Bijlagen

Bijlage 1 – Volledige originele definities van de indicatoren

In deze bijlage zijn de volledige originele definities van de indicatoren weergegeven zoals die in het Polity IV Project en de WDI omschreven zijn opgenomen.

POLITY2 indicator

Kader 1 – Volledige originele definitie van de POLITY2 indicator

Indicators of Democracy and Autocracy (Composite Indicators)

Three broad processes have reshaped the global landscape of state structures during the last two centuries. One is an extraordinary expansion in the absolute and relative power of the state, a process that began in Europe. The new states created by the American and French revolutions marked the threshold between a political world dominated by monarchies, whose claims to absolutism were belied by the fact that most social and economic life was autonomous from state control or extraction, and a political world in which state power was based on ever-widening control and mobilization of human and material resources in exchange for broadened rights of popular participation. An integral part of this process was the development of bureaucracies with high capacities to regulate, tax, and mobilize people in the service of state policy.

The second process was the transformation of the structures of political participation and legitimation. This transformation followed one of two paths, toward plural democracy or mass-party autocracy. The popular side of the bargain by which most West European rulers built state power in the nineteenth century was to acknowledge the right of widespread participation in policy making. That right was given institutional expression in elected assemblies which could review, and sometimes initiate, public policy; in elections, direct or indirect, of chief ministers; and in recognition of citizens' rights to voice and act on political opinions. The concept of bargain is a metaphor for sequences of political crises and reforms in which these rulers granted rights for participation, however limited, to all significant social classes and groups, while simultaneously extending the state's right and capacity to regulate, tax, and mobilize the human and material bases of state power.

The process of political democratization had its own logic and dynamic which, in most of Western Europe, eroded all but a few symbolic vestiges of traditional autocracy (see for example Bendix 1978). Nonetheless, pressures to extend democratization have always contended with the self-interested desire of rulers to preserve and enhance their autonomy from political constraints. The empires of Central and Eastern Europe--Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary--implemented the trappings but not the substance of effective democratic participation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And all of them collapsed under the combined pressure of unsuccessful wars and internal dissension. The revolutionary Soviet state in Russia provided a new model of autocracy which combined democratic forms--a mass party and nominally representative institutions--with near-absolute state control of social, economic and political life. In the middle run the new model was proven, in Europe and China, to be almost as resilient as the Western democratic forms, although less efficient for some social and economic purposes. The largely peaceful, post-1990 transformations of Soviet states to more liberal democratic forms of governance appears to

authenticate the democratic, normative element in this model and its influence on the quality of authority transition.

The third general process has been the "Westernization" of state structures elsewhere in the world. The European-derived models have been widely imitated, beginning with the establishment of derivative democracies in the newly independent states of nineteenth century Latin America and concluding with the socialist autocracies of most of the post-revolutionary states of contemporary Afro-Asia.

In an attempt to facilitate empirical analysis of these and other historical trends, Polity IV includes constructed annual measures for both institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC), as many polities exhibit mixed qualities of both of these distinct authority patterns. The measures are composite indices derived from the coded values of authority characteristic component variables (…) according to the formulas, originally designed by Gurr, provided below. A third indicator, POLITY, is derived simply by subtracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC value; this procedure provides a single regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy). During periods of central authority interruption, collapse, or transition, the DEMOC, AUTOC, and POLITY scores will be the assigned Standardized Authority Code (…). (…).

DEMOC (…)
Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. T hird is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include coded data on civil liberties.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.3 and 2.2), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4) using the following weights:

Authority Coding	Scale Weight
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP):	
(3) Election	+2
(2) Transitional	+1
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):	
only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)	
(3) Dual/election	+1
(4) Election	+1
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):	
(7) Executive parity or subordination	+4
(6) Intermediate category	+3
(5) Substantial limitations	+2
(4) Intermediate category	+1
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):	
(5) Competitive	+3
(4) Transitional	+2
(3) Factional	+1

This "institutional democracy" indicator follows a logic similar to that underlying the Polity I analyses. There is no "necessary condition" for characterizing a political system as democratic, rather democracy is treated as a variable. For example, the scale discriminates among Western parliamentary and presidential systems based on the extent of constraints on the chief executive. Charles de Gaulle as president of the French Fifth Republic operated within slight to moderate political limitations. Thus the early years of the Fifth Republic have lower Democracy scores than the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, where constraints on the executive approach parity. Similarly, the onset of "cohabitation" in France during the second phase of the first Mitterrand presidency is marked by a shift toward parity on the Executive Constraints scale and a concomitant increase in France's Democracy score.

If the composite indicator of institutionalized democracy is inappropriate for some conceptual purposes, it can be easily redefined either by altering the constituent categories and weights, or by specifying some minimum preconditions. A mature and internally coherent democracy, for example, might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.

2.2 AUTOC (…)

Institutionalized Autocracy: "Authoritarian regime" in Western political discourse is a pejorative term for some very diverse kinds of political systems whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and concern for political freedoms. We use the more neutral term Autocracy and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity, but we regard this as a function of political ideology and choice, not a defining property of autocracy. Social democracies also exercise relatively high degrees of directiveness. We prefer to leave open for empirical investigation the question of how Autocracy, Democracy, and Directiveness (performance) have covaried over time.

An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational indicator of autocracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 2.6), the regulation of participation (variable 2.5), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.2 and 2.3), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4) using the following weights:

Authority Coding	Scale Weight
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP):	
(1) Selection	+2
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):	
only if XRCOMP is coded Selection (1)	
(1) Closed	+1
(2) Dual/designation	+1
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):	
(1) Unlimited authority	+3
(2) Intermediate category	+2
(3) Slight to moderate limitations	+1
Regulation of participation (PARREG):	
(4) Restricted	+2
(3) Sectarian	+1
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):	
(1) Repressed	+2
(2) Suppressed	+1

> The logic of this "institutionalized autocracy" scale is similar to that of the institutionalized democracy scale, below, and it is subject to the same kinds of operational redefinition to suit different theoretical purposes. Note that the two scales do not share any categories in common. Nonetheless many polities have mixed authority traits, and thus can have middling scores on both Autocracy and Democracy scales. These are the kinds of polities which were characterized as "anocratic" and "incoherent" in the Polity I studies. As a group they proved to less durable than coherent democracies and autocracies (see Gurr 1974, Harmel 1980, Lichbach 1984).
>
> **POLITY (…)**
> Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
>
> **POLITY2 (…)**
> Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or ""fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).

Bron: Marshall, M.G. en K. Jaggers 2002.

LIFEXPATBIR indicator

Kader 2 – Volledige originele definitie van de LIFEXPATBIR indicator

> **Life expectancy at birth, total**
> Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the United Nations Statistics Division's Population and Vital Statistics Report, country statistical offices, and Demographic and Health Surveys from national sources and Macro International.

Bron: World Bank 2005.

GDPPERCAP indicator

Kader 3 – Volledige originele definitie van de GDPPERCAP indicator

> **GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)**
> GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current international dollars. Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database.

Bron: World Bank 2005.

URBPOP indicator

Kader 4 – Volledige originele definitie van de URBPOP indicator

> **Urban population (% of total population)**
> Urban population is calculated as the difference between the total population and the rural population. Source: The data on urban population shares used to estimate rural population come from the United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. Total population figures are World Bank estimates.

Bron: World Bank 2005.

EMPINAGR indicator

Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)
Employment in agriculture is the proportion of total employment recorded as working in the agricultural sector. Employees are people who work for a public or private employer and receive remuneration in wages, salary, commission, tips, piece rates, or pay in kind. Agriculture includes hunting, forestry, and fishing, corresponding to major division 1 (ISIC revision 2) or tabulation categories A and B (ISIC revision 3). Source: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database.

Bron: World Bank 2005.

LITRATADU indicator

Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)
Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics.

Bron: World Bank 2005.

GROSSCHENRTOT indicator

Gross enrolment ratio
Total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in give school-year. Source: school register, school survey or census for data on enrolment by level of education. Population censuses for school-age population normally obtained from the Central Statistical Office.

Bron: World Bank 2005.

Bijlage 2 – Alfabetisch overzicht van de landen

In deze bijlage is een overzicht van de landen die in het empirisch onderzoek zijn beschouwd opgenomen.

Afghanistan
Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Bhutan
Bolivia
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czech Rebuplic
Dominican Republic
East Timor (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste)
Ecuador
El Salvador
Estonia
Georgia
Germany East
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan

Laos (Lao People's Democratic Republic)
Latvia
Lithuania
Macau
Malaysia
Maldives
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
Nicaragua
North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Singapore
Slovakia
South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Spain
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Thailand
Tibet
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam