

# Making transport more sustainable

*The impact of European White Papers on national transport policy goals*

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## SUMMARY

This research investigates the impact of European White Papers on Transport on national policy, focusing on goals proposed by the European Commission (EC) to reach more sustainable transport.

The vision of the EC on the subject is investigated and compared to national transport policy goals of two Member States. The Netherlands and Spain are chosen as cases to study the impact of the White Papers on their national transport policy documents. Determining the impact consists of two parts: (1) investigating similarities and differences between national transport policy goals and the goals of the EU White Paper based on document analysis and (2) finding the 'level of implementation' applying the 'Communications Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation'. This 'level' is based on questionnaires aimed at policymakers for both cases. Using the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix, the White Papers on Transport are theoretically positioned to find how Member States are supposed to deal with these documents. This tries to explain part of the 'level of implementation'.

It was found that the European White Papers on Transport can be associated mostly with a 'symbolic' style of implementation in the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix. Setting out proposals for action by the EU, the documents do not contain actual legislation or subsidy programs, but these can be initiated as a result of a White Paper. Using Implementation Theory, it appears the 'level of implementation' is highest for the Netherlands. Spain scores slightly lower, mainly due to the lack of credibility of the White Paper as seen by the Spanish. Remarkably, unlike what this 'level' may suggest, the similarity of Spanish national transport policy goals to the goals of the 2001 White Paper appears to be greater than the Netherlands as Spain shares the goals more explicitly. Despite some identified issues of credibility which could be improved to stimulate the implementation of the White Paper, it can be concluded the White Papers make an impact to *a certain extent* on national transport policy documents.

*Keywords:* European Union; White Papers; sustainable transport; implementation theory; ambiguity-conflict matrix.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

European transport policy is rooted in the European Union as early as 1958, being part of the Treaty of Rome. It took until the 1980's to become clear the European Union (EU, then called European Community) had indeed the legitimacy to get involved in Member State's transport policy (EC, 2001: 11). Until 1992, no actual policy proposals were put forward how this should be done. In that year, the first White Paper on transport was published. The focus of that White Paper was on opening-up transport markets in the Community (*ibid.*: 11). Although emphasis on the environmental aspect of transport had emerged in the early 1990s already (Stevens, 2004: 61), it took until the 2001 White Paper on Transport before the term 'sustainable' was added by the European Commission (EC), making it an explicit policy goal.

## 1.1 TRANSPORT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union consists of multiple institutions (see Figure 1). Most relevant for transport policy are the European Parliament and the European Commission. The European Parliament (and the Council of Ministers, in which national governments of the Member States are represented) form the legislative institution for European laws and regulations. The Commission can be seen as the more 'executive' institution (Wallace *et al.*, 2005: 50).




Figure 1 Institutions of the European Union. Adapted from Wallace *et al.* (2005: 52).

Transport policy is influenced largely by the transport committee of the European Parliament (Kaeding, 2007: 42), before it is released through the European Commission. Deadlines for implementation are set by the Council of Ministers of Transport (*ibid.*: 93). A distinct focus of EU transport policy can be found on road transport. About a third of all European transport Directives focus on road issues (and another third on shipping; *ibid.*: 90).

## 1.2 EXISTING RESEARCH AND MOTIVE FOR THIS RESEARCH

Existing research reviewing European transport policies has indicated that these can be seen as important in "providing an international framework" (Transport Research Planning Group, 2006: V). The actual impact of EU White Papers on national transport policy goals seems to have received little attention in literature. For example, KiM (2007) investigated the similarity of multiple Member States and the EU to Dutch national transport policy. Annema

(2005) investigated the effectiveness of certain proposed *measures* of the 2001 White Paper on Transport rather than comparing similarities and differences in more abstract policy goals like this research sets out to investigate. Other research of European transport policy aims at, for example, national policies (Transport Research Planning Group, 2006), reviewing policy scenarios (Petersen *et al.*, 2009) or urban policy transfer (Timms, 2011). To what extent EU policy relates to and actually affects national policy has not always been dealt with sufficiently. This research tries to fill that ‘gap in knowledge’.


**1.3 GOAL AND QUESTIONS**

The goal of this research is to reveal what the impact of the goals proposed in the two most recent EU White Papers on Transport to reach more sustainable transport is on national policy goals. A comparison of similarities and differences between national transport policy goals of two Member States and the goals of the 2001 EU White Paper and the ‘level of implementation’ is made to answer the main question:

What is the impact of European Transport White Papers on national transport policy goals to make transport more sustainable?

The impact will be sought by answering the following sub questions:

1. What is the role of the European White Papers to make transport more sustainable? (Chapter 2)
2. What are the goals of the European Union to make transport more sustainable? (Chapter 2)
3. What are Member States *supposed* to do with the White Papers on Transport? (Chapter 6)
4. What do Member States *actually* do with the 2011 White Paper on Transport? (Chapter 7)



**Figure 2 General research set-up: rough relation between questions and chapters.**

Finding the *impact* of the EU White Papers on national transport policy goals will be done by (1) investigating similarities and differences between the goals of the 2001 White Paper and national policies (Chapter 5) and (2) explaining how the 2011 White Paper is received, perceived and dealt with by Member States (by formulating the ‘level of implementation’ based on Implementation Theory; Chapter 7).

#### **1.4 FOCUS AND DEFINITIONS**

This research will start from the 2001 White Paper on Transport which focused explicitly on making transport more sustainable. The 2001 White Paper sets out to achieve “[a] modern transport system [which] must be sustainable from an economic and social as well as an environmental viewpoint” (EC, 2001: 10). Both the 2001 and 2011 White Papers are looked at to provide a broad overview of European goals to make transport more sustainable. Only the 2001 White Paper will be researched to find the similarities and differences between the White Paper and national transport policy documents as the more recent White Paper may not yet have found its way into national policy. The ‘level of implementation’ will be based on the 2011 White Paper on Transport, as it may be more difficult for respondents to answer the questions for an rather old document.

Sustainable development has been a goal for the European Union for several years. Although reaching more sustainable transport has been said to be a ‘key issue’, it is important to keep in mind that it is only *one* key issue. Health, poverty and social exclusion are examples of other ‘key issues’ which also need to be taken into account in sustainable development in general (see e.g. EC, 2005).

#### **1.5 OUTLINE**

In Chapter 2, the *European Union* is the focus of attention. The role of the EU White Papers to influence transport policy is introduced. The Chapter also outlines the goals of the EU to make transport more sustainable. The expected roles of the European Union itself and ‘others’ to reach more sustainable transport are investigated. This is to lay the basis for comparing Member State’s national transport policy goals with the goals expressed in the White Papers on Transport.

Chapter 3 discusses the *theory* behind this research. It introduces the ‘Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix’ for studying what ‘style of implementation’ the White Papers aim at, i.e. what Member States are supposed to do with these documents. ‘Implementation Theory’ is introduced which will be used to study what Member States actually do with the White Papers<sup>1</sup>. A model is presented to indicate how policy implementation is influenced and what indicators can be used to study implementation. As (the outcome of) the first theory may have certain implications for the outcome of the second theory, this point will be briefly addressed.

In Chapter 4, the *methodology* of this research is outlined. What research design this thesis builds on is explained, as well as how the two cases are selected and what actual methods are used to investigate these cases. The cases are investigated to find what different countries do with EU White Papers. The idea behind choosing the specific cases is to have some variety in general ‘transposition delay’ as well as expressed transport policy goals of countries.

In Chapter 5, the political context of the two cases is introduced to provide a background in what the most relevant *transport policy* is. Further, the main points of each cases’ transport policy are outlined and compared to the 2001 White Paper to find similarities and differences between the goals of the White Papers and national policy as part of the impact of the EU on national policy.

Chapter 6 positions the White Papers on Transport in the *Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix* developed by Matland (1995). It is investigated to indicate what Member States are *supposed* to do with the White Papers.

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<sup>1</sup> White Papers are not required to be ‘implemented’ like, for example, legislation so this term may be confusing. For further discussion, see section 3.2.



Chapter 7 scores and studies what the Member States *actually* do with the White Papers using *Implementation Theory* developed by Goggin *et al.* (1990). Per case the results on scoring the 'level of implementation' are presented as part of the impact of the EU on national transport policy goals. The two countries are compared to each other in the concluding section.

Lastly, in Chapter 8 the main *conclusions* from the research are presented, including a discussion of and reflection on the research as well as recommendations for both reaching EU policy goals to make transport more sustainable and for future research.

## 2. EUROPEAN WHITE PAPERS ON TRANSPORT

In this Chapter, the European White Papers are focus of attention. It aims to find an answer to the question what role these documents have in making transport more sustainable. First, the role of the White Papers is outlined. Second, the main points of the 2001 White Paper are set out. The second will provide the basis for comparing Member State's national transport policy goals with the goals expressed in the White Papers on Transport, part of finding the impact of White Papers on national transport policy goals.

### **2.1 THE ROLE OF EU WHITE PAPERS**

The European Union has two main types of legal instruments (Alesina *et al.*, 2005). A distinction can be made between 'primary' and 'secondary' legislation. 'Primary' legislation refers to treaties in general which legally bind Member States to comply with the contents of a treaty, which is further not the focus of this research. 'Secondary legislation' refers to both *binding* instruments and *non-binding* instruments. 'Regulations', 'directives' and 'decisions' are identified as binding instruments. Then there are the non-binding instruments such as the White Papers for the EU "to outline their legislative strategies" (Alesina *et al.*, 2005: 288). These are not exclusively 'soft' documents to outline a strategy, since "in many cases they are used to lay tentative ground for successive more binding forms of policy" (*ibid.*: 294) and can show a certain level of attention to the subject at hand. As Alias (2008: 21) emphasizes, White Papers *aim* at, though not yet *are* "setting the legal framework and the budgetary support by the European Union for a certain development".

Key aspect of a White Paper is this non-binding nature, "containing proposals for Community action in a specific area" (Summaries of EU legislation, 2012). It may also be a way to communicate that the Commission, which releases the White Papers, is 'aware' of certain issues (see e.g. Alias, 2008). Only when Member States agree on the goals and actions proposed in a White Paper, this may lead to actual legislation, subsidy programs, and the like. In other words, "[w]hen a White Paper is favourably received by the Council, it can lead to an action programme for the Union in the area concerned" (Summaries of EU legislation, 2012). Many such subsidy or action programs are in place already (see Humphreys, 2011 for an overview), like the 'Marco Polo' subsidy program to stimulate intermodality.

It appears from the above there are no (direct) consequences at all for Member States if they would not comply with the goals of the White Papers on Transport, since such documents contain only *proposals* for action with which Member States can deal at their own discretion. When the content of the White Paper *would* be turned into 'binding policy', Member States that acted according to the content of a White Paper in the first place may have some sort of advantage. It is important to note that even in cases of legally binding policy to make transport more sustainable, (legal) consequences are unlikely at all as it may be nearly impossible to review the abstract notion of 'sustainability' in policy (Humphreys, 2011: 112). Still, having similar goals as the EU White Papers could possibly 'smooth' the implementation of binding policy resulting from the White Papers.

### **2.2 THE GOALS OF THE EU: MAIN POINTS OF THE 2001 WHITE PAPER**

This section tries to answer the question what the goals of the EU are to make transport more sustainable and provide the basis for comparing Member State's national transport policy goals with the goals expressed in the White Papers on Transport.

Janic (2006) the EU defines a sustainable transport system as one that<sup>2</sup>:

1. provides in basic access for and development needs of individuals, companies and society in a way that is consistent with human and ecosystem health;
2. offers a choice of transport mode, is affordable and supports a competitive economy and regional development;
3. limits emissions to the ability of the environment to absorb these, makes use of renewable energy sources, while also minimizing the impacts of the use of land and generation of noise (Janic, 2006: 83).

The above definition provides a starting point on how sustainable transport is seen by the European Union. In the 2001 White Paper, the Commission made sustainable development an explicit part of the document by stating a large amount of measures to be taken to ‘optimize’ the transport system which should be able to support the “demands of enlargement and sustainable development” (EC, 2001: 11). It contains “the essential abstract objectives and concrete measures or concepts for a more sustainable transport policy” for the EU (Alias, 2008: 7). Optimizing the transport system should be achieved by the five main elements that can be identified in the White Paper:

1. Balance modes of transport;
2. Reduce congestion;
3. Ease bottlenecks;
4. Ensure user rights;
5. Manage globalization of transport (EC, 2001: 21).

All elements are related to each other (and to some extent overlap) and all elements are to be influenced by a number of measures and actors.

1. The Commission identifies a great *imbalance between modes of transport*, particularly referring to the relatively large share of road and air traffic (EC, 2001: 23). This is unwanted not only because it supposedly causes congestion, but also because it limits the use of alternative modes than road haulage. To stimulate a shift in modal choice, the Commission wants to actively stimulate two measures: increasing competition between modes and stimulating intermodality (*ibid.*: 23). The first is proposed to be done by eliminating price distortions (e.g. through taxation or subsidies) from both the EU and Member States perspective (*ibid.*: 20). The second should be incorporated in the Trans-European Networks (TEN’s) and supported by European funds to initiate such developments (*ibid.*: 42). For example, a specific subsidy program called ‘Marco Polo’ was proposed and started to stimulate intermodality initiatives by providing subsidies (*ibid.*: 47). This program is also an example of how proposals in a White Paper may lead to actual programs.
2. *Congestion* is said to be caused by the just-discussed imbalance between modes. A ‘better spread’ between different modes of transport is expected to reduce congestion by applying the measures mentioned in the previous point. Transport via rail and waterways are identified as “a real competitive alternative to land transport” (EC, 2001: 42). The Commission sees itself in a role of stimulating such alternatives to reduce congestion. Congestion clearly relates to easing bottlenecks as well.

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<sup>2</sup> For reasons of simplification, some elements have been slightly reformulated or left out.

3. *Easing bottlenecks*, or eliminating those entirely, is another main point the Commission sees a clear role for itself by stimulating the quicker development of unfinished TEN-projects, including the improvement of links with the new Member States after the enlargement (EC, 2001: 88). In addition, the Community (i.e. the Member States) is needed “to allow the development of multimodal corridors giving priority to freight and a high-speed network for passengers” (*ibid.*: 51). Such multimodal corridors are expected to ease bottlenecks. The issue of funding for necessary infrastructure is explicitly discussed in the White Paper and the need to include public funding is emphasized (*ibid.*: 58, 59). So, ‘others’ are to be involved here as well, referring to the private sector and effectively meaning the attraction of private investors and using public-private partnerships.
4. *Ensuring user rights* is to be achieved mostly through EU regulation. The White Paper states this is related to road safety, clearly setting out actual costs of transport and the rights (as well as obligations) transport users have in case of conflicts (EC, 2001: 65). The Commission plans to drastically reduce the number of casualties in road transport by enforcing Directives on, for example, technical requirements for vehicles, adapt penalties and fines in different Member States to equalize those (*ibid.*: 66). Although Member States are urged to comply with basic safety regulations (to be) set by the Commission (e.g. *ibid.*: 68), these do not have a clear role in this part of ensuring user rights. With regard to the actual costs of transport, the Member States are indeed expected to play a role as the Community should “gradually [...] replace existing transport system taxes with more effective instruments for integrating infrastructure costs and external costs” (*ibid.*: 71). The goal here is to reach a ‘fair price’ that reflects also the actual costs of transport, which in turn is supposed to increase competitiveness between different modes of transport (again this exemplifies the overlap between the elements). Lastly, with regard to setting out the rights and obligations of transport users the Commission ascribes itself the role of setting clear regulations in case of conflicts. *Very* concrete examples of these are mentioned to be publishing a list classifying different airlines according to performance and provide legal charters for conflicts in air transport as a result of passenger misbehavior (*ibid.*: 79-80). So, in this element the emphasis is mostly on the role of the Commission, although some links with Member States can be found.
5. Management of *the globalization of transport* is the final main element of this White Paper. It refers mainly to the enlargement of the EU that had yet to take place in 2001. It is said to give the EU “a truly continental dimension” (EC, 2001: 87), increasing the need to see especially maritime and air transport in a global context. The Commission sees its role in this as speaking “a single voice for the European Union in international bodies” (*ibid.*: 92), such as the WTO and ICAO. The Commission emphasizes that Member States should (no longer) act on their own behalf in global agreements and partnerships on transport issues, but rather let the EU speak on behalf of the common European interest. Thus, the focus of the White Paper remains on strengthening the role of the EU itself.

Table 1 summarizes the findings of analyzing the 2001 White Paper on Transport on who are expected to play a role in achieving the policy goals, using only the key elements from the White Paper. Within these elements, many concrete measures are proposed. These are not incorporated in the Table to keep it orderly.

**Table 1 Roles of EU, Member States and ‘others’ in the 2001 White Paper.**

		EU	Member States	Others
2001	Balance modes of transport	x	x	
	Reduce congestion	x		
	Ease bottlenecks	x	x	x
	Ensure user rights	x	x	
	Manage globalization of transport	x		

**Based on EC (2001).**

The roles the EU itself has and the Member States have, has traditionally been one of initiating and facilitating by the former and implementing and enforcing by the latter (Banister *et al.*, 2000: 64), both for EU policy in general and transport policy more specifically. In general, the White Papers focus on the role of the European Commission itself, the organization that published the Papers in the first place. In some instances, the Member States are expected to act together with the Commission or on their own. In one case, ‘others’, like transport users, are expected to play some sort of role as well, as can be identified in Table 1.

**2.3 CONCLUSION**

In this Chapter, the European Union has been focus of attention. It was found that the White Papers are mostly ‘soft’ documents, containing *proposals* for action by the European Community. Actual actions are still to be determined. White Papers seem to indicate the Commission is ‘aware’ of certain issues and sets out how this could be responded to. It was also found that when Member States ‘favorably receive’ the proposals of the document, these may be turned into actual legislation, subsidy programs and the like.

Investigation of the 2001 White Paper to answer the question what the goals of the EU are to make transport more sustainable, found that the document seemed to focus on *curbing* mobility. In addition, the White Paper explicitly sets out the Commissions tries to achieve most goals itself and in some instances expects ‘others’ (e.g. Member States or road users) to play a role in reaching more sustainable transport. This has been investigated to form the basis for finding the impact of White Papers on national transport policy goals.

### 3. IMPLEMENTATION AND THEORY

In this Chapter, two scientifically sound theoretical models will be introduced for studying the impact of the European White Papers on Transport.

First, for answering the question what Member States are *supposed* to do with the White Papers, the ‘Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix’ developed by Matland (1995) will be applied. This theory is chosen for it tries to describe the implementation process of a policy to find the ‘*type* of implementation’ (Matland, 1995: 156), identifying *how* the policy is *supposed* to be implemented. In other words, the model “creates a typology of policy implementation contexts by considering the extent to which ambiguity and conflict impact policy implementation” (Mischen & Sinclair, 2009: 149). It could therefore be suitable to study the question how Member States are *supposed* to implement the White Papers on Transport, providing a framework for investigating the ‘context’ in which (i.e. ‘how’) the documents are to be ‘implemented’.

Second, to find an answer to the question what the Member States *actually* do with the White Papers, ‘Implementation Theory’ as formulated by Goggin *et al.* (1990) will be applied. This second theory is chosen for it is developed to find the ‘*style* of implementation’, in other words the way in which policy is (actually) implemented like this research seeks to find. The theory focuses on the implementation of *intergovernmental* policies, like the EU White Papers and it can be used not only for ‘hard’ laws and court decisions, but also more ‘soft’ policies and regulations (Goggin *et al.*, 1990: 35), like the European White Papers. A practical consideration to choose this model is the research design Goggin *et al.* include for setting up implementation research (using a large number of indicators). After slightly adapting the indicators to make the theory suitable for the situation of the EU, it provides a scientifically sound framework for researching what Member States actually do with the European White Papers on Transport.

Both models will be introduced in this Chapter, setting out its main points and how these could be used for research and how these are adapted to this research more specifically.

#### 3.1 THE AMBIGUITY-CONFLICT MATRIX

The ‘Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix’ is a way of mapping different ways in which policy is implemented (so-called ‘styles of implementation’; see also Figure 3). In this research, it is used to




Figure 3 Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix. Source: Matland (1995: 160).

investigate what ‘style of implementation’ the European Union aims at with the White Papers on Transport. In other words, what Member States are *supposed* to do with White Papers.

The matrix, developed by Matland (1995), centers around the levels of two key variables: *ambiguity* and *conflict*. By combining these, a matrix can be formed to position the ‘style of implementation’. The matrix is especially sensitive to local contexts, acknowledging that a different situation requires a different kind of implementation, accounting for a high level of complexity in policy-making (deLeon & deLeon, 2002: 471).

### 3.1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE MATRIX

As Matland (1995: 159) argues, policy *ambiguity* has a clear effect on the implementation process and notes several examples. For example, ambiguity may hinder the proper monitoring of the implementation process, the policy may be differently understood in different places and contextual factors may play an increasing role in implementation. This could be seen as a problem, but not necessarily is so as “[t]he clearer the goals, the more likely they are to lead to conflict” (*ibid.*: 158). Thus, by deliberately making policy ambiguous, conflicts may be avoided hence actually improving policy implementation.

*Ambiguity* is argued to consist of at least four elements, namely:

1. Clarity of goals;
2. Extent to which interpretation is allowed;
3. Uncertainties about roles of various organizations;
4. Uncertainties about which tools to use to implement the policy (Matland, 1995: 157-158).

The *first* refers to the extent to which goals are formulated in such a way that it is clear how the abstract policy is to be translated to local measures, which could contribute to a greater ‘ambiguity’ or ‘unclearness’. The *second* expresses the extent to which “diverse actors can interpret the same act in different ways” (Matland, 1995: 158), possibly making the policy more problematic to implement. Goals could be met in different ways, for example sensitive to local circumstances or precisely prescribed. The *third* refers to the level of clarity on who is expected to actually implement the policy. The *fourth* is meant to account for complex situations in which it may be unclear which tools are most appropriate to implement the policy, for example referring to uncertainties of the impact of a certain tool.

*Conflict* is the other key element of the matrix. The “degree of goal congruence” mainly influences the policy implementation which is noted to depend on:

1. Interdependence of actors;
2. Incompatibility of objectives;
3. Perceived zero-sum element to the interactions (Matland, 1995: 156).

The *first* and *second* may become apparent when several organizations see the policy as relevant to their interests but not share the same view on, for example, how to realize the goals or the means to do so. As Mischen & Sinclair (2009: 159) emphasize, it is vital here to ask “conflict between whom?” to identify where conflict exists, like between cultures of organizations or simply between people involved. They argue it is key to know how consistent the proposed policy is with such cultures to identify and deal with conflict. The *third* is mostly apparent when there is a lot at stake with the policy and these stakes are incompatible with each other:

“[t]he more important a decision is, the more aggressive behavior will be” as Matland (1995: 157) described the element. This third element appears hardly distinctive from the second and will therefore not be used further in this research.

The actual *level* of ambiguity and conflict is the basis of the matrix developed by Matland. Using these two basic variables it creates four ‘types of implementation’ processes, each representing a certain kind of likely implementation under the given policy (i.e. under low or high conflict and low or high ambiguity). The ‘central principle’ that determines the outcome of the type of implementation is shown as well. Each of these four types will be briefly outlined below.

#### *3.1.1.1 Administrative implementation*

For this type of implementation, both the ambiguity and conflict are low, which allows “a rational decision-making process” (Matland, 1995: 160), basically a ‘top-down’ manner of hierarchically passing-on the policy. Although both goals and means are clear in this type, the actual outcome still depends on the availability of *resources*. Due to the overall clarity in means to reach certain goals, assigning resources would hardly be a problem. This type of implementation is described as a relatively smooth, ‘top-down’ process.

#### *3.1.1.2 Political implementation*

Cases of relatively low ambiguity but high conflict are typical for political settings. The goals are clear (not-ambiguous), but the means are disputed (Matland, 1995: 163). The implementation now depends mostly on *power*: what coalition has the most power to push their policy proposals or ideas through determines the outcome of the implementation process. To force the policy through, Matland (1995: 164) observes two predominant mechanisms: coercive and remunerative. The first mainly refers to obligate the policy implementation with sanctions as pressure measures. The second emphasizes agreement on means and actions (not so much the goals) to force implementation, for example through bargaining in conflicts; those conflicts which “cannot be resolved can be buried in ambiguous text” (Matland, 1995: 164).

#### *3.1.1.3 Experimental implementation*

When conflict is low, but ambiguity is high, the *contextual conditions* on the local scale where policy is being implemented become dominant (Matland, 1995: 165-166). Suddenly all depends on the local actors and (their) resources, which can vary greatly from place to place. When the goals are rather ambiguous, the uncertainty of means to get to those goals can become problematic. Which actors are involved becomes key in the outcome of the process. Such an implementation type could be used to “create policies to deal with local needs” (*ibid.*: 166).

#### *3.1.1.4 Symbolic implementation*

Cases in which both ambiguity and conflict are high may seem slightly unlikely. The question then would be what actually is causing conflict if a policy is so vague. The key thing in such a case is the ‘symbols’ intended with the policy that are disputed. It could be said that symbolic implementation “appears to be code for ‘not much hope here’” (deLeon & deLeon, 2002: 486). However, as Matland (1995: 168) argues, this is not the case as it instead simply leads to different approaches locally in translating abstract, ambiguous policy goals into concrete actions. Therefore, the *coalition strength* in putting forward their preferred interpretation at the local level becomes key since it controls resources for implementation. This type seems to relate most clearly to a ‘bottom-up’ approach, although “Matland has difficulty placing this form of implementation in either the top-down or bottom-up camp” (Mischen & Sinclair, 2009: 157). Just like in the type of ‘political implementation’, coercive and remunerative (us-



ing sanctions and bargaining, for example) mechanisms could be used to deal with conflicting views.

**3.1.2 RECOGNIZING TYPES OF IMPLEMENTATION**

In order to actually recognize different types of implementation, Table 2 is created based on the variables involved in ambiguity and conflict according to Matland’s matrix as outlined above. The two key variables ambiguity and conflict consist of several indicators, as just-discussed. When measuring or scoring these, it should indicate the level of ambiguity and conflict (in the matrix ranging from ‘low’ to ‘high’). This could then be used to determine in what type of implementation the policy can be situated. Some caution is required in scoring the variables, however, as Mischen & Sinclair (2009: 151) remind us that ambiguity and conflict “fall along a continuum”. Not in all cases the scoring may be exactly clear and may in some cases be debated.

**Table 2 Recognizing types of implementation.**

Variable		Scoring (low-medium-high)
Ambiguity	Of goals	Goal clarity
		Allow interpretation
	Of means	Uncertainties about roles of various organizations Uncertainties of knowing which tools to use
Conflict	Degree of goal congruence	Interdependence between actors
		Incompatibility of objectives

**Based on Matland (1995).**

**3.1.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE MATRIX**

For this research, the limited role of resources (whether financial or in terms of personnel to implement the policy) and feedback in the matrix stand out. For studying how the White Papers are supposed to be implemented, the second element is rather important as it remains unexplained how inputs from feedback could shape what Member States are supposed to do with the White Papers. In the model, Matland seems to pay only little attention to this issue in the form of ‘learning’ in ‘experimental implementation’ (Matland, 1990: 167). Yet still, it does not provide implications for the role of feedback in a revision or renewal of a White Paper on Transport. The first is less important as the documents do not come with resources to be implemented. Matland argues the available resources determine the outcome of ‘administrative implementation’, but what role resources play in the other types of implementation remains largely implicit. So, how (lack of) resources could influence the type of implementation remains unexplained for the case of the EU White Papers on Transport.

Despite these limitations, the matrix provides in indication of what type of policy documents the White Papers are to explain what Members States do with the White Papers. The latter will be investigated using Implementation Theory.

**3.2 IMPLEMENTATION THEORY**

To study what the Member States *actually* do with the White Papers, ‘Implementation Theory’ as formulated by Goggin *et al.* (1990) will be used. In the context of this research, the name of this theory may be a bit deceiving. Although the White Papers do not require to be ‘implemented’ like laws or directives for example, the theory provides a *framework* for investigating how policy is received, perceived and dealt with, which is precisely what this research sets out to study. ‘Implementation’ should thus be seen as giving “practical effect to and en-

sure of actual fulfillment by concrete measures” (Merriam-Webster, 2012). This will become more clear in introducing the theory and model.

3.2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND THE MODEL

When using this theory, a vast number of indicators is to be considered to study what affects the actual implementation of a policy. The model is visualized in Figure 4, only showing the most essential elements. It will be used to study what Member States actually do with the EU White Papers.

The model sets out to investigate what determines how policy is implemented. It argues that this is determined by a large number of factors (in actually applying the model called ‘indicators’), like ‘Federal-level Inducements and Constraints’, ‘State Decisional Outcome’ and ‘State Capacity’. These clearly focus on the situation of the United States and thus has to be adapted slightly for the situation of the European Union.

Implementation of policy is seen as a process in this model, rather than just one fixed moment in time, since it may be difficult to say precisely *when* a policy is ‘fully’ implemented. The model tries to account for the dynamics of this process by investigating how decisions are made, based on what agendas, interests, motives, patterns of influence, inducements (incen-




Figure 4 ‘Communications Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation’. Adapted from Goggin et al. (1990: 32).

tives) and constraints, et cetera (Goggin et al., 1990: 30-31). The level of (policy) implementation (in Figure 4 called ‘State Implementation’) is determined both from the ‘top’ (e.g. the ‘federal’ level) and from the ‘bottom’ (‘state’ and ‘local’ level). From both levels, certain inducements and constraints determine the extent or ‘level’ to which a policy can be implemented. For example, Goggin et al. (1990: 172) hypothesized that policy implementation coming from the ‘top’ will be improved when it comes with sufficient resources and is seen as a credible solution to the problem at hand. Lack of these may constrain implementation, they argue. Some inducements or constraints may come from the ‘bottom’, like the strength of advocacy coalitions to promote or block policy implementation and the level of available resources from the lower-level government to actually be able to implement policy (Goggin et al., 1990: 179).

Both levels (top and bottom) determine the ‘state decisional outcome’ and ‘state capacity’, which refer to the ability of a state to act both in terms of organizational capacity (e.g. the availability of personnel and resources) and ecological capacity (the context environment of the state, e.g. political or socioeconomic circumstances in a state), as Goggin *et al.* (1990: 38) have defined these elements. Such circumstances may promote or hinder implementation. The way policy is implemented may be a source for feedback and policy redesign, in order to make the policy more suitable (Goggin *et al.*, 1990: 39). This also may be promoted or constrained by the extent to which policy-makers can be reach for listening and learning (e.g. due to their ideological background, willingness to redesign policy; Goggin *et al.*, 1990: 186).

### *3.2.2 ELEMENTS AND INDICATORS OF THE MODEL*

To operationalize the model for actual research, Goggin *et al.* (1990) have formulated a large number of indicators for the different factors outlined above to find the ‘level of implementation’. The indicators are summarized and explained in Table 3. The column ‘Meaning’ explains what the indicator entails. In the next section, these will be slightly adapted to fit the situation of the EU better. The actual operationalization in order to use the model for researching policy in the EU will be done in the next Chapter.

**Table 3 Factors and indicators of the Model.**

	Factor from model	Indicator	Meaning	
Independent variables	Federal-level inducements and constraints	Policy content	Extent to which policy comes with sufficient resources and is credible (e.g. makes sense, seems effective)	
		Policy clarity	Straightforward in terms of means and ends (e.g. tasks and targets)	
		Policy consistency	Coherent with and not contradict other policies	
		Policy form	Extent to which policy is clear, frequently repeated and actually received	
		Perceptions about federal officials	Extent to which officials are seen as legitimate and credible	
	State and local inducements and constraints	Strength of an advocacy coalition	Extent to which advocates (either in favor of or opposed to) policy can use pressure to be heard (e.g. by size of the coalition, resources spent)	
		Attributes of elected and appointed officials	Interests and motives of both influencing policy (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation)	
		Message content and form	Extent to which policy is credible and well-received by local governments	
		Attributes of senders	Extent to which the 'messenger' of the new policy is credible, legitimate, et cetera	
		Intervening variables	State decisional outcome & State capacity	<i>Organizational capacity:</i> Organizational units
Financial resources	Extent to which sufficient funding is available in the state to implement policy			
<i>Ecological capacity:</i> State fiscal capacity	Size of available budget from the state itself (related to the wealth of the state)			
State political capacity	Political openness for policy innovation (e.g. liberal, progressive, political culture in general)			
State situational capacity	Extent to which the policy issue is seen as a problem in the state (influenced by e.g. severity of the problem and media attention)			
Feedback and policy redesign	Listening and learning		Extent to which feedback from lower levels (on problems) are described, explained and processed	
	Agents, agencies, messages and channels		Reputation and credibility of elected officials, their organizations and formal or informal ways of communication	
	Principle characteristics		Extent to which highest level officials can be reached for communicating feedback (e.g. influenced by ideology of the 'principle' official)	
Dependent variable	Implementation process, outputs and outcomes			

**Source of the elements, indicators and their meaning: Goggin et al. (1990: throughout).**

### 3.2.3 ADAPTING THE MODEL: MEASURING IMPLEMENTATION FOR EU WHITE PAPERS

As the original model was developed for policy and regulations for the situation in the United States (with its system of federal and state levels), the indicators and names of the elements in the model should be adapted to be applicable to the European situation. For example, what will be regarded as 'federal level' is the level of the EU as the creator of the policies under investigation. The 'States' are considered to be the 'Member States' of the EU, being the primary 'receivers' of the policy. The actual meaning of the indicators largely remains the same, as will be elaborated more on below.

#### 3.2.3.1 Indicators

Not all indicators from the original model are relevant for studying the impact of European White Papers on national policy goals. For example, due to the character of the White Papers under investigation here, there are no financial resources available to meet its content (indicator 'Policy content') and therefore this is changed in measuring the indicator. As the White Papers also do not have to be 'implemented' as meant in the original model, the financial resources available to do so is less relevant and thus is adapted slightly as well (see indicator 'Financial resources'). Another example includes the consistency of policy over time from both White Papers (indicator 'Policy consistency') which is less relevant in this research which looks mainly at the 2001 White Paper in comparing it to national transport policy documents. Lastly, the indicator 'Listening and learning' with regard to feedback is mostly relevant from the EU perspective, less so from a Member State's perspective and thus will be left out of the analysis. Feedback is already accounted for in mapping the way in which feedback is communicated to the EU and 'policy redesign' (indicators 'Agents, agencies, messages and channels' and 'Principle characteristics').

For these reasons, the above-mentioned indicators are slightly changed from the original theory or left out of the analysis in adapting the 'Communications Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation' to the case of EU White Papers (see Table 4).

#### 3.2.3.2 Measurement and scores

The indicators to investigate the implementation of the White Papers can generally be measured through (1) content analysis (i.e. in this case: studying the White Papers as well as the transport policy of Member States) and (2) 'expert interviews' (i.e. with the actual policy-makers involved; Goggin *et al.*, 1990: 171-197). This will be discussed in the next Chapter.

The main issues for this research are (1) determining meaningful values which are (2) either relative to other case countries (Member States) or absolute (e.g. scoring 8 out of 10) and (3) choosing between taking average scores or total scores, when combining score for all indicators in one 'end-score' (separate scores per indicator could also be an option). To be able to compare the indicators, a standardized score is proposed by Goggin *et al.* (1990). It could for example range from 0 (to indicate deviation from the policy) to 1 (to indicate compliance) and values like 0,33 and 0,67 in between to indicate degrees of delay (Goggin *et al.*, 1990: 173). However, what is regarded here as the most meaningful, information-rich measurement style is a score per indicator ranging from 1 to 10. This would not only provide an indication of an 'end-score' for the 'level of implementation', but would also provide the possibility of an informed comparison between the different Member States on a specific indicator.

Table 4 shows once more the elements of the Communications Model, now including *which* indicators seem most applicable to the 'soft' White Paper policies and how these indicators are going to be recognized and measured. All these indicators are meant to be scored in order to find what Member States actually do with White Papers. The score is to indicate *what factors determine the impact* of the White Paper on national transport policy.

**Table 4 Factors and indicators of the Model: operationalization of indicators.**

	Factor from model	Indicator	Meaning	Measurement
Independent variables	Federal-level inducements and constraints	Policy content	Extent to which policy comes with sufficient resources and is credible (e.g. makes sense, seems effective)	Scoring on perceived efficacy <sup>2</sup>
		Policy clarity	Straightforward in terms of means and ends (e.g. tasks and targets)	Scoring clarity of both means and ends and assign scores <sup>2</sup>
		Policy consistency	Coherent with and not contradict other policies	Compare messages between the 2001 White Paper and (other) Member State policy ( <i>cross-message</i> ) <sup>2</sup>
		Policy form	Extent to which policy is clear, frequently repeated and actually received	Scoring on perceived clarity <sup>2</sup>
		Perceptions about federal officials	Extent to which officials are seen as legitimate and credible	Subjective scoring on legitimacy and credibility of EU policy-makers as seen by Member States <sup>2</sup>
	State and local inducements and constraints	Strength of an advocacy coalition	Extent to which advocates (either in favor of or opposed to) policy can use pressure to be heard (e.g. by size of the coalition, resources spent)	Identify advocacy coalitions and indicate spent resources, total number of members and score degree of 'skill' to influence policy implementation <sup>2</sup>
		Attributes of elected and appointed officials	Interests and motives of both influencing policy (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation)	Use scalar scores to explain official's behavior <sup>2</sup>
		Message content and form	Extent to which policy is credible and well-received by local governments	Comparing consistency between White Paper and Member State policy <sup>1</sup>

Intervening variables	State decisional outcome & State capacity	<i>Organizational capacity:</i> Organizational units	Extent to which personnel is available and able to act	Investigate the number of ‘units’ (personnel) available for dealing with policy implementation (e.g. using organizational charts) or the organizational structure within which these have to act <sup>2</sup>
		Financial resources	Extent to which sufficient funding is available in the state to implement policy	Identify the budget available for transport policy <sup>1</sup>
		<i>Ecological capacity:</i> State fiscal capacity	Size of available budget from the state itself (related to the wealth of the state)	Set out the income, tax capacity and transport-related expenditures for each Member State <sup>1</sup>
		State political capacity	Political openness for policy innovation (e.g. liberal, progressive, political culture in general)	Score Member State’s political <i>milieu</i> on a scalar scale according to openness and innovativeness <sup>2</sup>
		State situational capacity	Extent to which the policy issue is seen as a problem in the state (influenced by e.g. severity of the problem)	Score perceived severity of problem by Member States <sup>2</sup>
		Feedback and policy redesign	Agents, agencies, messages and channels	Reputation and credibility of elected officials, their organizations and formal or informal ways of communication
	Principle characteristics		Extent to which highest level officials can be reached for communicating feedback (e.g. influenced by ideology of the ‘principle’ official)	Score the by Member States perceived openness to policy redesign of the EU <sup>2</sup>
Dependent variable	Implementation process, outputs and outcomes			

Based on Goggin *et al.* (1990).

### 3.2.4 CRITIQUE ON IMPLEMENTATION THEORY

As the previous exemplified, Implementation Theory requires some adaptation for his research. In addition, it is not immune to other criticism as this section will illustrate. However, this section also argues that Implementation Theory is still very useful for this research. A major critique on the model is formulated by Cline (2000) and can be summarized as the following:

1. The view on *conflict* in policy implementation is limited;
2. Too little attention is paid to issues of *interaction*;
3. Too much focus on a *centralized* view, seeing only the national level as legitimate policy-makers (Cline, 2000: 562, 565, 567).

Such critique may stand in other instances, but it is argued here to be less relevant for this research:

1. Implementation Theory is said to be *too limited in recognizing conflict* since the model “does not link conflict in the implementation process to conflicts over larger social values” and “tends to delink implementation not only from the rest of the policy process but from larger society as well” (Cline, 2000: 562). Cline argues that it appears to be seen in terms of conflicts in the administrative process only. For researching the content of the EU White Papers, this may become an issue since its ‘legal status’ depends entirely on the agreement of Member States, which may be subject to influence from the larger societal discussions. However, in studying the impact of the White Papers on national transport policy documents, this point seems to be less important since the Member States communicate their own views, likely already accounting for such larger societal discussions.
2. The *attention paid to issues of interaction* is argued to be too limited as well. Cline (2000: 565) argues the model emphasizes too much that the lower-level governments simply have to execute what the higher-level governments prefer, leaving too little room for issues on “legitimate interaction in the implementation process” between government levels as well as a lack of attention for the roles of different organizations. This appears to be less applicable to the case of the White Papers, since these documents only emphasize general policy goals in which interaction between Member States and the EU is key in order to find support for the proposals of the document. Thus, this critique is not making the use of Implementation Theory problematic either.
3. A third criticism is the model overemphasizes a *centralized view*, seeing only the national government as the legitimate policy-making authority. The model is argued to leave no room for adaptation by lower-level governments, using communication to minimize such adaptations instead of using it for discussion and negotiation (Cline, 2000: 567). By this, the model would be “incorrectly isolating the process from its larger social and political context” (*ibid.*: 567) since adapting the policy to the circumstances of the lower-level governments would be largely ignored in the model. For the case of the EU White Papers this critique again seems less relevant since the White Papers *are* mainly formulated centrally and only set out general policy goals. Thus, sufficient room for adaptation by the Member States remains, in this case the ‘lower-level governments’.

As the above has exemplified, the ‘Communications Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation’ can be used to study the implementation of *intergovernmental* policies and



'soft' policies, like the EU White Papers. However, some limitations to Implementation Theory can also be found. These appear to be directed mainly at studying the implementation of laws and the like. Since White Papers only set out general policy goals, the mentioned criticism appears less relevant in this case. Therefore, the criticism does not make the theory less useful to study the impact of EU White Papers on national policy.

### **3.3 CONNECTION BETWEEN THEORIES**

The outcome of the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix is likely to have implications for the outcome of Implementation Theory. For example, if the White Papers would be positioned in the 'administrative implementation' box, it would suggest low ambiguity and low conflict about its content. The indicators from Implementation Theory related to these two key variables may then be expected to be scored accordingly. For example, the indicator 'policy clarity' would likely be high (low ambiguity) in the case of 'administrative implementation' and the indicator 'policy consistency' would likely be low (low conflict when it does not contradict other policies). Precisely how these will connect for the case of the EU White Papers may be difficult to predict beyond the just-mentioned examples; this will become more clear after applying both.

### **3.4 CONCLUSION**

In this Chapter, two theoretical models for studying the European White Papers on Transport have been introduced to answer the questions what Member States are supposed to do with the White Papers on Transport and what they actually do with these. For the first, the 'Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix' developed by Matland (1995) was found to be useful to find how the documents are supposed to be implemented, in other words to find the *type* of implementation aimed at for the White Papers. For the second, 'Implementation Theory' as formulated by Goggin *et al.* (1990) has been identified as a suitable theory for this research indicating the way in which the White Papers are actually 'implemented', in other words indicating the *style* of implementation. Despite some possible criticism, these models provide a scientifically sound framework for investigating the White Papers on Transport, especially when slightly adapted for the situation of the European Union.

## 4. METHODOLOGY

In this Chapter, the research method will be outlined and, using two selection criteria, the cases for researching the impact of EU transport policy will be determined based on existing research.

### 4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

To investigate the impact of EU transport policy on Member State transport policy, a comparative case study of two cases will be performed. A case study is suitable for this research as it allows looking at Member State policy in *detail* to find impacts of European White Papers. Looking at a *general* image of *all* EU Member States would hardly provide information on the actual impact of the White Papers on national transport policy. Due to limited time and resources, the number of cases has been restricted to two. Three or more cases would be preferable for it may cover more variety between countries than just two ‘extremes’. However, this proved impossible within the time available to conduct this research, as shall be elaborated more on below. The variety between cases is sought in transposition (relatively ‘slow’ and ‘quick’ in implementing EU policy) and compliance (extent to which EU policy is implemented as the policy is meant to be implemented).

### 4.2 CASE SELECTION

In this research, a comparison between two case-countries will be made to find the impact of European policy to reach more sustainable transport. This section will, first, outline selection criteria to choose case-countries and, second, determine what countries fit these criteria.

#### 4.2.1 SELECTION CRITERIA

Countries that have been a Member State since *both* most recent EU White Papers from 2001 and 2011 will be investigated in this research. The 2001 White Paper may not have been dealt with by the newer Member States (since the enlargement in 2004) and the 2011 White Paper may not yet have found its way into national transport policy documents already. This condition limits the countries to the 15 EU Member States before the enlargement in 2004.

From these 15 Member States, two will be chosen as case-countries. Trying to cover a range of countries (to be able to find different impacts of the White Papers) these cases will be relative ‘extremes’. The variety is sought in two criteria:

1. General similarity of transport policy goals between the European Union and the Member States (based on KiM, 2007);
2. General transposition delay for European transport directives (based on Kaeding, 2007).

The first criterion is chosen for it resembles the first part of finding the impact of White Papers on national transport policy goals: the similarities and differences between Member State policy and the goals of the White Papers. The results from KiM (2007) take the Netherlands as a starting point for comparing national transport policy goals between Member States. Hence the research could be useful as a starting point for selecting cases, although explicitly comparing the general goals of Member States to the goals expressed in the 2001 EU White Paper on Transport still needs to be done.

The second criterion relates to how Member States generally implement EU policy, and hence relates to Implementation Theory as used in this research. Due to certain ‘inducements and constraints’ as these are called in that theory, implementation occurs in a certain way. Kaeding (2007) has researched such factors and called these ‘determinants’, like ‘amount of

discretion' and 'number of veto players' (Kaeding, 2007: 102). Thus, 'transposition delay' for EU transport directives may indicate how Member States generally implement EU policy and what explains it. This second criterion is used here to find some variation between cases for answering the question what Member States actually do with the White Papers.


The first criterion provides the overview in Table 5. The Table shows what transport policy goals the selected countries (and the EU) allegedly have in common with the Netherlands, according to KiM (2007). These are divided in two main groups: the EU15 to indicate the countries that have been Member States since the 2001 White Paper. These are the countries that are looked at for finding cases to compare to the Netherlands. The 'new' Member States (since 2004) are indicated after that. The EU is shown on the left. The total number of goals that are similar to the EU are counted to find how many policy goals are shared.

**Table 5 Comparing transport policy goals of Member States to the Netherlands and the EU.**

	EU	AT	BE	DE	ES	FR	PT	SW	UK	CZ	PL	SL
Stimulate public transport growth		x	x			x			x			x
Reliable and predictable travel time	x		x	x		x		x	x			x
Reliable, safe, sustainable freight transport	x			x	x		x	x	x	x		x
Modal choice	x	x	x	x		x	x		x	x	x	
Strict environmental measures	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		
Strict source policy			x									
Permanent improvement of safety	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Via change in behavior		x	x			x	x	x		x		
Internalize external costs via pricing	x	x	x			x	x		x	x		x
Standard charging techniques								x				
Sum of similar goals as the EU	-	4	5	5	3	5	5	4	6	5	2	4

**Adjusted from KiM (2007: 22).**

The second criterion on transposition delay is visualized in Figure 5, which is combined with the first criterion (similarity to EU policy). It shows the relative positions of the countries from both the research by KiM (2007) and by Kaeding (2007). It exemplifies the differences between countries, ranging from 'quick' countries also being rather similar to EU policy (e.g. the United Kingdom) to 'slow' countries with relatively little similarities (e.g. Spain), according to both mentioned sources.



**Figure 5 Positioning countries based on both criteria. Based on KiM (2007: 22) and Kaeding (2007: 95).**


#### 4.2.2 SELECTING CASES

The first case is that of the Netherlands. As Héritier *et al.* (2001: 2) have found, there is “a striking congruence between the lines of domestic and European road and rail policies”. What is interesting to find is that, even though Dutch transport policy is found to be ‘strikingly’ similar to EU transport policy, the Netherlands is also a relative ‘laggard’ in implementing transport Directives when compared to eight other EU15 Member States (Kaeding, 2007: 95). Generally referred to as a ‘transposition deficit’, the Netherlands ranks among countries like Italy and Greece when it comes to implementation times in the studied countries. Although some authors have argued that there is no such thing as a ‘transposition deficit’ for EU policy (see e.g. Börzel, 2001), this *does* in fact seem to be the case for EU transport policy in general (Kaeding, 2007) and for the Netherlands more specifically as well (see e.g. Mastenbroek, 2003).

The second case is Spain. As can be found in Table 5, Spain is the one country from the EU15 that stands out as having the least in common with Dutch transport policy. Spain is stated here to have three policy goals in common with the Netherlands. These three are also in compliance with what has been identified as being EU policy goals. In addition, Spain is quicker than the Netherlands in implementing EU transport policy (Kaeding, 2007: 95). What is interesting now is to compare Spain as well in relation the EU transport policy. When policy in the Netherlands is seen as closely related to the contents of European policy, but is relatively slow in implementation, and Spain differs from the Netherlands in both content and speed, perhaps Spain also deals with the EU White Paper quite differently. Whether or not this is indeed the case, will be investigated here.

Other cases could have been the United Kingdom or Sweden (Germany and France as the only other options were relatively too similar to consider). These countries were found to be the “champion” when it comes to the least transposition (implementation) delay (Kaeding, 2007: 95). However, Swedish transport policy was available in the Swedish language only, which made comparing the document to the goals of the White Paper, like is done for the other cases, rather difficult. The other ‘extreme’, the United Kingdom, was indeed chosen, but completing the questionnaire (discussed in the next section) by a knowledgeable policy-maker to represent the country was found to be impossible. Hence, the number of cases was limited to two due to issues outside control of the researcher.

So, what is interesting now is to take the Netherlands as a starting point and compare it



**Figure 6 Positioning the Netherlands and Spain in relation to each other. In grey, other countries from both studies have been positioned as well.**

with Spain, a country that is said to have different policy goals, yet is also relatively quicker than the Netherlands in implementing EU transport policy. A relative position of the countries to each other is visualized in Figure 6 in which the position of ‘transposition delay’ is based on Kaeding (2007) and the ‘compliance to EU policy’ on KiM (2007). The other countries that have been investigated in both sources are positioned in Figure 6 in grey once more as well to provide an indication why the two countries were chosen as relative ‘extremes’.

### **4.3 METHOD**

To study what the cases (Member States) are *supposed* to do with the White Papers, the ‘Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix’ developed by Matland (1995) will be used. Both ‘ambiguity’ and ‘conflict’ are indicated mainly based on document analysis as both literature and the White Papers themselves hold information for indicating the relatively objective levels of ambiguity and conflict. For conflict, one indicator is based on an indicator from Implementation Theory, discussed next.

To study what the cases (Member States) *actually* do with the White Papers, ‘Implementation Theory’ as developed by Goggin *et al.* (1990) will be used. The theory consists of a model with many indicators, both objective and subjective, which are to be scored (on a scale from 1 to 10 to indicate the extent to which it applies for the organization). As described before, the indicators are meant to be investigated through (1) content analysis (i.e. in this case: studying the White Papers as well as the transport policy of Member States) and (2) ‘expert interviews’ (i.e. with the actual policy-makers involved; Goggin *et al.*, 1990: 171-197). This will be taken over in this research. *First*, to study the more ‘objective’ indicators, relevant transport policy documents of each country will be investigated as the main source of expressed policy goals to reach sustainable transport. *Second*, some more ‘subjective’ indicators have to be scored. This requires ‘expert knowledge’ from policy-makers involved with the EU White Papers and national transport policy as the information needed cannot be found in documents. Based on questionnaires aimed at policy-makers of the selected Member States, information on the relevant issues is to be gathered. Some disadvantages of this method could be identified as well, which will be discussed below.

#### **4.3.1 QUESTIONNAIRES**

Based on questionnaires, information on the more subjective indicators will be gathered. A questionnaire may be a quick source of a lot of information and allows the policy-maker at which the questionnaire is directed to easily assign a score for an indicator and elaborate on the score. Disadvantages are identified in the next section.

As both Goggin *et al.* (1990) and Low & Carney (2012) recommend, a mixed-approach of primary and secondary data sources will be used (the first in the form of a questionnaire, the second by document analysis). The first is exemplified in Table 6 which shows what questions were used to gather information for each indicator, through turning the theoretical model into actual questions. It includes indicators to which no question is ascribed since three are only based on document analysis. A copy of the actual questionnaire as presented to the policy-makers is included in Annex I.

The policy-makers at which the questionnaires are directed have been approached via telephone and e-mail, after having kindly requested the organization in question who would be able best to answer the questionnaire. The questionnaire was then sent as a virtual document. The respondent was asked to score the extent to which the question is perceived to apply for

**Table 6 Measuring implementation.**

	Factor from model	Indicator	Meaning	Measurement	Question
Independent variables	Federal-level inducements and constraints	Policy content	Extent to which policy comes with sufficient resources and is credible (e.g. makes sense, seems effective)	Scoring on perceived efficacy <sup>2</sup>	1. To what extent does the content of the White Paper seem to be effective to reach its goals?
		Policy clarity	Straightforward in terms of means and ends (e.g. tasks and targets)	Scoring clarity of both means and ends and assign scores <sup>2</sup>	2. How clear are the tasks proposed in the White Paper? 3. How clear are the targets proposed in the White Paper?
		Policy consistency	Coherent with and not contradict other policies	Compare messages between the 2001 White Paper and (other) Member State policy ( <i>cross-message</i> ) <sup>2</sup>	4. To what extent does the White Paper conflict with other policies (in particular other national policy)?
		Policy form	Extent to which policy is clear, frequently repeated and actually received	Scoring on perceived clarity <sup>2</sup>	5. How clear are the general goals of the White Paper?
		Perceptions about federal officials	Extent to which officials are seen as legitimate and credible	Subjective scoring on legitimacy and credibility of EU policy-makers as seen by Member States <sup>2</sup>	6. Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper legitimate? 7. Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper credible?
	State and local inducements and constraints	Strength of an advocacy coalition	Extent to which advocates (either in favor of or opposed to) policy can use pressure to be heard (e.g. by size of the coalition, resources spent)	Identify advocacy coalitions and indicate spent resources, total number of members and score degree of 'skill' to influence policy implementation <sup>2</sup>	8. To what extent have advocacy coalitions (e.g. representatives of Member States, NGO's or others) influenced the content of the White Paper?
		Attributes of elected and appointed officials	Interests and motives of both influencing policy (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation)	Use scalar scores to explain official's behavior <sup>2</sup>	9. To what extent did interests and motives of the EU policy-makers (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation) play a role in the formulation of the White Paper?
		Message content and form	Extent to which policy is credible and well-received by local governments	Comparing consistency between White Paper and Member State policy <sup>1</sup>	N/A

Intervening variables	State decisional outcome & State capacity	<i>Organizational capacity:</i> Organizational units	Extent to which personnel is available and able to act	Investigate the number of ‘units’ (personnel) available for dealing with policy implementation (e.g. using organizational charts) or the organizational structure within which these have to act <sup>2</sup>	10. To what extent does your organization have the ability to act in accordance with the content of the White Paper (e.g. through the availability of personnel)?
		Financial re-sources	Extent to which sufficient funding is available in the state to implement policy	Identify the budget available for transport policy <sup>1</sup>	N/A
		<i>Ecological capacity:</i> State fiscal capacity	Size of available budget from the state itself (related to the wealth of the state)	Set out the income, tax capacity and transport-related expenditures for each Member State <sup>1</sup>	N/A
		State political capacity	Political openness for policy innovation (e.g. liberal, progressive, political culture in general)	Score Member State’s political <i>milieu</i> on a scalar scale according to openness and innovativeness <sup>2</sup>	11. To what extent does your organization invest in innovations?
		State situational capacity	Extent to which the policy issue is seen as a problem in the state (influenced by e.g. severity of the problem)	Score perceived severity of problem by Member States <sup>2</sup>	12. To what extent is making transport more sustainable a priority for your organization?
	Feedback and policy redesign	Agents, agencies, messages and channels	Reputation and credibility of elected officials, their organizations and formal or informal ways of communication	Mapping the ways of communicating feedback from Member States towards the EU <sup>2</sup>	13. To what extent could feedback on the content of the White Paper be communicated towards the EU policy-makers?
		Principle characteristics	Extent to which highest level officials can be reached for communicating feedback (e.g. influenced by ideology of the ‘principle’ official	Score the by Member States perceived openness to policy redesign of the EU <sup>2</sup>	14. How open are the EU policy-makers for redesigning the policy content of the White Paper?
Dependent variable	Implementation process, outputs and outcomes				

**Indicators and their meaning based on Goggin *et al.* (1990). Indicator measured through**

**<sup>1</sup> document analysis or <sup>2</sup> a questionnaire. N/A: not applicable for the questionnaire (i.e. measured through documents only).**

their country and elaborate on this score. These scores are then used to indicate the impact of the White Paper on each Member State under investigation, substantiated as much as possible by the elaboration of the policy-maker and, where applicable, other sources.

Other approaches for using Implementation Theory could have been used. For example, Low & Carney (2012) took the indicators of the model to formulate hypotheses on policy implementation, asking open-ended questions to over 50 interviewees. Answers were then placed in categories to indicate to what extent the indicator was applicable. Their approach will not be entirely taken over here, indeed asking open-ended questions but using a questionnaire and a different scoring mechanism. Here, interviews will not be used due to the relatively large physical distance between researcher and respondent, and since interviews by phone may result in interpretation issues of both the questions and given answers. The questionnaire gives the opportunity for any respondent to formulate an informed answer instead of having to give a direct, possibly incomplete answer like in an interview. With regard to the scoring, a scale from 1 to 10 will be used to indicate the extent to which an indicator is applicable. Due to the very small number of 'interviewees', percentages like Low & Carney (2012) used would be less meaningful in this research. The questions from the questionnaire also aim to stay as close as possible to the theory and its indicators to try and use Implementation Theory as it was intended.

#### *4.3.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES*

In analyzing policy documents, two issues are to be taken into account: (1) subjectivity and (2) determining the most relevant document(s) (O'Leary, 2010: 223-224).

1. *Subjectivity* with regard to the questionnaire includes the single source for information (only one policy-maker) and the subjective scoring. As a result, the scoring could be different when the questionnaire would be completed by a different policy-maker. As scoring the indicators set out to investigate how the White Papers are received, perceived and dealt with, this would inherently be (largely) subjective and one 'correct' score for each Member State may not exist, so some uncertainty on this point remains. This issue is tried to be dealt with by carefully seeking the most knowledgeable policy-maker involved with the European White Papers and clearly accounting for who has been approached to assign scores.
2. A starting point for determining the most *relevant documents* for the case countries is the report by KiM (2007). For a number of Member States, that research set out the most relevant policy document for each country, including the case countries investigated here. However, since another document could be more relevant for this research, the transport policy documents mentioned by KiM (2007) will be subject to critical scrutiny and investigated separately in the next Chapter.

#### **4.4 CONCLUSION**

Two cases for studying the impact of European White Papers on national transport policy goals have been selected, namely the Netherlands and Spain. These were found to be interesting as they cover a variety between the two selection criteria of transposition delay and (stated) similarity between transport policy goals. To study the cases, questions based on Implementation Theory will be aimed at relevant policy-makers of each case. These are presented in a questionnaire form, despite some possible disadvantages, to enable a respondent to easily assign a score for an indicator and provide an answer instead of having to give a direct, possibly incomplete answer like in an interview.



## 5. TRANSPORT POLICY OF CASES

In this Chapter, the political context of the cases will be introduced in order to investigate how and by whom transport policy is formulated and what the most relevant transport policy document is. The Netherlands and Spain will be discussed in that order. For each case, first, the basic political structure will be outlined before second, the transport policy is introduced. The last is investigated to find similarities and differences between the goals of the White Paper and national transport policy goals, to find a part of the impact on national policy.

### 5.1 THE NETHERLANDS: POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT POLICY

The basis for the Dutch political system is laid in its Constitution dating back to 1815, with some major changes in 1848 like adding the currently existing parliamentary system (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009: 19). A characteristic of Dutch society that made its mark on the design and application of the Constitution is the relative segregation and division of the society (generally called *verzuijing*).

The Netherlands can be regarded as a ‘consociational-democracy’ (Lijphart, 1975 in Andeweg & Irwin, 2009: 34). The categorization refers to the aspect of *verzuijing* where this type of democracy aims to keep a stable system despite a segregated society. A consensus-based system provides this stability by allowing each ‘group’ to be heard. It seems to have contributed to the currently prevailing ‘polder model’ and ‘corporatism’ in Dutch policy-making, aiming at consensus, compromises and general support (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009: 178).

The Dutch government consists of a monarch and a Cabinet, the first being currently the Queen. The Cabinet is controlled by two Chambers, together forming the Parliament. Below these institutions at the national level are the provinces and municipalities. The first link to the national level by choosing the representatives in one of the Chambers. The second do not directly influence the national level. The other Chamber is chosen by the electorate, just like the representatives of the province and municipalities (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009: 20).

For decades, “all major [political] parties had been supportive” of European integration (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009: 199). In more recent years, however, this position seems to have changed slightly in the Netherlands. Even though “the Dutch may have lost their enthusiasm for further European integration”, the integration appears ‘inevitable’ and necessary, but is also used as an excuse to legitimate unpopular measures (‘hiding behind Brussels’, *ibid.*: 204-205). Thus, the position towards the EU seems to be slightly mixed in terms of support.

When it comes to larger issues, like transport policy, these are quickly named of ‘national importance’ and likely to become the responsibility of one of the ministries. With regard to *transport policy*, the former<sup>3</sup> ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management formulates a vision on mobility, which will be looked at next.

#### 5.1.1 TRANSPORT POLICY

To study the impact of the 2001 White Paper on national policy, the ‘Mobility Policy Document’ (*Nota Mobiliteit*), by the former ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, will be looked at. In 2012, it has been replaced by a more integrated vision on infrastructure and space (*Structuurvisie Infrastructuur en Ruimte*). The *Nota Mobiliteit* is regarded as the leading document for some 15 years since its enactment. It not only describes

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<sup>3</sup> More recently, this ministry has merged with another, becoming part of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.

transport policy, but also expresses a more detailed view on spatial planning, defining “shared starting points for policy” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 3). One of its goals is making transport more sustainable and emphasizes the need for a “transition to more sustainable forms of transport”, for example in order to reduce emissions and also proposes programs to do so (*ibid.*: 13, 44). The *Nota Mobiliteit* stands for a proposed package of measures with a budget of nearly 60 billion euros in the period of 2011 until 2020 (*ibid.*: 131). Therefore, some effects of the policy on transport are expected. Its key characteristics will be outlined next.

### 5.1.2 DUTCH TRANSPORT POLICY: MAIN POINTS

The *Nota Mobiliteit* is a detailed transport policy document released in 2004 setting the main framework for decision-making with a time horizon of some 15 years. It sets out many policy goals, proposes even more actions to achieve these, and also encompasses a financial framework for the *Nota*. Its main focus is on stimulating the economy. The goals are of interest in this research, the financial framework for example are less relevant to investigate.

The main points of the *Nota Mobiliteit* are:

1. Channeling mobility growth properly;
2. Building coherence between spatial planning, economy, traffic and transport;
3. Stimulate strategic renewal (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 16-28).

These very general policy goals (ends) clearly need to be supported by more concrete actions (means) to actually achieve these. Many are indeed proposed, which will now be discussed.

1. No less than eight statements support the goal of *channeling mobility growth properly*. These are all aimed at creating “reliable, fast and safe movements from A to B” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 16). The document states the expectation for the Netherlands that mobility will grow and this will affect the accessibility of economically important areas. It calls for making travel times more predictable, accepting some delays (*ibid.*: 32-33). In order to keep these areas accessible and travel times predictable, mobility is to be *facilitated*. At the same time, the policy aims at limiting “other side-effects of mobility” like emissions and landscape fragmentation (*ibid.*: 17). The general emphasis of this goal seems to be on the making the most efficient use of the current system, while also creating some new capacity. What seems not to be aimed at, is some sort of modal shift as it states: “[e]ach method has its own strengths and these strengths must be exploited optimally” and therefore, the cabinet is “not a proponent of a generic policy that focuses on changing transport methods” (*ibid.*: 17). It emphasizes the importance of stimulating each mode where it is of best use.
2. Improving the coherence between spatial planning, economy, traffic and transport is seen as key “[f]or economic growth and a strong international competitive position” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 18) with a clear focus on (new) infrastructure, also looking ahead into the future (for example already thinking about the possibility of expanding infrastructure). It sees a clear role for the national government (*Rijk*) in providing the main infrastructure network and bundling transport flows (*ibid.*: 143), but requires lower governments to participate as well, providing in an integrated transport system (*ibid.*: 36). This brings us to the final main goal.
3. With the goal of *strategic renewal*, the policy expects different roles from different actors. First, a major focus on decentralization can be found here. Due to regional differences and the need for area-specific approaches, it is proposed to give lower gov-

ernments the responsibility for executing the policy which remains steered by the national government. For example, resources are said to be made available for regional mobility policy, which previously not really existed (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 21).

Second, the *Nota Mobiliteit* expresses the need for corporation between all kinds of actors: “[i]nteraction between government (international, national and regional), social organisations, citizens and companies is required [...] to effectively handle problems and exploit opportunities” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 20). This is, for example, reflected in the ambition to facilitate an “innovation climate” by creating an “inspiring innovation policy” with key roles for businesses and industry to develop and be able to actually apply innovative ideas (*ibid.*: 22). Such opportunities are to be stimulated further by public-private partnerships, through the “bundling of strengths” of both parties (*ibid.*: 25).

As can be seen from the three main points of the Dutch transport policy and their brief outline, these are slightly different from the main focus of the European White Papers. How the two actually relate will be investigated next.

### 5.1.3 DUTCH TRANSPORT POLICY: SIMILARITIES & DIFFERENCES WITH 2001 WHITE PAPER

The previous section outlined the goals of the *Nota Mobiliteit*. Similarities and differences between this transport policy document and the goals of the 2001 White Paper on Transport, set out in section 2.2, will now be investigated and summarized in Table 7. It provides part of the conclusion on the impact of the White Papers on national policy goals. The score for the indicator ‘Message content and form’ is based on this investigation as well.

1. Instead of *balancing modes of transport*, the *Nota Mobiliteit* tries to “harness the strengths of each transport mode” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 17). The document emphasizes the different markets for different modes of transport and sees no use in redistributing shares of transport. This is exemplified by the statement that “[t]he exchangeability of the different transport [modes] is limited, particularly for passenger traffic” (*ibid.*: 17). These are to be optimized rather than balanced. The *Nota* proposes to investigate what chances exist at the regional level to solve accessibility problems. It positions the appropriateness for the traveler above the mode of transport (*ibid.*: 138).
2. *Reducing congestion* is not as important as making travel times predictable, the *Nota* emphasizes. This seems to be a rather pragmatic approach, accepting that congestion reduction may not be realistic. Although mobility is to be facilitated, elaborated on before, not all congestion can be solved the idea seems to be. With the measures proposed in the policy document, delays (the term that seems to be used for congestion) are reduced, just not entirely (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 17, 38).
3. Related to the previous point is the *easing of bottlenecks*, in which case the policy again emphasizes to make these predictable rather than solving all existing bottlenecks (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 39, 46). The latter would require more investments than are available (*ibid.*: 44) Some major bottlenecks are to be eased in which “governments are working together to take on bottlenecks” (*ibid.*: 39). This not only refers to the corporation with lower-level governments, but also between national governments with regard to easing bottlenecks in international traffic flows (*ibid.*: 27). Creating new infrastructure may not always be an option, the *Nota* stresses, in which case area-specific alternatives may need to be sought (*ibid.*: 38). Again the focus appears to be on a pragmatic approach to easing bottlenecks.

4. *Ensuring user rights* does not seem to be an issue as in the 2001 White Paper, for example with regard to legal protection in the case of conflicts. Reference is made to the idea that “[m]obility is a right” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 16) due to which the main emphasis of the policy is to facilitate that right and thus facilitate mobility. With regard to the ‘rights and obligations’ expressed in the White Paper, the emphasis appears to tend slightly more to the ‘obligation’, for example when it comes to paying for the (external or actual) costs of mobility. Proposals are made in the *Nota* to ensure “the user pays” (*ibid.*: 23), which is proposed to be done by a new pricing scheme like road pricing. This is, however, deviating from what the White Paper in essence refers to in ensuring user rights.
5. The *Nota* foresees that “[d]ue to demographic, economic, spatial and international developments, traffic and transport are continuing to grow strongly”, which is to be facilitated due to its “social and economic importance” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 10). In *managing globalization of transport*, the Netherlands is said to profit greatly from a maintained accessibility from sea and by air (*ibid.*: 12-13). Again the emphasis seems to be on facilitating and actually attracting transport (rather than letting the EU manage common European interests) to provide in a “properly functioning passenger and freight transport and internationally competitive accessibility [which makes] it attractive to do business in the Netherlands” (*ibid.*: 16). This facilitation is to be achieved through, for example, resolving road-related bottlenecks in international transport and creating transport corridors (*ibid.*: 27). It is to lead to a better competitive international position of the main urban areas in the Netherlands and the so-called ‘mainports’ (like the Rotterdam harbor; e.g. *ibid.*: 27, 34).

So, what can be found from is that Dutch transport policy shares only one of the goals from the EU White Paper and mainly focuses on its own, in some instances actually opposing those goals. These findings are summarized in Table 7.

**Table 7 Comparing the Nota Mobiliteit to the 2001 White Paper.**

	2001 White Paper	Nota Mobiliteit 2004	Explicitly similar
1.	Balance modes of transport	Optimize, not necessarily balance, modes of transport	No
2.	Reduce congestion	Make travel time predictable rather than trying to reduce congestion	No
3.	Ease bottlenecks	Ease major bottlenecks	Yes
4.	Ensure user rights	No explicit reference to ensuring user rights	No
5.	Manage globalization of transport	Facilitate globalization of transport to improve competitiveness	No

**Based on EC (2001) and Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (2004).**

## **5.2 SPAIN: POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT POLICY**

Determinant for the current political system in Spain is its Constitution from dating 1978 which completed “restoration of democratic processes and institutions” after a decades-long period of dictatorial ruling (Newton & Donaghy, 1997: 5). It provided a framework for reform, including opening up to Europe and the rest of the world in an economic sense. Spain greatly aspired to join what is nowadays the European Union, which could explain its relatively ‘smooth’ integration in the EU (*ibid.*: 8) as well as the many references made to European directives in the main transport policy document discussed later.

Spain is essentially a constitutional monarchy (Magone, 2004: 50) with relative autonomy for its regions. Each of these have their own parliaments and presidents, due to which Spain can be considered a semi-federal democracy (Newton & Donaghy, 1997: 117).

A key figure in Spanish government is the Prime Minister, behind whom stands a Council of Ministers. The latter is controlled by a Parliament and a Congress of Deputies representing the regional governments (Magone, 2004: 59). However, at the lower level of the autonomous communities, these regional governments hardly have the power to actually influence policy-making since “they are subordinate to the will of the minister of the respective central government ministries” as Magone (2004: 121) notes. Therefore, the actual formulation of policy seems mostly a task of the national government, the implementation more of the lower level of the regions.

With regard to European policy it is observed that it is generally positively received and relatively well implemented. Integration with the European Union is noted to have accelerated the processes of democratization and liberalization so desperately desired after the dictatorial period (Magone, 2004: 156).

Although the regions are slowly gaining more influence in different policy areas (Magone, 2004: 164), both “parliament and civil society are quite weak to influence [European] policy” (*ibid.*: 160). When it comes to this type of policy, the central state dominates the coordination. For transport policy, the ministry will be taken as a starting point. More specifically, the *Ministerio de Fomento* (Ministry of Development<sup>4</sup>) will be looked at.

### 5.2.1 TRANSPORT POLICY

The main Spanish transport policy document is formulated by the Ministry of Development under the name ‘*Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte*’ (abbreviated as PEIT). The most recent available version of this ‘Strategic Infrastructures and Transport Plan’ was approved in 2005 and serves as “an instrument at the service of major economic and social policy objectives” setting the key framework to support decision-making with a time horizon for 2020 (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 3). It stresses the importance of making transport more sustainable and states that “[i]t is no coincidence that the modes of transport most enhanced by the PEIT, such as rail, are precisely those which contribute most to transport sustainability” (*ibid.*: 3). Setting the framework for a budget of some 15 billion euros annually, it is expected to have an influence on transport, for example by stimulating mixed traffic, rail transport and intermodal transport. Its key characteristics will be outlined next.

### 5.2.2 SPANISH TRANSPORT POLICY: MAIN POINTS

The *Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte* (PEIT) is a detailed transport policy document from 2005 setting the main framework for decision-making with a time horizon of some 15 years (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 3). It sets out some main policy goals, main actions to achieve these, a financial framework and proposals for monitoring the effects of the plan. It tries to set out goals for all modes of transport (land, sea, air), although focusing to stimulate some more than others. Precisely those goals are of interest in this research, the monitoring and financial framework for example are less relevant to investigate.

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<sup>4</sup> This is a literal translation. The ministry can also be referred to as ‘Ministry of Public Works and Transport’ in English (see e.g. Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 4).

The main points of the PEIT are:

1. Enhance transport system efficiency;
2. Enhance social and territorial cohesion;
3. Contribute to transport system's general sustainability;
4. Promote economic development and competitiveness (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 37).

The overarching policy goals (ends) are clearly supported by more concrete actions (means) to actually achieve these.

1. In order to “deal with the needs for the mobility of persons and flows of goods”, the *transport system efficiency* is to be improved. It is proposed to be done by enhancing service quality, safety and security of the transport system (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 37). The first is to be achieved through the involvement of the public (stimulating debates on strategic solutions) and the improved integration of the transport system (by balancing modes of transport in intermodal transport over longer distances) so as to reduce congestion and hence bring down time delays. The second seems to refer mostly to bringing down traffic-related accidents by, for example, better maintenance of infrastructure. The third is to be improved through setting-up a ‘charter of user rights’ for different modes of transport, later to be replaced by an integrated charter to enhance intermodal travel (*ibid.*: 38).
2. Enhancing both *social and territorial cohesion* is argued to be important to ensure accessibility throughout Spain for all societal groups and reduce isolation of certain parts of the country. The first is to be improved by aiming for a guarantee to a “universal minimum to access to public services” such as education and health care for all groups, in particular children and the elderly (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 39). In corporation with lower-level governments, setting ‘priority areas’ is proposed to enhance, for example, access to public transport. The second aims at stimulating the connection of more isolated areas by enhancing interurban public transport, including “sea and air connecting links, to improve non-mainland Spain’s integration into these links” (*ibid.*: 39).
3. Improving the *transport system’s general sustainability* is aimed at two main levels: locally and globally. Locally, the PEIT aspires to improve the environmental quality, like meeting air quality standards. Globally, the PEIT tries to contribute to reducing emissions. It proposes to integrate different Spanish policy areas (e.g. health and nature protection) with transport policy to effectively achieve this goal (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 40).
4. *Economic development and competitiveness* is directed at several aspects like territorial development, macroeconomic objectives, innovation and energy efficiency. The first again emphasizes the inclusion of all areas, now also looking at integration with its neighboring countries France and Portugal. The second is argued to relate to an overall increased economic productivity with an efficiently functioning transport system and needs stimulation by investments in the system. The third is to be stimulated by assigning a certain amount of the Plan’s budget to innovation, although the importance for economic development is not further elaborated. The fourth is to decrease Spain’s energy dependence, which is stated to be relatively high and costly relative to other European countries (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 25; 41).

### 5.2.3 SPANISH TRANSPORT POLICY: SIMILARITIES & DIFFERENCES WITH 2001 WHITE PAPER

The previous section outlined the goals of the PEIT. Similarities and differences between this transport policy document and the goals of the 2001 White Paper on Transport, set out in section 2.2, will now be investigated and summarized in Table 8. It provides part of the conclusion on the impact of the White Papers on national transport policy goals. The score for the indicator ‘Message content and form’ is based on this investigation as well.

1. The PEIT indeed tries to *balance modes of transport*, like the White Paper stresses. As exemplified in the first point in the previous section, the PEIT tries to stimulate an “increase in the relative weight of the modes involved in intermodal transport for the long-distance movement of passengers and goods” (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 38). It seems to be promoted through a “balanced competition” between modes of transport to balance the shares as well (*ibid.*: 70).
2. *Reducing congestion* seems to be most easily found in the goal of improving the overall efficiency of the transport system in the PEIT (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 38). It is argued to reduce congestion in order to reduce external costs (*ibid.*: 32) and average travel time (*ibid.*: 38). Related to air transport, the PEIT even aims at relieving other European airports by attracting more flights: the airports of Madrid and Barcelona are proposed to “develop their world traffic potential, as gateways to Europe providing alternatives to the other large European airports, most of which suffer from serious congestion problems” (*ibid.*: 69). With regard to road transport, increasing the capacity of existing roads and creating new roads are to be considered (*ibid.*: 130).
3. Related to the previous point is the EU goal of *easing bottlenecks*. The policy document has formulated a number of scenarios, of which the ‘PEIT 2020’ is the main one. With regard to easing bottlenecks it states: “[t]he PEIT 2020 Scenario has chosen an intermodal and hierarchical conception of the transport system, offering balanced accessibility throughout the territory, resolving bottlenecks” (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 50). It does not very clearly go into proposing to resolve very concrete bottlenecks, although for example ‘intermodal’ bottlenecks in general are mentioned to be resolved (e.g. *ibid.*: 105).
4. *Ensuring user rights* is explicitly mentioned in the PEIT, as also discussed in the first point in the previous section. The PEIT proposes to formulate a charter of user rights per mode of transport, which at a later stage are to be integrated to promote intermodality (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 38).
5. *Managing globalization of transport* also plays a role in Spanish national transport policy as the PEIT sees “major potential for expansion” in international traffic between Morocco and Portugal to the rest of Europe as well as increased possibilities for transport to the ever more integrating European countries (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 20). In addition, it states that, besides its relative peripheral position in Europe, “the same is not the case in the global situation, where this country occupies a key position in international movements of sea transport” especially between Northern Africa and Europe (*ibid.*: 24). With regard to air transport, it states that “there is by no means negligible potential for it to enhance its position in trans-Atlantic traffic” (*ibid.*: 24).

So, what can be found from is that Spanish transport policy shares most EU White Paper goals and adds some more. These findings are summarized in Table 8.

**Table 8 Comparing the PEIT to the 2001 White Paper.**

	2001 White Paper	PEIT 2005	Explicitly similar
1.	Balance modes of transport	Increase relative weight of modes in inter-modal transport	Yes
2.	Reduce congestion	Reduce congestion to decrease external costs	Yes
3.	Ease bottlenecks	Smooth out intermodal bottlenecks	Yes
4.	Ensure user rights	Provide in an integrated charter of users rights for all modes of transport	Yes
5.	Manage globalization of transport	Spain holds a key position in global traffic	Yes

**Based on EC (2001) and Ministerio de Fomento (2005a).**

### **5.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRANSPORT POLICY DOCUMENTS**

The above-mentioned national transport policy documents clearly differ from each other, mainly in the role they play in each country. This could make comparison between the two transport policy documents and the European White Paper more difficult and therefore these differences will be briefly discussed.

In the Dutch *Nota Mobiliteit*, the “shared starting points for policy are defined” (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004: 3). *Some* elements of the document seem to be binding for different levels of government, for example reflected in the statement that “essential components must also be incorporated into the policy and plans of central and decentral government[s]” (*ibid.*: 3).

The Spanish *Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte* could be seen as providing “basic guidelines for action on infrastructures and transport” aiming at “defining an overall and coherent framework to ensure the stability of infrastructure and transport policy” (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005a: 3). It strives to use planning as “the tool by which to frame its medium-term actions” (*ibid.*, 11), seemingly focusing again on the document’s role of setting a concrete framework for action.

So, some differences can be found between the national transport policy documents. All set out the main strategy of the national government, obviously, stating some main goals which is what this Chapter tries to compare. The Dutch transport policy document contains some binding elements and the Spanish transport policy document aims to frame its own concrete actions. Even though these differences exist, in comparing the documents on the indicators of Implementation Theory (in Chapter 7), no difficulties are expected: all set out at least some general goals like the European White Paper to which the latter can be related.



#### 5.4 CONCLUSION

The above has briefly introduced the political context of the cases and identified the most relevant transport policy documents. The similarities and differences of each document to the European White Paper was found to vary, where Spain was found to support most similar policy goals, the Netherlands the least (see also Table 9). In this respect, the impact of the White Paper would thus seem greater for Spain than for the Netherlands as the Spanish PEIT shares more goals explicitly than the Netherlands. The latter even opposes some goals. An effort to find why these differences occur will be made next, especially by investigating what Member States actually do with the White Papers in Chapter 7.

**Table 9 Similarities and differences between transport policy goals and 2001 White Paper.**

2001 White Paper	Nota Mobiliteit 2004	PEIT 2005
1. Balance modes of transport	Optimize, not necessarily balance, modes of transport	Increase relative weight of modes in intermodal transport
2. Reduce congestion	Make travel time predictable rather than trying to reduce congestion	Reduce congestion to decrease external costs
3. Ease bottlenecks	Ease major bottlenecks	Smooth out intermodal bottlenecks
4. Ensure user rights	No explicit reference to ensuring user rights	Provide in an integrated charter of users rights for all modes of transport
5. Manage globalization of transport	Facilitate globalization of transport to improve competitiveness	Spain holds a key position in global traffic

**Based on EC (2001), Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (2004) and Ministerio de Fomento (2005a)**

## 6. THE AMBIGUITY-CONFLICT MATRIX: POSITIONING WHITE PAPERS

In this Chapter, the question what Member States are supposed to do with White Papers will be researched using the theoretical ‘Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix’ developed by Matland (1995). It provides the framework for studying what ‘type of implementation’ is meant with the White Papers. First, ambiguity will be investigated for the White Paper based on document analysis. Second, the same will be done for conflict.

### 6.1 AMBIGUITY

Ambiguity with regard to policy (implementation) was argued to consist of at least four elements:

1. Goal ambiguity;
2. Allow interpretation;
3. Uncertainties about roles of various organizations;
4. Uncertainties of knowing which tools to use (Matland, 1995: 157-158).

These determine the combined ‘level of ambiguity’, used to position the ‘type of implementation’. Each will now be investigated to find this ‘type’ for the 2001 White Paper on Transport. The investigation is based on document analysis (what can be found in the White Paper), with references to sections within this research where applicable.

1. With regard to *goal clarity*, scored here as *goal ambiguity* to stay consistent, the White Paper seems to set a number of clear goals combined with some general measures. However, what is meant in the matrix is the ‘translation’ from more abstract policy goals to concrete measures at the local level. As outlined before (see section 2.2), the 2001 White Paper sets out a number of abstract policy goals, like balancing modes of transport and reducing congestion and bottlenecks. But precisely *how* these are to be realized at the local level (to support a more efficient transport system as a whole) remains largely unspecified, despite the “Action programme” of the White Paper (EC, 2001: 100-103).

For example, how price distortions are to be tackled or to what extent governments are to intervene in stimulating rail transport (if at all) remains to be answered. The *first* is proposed to be done through “setting out the principles and structure of an infrastructure-charging system” and by “a common methodology for setting charging levels, offset by the removal of existing taxes, and allowing cross-financing” (EC, 2001: 102). Remaining on the more abstract level, concrete realization measures seem to be out of place in the White Paper. The *second* is proposed to be stimulated for example by “allocating revenue from charges on competing routes to the construction of new infrastructure, especially rail infrastructure” (*ibid.*: 102). However, ‘how much’ rail infrastructure is to be constructed to stimulate this mode of transport sufficiently remains to be seen. Thus, actual proposals for realization of both examples are yet to be determined.

Clearly relating to the second point of ‘allowing interpretation’, the White Paper only outlines the general policy goals, not so much concrete measures (suitable for the local-level). Therefore, the ‘goal ambiguity’ is regarded here as ‘**high**’.

2. The 2001 White Paper seems to *allow interpretation* to a large extent, as also just elaborated upon. Even though some general goals are outlined in the White Paper,

these can seemingly be met in any preferred way – as long as these goals are supported at all (see e.g. section 2.1). For example, balancing different modes of transport could be done through taxation and subsidies, but taxing or subsidizing precisely *what* activities are apparently largely to be determined by Member States. Therefore, the extent to which interpretation is allowed is regarded here as **‘high’**.

3. Some *uncertainties about roles of various organizations* remain in the White Papers. As identified before, the White Papers are formulated mainly for setting out proposed actions by and for the Community. This was reflected in section 2.2 as well, where the EU mainly assigns a role to itself in influencing mobility and does not wish to assign many tasks to Member States and, even less so, other parties. What their expected role precisely could be in reaching more sustainable transport remains slightly unclear. The uncertainty for this element would be therefore be **‘medium’**.
4. Policy can become more ambiguous when there are *uncertainties of knowing which tools to use*. Especially in more complex environments, it may become “difficult to know which tools to use, how to use them and what the effects of their use will be” (Matland, 1995: 158). In cases where policy is not to be implemented in a very specific way, an effective tool could be difficult to formulate, especially when its effects cannot be known beforehand (for example in the case of an experimental tool). Again taking the example of using taxation or subsidies to influence the balance between different modes of transport proposed by the EU (see section 2.2), this may not be a proven method. Another example would be uncertainties of the effectiveness of measures to reduce bottlenecks, like stimulating the use of other modes of transport (e.g. public transport) as proposed in the 2001 White Paper (Stopher, 2004).

As there are hardly actual ‘tools’ proposed in the White Papers which aims mostly at setting abstract policy goals, this element is slightly more difficult to score. However, due to the great uncertainties of the effectiveness of measures to reach the proposed goals, this element is scored **‘high’** here, contributing to a higher level of overall ambiguity.

So, it appears the level of ambiguity is generally high for the 2001 White Paper on Transport. This seems to place the White Papers in the bottom half of the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix. To position these documents more precisely in the matrix, the element ‘conflict’ is investigated next.

## **6.2 CONFLICT**

Conflict in policy implementation is argued to consist of at least two elements:

1. Interdependence between actors;
2. Incompatibility of objectives (Matland, 1995: 156).

These determine the combined ‘level of conflict’, supporting the ‘type of implementation’. Investigation of the first element is based on document analysis (what can be found in the White Paper), with references to sections within this research where applicable. The investigation of the second element is based on the questionnaire aimed at policy-makers from the case-countries as it is rather subjective and cannot be found in documents.

1. Conflict may arise when there is some sort of *interdependence between actors*, as Matland (1995) argues. This may become apparent, for example, in cases where “more than one organization sees a policy as directly relevant to its interests and when the organizations have incongruous views” (Matland, 1995: 156). It seems to mainly regard conflicts over which means are to be used to reach certain goals (either

agreed-upon or not). In the 2001 White Paper, these means are proposed, but yet to be determined (see section 2.1). It may therefore seem unlikely to be a point of conflict, since there are no real means to oppose to. However, the means *are* to be determined and thus can be discussed and conflict *may* indeed arise. For example, the Dutch government has expressed that, although it wishes to achieve a balance in modes of transport, means to do so should not be based on quantitative goals (see e.g. Tweede Kamer, 2001). Other Member States are able to express their own views on the means to reach the goals set out in the 2001 White Paper as has been seen before, which may have an entirely different emphasis. Therefore, conflict on means may well be **'high'** for this element.

2. The *incompatibility of objectives* clearly could influence the level of conflict. Objectives stressed in the 2001 White Paper may very well conflict with existing policies emphasizing other developments than the White Paper. As this may be problematic to identify from documents, this is determined based on the questionnaire discussed more in Chapter 7. In the questionnaires, it was specifically asked to what extent the White Paper conflicts with other policies, in particular national policies. For both the Netherlands and Spain, this was found to be rather low, being assigned a score of 3 and 2 respectively. So it would seem the incompatibility of objectives is hardly an issue. Therefore, conflict on objectives seems to be rather **'low'** for this element.

So, it appears the level of conflict is generally high for the 2001 White Paper on Transport. This seems to place the White Papers to the right half of the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix.

### **6.3 CONCLUSION**

Based on the above analysis for both policy ambiguity and conflict, what Member States are supposed to do with the 2001 White Paper on Transport seems to hint towards the 'symbolic' type of implementation.

When it comes to ambiguity, it appears clear that on both goals and means the White Papers are rather ambiguous. *Interpretation* is allowed to a great extent, especially since White Papers only set out proposals for action where concrete actions are to be determined. Means appear ambiguous as well since there are uncertainties of knowing which tools to use (and which would be most effective). Uncertainties about *roles* of various organizations has been identified, although the White Paper does in fact see certain roles for different actors. So, only this element was scored other than 'high'.

When it comes to conflict, this provided a mixed result. There appeared to be a high *interdependence* between actors, in this case mainly Member States. This was especially the case since turning the proposals of the White Paper into actions depends entirely on the agreement of Member States. The *incompatibility* of objectives, however, seemed hardly to play a role since White Papers conflict only conflict very little, if at all, with Member State's own policy. So this element was scored as 'low'.


Table 10 below summarizes the findings per variable before discussing the connection from the theoretical Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix with (the role of) the White Papers.

**Table 10 Scoring the 2001 White Paper on ‘ambiguity’ and ‘conflict’.**

Variable	Element		Scoring (low-medium-high)
Ambiguity	Of goals	Goal ambiguity	High
		Allow interpretation	High
	Of means	Uncertainties about roles of various organizations	Medium
		Uncertainties of knowing which tools to use	High
Conflict	Degree of goal congruence	Interdependence between actors	High
		Incompatibility of objectives	Low

**Based on Matland (1995) and EC (2001).**

Therefore, what Member States are *supposed* to do with the 2001 White Paper on Transport seems to fit the ‘symbolic’ type of implementation best. This would theoretically mean that the ‘central principle’ for the White Papers is coalition strength in which advocacy coalitions largely determine the content of the transport policy document. This does indeed seem to be the case when the White Papers depend so strongly on the support of Member States for taking actual action (see e.g. section 2.1). More importantly: symbolic implementation suggests that “[v]ariations in coalition strength and dominant coalition make-up manifest themselves in in different programs in different localities” (Matland, 1995: 196). In other words this seems to suggest, at least theoretically, that the goals of the White Papers are likely to be *interpreted* rather than *taken over* directly in national transport policy. This clearly holds *implications* for some indicators of Implementation Theory in the next Chapter. For example, ‘message content and form’ (comparing consistency between the White Paper and national transport policy) could possibly show little consistency due to interpretation theoretically ‘allowed’ to the stated goals in the White Paper. The extent to which this is the case will become clear in discussing the indicators in the next Chapter.



**Figure 7 Positioning the White Papers on the matrix developed by Matland (1995).**

## 7. IMPLEMENTATION THEORY: STUDYING MEMBER STATES

In this Chapter, what is *actually* done with the White Papers will be investigated by applying the theoretical model of Implementation Theory (to indicate the theoretical ‘level of implementation’). As mentioned before, the name of this theory may be a bit deceiving in the context of this research. Although the White Papers do not require to be ‘implemented’ like laws or directives for example, the theory provides a scientifically sound framework for investigating how policy is received, perceived and dealt with. This is precisely what this Chapter sets out to find for each case under study here. ‘Implementation’ should thus be seen in the context of the non-binding nature of the White Papers which only sets out general policy goals.

Per section, the indicators of the Implementation Theory model are scored to be able to compare the cases with each other. The last section compares the findings.

### 7.1 THE NETHERLANDS: SCORING IMPLEMENTATION INDICATORS

The first case-country under investigation is the Netherlands. Supposedly having relatively similar transport policy goals as the EU (KiM, 2007) but also relatively slow in implementation of transport directives (Kaeding, 2007), this raises expectations about the impact of the EU White Paper on national transport policy goals.

To score the indicators 8, 10 and 11 for the Netherlands, relevant (policy and budgetary) documents have been identified and analyzed to base the score on for the 2001 White Paper. The other indicators (1 through 7, 9 and 12 through 15) are scored for the 2011 EU White Paper and are based on the comments given in a questionnaire aimed at mister Hoornstra, senior Advisor Policy Affairs at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. Scoring the latter indicators express the extent to which it is perceived to apply for the ministry. The assigned scores will now be discussed and are summarized in Table 11 at the end of the section.

1. **Policy content.** Score: 7. The perceived efficacy of the 2011 White Paper was scored asking about the extent to which the content of the White Paper seems to be effective to reach its goals. It appeared this seemed to be generally the case, although it was stated by Hoornstra that “[s]ome strategies are flawed”. Exemplified by strategies proposed by the EU to achieve a modal shift, not all strategies are perceived as effective to reach its goals by the Netherlands. Related to this issue, Hoornstra mentioned that proposed “[i]nstruments fall short to match objectives”. It seems that for these reasons, the score 7 has been assigned.
2. **Policy clarity.** Score: 7 (average). When it comes to scoring the perceived clarity of means and ends to reach the goals proposed in the White Paper, the question was raised to what extent the tasks and targets were clear for the Netherlands.

With regard to *tasks* (scored as 5) it was noted that these are hardly clear at all, but Hoornstra mentioned this to be “inherent to the character of the document”. As outlined before, the White Papers only contain proposals for action by the EU and does not formulate actual programs, for example. Assigning tasks could perhaps be slightly premature.

The *targets* (scored as 9) proposed by the EU are perceived to be much more clear than its tasks. What determined the clarity of targets is because these are “numerical, verifiable” and setting “time limits”, according to Hoornstra. So, it was noted that it is mainly because of the way these are set.
3. **Policy consistency.** Score: 3. This indicator sets out to find any conflict with other policies (in particular other national policy). For the Netherlands, this seemed not to

be the case at all. Examples mentioned by Hoornstra seem to point out the fact that proposals by the EU are not part of Dutch policies, like road pricing as financial incentives to stimulate a modal shift.

4. **Policy form.** Score: **10**. Indicating the extent to which policy is clear, frequently repeated and actually received was approached by asking how clear the general policy goals. In the questionnaire, this was not even further elaborated on but simply assigned the full score. Perhaps differing too little from other indicators, a comment was omitted.

5. **Perceptions about federal officials.** Score: **8** (average). As the name of this indicator suggests, it aims at finding the extent to which officials are seen as legitimate and credible. These were measured through two separate questions for legitimacy and credibility.

*Legitimacy* was scored with a **9** without further comment. Apparently, the Dutch ministry views the White Paper on transport coming EU policy-makers as completely legitimate, without the need to further exemplify this.

The *credibility* of the White Paper was assigned a score of **7** out of **10**. It seems mainly due to strategies proposed in the White Paper that the score is slightly lower. It was exemplified by the CO<sub>2</sub> reduction target of 60% which Hoornstra noted to be “hard to attain with strategies and measures contained”. Adapting the strategies better to the proposed targets could perhaps make the White Paper more credible.

6. **Strength of an advocacy coalition.** Score: **7**. This indicator sets out to find to what extent advocacy coalitions (e.g. representatives of Member States, NGO’s or others) influenced the content of the White Paper. For the Netherlands, this seemed to have been the case to some extent. The main example mentioned by Hoornstra was the rail sector. This could be expected, since that sector may have a clear interest in the content of the White Paper emphasizing a greater role of railways in a more sustainable transport system.

7. **Attributes of elected and appointed officials.** Score: **2**. Theoretically, interests and motives of individual policy-makers could influence the content of a policy. To what extent this is also applicable to the EU White Papers is investigated here for the Netherlands. Besides Hoornstra’s reference to Siim Kallas, Vice-President of the EC on “funding issues”, interests and motives of EU policy-makers have not influenced the content of the White Paper at all.

8. **Message content and form.** Score: **2**. The Dutch Transport Policy Document (*Nota Mobiliteit*) mostly differs from the 2001 White Paper (see section 5.1.3). Reducing bottlenecks was found to be the major policy goal that corresponds to the expressed EU goals. With regard to all the other goals, the Dutch approach has been slightly different. Balancing modes of transport was mentioned to be less useful than optimizing those modes since all have their own respective markets. In addition, reducing congestion was noted to be less realistic for the Netherlands than making travel times more predictable. Therefore, it seems not all EU goals are supported by the Netherlands. The score for this indicator on comparing consistency between White Paper and Member State policy would thus be rather low, since only one out of five policy goals is explicitly supported in the *Nota Mobiliteit*.

9. **Organizational units.** Score: **5**. There is no specific personnel available to deal with the White Papers. For the Netherlands, this was stated by Hoornstra to be not applicable since “[t]he White Paper is not a policy document of the Member States, so there is no commitment to its implementation”.

10. **Financial resources.** Score: **3**. The ministry has a specific budget for transport policy, besides its other tasks, including making transport of people and goods more sustainable (Tweede Kamer, 2003: 201). Nearly 2 billion is aimed directly at transport policy, like improving the safety of air transport or stimulating the transport network (*ibid.*: 201). Making the transport network more *sustainable* has its own budget as well, accounting for roughly 180 million euros annually for three policies programs (sustainable goods transport, personal transport and air transport). Thus, of the roughly 6 billion budget, some 33% appears to be available to influence transport in some way. Dividing the percentage by 10 provides the score, making it comparable to the other case.
11. **State fiscal capacity.** Score: **5**. Over several years, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management has spent over 6 billion euros annually, going up to 7 billion in more recent years (Tweede Kamer, 2003: 119). The budget is devoted to a range of issues, like improving safe personal mobility, sustainable air transport, water management and weather services (*ibid.*: 201). When calculated in relative terms, the ministry receives around 5% of the of the total national expenditures of about 150 billion. In this case the percentage is not divided by 10, to enable comparison.
12. **State political capacity.** Score: **9**. This indicator sets out to score the Member State's political *milieu* on a scalar scale according to openness and innovativeness. More specifically, it aims at mapping the political openness for policy innovation (e.g. liberal, progressive, political culture in general). As this may be a rather complex question, it was done by asking to what extent the ministry invests in innovations. For the Netherlands this is stated by Hoornstra to be done "[a]s far as resources allow", supported by a rather high score. Thus it would appear the Dutch ministry sees itself as rather innovate when it is able to invest much in innovations.
13. **State situational capacity.** Score: **9**. The extent to which the policy issue is seen as a problem in the Member State (influenced by e.g. severity of the problem) would theoretically be important to investigate how policy is dealt with, as has been seen before. Making transport more sustainable, like the EU White Paper sets out to do, "is a key target" for the Netherlands according to Hoornstra. This comment supports the assigned score to indicate the large extent to which making transport more sustainable is a priority for the Netherlands.
14. **Agents, agencies, messages and channels.** Score: **8**. In the feedback part of Implementation Theory, this indicator aims to map the ways of communicating feedback from Member States towards the EU. In the questionnaire, this was mentioned by Hoornstra to be possible to a large extent through "written comments and a debate in the June 2011 Transport Council". Supported by its score, it seems the Dutch ministry feels feedback on the content of the White Papers can be well communicated towards the EU.
15. **Principle characteristics.** Score: **1**. Aiming to score the perceived openness to policy redesign of the EU by Member States, this question was possibly aimed too much at policy-makers rather than the Commission, which formulates the content of the White Papers. As stated by Hoornstra: "[i]t is the Commission's point of departure, on which it bases every new proposal". So, the openness to policy redesign of EU policy-makers as expressed by Hoornstra is simply "not at all" and was scored accordingly.



**Table 11 Scoring of indicators for the 2001 White Paper: The Netherlands.**

	Factor from model	Indicator	Meaning	Measurement	Question	Score
Independent variables	Federal-level inducements and constraints	1. Policy content	Extent to which policy comes with sufficient resources and is credible (e.g. makes sense, seems effective)	Scoring on perceived efficacy <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does the content of the White Paper seem to be effective to reach its goals?	7
		2. Policy clarity	Straightforward in terms of means and ends (e.g. tasks and targets)	Scoring clarity of both means and ends and assign scores <sup>2</sup>	How clear are the tasks proposed in the White Paper?	5
					How clear are the targets proposed in the White Paper?	9
		3. Policy consistency	Coherent with and not contradict other policies	Compare messages between the 2001 White Paper and (other) Member State policy ( <i>cross-message</i> ) <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does the White Paper conflict with other policies (in particular other national policy)?	3
		4. Policy form	Extent to which policy is clear, frequently repeated and actually received	Scoring on perceived clarity <sup>2</sup>	How clear are the general goals of the White Paper?	10
	5. Perceptions about federal officials	Extent to which officials are seen as legitimate and credible	Subjective scoring on legitimacy and credibility of EU policy-makers as seen by Member States <sup>2</sup>	Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper legitimate? Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper credible?	9 7	
	State and local inducements and constraints	6. Strength of an advocacy coalition	Extent to which advocates (either in favor of or opposed to) policy can use pressure to be heard (e.g. by size of the coalition, resources spent)	Identify advocacy coalitions and indicate spent resources, total number of members and score degree of 'skill' to influence policy implementation <sup>2</sup>	To what extent have advocacy coalitions (e.g. representatives of Member States, NGO's or others) influenced the content of the White Paper?	7
		7. Attributes of elected and appointed officials	Interests and motives of both influencing policy (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation)	Use scalar scores to explain official's behavior <sup>2</sup>	To what extent did interests and motives of the EU policy-makers (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation) play a role in the formulation of the White Paper?	2
8. Message content and form		Extent to which policy is credible and well-received by local governments	Comparing consistency between White Paper and Member State policy <sup>1</sup>	N/A	2	

Intervening variables	State decisional outcome & State capacity	<i>Organizational capacity:</i> 9. Organizational units	Extent to which personnel is available and able to act	Investigate the number of ‘units’ (personnel) available for dealing with policy implementation (e.g. using organizational charts) or the organizational structure within which these have to act <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does your organization have the ability to act in accordance with the content of the White Paper (e.g. through the availability of personnel)?	<b>5</b>	
		10. Financial resources	Extent to which sufficient funding is available in the state to implement policy	Identify the budget available for transport policy <sup>1</sup>	N/A	<b>3</b>	
		<i>Ecological capacity:</i>					
		11. State fiscal capacity	Size of available budget from the state itself (related to the wealth of the state)	Set out the income, tax capacity and transport-related expenditures for each Member State <sup>1</sup>	N/A	<b>5</b>	
		12. State political capacity	Political openness for policy innovation (e.g. liberal, progressive, political culture in general)	Score Member State’s political <i>milieu</i> on a scalar scale according to openness and innovativeness <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does your organization invest in innovations?	<b>9</b>	
		13. State situational capacity	Extent to which the policy issue is seen as a problem in the state (influenced by e.g. severity of the problem)	Score perceived severity of problem by Member States <sup>2</sup>	To what extent is making transport more sustainable a priority for your organization?	<b>9</b>	
	Feedback and policy redesign	14. Agents, agencies, messages and channels	Reputation and credibility of elected officials, their organizations and formal or informal ways of communication	Mapping the ways of communicating feedback from Member States towards the EU <sup>2</sup>	To what extent could feedback on the content of the White Paper be communicated towards the EU policy-makers?	<b>8</b>	
15. Principle characteristics		Extent to which highest level officials can be reached for communicating feedback (e.g. influenced by ideology of the ‘principle’ official)	Score the by Member States perceived openness to policy redesign of the EU <sup>2</sup>	How open are the EU policy-makers for redesigning the policy content of the White Paper?	<b>1</b>		
Dependent variable	Implementation process, outputs and outcomes					<b>101</b>	

Measurement based on <sup>1</sup> document analysis and <sup>2</sup> a questionnaire.

## 7.2 SPAIN: SCORING IMPLEMENTATION INDICATORS

The third case country under investigation is Spain. Supposedly having relatively different transport policy goals than the EU (KiM, 2007) but being relatively quicker in implementation of transport directives than for example the Netherlands (Kaeding, 2007), this raises also raises expectations about the similarity between national transport policy goals and the EU White Paper.

To score the indicators 8, 10 and 11 for Spain, relevant (policy and budgetary) documents have been identified and analyzed to base a score on for the 2001 White Paper. The other indicators (1 through 7, 9 and 12 through 15) are scored for the 2011 EU White Paper and are based on the scores given in a questionnaire aimed at mister Pallardó, General Deputy Director for Planning of Infrastructure and Transport<sup>5</sup> at the Spanish Ministry of Development. Scoring the indicators express the extent to which it is perceived to apply for the ministry. Due do the very limited time of the respondent, the individual scores could not be further elaborated on. Pallardó was indeed able to provide a general comment at the very end of the questionnaire, which will be referred to in the indicator it may apply to. The assigned scores are briefly mentioned next and are summarized in Table 12.

1. **Policy content.** Score: **3**. The perceived efficacy of the 2011 White Paper was scored asking about the extent to which the content of the White Paper seems to be effective to reach its goals. For Spain, this does not seem to be the case.

2. **Policy clarity.** Score: **5,5** (average). When it comes to scoring the perceived clarity of means and ends to reach the goals proposed in the White Paper, the question was raised to what extent the tasks and targets were clear for Spain.

With regard to *tasks* (scored as **4**) it seems these are not very clear. This seems similar to the case of the Netherlands as well and is perhaps inherent to the type of documents White Papers are since these only contain proposals for action by the EU.

The *targets* (scored as **7**) proposed by the EU are perceived to be more clear than the tasks, although these were deemed “very ambitious” by Pallardó. So, this indicator does not necessarily says something about the feasibility of the proposed targets of the EU.

3. **Policy consistency.** Score: **2**. This indicator sets out to find any conflict with other policies (in particular other national policy). Judging by the score, this seemed not to be the case at all for Spain.

4. **Policy form.** Score: **7**. Indicating the extent to which policy is clear, frequently repeated and actually received was approached by asking how clear the general policy goals. In the questionnaire, was assigned a 7 out of 10. As was noted earlier, this indicator perhaps differs too little from other indicators.

5. **Perceptions about federal officials.** Score: **5** (average). As the name of this indicator suggests, it aims to find the extent to which officials are seen as legitimate and credible. These were measured through two separate questions for legitimacy and credibility.

*Legitimacy* was scored with a **8**. So, seemingly the Spanish ministry views the White Paper on transport coming EU policy-makers as legitimate.

The *credibility* of the White Paper was assigned a score of **2**. Pallardó did explicitly address this point, stating that the 2011 White Paper is “very ambitious in goals, [but]

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<sup>5</sup> In Spanish: Subdirector General de Planificación de Infraestructuras y Transporte.

too little in the means needed to reach the goals”. This latest White Paper is perceived to be rather different from the 2001 White Paper which “really was a road map targeted to its objectives” as Pallardó noted.

6. **Strength of an advocacy coalition.** Score: **4**. This indicator sets out to find to what extent advocacy coalitions (e.g. representatives of Member States, NGO’s or others) influenced the content of the White Paper. For Spain, it appears to be hardly applicable. This seems to reflect literature as well, as for example Magone (2004: 163) noted that “interest groups are marginalized from the European public policy process”. So it seems advocacy coalitions do not play a role in influencing the content and goals of the 2011 White Paper.
7. **Attributes of elected and appointed officials.** Score: **4**. Theoretically, interests and motives of individual policy-makers could influence the content of a policy. To what extent this is also actually applicable here, is scored by the accompanying question for Spain. As the score seems to indicate, interests and motives of EU policy-makers have were of no influence for the content of the White Paper.
8. **Message content and form.** Score: **10**. The PEIT seems to show a great consistency with the goals of the 2001 White Paper (see section 5.2.3). Balancing modes of transport was mentioned to be of great importance, as well as reducing congestion. Reducing bottlenecks was found to be the major policy goal as well, although largely unspecified. Ensuring user rights could be identified as a goal of the PEIT just like in the EU White Paper. Therefore, it seems all EU goals are supported by Spain. The score for this indicator on comparing consistency between White Paper and Member State policy would thus be rather high, since all five policy goals are explicitly supported in the PEIT.
9. **Organizational units.** Score: **5**. Unlike the scoring of this indicator for the Netherlands, for Spain this is based only on the score from the questionnaire. Relevant sources, as far as these could be found at all, were difficult to interpret as these were exclusively in Spanish. Ascribed a 5 by Pallardó, this is comparable to the Netherlands, possibly with a comparable reasoning as the White Papers do not require to be implemented for which specific personnel is needed.
10. **Financial resources.** Score: **7**. The total public spending by the Ministry of Development is about 8.5 billion euros annually since 2005 (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005b: 13). This budget clearly needs to be divided over the different tasks of the Ministry (*ibid.*: 14). When it comes to spending to reach transport policy goals, it appears roughly 5.5 billion euros is directed at this aspect (calculated for civil aviation, roads, road transport and railways, also the major themes in the PEIT). Thus, of the roughly 8,5 billion budget, nearly 65% appears to be available to influence the transport system. The scoring for Spain would be 7 when dividing the percentage by 10 provides the score, making it comparable to the other case.
11. **State fiscal capacity.** Score: **3**. Over several years, the Ministry of Development has had an increasing budget from some 5.7 billion in 2000 to about 8,5 billion euros in 2005 (Ministerio de Fomento, 2005b: 13). The budget is devoted to a range of issues which fall under the responsibility of the ministry, like railways, ports, civil aviation and housing (*ibid.*: 15). When calculated in relative terms, the ministry received just under 3% of the of the total national expenditures of about 311 billion in 2012 (the most recent and most accessible publication; see Ministerio de Hacienda, 2012: Artículo 2). The score would then be 3. In this case the percentage is not divided by 10, to be able to still compare a meaningful score to other countries.

12. **State political capacity.** Score: **7.** This indicator sets out to score the Member State's political *milieu* on a scalar scale according to openness and innovativeness. More specifically, it aims at mapping the political openness for policy innovation (e.g. liberal, progressive, political culture in general). As this may be a rather complex question, it was done by asking to what extent the ministry invests in innovations. For Spain this is scored as a 7 by Pallardó.
13. **State situational capacity.** Score: **5.** The extent to which the policy issue is seen as a problem in the Member State (influenced by e.g. severity of the problem) would theoretically be important to investigate how policy is dealt with, as has been seen before. Judging by the assigned score, making transport more sustainable like the 2011 White Paper sets out to do, does not seem to be a major issue for Spain.
14. **Agents, agencies, messages and channels.** Score: **6.** In the feedback part of Implementation Theory, this indicator aims to map the ways of communicating feedback from Member States towards the EU. In the questionnaire, this was scored by Pallardó to be applicable to some extent. So it would seem the Spanish ministry feels feedback on the content of the White Papers can be communicated towards the EU, although less well than perceived by the Netherlands, for example.
15. **Principle characteristics.** Score: **3.** Aiming to score the perceived openness to policy redesign of the EU by Member States, this question was possibly aimed too much at policy-makers rather than the Commission, which formulates the content of the White Papers. Like for the Netherlands, this indicator is scored rather low for Spain as well. So, the openness to policy redesign of EU policymakers is apparently seen as limited.

The above is summarized in Table 12.

**Table 12 Scoring of indicators for the 2001 White Paper: Spain.**

	Factor from model	Indicator	Meaning	Measurement	Question	Score
Independent variables	Federal-level inducements and constraints	1. Policy content	Extent to which policy comes with sufficient resources and is credible (e.g. makes sense, seems effective)	Scoring on perceived efficacy <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does the content of the White Paper seem to be effective to reach its goals?	<b>3</b>
		2. Policy clarity	Straightforward in terms of means and ends (e.g. tasks and targets)	Scoring clarity of both means and ends and assign scores <sup>2</sup>	How clear are the tasks proposed in the White Paper?	<b>4</b>
					How clear are the targets proposed in the White Paper?	<b>7</b>
		3. Policy consistency	Coherent with and not contradict other policies	Compare messages between the 2001 White Paper and (other) Member State policy ( <i>cross-message</i> ) <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does the White Paper conflict with other policies (in particular other national policy)?	<b>2</b>
		4. Policy form	Extent to which policy is clear, frequently repeated and actually received	Scoring on perceived clarity <sup>2</sup>	How clear are the general goals of the White Paper?	<b>7</b>
	5. Perceptions about federal officials	Extent to which officials are seen as legitimate and credible	Subjective scoring on legitimacy and credibility of EU policy-makers as seen by Member States <sup>2</sup>	Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper legitimate?	<b>8</b>	
				Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper credible?	<b>2</b>	
	State and local inducements and constraints	6. Strength of an advocacy coalition	Extent to which advocates (either in favor of or opposed to) policy can use pressure to be heard (e.g. by size of the coalition, resources spent)	Identify advocacy coalitions and indicate spent resources, total number of members and score degree of 'skill' to influence policy implementation <sup>2</sup>	To what extent have advocacy coalitions (e.g. representatives of Member States, NGO's or others) influenced the content of the White Paper?	<b>4</b>
7. Attributes of elected and appointed officials		Interests and motives of both influencing policy (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation)	Use scalar scores to explain official's behavior <sup>2</sup>	To what extent did interests and motives of the EU policy-makers (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation) play a role in the formulation of the White Paper?	<b>4</b>	
8. Message content and form		Extent to which policy is credible and well-received by local governments	Comparing consistency between White Paper and Member State policy <sup>1</sup>	N/A	<b>10</b>	

Intervening variables	State decisional outcome & State capacity	<i>Organizational capacity:</i>											
		9. Organizational units	Extent to which personnel is available and able to act				Investigate the number of ‘units’ (personnel) available for dealing with policy implementation (e.g. using organizational charts) or the organizational structure within which these have to act <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does your organization have the ability to act in accordance with the content of the White Paper (e.g. through the availability of personnel)?	<b>5</b>				
		10. Financial resources	Extent to which sufficient funding is available in the state to implement policy				Identify the budget available for transport policy <sup>1</sup>	N/A	<b>7</b>				
		<i>Ecological capacity:</i>											
		11. State fiscal capacity	Size of available budget from the state itself (related to the wealth of the state)							Set out the income, tax capacity and transport-related expenditures for each Member State <sup>1</sup>	N/A	<b>3</b>	
		12. State political capacity	Political openness for policy innovation (e.g. liberal, progressive, political culture in general)							Score Member State’s political <i>milieu</i> on a scalar scale according to openness and innovativeness <sup>2</sup>	To what extent does your organization invest in innovations?	<b>7</b>	
		13. State situational capacity	Extent to which the policy issue is seen as a problem in the state (influenced by e.g. severity of the problem)							Score perceived severity of problem by Member States <sup>2</sup>	To what extent is making transport more sustainable a priority for your organization?	<b>5</b>	
		Feedback and policy redesign	14. Agents, agencies, messages and channels							Reputation and credibility of elected officials, their organizations and formal or informal ways of communication	Mapping the ways of communicating feedback from Member States towards the EU <sup>2</sup>	To what extent could feedback on the content of the White Paper be communicated towards the EU policy-makers?	<b>6</b>
			15. Principle characteristics							Extent to which highest level officials can be reached for communicating feedback (e.g. influenced by ideology of the ‘principle’ official	Score the by Member States perceived openness to policy redesign of the EU <sup>2</sup>	How open are the EU policy-makers for redesigning the policy content of the White Paper?	<b>3</b>
Dependent variable	Implementation process, outputs and outcomes					<b>87</b>							

Measurement based on <sup>1</sup> document analysis and <sup>2</sup> a questionnaire.

### 7.3 CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis for the indicators and assigned scores, what Member States *actually* do with the White Papers on Transport seems to differ quite a bit between the investigated countries (see Table 13). At first glance, it seems the 'level of implementation' is highest for the Netherlands, suggesting the White Papers are relative to Spain better received, perceived and dealt with. Despite having the least national transport policy goals in common with the 2001 White Paper, the score was highest of the two. The opposite has been found to be the case for Spain. So, a more detailed discussion could help provide more insight in all fifteen indicators to find why this could be the case.

**Table 13 Comparing scores between cases.**

Indicator	Scores for the Netherlands	Scores for Spain
1. Policy content	7	3
2. Policy clarity *	7	5.5
3. Policy consistency	3	2
4. Policy form	10	7
5. Perceptions about federal officials *	8	5
6. Strength of an advocacy coalition	7	4
7. Attributes of elected and appointed officials	2	4
8. Message content and form	2	10
9. Organizational units	5	5
10. Financial resources	3	7
11. State fiscal capacity	5	3
12. State political capacity	9	7
13. State situational capacity	9	5
14. Agents, agencies, messages and channels	8	6
15. Principle characteristics	1	3
<i>End-score</i>	101	87


\* Average of two scores.

Overall, it appears the higher score for the Netherlands seems to be caused simply for it is more 'positive' about the 2011 White Paper than Spain. The first sees the goals as rather clear, the EU as legitimate and credible in formulating White Papers on Transport and finds the tasks and targets both clear and relatively effective. All these indicators are scored lower for Spain. In fact, only four out of fifteen scores are higher than or the same as the Netherlands (see also Figure 8 below).

What explains these differences? Looking at the scored indicators to find an answer, especially the scores with the largest differences (4 points or more) determine the differences in overall 'level of implementation', besides the already mentioned overall higher scores assigned for the Netherlands. The largest differences are found to be 'policy content', 'state situational capacity' and 'message content and form'.

**Policy content** (indicator 1) sets out to score the perceived extent to which the policy is credible (i.e. makes sense, seems effective). For Spain, this does not seem to be the case at all, scoring a 3 out of 10. For the Netherlands, this was scored 4 points *higher*, even though some strategies were mentioned to be 'flawed' (see section 7.1). Contributing to a higher 'level of implementation' for the Netherlands, the main finding here is that the 2011 White Paper is viewed there as much more credible than in Spain, suggesting the impact on Dutch national transport policy could be greater than on Spanish national transport policy as the 'credible' goals could be taken over.





**Figure 8 Comparing scores per indicator.**

**State situational capacity** (indicator 13) scores to what extent making transport more sustainable a priority for each Member State provided another significant difference in scores. For the Netherlands, this was scored with a 9, indicating the large extent to which this is a goal for the ministry. For Spain, making transport more sustainable appeared to be hardly an important goal, judging by the assigned 5 to this indicator. Perhaps other goals have to be met before making transport more sustainable can be a goal at all. Perhaps the importance of transport for the Netherlands contributes to the extent to which it sees making transport more sustainable as a priority.

**Message content and form** (indicator 8) was scored based on document analysis by comparing similarity of Member State transport policy with the goals of the 2001 White Paper. It appeared the Netherlands explicitly supported only one of the major goals of the White Paper and in some instances stated to oppose what the White Paper proposed as a goal (see section 5.1.2). Spain, on the other hand, did made explicit mention of all the goals of the 2001 White Paper, scoring a 10 (see section 5.2.3). So, even though the goals are supported, as has been seen earlier, Spain does find the goals of the White Paper very credible, but the measures proposed less so. This seems to be reflected in the seeming similarity between the 2001 White Paper and Spanish national transport policy.

Other indicators were scored relatively similar, like ‘principle characteristics’. This indicator was possibly aimed too much at policy-makers rather than the Commission, so concluding the EU is not open to policy redesign should be approached with some caution, despite low scores for both the Netherlands and Spain.

The expectations from what Member States are supposed to do with the White Papers (based on the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix) were partly confirmed by the assigned scores. The indicators ‘policy consistency’ and ‘organizational units’ were scored relatively low, exemplifying the expectation that the White Papers were unlikely to conflict with national policies and the lack of personnel needed to implement the White Paper due to its non-binding character. The Dutch *Nota Mobiliteit* confirmed the expected low consistency with the White Pa-

per (indicator ‘message content and form’; due to the possible interpretation of the ‘symbolic’ document), but the found consistency of the Spanish PEIT counteracted this. As shall be elaborated more upon later, the causality may be questioned: these goals may have been supported by the Spanish without the White Paper. With regard to ‘policy clarity’, the clarity of *targets* proved to be relatively high for both Member States, unlike what the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix suggested. However, the theoretical expectation may be confirmed by the lower scores for clarity of *tasks*. These were deemed less clear by both countries, exemplifying the relative ambiguity in this respect.

So, to summarize, it appears the level of implementation for the Netherlands is higher than for Spain. This can be explained mainly by the lack of credibility of the 2011 White Paper for Spain. Due to this lack of credibility, several indicators were scored lower than the Netherlands, which appears more ‘positive’ about the goals of the 2011 White Paper. Still, both Member States note the goals are not always supported by appropriate means. To some extent, this could be ascribed to the character of the White Papers. Since these set out proposals for action, further specification of means can still be made to actually turn the goals into action (see also Chapter 6). Interestingly, unlike what the end-score may suggest, the impact of the 2001 White Paper when it comes to similarities and differences between Spanish national goals and EU goals seems greater than that of the Netherlands as the former shares the goals more explicitly.

## 8. CONCLUSION

This research set out to find the impact of European White Papers on national transport policy goals to make transport more sustainable. The two most recent White Papers on Transport from 2001 and 2011 were focus of attention. The impact of the EU White Papers on national transport policy goals was researched by (1) investigating similarities and differences between the goals of the 2001 White Paper and national transport policy and (2) explaining how the 2011 White Paper is received, perceived and dealt with by Member States. Two Member States and their national transport policy have been investigated to find impacts of the EU White Papers.

### 8.1 RESULTS

For each sub question, the results are briefly concluded below before the main question is answered.

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#### *What is the role of the European White Papers to make transport more sustainable?*

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It was found that the White Papers are mostly ‘soft’ documents, containing *proposals* for action by the European Community. Actual actions are still to be determined. The White Papers could be seen as ‘soft’ documents, without any (direct) consequences for Member States when these do not support these goals. White Papers seem to indicate the European Commission is ‘aware’ of certain issues and sets out how such issues could be responded to. It was also found that when Member States ‘favorably receive’ the proposals of the document, these may be turned into actual legislation, subsidy programs and the like. It seems only with enough support from Member States, White Papers play a role in making transport more sustainable.

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#### *What are the goals of the European Union to make transport more sustainable?*

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Investigation of the 2001 White Paper to answer the question what the goals of the EU are to make transport more sustainable, delivered five main points. This seemingly focused mostly on *curbing* mobility. The main goals were to (1) balance modes of transport, (2) reduce congestion, (3) ease bottlenecks, (4) ensure user rights and (5) manage globalization of transport. These were supported by many possible actions to be taken. Agreement of Member States to these actions is vital to result in actual legislation and the like. This 2001 White Paper explicitly expected ‘others’ (i.e. Member States or road users) to play a role in reaching more sustainable transport.

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#### *What are Member States supposed to do with the White Papers on Transport?*

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With regard to what Member States are *supposed* to do with the White Papers on Transport, it was found that these hint mostly to a form of ‘symbolic implementation’ in the theoretical view of the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix. It leaves much room for interpretation and hardly assigns any specific roles to achieve the goals set out in the White Papers (contributing to a higher level of ‘*ambiguity*’). When it comes to ‘*conflict*’, this provided a mixed result. There appeared to be a high interdependence between actors, in this case mainly Member States. This was especially the case since turning the proposals of the White Paper into actions depends entirely on the agreement of Member States. The incompatibility of objectives, however, seemed hardly to play a role since White Papers conflict only conflict very little, if at all, with Member State’s own policy. According to the matrix, the strength an advocacy coalition determines the outcome of policies in this type, at least in theory. This may be the case

for White Papers as well, where Member States need to support the content of the White Papers before these are turned into any kind of legislation or programs. So, when it comes to what Member States are *supposed* to do with the White Papers on Transport, this may be mostly ‘symbolic’, with hardly any (direct) consequences when the content is not supported.

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*What do Member States actually do with these White Papers?*

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When it comes to what Member States *actually* do with the White Papers on Transport, a slightly mixed result was found based on Implementation Theory to find how policy is received, perceived and dealt with. Overall, it appears the Netherlands is more ‘positive’ about the White Papers than Spain. The Netherlands sees the goals as rather clear, the EU as legitimate and credible in formulating White Papers on Transport and finds the tasks and targets both clear and relatively effective. All these indicators are scored lower for Spain. It appears the level of implementation for the Netherlands is higher than for Spain mainly due to the lack of credibility as seen by the Spanish which lowered its overall score. Remarkably, unlike what the end-score may suggest, the similarity of the 2001 White Paper to Spanish national transport policy goals seems greater than that of the Netherlands as Spain shares the goals more explicitly. Both Member States note the goals are not always supported by appropriate means. This could be ascribed to some extent to the character of the White Papers: since these set out proposals for action, further specification of means can still be made to actually turn the goals into action. It would therefore seem agreement on goals (‘symbols’) is more important than agreement on the means to reach these, like the theoretical Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix already suggested.

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*What is the impact of European Transport White Papers on national transport policy goals to make transport more sustainable?*

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To conclude, based on (1) the similarities and differences between the goals of the White Papers on Transport and Member States’ national policies and (2) the scored ‘level of implementation’, it seems that the European White Papers on Transport do in fact have some impact on national transport policy goals of the selected cases. Firstly, Member States’ national transport policy share relative similar goals as the EU. Secondly, despite some issues like lack of efficacy and credibility of the White Papers (mainly ascribed to the proposed measures to reach goals), the 2011 White Paper seems to be relatively well received, perceived and dealt with by the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Spain.


With regard to similarities and differences between the goals of national transport policy of the cases and the 2001 White Paper, it appears Spain shared all goals explicitly where the Netherlands did not and openly opposed some of those goals. In this respect, it seems that the impact of the White Paper is greatest on the Spanish national transport policy document. Remarkably, the other part of investigating the impact of the 2011 White Paper (namely the ‘level of implementation’) was scored lower than the Netherlands.

With regard to the ‘level of implementation’, the end-score was found to be higher for the Netherlands relative to Spain. This can be mainly explained mainly by the lack of credibility of the White Paper for Spain. Due to this lack of credibility, several indicators were scored lower than the Netherlands, which suggests the White Paper is more well received, perceived and dealt with by the latter. However, it appears the Netherlands is more ‘positive’ about the goals of the White Papers. Still, *both* Member States note the goals are not always supported by appropriate means.

To some extent, this could be ascribed to the expectations from what Member States are

supposed to do with the White Papers (based on the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix): for the indicator ‘policy clarity’, the theoretical expectation was raised that these would be scored rather low and may be confirmed by the lower scores for clarity of *tasks*. These were deemed less clear by both countries, exemplifying the relative ambiguity in this respect as expected from the theoretical matrix. However, for other indicators, the link between the matrix and the ‘level of implementation’ seems limited as some indicators were scored different from what could perhaps be expected from the ‘symbolic’ style of implementation, like the indicator ‘policy clarity’, for which the clarity of *targets* proved to be relatively high for both Member States, unlike what the Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix suggested. For the indicator ‘message content and form’ the Dutch transport policy document confirmed the expected low consistency with the White Paper (due to the possible interpretation of the ‘symbolic’ document), but the found consistency of the Spanish transport policy document counteracted this. So, the link between the matrix and the ‘level of implementation’ seems to be limited.

Unlike what the end-score may suggest, the impact of the 2001 White Paper on Spanish *national policy goals* seems greater than that of the Netherlands as the former shares the goals more explicitly. However, the causality may be questioned: are these goals supported by Member States *due to* the White Paper or would they support comparable goals without these documents anyway?



**Figure 9 Positioning results: comparing found similarity to EU policy goals and the found ‘level of implementation’ (end-scores).**

Generalizing the results from this research, Figure 9 hints at the variety between the two selected cases. The results also seem to suggest the curious conclusion that the less goals national transport policy are explicitly shared (or ‘supported’), the higher the ‘level of implementation’ would be for a given country. This would mean the more similar goals national transport policy shares with the EU White Paper on Transport, the less well the White Paper is received, perceived and dealt with. However, based on two cases, it may be difficult to discern a pattern. Investigating a larger number of Member States and comparing national transport policy to the 2011 White Paper when that document has had the chance to find its way into national transport policy, could provide more evidence for this conclusion.

When looking at the combination of both parts to find the actual impact, it can be concluded the White Papers make an impact to *a certain extent* on national transport policy documents. For neither case, the White Papers make a very high or very low impact in which case the cases would be positioned near the corners in Figure 9. Still, the conclusion is justified that White Papers do seem to impact national transport policy goals.

## **8.2 DISCUSSION AND REFLECTION**

Some conclusions of this research should be approached with a little caution. Due to limited time and resources, not all elements of this research could have been researched exhaustively as the following will try to exemplify.

Firstly, the theories used to investigate what Member States are supposed to do and what they actually do with the White Papers, were originally developed for other circumstances. Especially the Implementation Theory used for the latter question was developed for the situation of the United States, not the EU, and emphasizes more 'hard' legislations than 'soft' White Papers. So, some indicators were less relevant and were left out beforehand. Afterwards, some indicators proved to be less relevant as well (e.g. 'Financial resources') or simply hard to score (e.g. 'State fiscal capacity'; see also section 3.2.3). The effect on this research may have been that the scores for the less relevant indicators should be approached with some caution. Still, after adapting the theories to the situation of the EU and its White Papers, these provided a scientifically sound framework for investigating and explaining the impact of White Papers on national policy goals as it sets out to investigate a large number of factors that influence the implementation of such documents.

Secondly, the results of scoring the indicators was suboptimal due to the lack of comments given for the Spanish case. Possibly due to the used method of a questionnaire rather than an interview, the scores were not elaborated upon. However, an interview method was not likely to be more successful due to the extra time that would take *for the respondent*: quickly scoring the questions was, apparently, the most the respondent could do within the given time. Information from other sources, like documents, rather than using a questionnaire or interview, could pose difficulties for scoring *all* the indicators properly (e.g. due to availability of information) as well as comparison to scores that were not scored based on document sources. Looking for other respondents was impossible for Spain, as the respondent was said to be the only contact. So, for this case, no real interpretation can be given to the assigned scores. The scores still *are* useful to indicate what Spain actually does with the White Paper, but further interpretation of *why* Spain deals with the White Paper the way it does cannot be done based on these data.

Thirdly, scores from only one respondent for each Member State were used in this research. This was done for it would not make sense for multiple respondents to represent the same Member State. Still, another respondent might have scored the indicators differently. As scoring the indicators set out to investigate how the White Papers are received, perceived and dealt with, this would inherently be (largely) subjective, so one 'correct' or 'best' score for each Member State may not exist and some uncertainty on this point remains. There is thus no 'solid' way of scoring the indicators, which only set out to *indicate* the 'level of implementation', relative to other cases. Future research could focus on scoring the indicators by more respondents (perhaps also other than policy-makers) of each Member State to find whether this would result in any significantly different outcome.

Fourthly, there is not necessarily a (causal) link between the impact of the White Papers and the similarity of Member State's transport policy goals. In other words, similarity between EU goals and a Member State's goals are not necessarily *due to* the EU White Paper. General goals could be supported without a European White Paper stating these. Still, due to the relative similarity between the White Papers and national transport policy goals, they do seem to set a 'framework' as was noted in the beginning of this research (see section 2.1). Possibly by investigating more Member States, this answer could be answered.

Future research could take the above-mentioned issues and suggestions into account to improve finding impacts of the EU White Papers on national transport policy goals. Within the

given time and resources for this research, these issues have been dealt with as well as possible.

### **8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS**

For reaching the goals set out by the EU to make transport more sustainable, a major recommendation would be to improve the credibility of the White Papers: propose measures that actually seem effective to reach the proposed goals. By both the Netherlands and Spain this was identified as a major issue for the 2011 White Paper on Transport.

Some other recommendations could be provided based on the *other* indicators with the lowest scores. These would, however, quickly go against the character of the White Papers. For example, specific budgets could be assigned to the White Paper and personnel to implement the goals. Such recommendations would make no sense for this type of policy document only sets out proposals for action. These actions could in turn be assigned budgets and personnel, which may be result from the White Papers, but this would be beyond the focus of this research. Therefore, to provide in a *sensible* recommendation, this is based on the one major issue that can actually be improved, taking the character of the White Papers into account.

In addition to the issues discussed in the previous section, research could focus on comparing *more* Member States to compare and generalize the impact of the White Papers on Transport on national transport policy goals. It could provide a better insight in the issue of causality: is the relative similarity of goals as found in this research really due to the impact White Papers have, or would comparable goals be supported without these documents anyway? Future research could perhaps answer this question.

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## ANNEX I. QUESTIONNAIRE

Below, the actual questionnaire that was used for this research has been added.

Dear sir or madam,

The enclosed survey about the **2011 EU White Paper on Transport** [COM(2011)144] consists of 14 questions. Please assign **one** score (on a scale from 1 to 10) per question to indicate the 'extent' to which it applies for your organisation and in **your** view. You are kindly invited to elaborate more on the scoring. If you do not wish to elaborate on the score, please write that down for that question.

The scoring will be used in my master thesis research to indicate how Member States have dealt with the contents of the White Paper, regardless of its official, 'legal' status. Assigning scores enables the comparison between countries (of which I study three in total<sup>6</sup>), using additional comments to support the score. The scores and comments will be processed and communicated for confirmation before they are used in the thesis.

The document can be saved at any moment and resumed later on. If any problems were to occur, please let me know so it can be solved as quickly as possible.

It would be much appreciated if you could return the questionnaire within two weeks.

Sincerely,

Erwin van Veen  
Master student Environmental and Infrastructure Planning  
Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, the Netherlands.

E-mail: e.a.van.veen@student.rug.nl

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<sup>6</sup> At the time of formulating this questionnaire, it was assumed three cases were going to be studied.

# EUROPEAN WHITE PAPER ON TRANSPORT, 2011

1. To what extent does the content of the White Paper seem to be effective to reach its goals?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

2. How clear are the tasks (generally, but also for your organisation) proposed in the White Paper?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

3. How clear are the targets proposed in the White Paper?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

4. To what extent does the White Paper conflict with other policies (in particular other national policy)?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

5. How clear are the general goals of the White Paper in your view?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

6. Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper legitimate in your view?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

7. Being formulated by EU policy-makers, to what extent is this White Paper credible in your view?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

8. To what extent have advocacy coalitions (e.g. representatives of Member States, NGO's or others) influenced the content of the White Paper?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

9. To what extent did interests and motives of the EU policy-makers (e.g. wish to get re-elected or gain reputation) play a role in the formulation of the White Paper?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

10. To what extent does your organisation have the ability to act in accordance with the content of the White Paper (e.g. through the availability of personnel)?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

11. To what extent does your organisation invest in innovations?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

12. To what extent is making mobility more sustainable a priority for your organisation?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

13. To what extent could feedback on the content of the White Paper be communicated towards the EU policy-makers?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

14. How open are the EU policy-makers for redesigning the policy content of the White Paper?

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9      10

Please elaborate on the assigned score.

Thank you for your participation, it is much appreciated. Is there anything else you would like to add?





