/ No
Duration interview:

Introduction:
1. Explanation of who I am: DDM RUG/ITB master student.
2. Explanation of research purpose: what the role of leadership means for institutional change in transport planning
3. explain that understood as Institutions are t*he rules of the game* (according to North, 1990). They can be divided into formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions are legitimated by legal back-up, whereby informal institutions are rules that result out of the repetition of behaviour, such as norms, values, discourse and culture.
4. Ask if it clear what is meant by institutions
5. Explaining that the questions will focus on *change* during a period of time when the leader was in office. This is referred to as institutional change is the change of a legal or societal *rule of the game.*
6. Explain how the interview is designed. There are four main topics
    a. planning law/planning document (Formal Institutions)
    b. governance (among others Participation)
    c. Leadership Influence (experience of the work of the leader in the city)
    d. Society (Informal institutions)
    Based on these topics some starting questions are formulated. If needed, the follow-up questions are addressed for additional information if needed.
7. Ask if there are any questions in advance
8. Ask if the interviewee would introduce her/himself: what is her/his background and what is the relation to the case of [leader] in [city]

Table A.3.1 Interview Guide (Wittig, 2016)

Topic	Question	Potential Follow-up Question
Planning Law	**Q. 1** What is/are the most important planning law for transport projects in [city] during the period [year-year]?	**Q.1a** Why is this law so important?
		Q.1b Since when is this law in place?
		Q.1c Did the interpretation of the law change (under the leader)?
		Q.1d Was there a change in regulation/law? (replacement or adjustment)
	Q.2 How does national (transport planning or other) law influence local transport planning?	**Q.2a** Did the national influence change over time?
Planning Document	**Q.3** What is/are the most important planning document for transport planning in [city]?	**Q.3a** Why are these/ is this planning document so important?
		Q.3b Did the focus of transport mode change?
		Q.3c What are the main changes in these documents?
Governance	**Q.4** How would you describe the governance of the city during the period [year-year]	**Q.4a** What makes this governance mode special?
		Q.4a How has the governance changed compared to the period before the leadership of [leader]
	Q.5 Did the leader engage the citizens through empowerment or participation? Yes/ no? could you elaborate on the approach	**Q.5a** How has the public participation changed compared to the period before the leadership of [leader]
		Q.5b What makes this public participation/engagement approach so special?
Leadership Style	**Q.6** How would you describe the vision of [Leader]?	**Q.6a** How is the vision of this leader different from leaders before?
		Q.6b What makes the vision of this leader so special?
		Q.6c Is the vision focussing on short term or long term success?
	Q.7 How did [leader] communicate his vision to the public?	**Q.7a** Which Medium did the leader use to communicate with the public?

		Q.7b Why did the leader use this medium?
	Q.8 How did the [leader] provide guidance to the staff?	**Q.8a** Did the leader appoint staff members independently?
	Q.9 Did the leader focus on solving problems?	**Q.9a** Did the leader attract new resources for problem solving solutions?
	Q.10 How did the leader cope with internal problems in the local government or with the opposition>	**Q.10a** Did the leader change the organizational structure?
Society (informal institutions)	**Q.11** Did the travel behaviour change in society?	**Q.11a** What caused this (specific) change of value/norms/perception?
	Q.12 Which underlying societal or political forces change during the period of [leader]?	

Conclusion of Interview
1. Are there any remarks the interviewee would like to stress/ point out?
2. Ask if the interviewee has any suggestions for important documents or contact data for follow-up interviews
3. Does the interviewee would like to receive the final research? Yes/ No
4. Thank for time and sharing of knowledge.

Appendix 4

Coding Manual

Total 70 predefined codes based on theory, in table A.4.1. In table A.4.2 the codes that were defined during the coding process are listed for the case of Bandung. In table A.4.3 the codes for the case of Medellín are listed.

Table A.4.1. Coding manual for predefined codes (Wittig,2016)

Code	Field of information	Relating to theoretical aspect	Explanation
G1_a	Governance (spatial level)	Conventional	The organization is taking place on the national level
G1_b	Governance (Spatial level)	SUT	The organization is taking place on the local level and it is taking into account the regional/metropolitan interests
G2_a	Governance (Structure)	Conventional	Hierarchical planning, transport and urban planning are assigned in two separate departments
G2_b	Governance (Structure)	SUT	Integrated form of planning, transport and urban planning are integrated. Most optimal in one department.
G3_a	Governance (Decision making)	Conventional	The decision making is exclusively done by the leader and a small group of experts
G3_b	Governance (Decision making)	SUT	Transparency and public engagement are the core elements in decision making
I_1a	Formal institution (aim of transport policy)	Conventional	The transport policies focus on developing/ increasing the mobility
I_1b	Formal institution (aim of transport policy)	SUT	The transport policies focus on developing/ increasing access
I_2a	Formal institution (policy strategies)	Conventional	The policy strategies are focussing on the construction of new roads and ITS
I_2b	Formal institution (policy strategies)	SUT	The main policy strategies are focussing on land use and telecommunication
I_3a	Formal institution (policy focus concerning network developments)	Conventional	The development of the transport system is focussing on one mode, most probably private road-based transportation
I_3b	Formal institution (policy focus concerning network developments)	SUT	The development of the transport system is focussing on developing an integrated multi-modal system, consisting out of modes which are most applicable and suitable for the local conditions
I_4a	Formal institutions (Objectives of policies)	Conventional	Road space and parking capacities are the objectives and are used to measure the success of policies and location decisions are made based on demand
I_4b	Formal institutions (Objectives of policies)	SUT	Economic analysis are used to define the optimal plans and investment locations for the transport developments
I_5a	Formal institutions (Integration of planning)	Conventional	Transport planning and urban planning policies are two separate documents and the land use plan is only used as an input for the development of transport plans
I_5b	Formal institutions (integration of planning)	SUT	Transport developments are made in combination with the land use plan and should support the local developments, which are also laid down in the land use plan
I_6a	Formal institutions (equity)	Conventional	Subsidies in conventional transport planning are aiming for reducing the general cost of using transport. This is for all societal groups equally beneficial
I_6b	Formal institutions (Equity)	SUT	Subsidies are programs to reduce the transportation cost for certain societal groups. Not all groups benefit equally but those groups
I_7a	Formal institution (investment policy)	Conventional	Transport developments are made because of a pre-defined investment budget for a certain mode develop
I_7b	Formal institution (Investment policy)	SUT	The transport developments mentioned in the policy are made because they are the most cost-effective solution for a certain local situation

I_8a	Formal institution (policy types)	Conventional	The policies are in the form of blueprints which are developed (most of the time) by the national government and which are not tailored to the local circumstances but relate to national development guidelines
I_8b	Formal institution (policy type)	SUT	Plans which are not predefined but which have a level of flexibility to adapt to changes in society and the build-up area.
II_1a	Informal institution (understanding of transport)	Conventional	In this conventional understanding private vehicles are involved in reaching the destination
II_1b	Informal institution (understanding of transport)	SUT	Reaching a destination or activity should no longer be reached by one mode but can be through a combination of different modes, especially public transport or NMT
II_2_a	Informal institution (perception of transport)	Conventional	Transport is a mean to achieve a goal, only considered as a service
II_2_b	Informal institution (perception of transport)	SUT	Transport is not only a service but it is also shaping society, it is the backbone of an urban area
II_3_a	Informal institution (kind of improvements)	Conventional	The developments remain on the physical level; technical improvements are conceived as the mean to change travel behaviour
II_3_b	Informal institution (kind of improvements)	SUT	Changes of the travel behaviour are the result of a set of physical changes and mind-set changes.
II_4_a	Informal institution (external effects)	Conventional	The direct burdens are considered to be an external effect. Especially air pollution. Burdens of noise, visual or light pollution are not taken into account
II_4_b	Informal institution (external effects)	SUT	Local burdens and global threats are equally considered.
II_5_a	Informal institution (effectiveness)	Conventional	Good transport is considered to be cheap and quick
II_5_b	Informal institution (effectiveness)	SUT	Good transport has a high level of reliability and the travel time and cost are on a reasonable level. It is more important to achieve a high area coverage instead of high speed.
A1_a	Power (creating support from community)	Power to	The leader executes an inclusive approach by sharing information about the planned and implemented progress of projects and program by sharing information
A1_b	Power (creating support from community)	Power to	The leader integrates the opinion of citizens in the decision making process
A1_c	Power (creating support from community)	Power to	The leader empowers the citizens by giving them the opportunity to independently take control of decisions and projects in the city
A1_d	Power (creating support from community)	Power over	The leader is taken the decisions independently and he does not integrates the opinion of citizens in the planning and decision making process
A1_e	Power (creating support from community)	Power over	The leader does not invest in creating support from society because the leader considers his own opinion as ruling
A2_a	Power (Leading and coordinating partnerships)	Power to	The leader invests a lot of time and energy in building a network of trust with the involved stakeholders by negotiating issues and projects
A2_b	Power (Leading and coordinating partnerships)	Power to	The leader develops a feeling of trust by sharing information with the involved citizens.
A2_c	Power (Leading and coordinating partnerships)	Power to	The leader develops new capacity between the different stakeholders by generating open relationships and trust
A2_d	Power (Leading and coordinating partnerships)	Power to	A feeling of trust by the stakeholders grows because the leader takes into consideration the interests of the different stakeholders in the decision making process to come to the most beneficial solution
A2_e	Power (Leading and coordinating partnerships)	Power to	The leader operates as a mediator between different stakeholders in order to develop new trust

A2_f	Power (Leading and coordinating partnerships)	Power over	The leader executes command and control. This means that the leader autonomously takes decisions without taking into account the opinion and needs of stakeholders
A2_g	Power (Leading and coordinating partnerships)	Power over	the leader does not invest in developing trust between and with the stakeholders
B1_a	Leadership orientation (coping with policy change)	Power to	The leader is having a positive and open attitude towards controversial issues and is not ignoring the problem but is undertaking actions to solve the issue
B1_b	Leadership orientation (coping with policy change)	Power to	The leader is solving problems by proposing innovative plans and projects to establish new institutions as a mean of breaking with old and unsuitable institutions
B1_c	Leadership orientation (coping with policy change)	Power to	The leader is having a long term perspective
B1_d	Leadership orientation (coping with policy change)	Power over	Innovation is avoided by the leader and instead the status quo and institutional context are protected at every time
B1_e	Leadership orientation (coping with policy change)	Power over	The leader has a short term perspective and does not take into account the impact of solutions and institutions for the long term
B2_a	Leadership orientation (problem solving & capacity)	Power over	The leader focusses on the mobilization of resources, especially financial
B2_b	Leadership orientation (problem solving & capacity)	Power to	The leader invests a lot ot time and energy in solutions for existing problems
B2_c	Leadership orientation (problem solving & capacity)	Power over	The leader does not make an effort to attract new resources
B2_d	Leadership orientation (problem solving & capacity)	Power over	The leader is taking a reactive position when it comes to problem solving and undertakes little to actually solve the underlying main problem
B3_a	Leadership orientation (personal urban agenda)	Power to	The leader develops clear objectives which should to be reached
B3_b	Leadership orientation (personal urban agenda)	Power to	The objectives of the leader are having a long term focus. This means that the success not necessarily can be felt within the time of the administration
B3_c	Leadership orientation (personal urban agenda)	Power to	To reach the formulated objectives, the leader develops a coherent program of projects which all relate and form together a holistic approach
B3_d	Leadership orientation (personal urban agenda)	Power over	The leader is not eager to change the existing urban form/ situation by developing a strong urban agenda
B3_e	Leadership orientation (personal urban agenda)	Power over	The leader practices inertia to prevent innovation to change the urban form/ situation
B3_f	Leadership orientation (personal urban agenda)	Power over	The leader only takes day-to-day decisions because of the lacking vision
B4_a	Leadership orientation (conflict)	Power to	The leader is aiming for effective coordination in the authority
B4_b	Leadership orientation (conflict)	Power to	The leader is making an effort to solve the problems between politicians and administration by mediating and bridging between different fields (perspectives)
B4_c	Leadership orientation (conflict)	Power to	The leader has the capacity to deal with internal fragmentation and focusses instead on developing a new identify to which also the community can relate
B4_d	Leadership orientation (conflict)	Power over	The leader does not has the ability to cope with any other opinion but his/her own.
B4_e	Leadership orientation (conflict)	Power over	The leader does not make an effort to bring together the politicians and the administration. Instead these two remain operating isolated
B5_a	Leadership orientation (accomplishment of executive action)	Power to	The leader is guiding the staff members and engages with them in daily activities

B5_b	Leadership orientation (accomplishment of executive action)	Power to	The leader defines a new orientation for the administrative structure, but rearranging functions or accountabilities
B5_c	Leadership orientation (accomplishment of executive action)	Power to	The leader appoints individual staff members to ensure a certain work ethic or level of knowledge which relate to his/her urban agenda
B5_d	Leadership orientation (accomplishment of executive action)	Power over	Does not appoint individual staff members, this is done by the executive officers
B5_e	Leadership orientation (accomplishment of executive action)	Power over	The leader does not change the orientation of the structure but does everything to keep the orientation
B5_f	Leadership orientation (accomplishment of executive action)	power	The leader is only involved in the policy design but is not involved in the implementation of the actual programs / projects

Table A.4.2. Coding manual for newly formulated codes during coding in the case of **Bandung** (Wittig, 2016)

Code	Content of code	Relates to field	Description of code
G1_c	Metropolitan	Governance	The metropolitan level in the BMA
G1_d	Decentralization	Governance	Reallocation of tasks and authorities from higher to lower governments
G3_c	Socialization	Governance	A change of order in society is needed to introduce participation
G3_d	Representative participation	Governance/ Power to	Participation is only taking place through community leaders or heads
G_Smart	Smart City movement	Governance	New governance mode which relays on virtual communication
BDG_ PPK	PPK	Zoning	Service centres allocation
BDG_ Angkot	Angkot	Available public transport	The main public transport mode in Bandung
BDG_ Angkot feeder	Angkot should become feeder	Planned changes to angkot	Plans to decrease role of angkot in the city to a feeder mode
BDG_ Basic	Requirement for basic infrastructure	Lack in city	The city is in need for basic infrastructure, such as transport, water, sewage etc.
BDG_ BRT	Bus rapid transit Trans Bandung	Available public transport	The developed BRT and planning process
BDG_ Budget	National budget constraints	Problems with national government	Through decisions and interference of Kamil in national plans
BDG_ Coordination	Problems of coordination	Governance problems	Problems of coordination in transport planning in Bandung
BDG_ Cross sector	Cross sectoral influences on transport	Influences on transport	
BDG_ Eco growth	Economic growth focus	Old planning aim	The aim of transport and urban planning was on economic growth
BDG_ Gedebage	Second centre- Gedebage	New urban form	Spreading of activities in city by developing new city
BDG_ Interesting choice	Public transport needs to be interesting	Competition for car	The public transport system needs to be an interesting mode of transport because private vehicles are very affordable
BDG_ Lapor	Lapor	Participation	National complain website
BDG_ motorcycle	Cheap motorcycle	Status & current transport mind-set	Motorcycles are cheap and are a real competition for public transport
BDG_ Phone	Phone culture	Culture	Many people own a smartphone
BDG_ PKN	National strategic areas	Zoning	Nationally assigned areas for growth
BDG_ young	Young population in Bandung	Context	60% of the population is under 40
BDG_ PD	Presidential degree	National regulations	Putting financial constraints on the development
BDG_ private vehicle	Cars and motorcycles are favoured	Mind-set	High status for cars; aim of many
BDG_ Problem angkot	Problems of angkot	Available public transport	Angkot has low comfort, unreliable and unsafe
BDG_ Railbased	BDG requires rail-based transport	Requirement	The problem of congestion requires a shift to railbased approaches
BDG_ Road for PT	Public transport is road based	Available transport	All public transport modes are currently road based and suffer from the consequences of congestion
BDG_SAUM	Mass rapid transit	Requirement	The city requires mass rapid transit developments
BDG_ Status	Car is status	Mind-set (II2)	The car is a very important element for the status in society
BDG_ Traditional travel behaviour	Traditional travel behaviour	Mind-set in movement	No assigned stops cause stopping of public transport whenever the passenger wants to enter/exit the vehicle; car is considered as preferable

RK_ Asian games	Missed opportunity of Asian games	no window of opportunity	The Asian games would have been a possible fund for transport developments but Bandung was not assigned as one of the main cities
RK_ App	Important role of applications on smartphones	Governance & mind-set through social media	Kamil uses apps for solving urban problems
RK_ Architect	Professional background	Kamil	Relates to beautification
RK_Bidding system	Bidding system for staff	Governance	Kamil introduced a bidding to decide which people should get a certain position
RK_BUM	Bandung urban mobility	Formal institution	New document
RK_ Change program	Change of policies	Change of formal institutions	Kamil changes documents to fit to the conditions
RK_ City beautification	City Beautification	Kamil	Through city beautification Kamil aims to solve problems
RK_ Quality information	Debatable quality/comprehensiveness of information	Social media	The information provided via social media is seen critically and not always comprehensive or correct
RK_E-musrembang	Online musrembang	Governance	New form for engagement of citizens (not specific for transport)
RK_FGD	Focussed Group Discussion	Governance	Way of decision making; exclusive
RK_ First & last	First and last mile movement	Turned prioritization	The focus of transport developments in Bandung are on the NMT or last and first mile movement but there is no system to back up.
RK_ education	Education	Change of mind-set	The focus of Kamil was on changing the mid-set on transportation of school children and students through programs
RK_Fighting corruption	Fighting corruption in government	Governance & mind-set change	Kamil aimed to eliminate corruption by introducing smart city and changing the mind-set of the civil servants.
RK_Hari Angkot	Public transportation day	Mind-set change	Changing mind-set by providing thematic days.
RK_ International ideas	Implementation of international ideas	Professional background	Kamil adapts many international examples in the planning of Bandung
RK_lack of consistency	Lack of consistency	Problem	Lack of consistency is a problem
RK_Lack of finance	Lack of finance	problem	Lack of law finance is a problem
RK_Lack of law enforcement	Lack of law enforcement	Problem	Lack of law enforcement is a problem
RK_marketing	Marketing strategy	Formal institutions	Policy documents are a marketing strategy
RK_metro capsul	Metro capsul	Transport development plans	
RK_Misleading	Misleading information	Social media	Information is misleading
RK_Monitoring	Monitoring projects	Governance	How projects are monitored
RK_NMT	Non-motorized transport	Transport developments	Focus on NMT developments
RK_Park	Thematic parks	Urban developments	Parks as local attractions
RK_PPP	Public private partnerships	Finance (B2)	PPPs are the finance scheme for transport plans
RK_ Prioritization	Prioritziatio of NMT	Transport prioritization	The plans which can be implemented quickly are prioritized
RK_problem	Transport problems	Problems of the transport systems	All problems that occur in the transport sector in Bandung
RK_ Resistence	Resistance in planning	Obstacle in planning	Public resistance in construction of new transport developments
RK_Quick win	Quick results	Success	Kamil aims to develop quick results

RK_Requires public transport	BDG needs public transport	Acknowledgement of problem	BDG requires the construction of a public transport system as a backbone, this is mentioned to be lacking acknowledgement
RK_Skywalk	Skywalk development	Transport developments	Developed elevated sidewalks
RK_social media	Usage of social media	Governance & providing information	Social media plays a role in reaching citizens
RK_superficial transparency	Superficial transparency	Governance & transparency	Not all information is provided/ not correct provided
RK_Technopolis	Technopolis in Gedebage	Urban developments	Plans to develop a technopolis to link with transport
RK_Vision	Vision of Kamil	B3	A happy Bandung

Codes with the prefix **MED** are assigned to information which present the situation of the city before Fajardo, while the prefix **SF** refers to actions or changes made by Fajardo during the administration.

Table A.4.3. Coding manual for newly formulated codes during coding in the case of **Medellín** (Wittig, 2016)

Code	Content of code	Relates to field	Description of code
G_1_a1	Decentralization	Governance	The importance of the decentralization for changes of local transport planning
G_1_b1	Public transport to metropolitan level	Governance	Upscaling of the responsibilities to the metropolitan level at the end of the term of Fajardo
G_1_c	Focus on centre	Governance	The former politicians focussed only on the formal city and city centre, the fringes of the city were not taken into account in the development
G_1_d	Focus on whole city	Governance	A shift from formal city to formal *and* informal city. Also the deprived areas of the city were developed by the local government
G_2_SF	EDU as director	Governance	The EDU became the new authority in which all departments worked together on holistic solutions for the city
G_3_b1	Participatory budgeting	Governance/ power to	The instrument of participatory budgeting in the participation process
G_3_b2	Imaginary workshops	Governance/ power to	The instrument of imaginary workshops in the participation process
G_3_b3	Organized participation	Governance/ power to	The participation process was steered and managed by the local government to increase the value of local knowledge by providing options to choose from or guide the process
G_3_c	Transparency	Governance/ power to	How often was it mentioned that transparency was crucial for the leadership style of Fajardo
MED_bus	Illegal business of bus	Context	The TPCs providers in the city of Medellín operate sometimes in illegal businesses
MED_ Ticket	Public transport ticketing	problem	The problem of the two parallel systems is enforced by two separated ticketing systems for the TPCs and the Metro
MED_ EPM	Financing through EPM	B2	The role of EPM in financing projects such as transportation developments is considered crucial
MED_ Estratos	Estratos and their influence	Context & problem	How the estratos system leads to a segregation in the city
MED_ Financial independence	Financial independence	B2	It was frequently mentioned that Medellín has compared to other Colombian cities has financial independence
MED_ Inequality	The problem of inequality	problem	Illustrations of how the situation of inequality is in Medellín
MED_ invisible borders	Invisible borders	problem	The problem of warzones within the cities

MED_ lobby TPC	Lobby of TPC	problem	The TPC providers have a strong lobby in the national and local political sphere, which influences laws and policies
MED_ competition	Bus and Metro are competing	Context & competition	The Metro company and the TPC busses are competing and are not integrated
MED_ Metro Own	Metro develops own idea	Metro role	Metro Company develops own transport development ideas, e.g. metrocable
MED_ isolation	Mobility led to isolation	Problem	The lack of transport led to isolation of informal areas
MED_ particular challenges	Particular Challenges	National plans don't work	The City of Medellín is having very specific problems which cant be solved by national projects, because they are so particular
MED_TPC	Private bus providers	Informal institutions	The role of the private bus providers
MED_ Local identity	Strong local identity	Informal institutions	The city of Medellín has a very strong local identity
MED_Metro Company	Strong role of the Metro Company	Governance	The Metro Company has a leading role in the public transport developments in Medellín
MED_Walk	Walking out of financial reasons	Available transport	Many citizens walk because this reduces the travel cost; result of two ticket systems.
SF_ acknowledgement	Acknowledgement of problems	B1 B2	Acknowledges problems in the informal city
SF_against nepotism	Fighting nepotism	Governance	Fajardo is against nepotism
SF_against traditional politics	Fajardo is against traditional political parties	Informal institutions & Context	Fajardo breaks with the traditional politics
SF_Anti-corruption	Fajardo is against corruption	Governance & Mind-set	Fajardo wants to end corruption
SF_Approval	Approval rate	Success	Approval rate as mayor
SF_Centrality development	Centrality development	Urban form & transport	The development of centralities to reduce need for movement by providing services and infrastructure
SF_ Changed mind-set	Changed mind-set about public transport	Mind-set	The public opinion about public transport has changed
SF_charisma	Charisma of Fajardo	Fajardo	His personality was mentioned as charismatic
SF_ citizen culture	Development of a citizen culture	Social development	Fajardo focussed on developing a new culture within society
SF_communication skills	Communication skills	Fajardo	As a professor his way of delivering information increased the ability to reach people
SF_ integration levels	different levels of integration	Transport	The development of urban and neighbourhood transport projects (through centralities)
SF_education	Education as the corner stond	Vision	Education would be the cure for the urban problems
SF_Financial decision	Fajardo takes financial decision	Decision making	The decision is made based on the finances
SF_Independent candidate	Fajardo as independent candidate	Politics of Fajardo	Fajardo run as an independent candidate, important to show he breaks with the old politics
SF_Integrate TPC	Integrating TPC and metro	Transport	Integrate bus as feeder in the metro system
SF_Local small interventions	Quick win projects	Governance & trust	Fajardo aimed for small interventions within neighbourhoods to increase the visible change
SF_mathematic	Fajardo's political background	Fajardo	Fajardo's background as mathematic as a reason for the systematic approach
SF_Meritocracy	Selection of staff	B5	Selection of staff takes place through the ideology of meritocracy
SF_Mistrust council	Mistrust of local council towards Fajardo	Politics	The local council did not support Fajardo, still Fajardo won the elections
SF_Negotiation table	Development of a negotiation table	Governance	Fajardo developed a negoatition table for different stakeholders to discuss issues in which he led the discussions
SF_New staff	New staff of local government	B5	Fajardo assigned new people

SF_NMT	Non-motorized transport	Transport	The development of especially pedestrian infrastructure
SF_Open Meetings	Open meetings to public	Governance	Fajardo made meetings of local government open to increase transparency
SF_Pedagogue	Fajardo as a teacher	Fajardo	His background as a teacher increased his knowledge on how to communicate with citizens
SF_people centered developments	Focus on citizens not economics	Development focus	Fajardo focussed in his developments on livability and increasing living conditions
SF_Public ownership	Public transport was public owned	Transport	The importance of the metro system being public owned to reconquer areas
SF_Public transport to reconnect	Public transport as social connectors	Transport & accessibility	Public transport made it possible to visit also other areas and people used same public space from different areas
SF_PUI	PUI	Governance	Integrated urban projects
SF_Relocation	Relocation of citizens	Comuna 13	The relocation of citizens because of hazardous living conditions to an area which was connected to the city through Line J
SF_ Sensitivity for problems	Sensitivity for local problems	Fajardo	Fajardo's ability to understand local problems and react
SF_Start dialogue	Opening discussions	Fajardo & governance & B3, B1	Fajardo opened dialogues between and with stakeholders to solve problems
SF_Strategic projects to develop connections	Strategic projects to develop centralities	Transport, accessibility	Strategic projects were developed to develop a network of centralities which are interconnected.
SF_system of projects	System of projects	B2	The projects enforce each other instead of being separate projects
SF_Systematic message	Systematic message	Communication, Fajardo	By developing a systematic message citizens were not surprised and the information was always provided in a recognizable manner
SF_TV	TV show	Fajardo, communication	The weekly tv-show of Fajardo to provide information and speak to people
SF_Using bad legacy	Using bad legacy for change	Fajardo, change, informal institutions	By reminding the people how far they have come Fajardo motivates the people in building the city
SF_Value public money	Valu of public money	B2	No corruption and transparency
SF_work on dream	Work on a dream	Vision	Fajardo pointed out that the sky is the limit to improve the city
SF_Walking for internal movement	Walking for internal movement in comunas and barrios	Transport, NMT	Developing accessibility for walking within the neighbourhoods and barrios by developing sidewalks and centralities

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Appendix 5

Interview Transcripts

[the interview transcripts are available upon request]

Appendix 6

Atlas.ti code count

Table A.6.1 Frequency of predefined codes assigned in Atlas.ti (Wittig, 2017)

Code	BDG	MED
G1_a	19	2
G1_b	8	9
G2_a	6	8
G2_b	2	18
G3_a	7	6
G3_b	7	11
I_1a	5	2
I_1b	8	25
I_2a	20	5
I_2b	15	12
I_3a	3	7
I_3b	13	29
I_4a	18	9
I_4b	2	3
I_5a	9	2
I_5b	3	11
I_6a	0	0
I_6b	2	5
I_7a	1	0
I_7b	2	0
I_8a	2	3
I_8b	1	1
II_1a	3	2
II_1b	6	5
II_2_a	3	2
II_2_b	0	12
II_3_a	8	2
II_3_b	7	13
II_4_a	3	2
II_4_b	3	0
II_5_a	4	0
II_5_b	4	5

Code	BDG	MED
A1_a	7	9
A1_b	1	3
A1_c	1	11
A1_d	3	0
A1_e	6	0
A2_a	3	4
A2_b	0	9
A2_c	1	7
A2_d	1	7
A2_e	0	5
A2_f	2	0
A2_g	2	0
B1_a	4	7
B1_b	2	3
B1_c	3	0
B1_d	0	0
B1_e	8	0
B2_a	6	3
B2_b	6	10
B2_c	2	0
B2_d	7	0
B3_a	4	8
B3_b	2	5
B3_c	2	3
B3_d	1	0
B3_e	2	0
B3_f	1	8
B4_a	4	4
B4_b	1	3
B4_c	0	3
B4_d	2	1
B4_e	7	0
B4_f	9	0
B5_a	1	3
B5_b	0	6
B5_c	2	8
B5_d	0	0
B5_e	0	0
B5_f	2	1

A

A

Table A.6.2 Frequency of newly formulated codes during coding in the case of **Bandung** (Wittig, 2017)

Code	Frequency BDG
G1_c	12
G1_d	1
G3_c	3
G3_d	3
G_Smart	16
BDG_ PPK	3
BDG_ Angkot	10
BDG_ Angkot feeder	4
BDG_ Basic	5
BDG_ BRT	7
BDG_ Budget	8
BDG_ Coordination	11
BDG_ Cross sector	2
BDG_ Eco growth	8
BDG_ education	3
BDG_ First & last	7
BDG_ Gedebage	7
BDG_ Interesting choice	11
BDG_ Lapor	1
BDG_ motorcycle	7
BDG_ Phone	1
BDG_ PKN	2
BDG_ young	1
BDG_ PD	1
BDG_ private vehicle	3
BDG_ Problem angkot	9
BDG_ Railbased	1
BDG_ Road for PT	3
BDG_SAUM	2
BDG_ Status	4

Code	Frequency BDG
BDG_ Traditional travel behaviour	3
RK_ Asian games	2
RK_ App	5
RK_ Architect	6
RK_Bidding system	1
RK_BUM	10
RK_ Change program	3
RK_ City beautification	10
RK_ Quality information	1
RK_E-musrembang	2
RK_FGD	2
RK_Fighting corruption	2
RK_Hari Angkot	1
RK_ International ideas	2
RK_lack of consistency	2
RK_Lack of finance	14
RK_Lack of law enforcement	4
RK_marketing	4
RK_metro capsul	2
RK_Misleading	6
RK_Monitoring	2
RK_NMT	23
RK_No BMA	1
RK_Park	5
RK_PPP	14
RK_ Prioritization	12
RK_problem	12
RK_ Resistence	2
RK_Wuick win	6
RK_Requires public transport	20
RK_Skywalk	2
RK_social media	15
RK_superficial transparency	3
RK_Technopolis	1
8RK_Vision	3

Table A.6.3 Frequency of newly formulated codes during coding in the case of **Medellín** (Wittig, 2017)

Code	Frequency MED
G_1_a1	6
G_1_b1	6
G_1_c	3
G_1_d	25
G_2_SF	12
G_3_b1	11
G_3_b2	6
G_3_b3	5
G_3_c	14
MED_bus	5
MED_ Ticket	7
MED_ EPM	6
MED_ Estratos	6
MED_ Financial independence	9
MED_ Inequality	2
MED_ invisible borders	1
MED_ lobby TPC	5
MED_ competition	6
MED_ Metro Own	4
MED_ isolation	6
MED_ particular challenges	9
MED_TPC	23
MED_ Local identity	3
MED_Metro Company	16
MED_Walk	4
SF_ acknowledgement	13
SF_against nepotism	4
SF_against traditional politics	9
SF_Anti-corruption	6

Code	Frequency MED
SF_Approval	3
SF_Centrality development	4
SF_ Changed mind-set about public transport	5
SF_charisma	5
SF_ citizen culture	4
SF_communication skills	14
SF_ integration levels	4
SF_education	9
SF_Financial decision	5
SF_Independent candidate	7
SF_Integrate TPC	11
SF_Local small interventions	4
SF_mathematic	3
SF_Meritocracy	13
SF_Mistrust council	6
SF_Negotiation table	9
SF_New staff	2
SF_NMT	14
SF_Open Meetings	1
SF_Pedagogue	6
SF_people centered developments	2
SF_Public ownership	13
SF_Public transport to reconnect	8
SF_PUI	18
SF_Relocation	3
SF_ Sensitivity for problems	23
SF_Start dialogue	5
SF_Strategic projects to develop connections	17
SF_system or projects	5
SF_Systematic message	6
SF_TV	3
SF_Using bad legacy	7
SF_Value public money	1
SF_work on dream	2
SF_Walking for internal movement	5

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Appendix 7

Atlas.ti analysis output

[the atlas.ti analysis outputs are available upon request]