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## Master's Thesis

Conflict of interests in the Multilevel  
Governance of Informal Settlements:  
Jakarta's Urban Kampung

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## Abstract



Kampungs in Jakarta | source: Rujak Center for Urban Studies, 2020

Jakarta - 27% of Indonesia's capital city is built within forms of *kampungs*, an Indonesian term for informal settlement. In Global South urbanism, others may refer to it as *slums*, *squatters* or in an extreme view, an *illegal* settlement. However, this research would like to elaborate on the term *informal settlement* to provide a better starting point of description in the research.

The informal settlement is much understood from its slum-like physical characteristics and obscured tenure status, making it one of the complex issues to address in many Global South cities. Moving away from spatiality and tenure perspective, this research aims to explore how the conflict of interests among stakeholders influences the governance of informal settlement in Jakarta, Indonesia at the multilevel praxis, which analyzed from the stakeholders involved at the level of public policy (top-down) and grassroots initiative (bottom-up). Through semi-structured interviews with stakeholders involved in the governance of kampungs, this research found that conflict of interests occurs at every level of stakeholder participation. As a result, the multilevel governance of kampungs in Jakarta becomes fragmented and contested between formal and informal modes of conduct, thus hindering the policymakers and grassroots initiatives to foster collaboration towards the already-complex issues of kampungs as informal settlements in Jakarta.

Keywords: conflict of interests, informal settlements, Jakarta, kampungs and multilevel governance

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# Chapter 1: Research Background

## 1. Introduction

Net rural-urban migration has become one of the major causes of population growth in cities. Net rural-urban migration refers to a phenomenon when some members of a rural community decide to settle permanently in urban areas. Insufficient income from the agricultural sector, lack of alternative jobs and minimum living access are among the general factors of migration, assuming cities as the destination for better economic opportunities and livability. Such dynamic migration is often found in cities of middle-to-low income countries. The insurgence of rural migrants demands for better urban governance in which cities in middle-to-low income countries often struggle to keep up. This struggle is reflected in the failure of affordable housing provision by the city government. As an alternative, the informal settlements become the affordable option for living in the city (Irawati, 2018), ultimately for the incoming poor migrants. In the developing countries, this type of urban settlement is named in various callings; *Favelas* in Brazil, *Bidonville* in the Philippines and *Kampung* in Indonesia.

In Jakarta, a *kampung* is defined as an unstructured, unorganized and informal settlement. Poverty and poor quality of infrastructure are its common features that are often stigmatized due to its marginal spatial and socio-economic characteristics. With these traits, *kampung* as the home of the urban poor and low-income migrants face governance dilemmas for years where it relates to the conflict of interests among stakeholders. The conflict of interests happens between various stakeholders, including the government, real estate developers and *kampung* residents, allying with community-based organizations (CBOs) and the NGOs. Each stakeholder represents differences of interests within the multilevel governance of *kampungs*; slum improvement by the government, profit-making by developers and place-based community participation by the residents to keep their home.

*Kampungs* in Jakarta go through at least three forms of intervention. First, from the government, the governance of *kampungs* is enforced within a contradictory dualism; eviction and upgrading. Most evictions are executed for legal and environmental reasons, while upgrading is given to improve the physical appearance and liveability of the *kampung*. Second, land commodification of *kampung* areas by real estate developers. Developers actively seek these lands for business expansion and future investment (Leitner & Sheppard, 2017). Third, relating to grassroots perspective, *kampung* is seen as a place for social co-production and a hub of local solidarity. Keeping this collective value leads to grassroots initiative, including their effort to organize and advocate their *kampung* through participatory land use planning (PLUP).

Within such complexity, assessing these interests and contestation will be a valuable insight to see the multilevel governance of *kampung* beyond the policy and regulatory framework. The central focus of this research is to explore how conflict of interests among stakeholders influences the multilevel governance of *kampungs*. This trajectory may bring new perspectives and further explanations on why the

governance of kampungs has been rather ineffective and problematic to solve in Jakarta. This research may also be beneficial for enriching the discussion and knowledge-transfer on the governance of informal settlements, especially in the Global South countries.

## **2. Research Question**

This research aims to answer the main question of how the conflict of interests of stakeholders influence the governance of Jakarta's urban kampungs. This research is neither aimed to find the best methodology nor alternative of governing the kampungs. Rather, it tries to map the interest of each stakeholder and how it influences their participation in the governance of kampungs in Jakarta. The stakeholders that are involved as subjects of study include the national and local government, real estate developers, NGOs and kampung residents. The research question pertains to scrutinizing stakeholders' interests that relate to motivation and their experience and/or involvement in kampung governance. To complement the main question, several questions are deployed as follows:

- How is the kampung land viewed by the stakeholders in terms of legal, social, cultural and economic value?
- What is the relationship among stakeholders?
- What is the form of contestation or conflict of interests among stakeholders on the governance of kampung?
- What hinders the cross-stakeholder coordination and cooperation on the governance of kampung?

## **3. Scientific and Societal Relevance**

### *Scientific Relevance*

As urbanization is becoming more inevitable, it is essential to accommodate informal settlements as part of its process due to rapid rural-urban migration and housing backlog in many metropolitan cities, especially in developing countries. This is especially relevant to the global agenda, particularly for achieving sustainable urbanization by 2030 according to Sustainable Development Goal 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities). The potential of informal settlements to be included in sustainable urbanization lies within the fact that it provides more housing supply for poor households, than the formal housing system is able to achieve (Dovey and King, 2011).

In regard to that potential, more studies should be conducted to capture the challenges facing informal settlements today. So far, the majority of studies on informal settlement put much emphasis in infrastructure upgrading and socioeconomic development. However, given the multifaceted issues of informal settlements, studies on the governance and stakeholders should also be encouraged as understanding a complex issue requires a diversity in perspectives (De Roo, 2003). From the premise, this research emphasizes the importance of stakeholders in multilevel governance of informal settlements and specifically how the conflict of



interests among stakeholders influences its governance process. Taking Jakarta as the case, the influence of conflict of interests on the governance of kampungs is examined by assessing how it has been hindering the multilevel governance process and stakeholders cooperation. The final outcome of this research is to provide a stakeholder mapping on how the conflict of interests influences the governance issues in the multilevel governance of kampung settlements.

### *Societal Relevance*

From the notion of just city, this research encourages equal distribution and rights to expressing opinions. The just city perspective not only emphasizes resource distribution but also the rights of speech by enabling the most disadvantaged group to the conversation (Fainstein, 2014). As this research seeks to hear from every level of stakeholder for their point of view, the principle of equal speech is especially given to the kampung residents. This is because kampung residents are often stigmatized as *second-class citizens* in Jakarta. Thus, their participation has been hindered in the urban governance process. By inviting the view of the kampung community, this research seeks to bridge the narratives of top-down approach and the bottom-up ideas. Therefore, a participative discussion and fair amount of perspectives can be achieved.

## **Chapter 2: Theoretical Review**

This section elaborates the concept of multilevel governance, the complexity of informal settlement, governance practices on informal settlement and conflict of interests among stakeholders that influence the governance process of kampungs in Jakarta. The first part of this chapter is to review the concept of multilevel governance in the urban governance process. Second, the framework of informal settlement is discussed to understand the complexity of this issue. Third, approaches of multilevel stakeholders within governance of informal settlement are explained through top-down and bottom-up processes. Finally, the concept of conflict of interests is brought into the discussion, derived from the premise that conflict of interests occurs in different means and ends, ideologies, values and institutional representation of the involved stakeholders.

### **1. Concept of Multilevel Governance**

In this context, the basic understanding of multilevel governance relates with the concept of urban governance in terms of shift and rearrangement to new emphases, modes and relationships in managing the city. From the actor-relational perspective, Obeng-Odoom (2012) defines urban governance as partnership in urban development between urban local governments and other stakeholders, such as business leaders and landowners. Under this perspective, its ontological meaning is accompanied by a departure from hierarchies to networks as a mode of coordinating affairs (Newman et al., 2004). Anderson and Nielson (2009) enhance the meaning by emphasizing the city as a complex form of organization, creating insight into urban living as a complex web of relationships. They conclude that urban stakeholders are multi-relational as the city consists of networks of social relations on various scales. In practice, the definition expects a substantial degree of active participation and negotiation among stakeholders in the process of urban development.

Discourses on stakeholders' participation cannot be separated from the institutional perspective. In this case, multilevel governance emerges as an embodiment of shift from governmental, top-down institutional management towards mix-institution modes of governance. In multilevel governance, governmental agencies are no longer the leading force in the decision-making process. In fact, multilevel governance sits in contrast to a top-down, hierarchical mode that prioritizes central control (Andrews, 2006; Stavins, 2010). It highlights collaboration rather than a top-down approach by agents of local governments (Newman et al., 2004). There is an on-going effort of creating a space for democratic decision-making among stakeholders beyond governmental framework, in ways that encourage inclusive and representative decision-making processes.

Transfer of power among different tiers is identified by Obeng-Odoom (2012) as a means to encourage inclusive participation of stakeholders. Transfer of power is often associated with decentralization. In a classical view of decentralization, Rondinelli (1981) defines it as:

The transfer or delegation of legal and political authority to plan, make decisions and manage public functions from the central government and its agencies to field organisations of those agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public corporations, area wide or regional development authorities; functional authorities, autonomous local governments, or nongovernmental organizations.

In other words, the transfer of power integrates both hierarchical and horizontal interactions. As the result of this integration, Homsy, et. al., (2018) propose at least a five-component framework for multilevel governance. First, vertical and horizontal co-production of knowledge. Local knowledge becomes an important consideration along with centralized policymakers and technical analysts (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Homsy & Warner, 2013). Second, framing of co-benefits. Multilevel governance allows the integration of perspective of how a certain issue is framed and therefore stimulates actions for common benefit. Third, the engagement of civil society. Citizens can influence and motivate government action (Homsy, et.al., 2018) to boost the desired outcome. Fourth, provision of capacity. Channelling the capacity needed in order to enable participation of the less-resourced stakeholders comes in the form of professional and technical assistance and financial provision (Homsy, et.al., 2018). Finally, sanctioning and coordinating authority, through which every stakeholder can monitor how the rule of conduct is followed to maintain the commitment and if not, to what extent the cost of sanction is determined. To sum up, multilevel governance is not referring to the absence of urban government but rather an arrangement in which state power has become dispersed and decentred (Newman et al., 2004) with other stakeholders, including the power in decision-making and modes of conduct in how the city is collectively governed.

## **2. Complexity of Informal Settlement**

Informal settlement is one of the most complex issues in urban development (Barry and Ruther, 2005), particularly in the context of Global South. The complexity of informal settlement is indicated within the fact that it has not been able to be clearly defined yet (UNHSP, 2003). Definitions of informal settlement may vary from country to country and from one author to another (Milbert, 2006). To capture the complexity of informal settlement, first it is important to distinguish its spatial traits and tenure characteristics. This is because there are many mixed interpretations from a multifaceted perspective. From the spatial characteristics, some scholars refer to informal settlements as slums, while some others define them as irregular settlements (Irawati, 2018; Kusno, 2020). From the tenure perspective, many classify it as a de facto settlement for its semi-formal tenure (Kusno, 2020). In an extreme view, it is seen as squatters due to its illegal occupation in the city (Barry and Ruther, 2005). Nevertheless, it may not be sufficient to address these fragmented views on informal settlements without understanding the process that shapes the characteristics of informal settlement.

It is worth emphasizing what conveys informal settlement beyond the formal framework of urban management. Put it simply, informality is recognized as practices outside state control (Dovey and King, 2012). Moreover, informality is a

framework for understanding the encroachment of informal activities and settlements within formally planned cities (Roy and Alsayyad, 2004). Therefore, the emergence and development of informal settlement should be identified as a process, rather than as a form. Dovey (2015) supports this argument as he favors term *incrementalism* within informal settlement. He explains that informal settlement embodies informal practices of sociality and economic production that are not easily retained in formal systems. For instance, informal economy and informal settlements are generally more capable in accommodating the influx of rural migrants as the formal systems cannot provide sufficient numbers of jobs or settlement to those newcomers (Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000; Zhu and Simamarta, 2015). Due to this process, some may interpret informal settlement as a counterproductive of established urban formal systems. Nevertheless, informal settlement is a reflection of how informal practices respond to inadequate provision from formally recognized urban systems, particularly in the housing sector (Dovey and King, 2011).

Consequences of informal practices that shape the informal settlement are reflected in at least two aspects. First, the obscured occupation status. The formal systems often fail to recognize these informal practices and/or refuse to integrate it within the formal administrations. For example, Zhu and Simamarta (2015) elaborate the dichotomy between formal and informal land rights in Jakarta. They find that the dichotomy comes as a manifestation of state incapacity in addressing socioeconomic gaps. Influx of poor migrants and emerging middle class both create a demand for housing which has to be fulfilled as their basic needs. Their income capability determines who gets access to the formal housing market which automatically reflects the occupation status between the two groups. The higher income group is generally able to acquire housing from a recognized housing market, while the poorer group has to find alternatives through unregulated housing systems. The inability of the state to recognize informal practices of housing provision may explain why informal settlement and its settlers are often associated with the term *illegal* and *marginal* (Kusno, 2020).

Second, how informal practice affects spatial conditions. Informal settlement is not akin to slums (Dovey and Kim, 2011), however, it can share slum-like physical characteristics due to several factors. As mentioned earlier, informal settlements accommodate the insurgence of migrants to the city. Constant influx of people increases the population growth in the settlement. The spatial quality can increasingly deteriorate if the population density and human activities exceeds the carrying capacity (Oh, et. al., 2005), especially without proper management and maintenance. From the formal systems perspective, any built environment that is not registered under the recognized market systems usually does not receive basic services such as infrastructure provision (water, sanitation, drainage, fire protection, etc). Therefore, while the population keeps increasing, the quality of the informal settlement is decreasing, making it gradually similar to slums in terms of infrastructure deficit and high density (Milbert, 2006). This further can justify why informal settlements overlap with slums or irregular settlements (Kohli, et. al., 2012; Kusno, 2020). Up to this point, it may not be surprising if there are various (if not

conflicting) interpretations on informal settlement as many scholars and public policies still attempt to comprehend its informal practices.

### **3. Multilevel Governance of Informal settlements**

Multilevel governance as an approach may be relevant as a mode of governing the complexity of informal settlement. To what extent multilevel governance is relevant relates to the complexity-based interaction. According to De Roo (2003), the degree of complexity of an issue determines the level of interaction of actors involved. Basically, the more complex the issue is, the more actors are needed to participate in addressing the issue. This is because a complex issue has more interfering context that requires a degree of understanding from various perspectives (De Roo, 2003), which in this case, to comprehend the multifaceted issues of informal settlement.

To implement the multilevel concept into the governance of informal settlement, it first can be described from the involving actors and stakeholders. Devas (2014) introduces the range of actors and institutions in urban governance. He classifies these various stakeholders that include the governmental agencies, private sectors, formal and informal civil society groups such as NGOs, religious groups, trade unions and associations. His framework suggests the wide participation of stakeholders from grassroots to governmental level, allowing the mixture of top-down and bottom-up collaboration. While urban governance stresses cross-collaboration with various stakeholders (Devas, 2014), the multilevel governance within this context prevails the transfer of sovereignty, competencies and decision-making in the process, diminishing hegemony despite differences of power and legitimacy among stakeholders. This may convey that approaches of the local wisdom of grassroots community in the governance of informal settlement can be equally considered the same way as technocratic or policy-wise from the government. Both locality and public policy approaches can be seen as a complementary effort in understanding the complex issues of informal settlement.

Second, how multilevel governance operates within the framework of governance. Governance encompasses various scope of activities from regulation, coordination and control (Rhodes, 1997). However, the governance of informal settlement in itself can be specific, if not complicated as informal settlement pertains to vague land occupation and spatial characteristics. Due to its prevalent obscurity, governance of informal settlement tends to focus on the issues of formal recognition and improvement, primarily to remedy its spatial condition, de jure positioning in the city planning and reformation of land tenure. Within multilevel governance, this can be implemented through a mix of formal and informal efforts, representing a collaboration of top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Both top-down and bottom-up efforts in multilevel governance of informal settlement derive from institutional representation. First, the top-down approach is manifested within public policies enacted by the government. In this area, Milbert (2006) classifies public policies that have been implemented in governing informal settlement such as clearance, upgrading and resettlement. These practices mainly try to rehabilitate informal settlement through physical improvement. Clearance is

perceived as necessary to accommodate modernity and the beautification of the city (Milbert, 2006). While the city is heading towards modernization, the presence of an informal settlement (or slums) contradicts the city's progressive development, which alters the action of clearance without being an openly stated public policy (Milbert, 2006). Another justification for clearance is the idea that the dwellings located in a high-risk zone, such as the edge of rail tracks, riverbanks, or sloping terrain needs to be removed. Next, to what extent the informal settlement being governed with technocratic approach is by upgrading. Here, informal settlement is distinguished from its degraded environment due to absence of urban services (Amoako, 2016). Thus, a technical approach for infrastructure provision has to be taken to address the physical deficit in informal settlement, may it be a subsidized housing construction or in any other technical aid.

Finally, both clearance and upgrading are linked to resettlement as the next step of governing informal settlement (Milbert, 2006). As a public policy, resettlement is often viewed positively. For tenure security, resettlement also acts to reform the previous land tenure status to the new occupants as a means of compensating and counterbalancing the negative social impact, especially in the process of clearance. For hazard mitigation, resettlement is preferable to ensure the safety of residents (Doberstein and Stager, 2013). However, Milbert (2006) criticizes these policies for the ambiguity between targeting the space versus targeting the population. It is often difficult to distinguish between social programs for the poor and spatial measures targeting the slums. Furthermore, she argues that "fighting slums" can constitute as tearing it down and evicting the inhabitants, especially within the fact that these policies are legitimized through non-negotiable regulations by the state and/or municipal rule of law.

Bottom-up governance offers participatory practices that are mainly facilitated by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs) and local communities and powered with regulatory framework and public policy by the government. One of the participatory methods to govern informal settlements is recognized as participatory land use planning (PLUP) by connecting land use planning and land use security as framed in Figure 1. It opens a decentralized land management, while enhancing local land rights through contributing to formal recognition of existing land tenure systems (Gwaleba and Masum, 2018). Theoretically, land tenure security and land use planning is interrelated. Supported by Chigbu, et. al., (2015), there are four functions of land use planning that are directly pertinent to tenure security: (1) its formal capacity to determine land areas, parcels and users; (2) it enables documentation of land areas, parcels, rights, restrictions and responsibilities; (3) it provides stakeholder collaboration, compensation of claims and community participation; and (4) it impacts on land value, land markets and credit opportunities.




Figure 1. Proposed framework for effective PLUP process

Source: Gwaleba and Masum, p.182 (2018)

PLUP is widely used as a participatory governance in many informal settlements, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa. However, the implementations have been rather complicated in every case. In Africa, Gwaleba and Masum (2018) studied the participatory land use planning (PLUP) for improving tenure security in Baruti informal settlement, Dar es Salaam City, Tanzania. PLUP in Baruti was known as MKURABITA project and was implemented to ensure participation of local communities in decision making processes concerned with the land they use and depended upon (IFAD, 2014). It brought actors together, such as landholders, development committees, municipal council and technical departments for coordination and developing a common vision that leads to long-term tenure security for the Baruti community. Despite the participatory nature of the approach, they found that the community perspectives were not always taken into consideration during the whole process and there was a wide gap between formal government policy and the actual implementation process. In Laos, the implementation of PLUP was started in the early 1990s in at least three periods; pre-PLUP approaches, the first generation of PLUP and the second generation of PLUP. As studied by Castella, et. al., (2014), they found various challenges in PLUP in each period respectively. This ranges from how limited facilitation skills of local government lead to limited participation of local communities, passive participation and unbalanced vertical-horizontal power relations and little-to-no willingness for social learning. Ideally, both top-down and bottom-up approaches can be mixed to bridge the gap in

each other's modes of conduct, yet when these approaches are combined, its implementation on the informal settlement is still rather difficult to thrive.

Private institutions such as real estate developers can have a role in multilevel governance of the city. One of the most common schemes to include private institutions in urban governance is through public-private partnerships (PPP). Since its origin in the 1970s, the private sectors exclusively operate and maintain the development of infrastructure or produce services for general economic interests (Hodge & Greve, 2017). Throughout the time, the PPP scheme differs based on priority and agenda, depending on the context of the country, cities and the locality. Overall, PPP plays an important role in financing, constructing, designing, operating and maintaining projects, depending on the agreed type of PPP, such as Operation-Maintenance (OM), Design-Build-Operate (DBO), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) (Kwak, et. al., 2009). In developing countries, PPP plays an essential role in infrastructure development of public services such as water, energy and transport (Sobuza, 2017).

The proliferate involvement of PPP in infrastructure development can be directed to improve infrastructure service delivery in pro-poor policies (World Bank, 2020), including policies on informal settlements. To illustrate the involvement of the private sector in this case, Shabaan (2019) studied the PPP scheme for water provision in Kosovo Village, Mathare informal settlement, Kenya. The PPP was established under the Operation-Maintenance (OM) scheme between the Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company. Although the partnership was successful to improve water availability and supply, lack of financial and human capacity to manage the water supply remained a challenge for the private sector, Sewerage Company. This is because pro-poor policies did not accompany the partnership, thus making the implementation difficult to be monitored and evaluated (Shabaan, 2019). This can be related to the fact that there has been no standardized conduct for PPP (Kwak, et. al., 2009). As a result, the implementation of PPP only depends on the practices of muddling through during the process and therefore can create a possibility for improper demeanor and procedures.

#### **4. Conflict of interests Within Multilevel Governance of Informal Settlements**

Druckman and Zechmeister (1970) give a comprehensive view on conflict of interests mainly from the value dissensus and propositions to highlight the forces behind the conflict. They introduce the concept by first distinguishing between a conflict of interests and a conflict of understanding (Glenn, et. al., 1970). Here, the idea of conflict of interests derives from ideological differences. They argue that conflict of interests occurs when each party, sharing the same understanding of the situation, prefers a different and somewhat incompatible solution to a problem involving either a distribution of scarce resources between them or a decision to share the work of solving it. In other words, many conflicts happen not because of competing interests but because parties do not share the same conceptualization of the situation,



contesting between conflicts over means and conflicts over goals. This situation is also what they refer to as value dissensus.

To classify the conflict intensity and its source, Druckman and Zechmeister (1970) use four propositions to explain the correlation. However, to what extent it is relevant under this research is Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. Proposition 1 refers to a conflict of interests that is derived explicitly from opposing ideological orientations. Their argument is based on the premise that competing parties are not homogeneous entities, neither in ideological orientation nor positions in conflict of interests. Proposition 1 may focus on ideological and cognitive oppositions among different/opposing groups. In contrast, Proposition 2 focuses on differences in orientations within a group, in which the degree of conflict may be less intense when parties within the group are homogenous. This proposition is more likely to focus on conflict of interests among individuals within a group.

*Applying Proposition 1: Conflict of interests originate from differences in ideologies/values among opposing groups*

Within Proposition 1, differences in ideologies and cognitive oppositions can be reflected in differences of institutional interest among stakeholders. Simply put, interest constitutes as predispositions of embracing goals, values, desires, expectation and other orientations and inclinations that lead a party to act in a certain manner (Gbor, et. al., 2020, p. 33). To describe the stakeholders' interest more explicitly, Deng (2017) classifies the stakeholders' interest in urban governance based on the institutional taxonomy. This classification represents the state interest (government), property interest (real estate developers) and general interest (civil society).

First, the interest of the government in urban governance relates to the state's objective for achieving social control. Shatkin (2016) backs up this idea that urban land is relatively an easy subject to practice state control, surveillance and regulation and therefore becomes central to the state interest. Instruments such as strict regulations and public policies are the modes of conduct to achieve social order. Second, interest that comes from private stakeholders, including real estate developers. The interest of real estate developers relates to the fact that prices of property products are highly dependent on city development and local public goods, such as infrastructure and public facilities. Property owners are likely to support the practices that increase the predictability in property and protection of property value and neighbourhood character in established areas (Kauko, 2019). Therefore, lands are largely the object of interest, in which any intervention will directly impact the marketability of that location (Roulac, 2007). For example, changes in land-use policy will influence the rent price of the property, affecting established enterprises in that location. Third, the interest of civil society, which inherently comes from place attachment (Deng, 2017). Place attachment is defined as a bond between people and particular places (Ujang & Zakariya, 2015, p. 374). It pertains to a certain living environment, e.g. a specific neighbourhood or district. However, place attachment is not solely associated with physical entities, rather be primarily related

to the meanings and experiences in a place that involves relationships with other people (Marzano, 2015). Social identity, including the living duration, developed habits and social relations contribute to sense of place attachment (Bernardo & Palma-Oliveira, 2013, p. 182). Civil society groups who express this interest might be motivated to ensure that any form of urban intervention will not discourage people's daily engagement or threaten their attachment to places they relate with.

In applying Proposition 1 to the context of this research, the conflict of interests between the government and civil society occurs when it comes to conflict over means versus conflict over goals. This may refer to the issue of formal recognition. Practices of informal institutions by the civil society are often conflicting with the existing formal system and regulations established by the government (Haider & Mcloughlin, 2016). This is because informal institutions tend to be seen as less accountable to be integrated into the formal systems and administration (Kombe & Kreibich, 2000). For example, when the self-initiative of the urban poor community becomes less recognized and is complicated through neglect, refusal and stringent regulations by the government (Kombe & Kreibich, 2000; Huchzermeyer, 2009). In a different scenario, the conflict of interests between private and civil society may also occur in a form of land dispute. For instance, Irawati (2018) explores land grabbing between the two parties through cases of kampung evictions and small business units in Jakarta, in which many local residents were evicted for the real estate projects. Finally, the conflict of interests between the government and private developers relates to the fact that the developers' business model relies on external factors, including policies and regulations in the established location (Deng, 2017). Thus, changes in land-use or urban policy can trigger a conflict of interests between the two, especially if the policy would undermine the business' profitability.

#### *Applying Proposition 2: Conflict of interests originate from differences in ideologies/orientations within groups*

Proposition 2 may relate to attitudinal dispositions of individuals within groups (Druckman and Zechmeister, 1970), such as behaviours to achieve individual gains. conflict of interests obtained from individual gains may relate the concept of Liberal Paradox by Sen (1977). According to Sen (1977), liberal paradox occurs within a contradiction between liberalism and respect for unanimity. It shows that certain people may make individually rational decisions with consequences that they collectively regret, such as practicing opportunistic behaviour (Sen, 1977), which often leads to a social choice dilemma between compromising individual interest on behalf of the collective or neglecting the collective interest for personal gain. Furthermore, when this practice involves more individuals, collusion or even nepotism can be inevitable.

In every institution involved in multilevel governance of informal settlement, acknowledging the conflict of Proposition 2 may be less explicit than Proposition 1. An opportunistic behavior is not easily detected as it often occurs under disguises and ambiguity (Dong, et. al., 2015). However, conflict of interests derived from attitudinal dispositions can still be recognized case by case. For example, Rigon

(2016) analyzed a conflict over tenure regularisation, which contested between collective and individual titles in Nairobi, Kenya. He found the difficulty in reaching consensus with existing land owners and tenants. The choice of tenure system was not a simple decision as it was embedded in local conflicts and negotiations with structure-owners and tenants. He concluded that when decisions around the land assets are not taken centrally, implementers and groups of local residents may have contesting claims over the land. Nevertheless, there are many forms of conflict of interests that occur from attitudinal dispositions and these conflicts may link to a wider context outside the multilevel governance framework such as psychology, preferences, individual goals and political attitude which may not be fully discussed in this research.

## 5. Conceptual Model




Figure 2. Conceptual Model  
Source: Author

## **6. Context of the Case: Jakarta's Urban Kampung**

### *Urban Development of Jakarta*

To understand the urban context of Jakarta, Rukmana (2008) captures it from the socio-economic dualism between the appearance of modern city and kampung in Jakarta urban setting. First, when it comes to modernization, Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia faces development pressure to increase its competitiveness in aspirations to become a global city (Bunel & Miller, 2011). The process was started in 1980-1990s when progressive domestic and foreign direct investment, finance and property development (Firman, 1998) shapes the trajectory of modern Jakarta today. Intensive investment physically restructured the urban Jakarta and periphery, resulting in rapid changes of land use and conversion of agricultural land to built environments (Firman, 1998). The majority of foreign capital was invested in the manufacturing industries and services sector. This was also followed by the growth of the property sector, such as high-rise apartments, commercial buildings, luxurious hotels, large-scale housing and new town development in the outskirts (Firman, 1998). As a result, Jakarta became the center for international activities, attracting expatriates and middle-upper class populations to the city in the 1990s which increased the demand for modern urban lifestyle. Currently, Jakarta has approximately 180 shopping centers, 6823 hotel rooms and 150 apartment buildings (All Jakarta Apartments, 2020).

Second, Jakarta as a modern-sophisticated city was not only drawing the white collars and aspiring middle-upper class, but also migrants from rural areas from across Indonesia. At the same time of Jakarta urban growth in the 1980-1990s, the flow of rural migrants increased rapidly in which the majority came from regions such as West Java and Bali Island (Krausse, 1979). The in-migration rate in Jakarta has been constantly growing for the past three decades. From 1990 to 2015, the number of in-migration to Jakarta has reached 8,9 millions (Lokadata, 2015) which outnumbered the native Jakartans (Betawi people). The motive of the migration was due to the disparity of development between Jakarta and rural regions (Krausse, 1979; Rukmana, 2008). Settling in Jakarta was seen as a better option for a bigger economic opportunity, rather than staying in the underdeveloped rural hometown.

Both development trajectories create a dualism where the substantial growth of Jakarta is inharmonious with the governance capacity in accommodating migration rate. Due to a significant property growth, the city is increasingly becoming unaffordable for certain income groups. Migrants who cannot afford the benefit must live with struggles of finding spaces for their survival. For instance, this struggle is often reflected in the housing sector, where there is a gap between the ones who can afford adequate living compartments and those who cannot. Between this gap, there comes a segregation and contrasted living environment which illustrates the everyday dualism in the Jakarta urban setting as shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Skyscrapers and kampung in Jakarta  
Source: <https://forums.spacebattles.com>

### Jakarta's Urban Kampung

In Jakarta, failure of housing provision by the state puts kampungs as the alternative place to live for the urban poor and rural migrants (Krausse, 1979). Kampung as defined by Tunas (2008) refers to traditional rural settlement or village, derived from Malaysian word as *kampung*. The term is later understood in contemporary urban context as slums or squatter settlements (Tunas, 2008). Irawati (2018) extends the view of kampung as unplanned settlements in which most of the houses and infrastructure are autonomously built by the residents. These settlements inhabit many areas in the city such as near commercial centers, city center, riverbanks, railway or even swamp. Many identify kampung as slums due to its lack of basic infrastructure, irregularity and informality (Irawati, 2018).

From a historical view, Irawati (2018) explores the existence of kampungs in Jakarta. Under the Dutch occupation in Batavia (former name of Jakarta during the colonialism), kampung settlement was segregated based on race and ethnicity, which often regarded as “indigenous neighbourhoods” by the European colonial administrators. The ethnic-based segregation was portrayed in the residential layout; European districts were located in better neighbourhoods with spacious houses, while the indigenous and other Asian descents lived in smaller plots, smaller houses and narrow streets. Urban improvement and city facilities were mostly allocated for the European neighbourhoods, leaving kampung (indigenous) settlements in deprivation and deterioration. As a consequence, kampung became unhygienic, a source for epidemic diseases and delinquency, drawing social stigma that kampungs are the unhygienic areas of the city. Even after Indonesia managed to gain

independence in 1945, stigma towards kampung remains as a setback and *antithesis to modern city life* (Irawati, 2018) as it is contrasted with today's Jakarta progressive growth.

Many kampungs still exist today since the Dutch occupation, in fact, kampungs grow and expand in different parts of the city due to informal practices of housing provision. However, the informal provision of kampung is also practiced within the local solidarity, where it provides socio-economic and cultural resources to its residents. For rural migrants, kampung settlement is the place for cultural adaptation to integrate within the urban lifestyle (Kusno, 2020), especially to migrants with just enough provision. Regarding socio-economic practices, a strong sense of solidarity among residents is prevalent in daily lives. It features many activities in a communal spirit which is known as *gotong royong*. Communal activities are embedded in *arisan* (non-bank savings groups), food sharing, collective fundraising for medical costs, mutual aid and social care (Leitner & Sheppard, 2017). Leitner & Sheppard (2017) argue that these activities are not just appearing as the social characteristic of kampung, rather as survival strategies in a collaborative effort. These activities come as a collective response due to the fact that most kampung residents live within limited basic infrastructure provision by the government.

Relating to kampung with land tenure, Kusno (2020) identifies three types of land tenure in Indonesia; formal tenure, semi-formal tenure and informal tenure. The land that is registered under the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Indonesia, BPN) is considered formal tenure. The opposite, informal tenure is categorized as abandoned state or private lands that are occupied by squatters without an official contract for land permit. Kampung that was built on these lands is often seen as illegal. The other type is semi-formal tenure, in which the tenure is authorized by the local government, not the national government. It is associated with customary lands and lands with inherited ownership rights. The customary lands refer to *tanah adat* (indigeneous) installed by Dutch colonizers (Zhu and Simamarta, 2015). Due to its inherited nature, most kampung lands belong to this category (Kusno, 2020) or many regard it as *girik*. Despite this categorization, kampung is nevertheless widely understood as an informal (sometimes illegal) settlement (Irawati, 2018), especially in the view of public policy.

Given the tenure issues and socio-spatial traits, kampung has been prone to contestation by various stakeholders in terms of governance and conflict of interests. Confirmed by Octifanny and Norvyani (2021), kampungs have become the target of increased physical, social and economic development. The current governance approach focuses on re-investments in infrastructure development through the temporary body and program (Warburton, 2016). At the same time, pressures on displacement and dispossession by both public and private entities have gradually increased, ranging from neighbourhood scale to the large-scale (Octifanny and Norvyani, 2021).

## Jakarta's Urban Kampung




Figure 4. Kampung Settlements in Jakarta  
Source: Rujak Center for Urban Studies, 2020

## **Chapter 3: Methodology**

This study aims to explore how the conflict of interests among stakeholders influence the governance of Jakarta urban kampung. Given this aim, the qualitative approach is the most suitable for conducting this research by putting stakeholders as the study subjects. Qualitative research is a research that is based on constructivism, a fundamental idea that a “reality” is more or less subjective (Cropley, 2019). This study explores the understanding of the stakeholders’ perspectives on how they perceive the conflict of interests and issues in the governance of kampungs. Inherently, conflict of interests might not be apparent on the surface, which requires a deeper exploration by constructing the reality as it is experienced, structured and interpreted through subjective interactions (Holloway & Wheeler, 2002). To operationalize this research under the qualitative approach, this section discusses procedures in the data collection, selection of informants, the position of researcher, the ethical consideration, and type of analysis that will be conducted.

### **1. Data Collection: Semi-structured Interviews**

An interview is the integral data collection method for this study. Interviews provide a unique chance to discover rich and complex information from an individual (Khan N, 2014) as this research intends to explore the interests and motivation of each stakeholder in the Jakarta kampung governance. The type of interview chosen for this study is the semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interviews are organized around a set of predetermined open-ended questions with other questions emerging from the dialogue between interviewer and interviewee(s) (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). In other words, semi-structured interviews are aimed to enter the world of the participant and try to understand how it is seen from the participants’ point of view (Josselson, 2013). Semi-structured interviews also offer a substantial degree of flexibility. It enables the researcher to conduct formal and informal nuances of conversation given the diversity of subjects in this research that includes from governmental actors to grassroots community. As this research will also require informants to share their experience with other stakeholders, the flexibility of semi-structured interviews in supplementing follow-up questions, probes and comments will be useful for the researcher to delve deeply into sensitive discussions (DeJonckheere & Vaughn, 2019).

### **2. Selection of Informants**

Unlike quantitative studies, the goal is not a large sample size as the qualitative approach seeks an in-depth and detailed understanding. Purposeful sampling is required to find the most reliable source of information for gaining a certain depth of understanding in the research process, which in this case selecting the suitable informants. According to DeJonckheere and Vaughn (2019), what constitutes good informants are the ones who have lived the experiences and internalized the knowledge on the topic of interest. Informants in this research must be able to provide information on their involvement and experience in the governance of



kampungs in Jakarta. The number of informants depends on the purpose of the study, what kind of study and what questions the study is trying to answer (DeJonckheere and Vaughn, 2019). To select proper informants, it is relevant to consider that the significance of sampling is not within the size, rather the representativeness (Neuman, 2011). Therefore, the selection of informants in this research relies on the informants' institutional representation. This research invites various stakeholders, such as local and national government, private developers, a kampung resident from CBO and NGOs. The interviewees chosen for participating in this research are outlined as follows.

Table 1. List of Interviewees

No.	Interviewees	Institutions
1.	National government	Ministry of General Works and Public Housing (Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat/PUPR)
2.	Jakarta government	Jakarta Housing Agency (Dinas Perumahan DKI Jakarta)
3.	Real estate developers (representative)	Jakarta Property Institute (JPI)
4.	NGOs	Rujak Center for Urban Studies (RCUS)
5.	Kampung residents representative	Urban Poor Consortium (UPC)

Source: Author

### 3. Position of the Researcher

Interviews typically depend on the direct contact between the researcher and the informants. It is important to establish a good relationship with the informant as the researcher tries to engage for their willingness and consent to participate in the research. Regarding the familiarity of the researcher and the informants, Hennink, et. al., (2011) warn that the role of the researcher may play in the process. In this study, the author herself is the former employee of Rujak Center for Urban Studies (RCUS). The researcher shares some similar interest in the process of kampung advocacy and has established some connections with stakeholders that are also part of the network of RCUS, such as Urban Poor Consortium (UPC). The established relationship affects the selection of informants. Given this familiarity, the researcher perceives that these stakeholders are reliable to participate in this research as the researcher knows their capability and positioning in the process of kampung governance in Jakarta. It is expected that these stakeholders may respond openly and truthfully to the researcher in the interview process.

### 4. Ethical Considerations

The ethical attitude should incorporate respect, sensitivity and time consideration, especially that this research is conducted under the online setting and with the help of two research assistants in Indonesia due to the pandemic situation. Prior to the interview, consent about the informants' participation regarding the purpose of the interview, time arrangement and their confidentiality are essential to be discussed with the informants. Particular consideration is given on the aspect of confidentiality and privacy (Allmark, et. al, 2009) to make sure that informants' identity towards their statement would remain anonymous. This is because the questions of this

research will require the informants to reveal institutional/personal information directly to the interviewer (DeJonckheere & Vaughn, 2019). As the interview is carried out using an online platform, informants are assured that the recording will be stored and used only for the author's purpose and the author has no rights to share the result without the consent from the informants. Considering the time difference, the informants also have the right to stop their participation at any given time. The interview typically will not exceed one hour, unless the informants are willing to answer follow-up questions or further clarifications.

## **5. Qualitative Data Analysis**

### *Narrative Analysis*

Narrative analysis refers to a cluster of analytic methods for interpreting texts or visual data that have a storied form (Figgou, et. al., 2015) within written stories and oral communication. In this sense, people tell stories to construct issues of interest that are purposeful and functional. For the exploratory purpose, narrative analysis is useful to uncover the underlying ideologies embedded in stories (Stokes, 2003), pertaining that this research attempts to analyze the interest, motivation and perception of the stakeholder. From the interpretative paradigm, the narrative analysis focuses on the meaning of the stories, recognizing the narratives that play in human experience. To achieve the exploratory purpose of the narrative and its interpretation, Figgou, et. al., (2015) introduce two approaches to work with narrative analysis with structural narrative analysis and performance analysis. The structural analysis put more concern on how a story is composed and functioned, giving less attention to the context of the narrative. In contrast, the performance analysis emphasizes the content of the narrative by focusing on the who, what and why of narratives (Riessman, 2008) to interrogate what a story is about. Both approaches allow for a comprehensive understanding of how the narrators construct the issue of interest through their lived experiences.

### *Triangulation*

Triangulation as a method of data analysis refers to use of multiple resources for increasing the validity of the study . The focus for triangulation is to integrate all possible sources to prove the validity and reliability of a particular subject. Triangulation of data is useful to provide confirmation on findings and enhance understanding of the studied phenomenon (Casey and Murphy, 2009). Bekhet & Zauszniewski (2012) classifies two types of methodological triangulation: across method and within method. Across method refers to the combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. Within method only uses one data collection method that stands between quantitative or qualitative.

In this research, within method triangulation is preferred. While the research relies on information given by interviewees, it is therefore important to validate the arguments, phenomena or data they refer to. This may come with at least two reasons. First, qualitative research has a substantial degree of subjectivity (Cropley, 2019) in which the data itself is constructed based on multiple realities of the

subjects. Second, all sources have biases yet they can complement each other to construct the realness of a studied phenomenon. The use of within method in this research attempts to compare various qualitative data that include informal discussions and written documentations. Here, the basic idea is to compare these sources to avoid false conclusions (Konecki, 2008).

## 6. Summary

Table 2. Framework of Data Collection Techniques and Analysis

<b>Question</b>	<b>Which Information</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Method of retrieval</b>	<b>Documen-tation Method</b>	<b>Method of Analysis</b>
How is the kampung land viewed by the stakeholders in terms of legal, social, cultural and economic value?	Perception on kampung by stakeholders	Interviews with representatives of the stakeholder	Semi-structured interviews	Transcripts	Transcription, Narrative Analysis and Triangulation
What is the relationship among stakeholders?	Degree of Institutional coordination and cooperation	Interviews with representatives of the stakeholder	Semi-structured interviews	Transcripts	Transcription, Narrative Analysis and Triangulation
What is the form of contestation or conflict of interests among stakeholders on governance of kampung?	Specific events or experience of conflict interests with other stakeholders	Interviews with representatives of the stakeholder	Semi-structured interviews	Transcripts	Transcription, Narrative Analysis and Triangulation
What hinders the cross-stakeholder coordination and cooperation on governance of kampung?	Personal/institutional sentiment towards other institutions, institutional conflict	Interviews with representatives of the stakeholder	Semi-structured interviews	Transcripts	Transcription, Narrative Analysis and Triangulation

Source: Adopted from Master's Thesis Course on 18/12/2020

## Chapter 4: Result

In this section, the result of interviews with stakeholders in the governance of Jakarta urban kampung is shown as follows. The result is written from the interview transcription by interpreting the meaning, context and terms spoken by the interviewees. The result is also triangulated from various sources, such as academic and non-academic literature, policy documents and informal conversations with well-informed individuals (shown in footnotes). This is done to verify and clarify the interviewee's claim, ensuring the completeness of information and avoiding biases. In total, there were five interviewees participating in the interview which included a community-based organization, NGOs, the national and local government and a real estate developer.

The results are focusing on the interviewees point of view which is classified through three main components; governance issues, stakeholders relations and conflict of interests to explore how the conflict of interests of stakeholders influence the governance of Jakarta urban kampungs. First, what constitutes governance issues pertaining to regulation, control and coordination (Rhodes, 1977). Second, perceived stakeholders relations is classified to understand the degree of collaboration and what hinders inclusive decision-making process (Newman, et. al., 2004; Andrews, 2006; Stavins, 2010) in the governance of kampungs. Third and finally, the conflict of interest is categorized based on the Druckman and Zechmeister (1970) theory on value dissensus (P1) which either relates to conflict over means versus conflict over goals or institutional interest (Deng, 2017). The other classification of conflict of interest is attitudinal disposition (P2) such as opportunistic behaviours and individual gains (Sen, 1977).

### Interviewee 1

Interviewee 1 is a community member in Kampung Tongkol, North Jakarta which also serves as a community organizer of Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), a community-based organization (CBO) in Jakarta<sup>1</sup>. Interviewee 1 along with UPC believes in community development as their kampung governance approach. Their main purpose is to increase the capacity of the kampung community in claiming tenure security and rights to the city, especially rights of adequate housing and de jure recognition of kampungs in the city spatial planning. To achieve this target, kampung residents are guided to build a collective mindset in creating their own vision of development and spatial plan through participatory planning with UPC's partner organizations<sup>2</sup>. At the end, their vision will be proposed and negotiated to the government in a hope that these efforts would result in a more just kampung governance at the level of public policy.

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<sup>1</sup> UPC was established in 1997. UPC's political influence starts with their vision to change unjust public policies towards the urban poor (Irawati, 2018). They advocate for rights of the poor by rejecting any form of eradication as urban solutions by proposing redevelopment alternatives for poor communities (UPC, 2016). UPC works intensively in advocacy, networking and community organizing, bringing together poor communities, community architects and other interested parties.

<sup>2</sup> The process resembles the PLUP concept.

### Governance Issues

According to Interviewee 1, there are at least two issues in the governance of kampung. One is within the community organizing process and the other is public policy by the government. First, the governance process using the PLUP approach may not be simple. From the community itself, Interviewee 1 admits that it can be very challenging to convince the community that they are able to take part in the spatial development of their kampung. However, Interviewee 1 understands their inferior attitude as the result of past injustices and stigmas towards kampung communities he works with: *“The biggest issue so far is to raise the sense of self-assurance within the community. They often do not have the confidence to be visionary for the development of their own kampung”* (Interviewee 1). Such inferiority hinders the process of community organizing. The participatory planning process cannot be implemented when community members do not have a unified vision for their kampung. In principle, participatory planning must be based on the community aspiration as their vision determines the development agenda.

Second, the PLUP process is even more complicated when it clashes with bureaucratic processes, rules and regulations enacted by the local government. According to Interviewee 1, the local government units are generally very paternalistic towards regulations, leaving very limited room for participatory planning to emerge. Their paternalistic attitude towards kampung is even more rigid due to lack of de jure recognition in the current spatial planning (RDTR)<sup>3</sup>. The condition often makes the bureaucrats hesitant, even reluctant to fix the issues of kampung and innovate with existing regulations. To make substantial progress, UPC often must approach the heads of bureaucrats to push the agenda forward: *“The local government units are very paternalistic. We must always approach them through their head of departments so that they would perform better to respond to our agenda. The same attitude goes forward in how they see regulations. When there is a legal barrier, they just give up. They don’t try to find any solution to accommodate what we do in a participatory approach”* (Interviewee 1). From this testimony, it may be clear that the government agencies are both paternalistic and pragmatic at the same time.

### Stakeholder Relations

When it comes to stakeholder relations, Interviewee 1 perceives that there are no substantial issues with fellow grassroots organizations and kampung community, despite challenges he encounters during the community organizing process. Instead, he shows most dissatisfaction towards the coordination with the government agencies. This is because there is no specialized agency to deal with the issues of kampung<sup>4</sup>. Existing agencies that already have job desks are often given extra

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<sup>3</sup> In the Jakarta planning systems, the term *kampung* is not officially recognized in the city spatial planning (Rencana Detail Tata Ruang/RDTR). Although by de facto kampung settlements exist anywhere in the city, RDTR conceives kampung zones as R1 (small-houses zone), not as *kampung* per se. Due to this vagueness, kampung areas in Jakarta have no legal stance, which makes it prone to unjust policies such as forced evictions.

<sup>4</sup> Interviewee 1 refers to Gugus Tugas Reforma Agraria (GTRA) Jakarta that responsible for addressing land registry issues in Jakarta, including land issues of kampung. To what extent this argument is valid from the

responsibilities to manage the administration of kampung development. As a result, the division of authority within the kampung governance is fragmented by administration and funding: *“Overall, our relationship with the government is quite bad. Their institutional structure is often unclear by functional role so it affects our coordination with them. As they already have duties, issues of kampung are not their priority. So they often have no initiative to take progressive action regarding the governance of kampung (Interviewee 1)”*.

### Conflict of interests

Interviewee 1 argues that conflict of interests can be found during the community organizing process. Inside the community themselves, there are individuals who refuse to embody collective values because individual gains are still more preferable: *“In the process of making spatial plans, some people want to have a bigger floorplan for their house. They don’t want to cooperate with us in rearranging the land plot. The thing is, we believe in the collective values and the community must come together as at the end, we aim to ensure tenure security through collective land certificate”* (Interviewee 1). This process is crucial because land ownership issues must first be addressed through a collective agreement before proceeding to the land use planning.

In some circumstances, conflict of interests with private companies can also threaten the community organizing process. Companies tend to target nearby kampung lands for their property business which often leads to a land dispute between the local community and the company. Interviewee 1 argues that the way companies solve the issue through individual compensation to each kampung resident undermines the process of community organizing. Compensation is used as the means to buy the residents out of their kampung. If the community gives up their land, the community organizers have no option but to let go of their organizing progress as they cannot force the residents to remain in the area. However, if the community wants to fight for their kampung, negotiation with the company is then initiated.

With the government, Interviewee 1 views the conflict of interests in terms of differences in the governance approach. In the government’s agenda, kampung is not part of the government’s strategic policy or at least, not a priority to be fixed holistically. Governance of kampung is only embedded as periodical programs, a series of temporary spatial fixes that does not solve the very basic issues of kampung such as tenure security and zoning: *“From the public policy, governance of kampung is implemented within programs after programs that mostly relate to physical improvement; fixing the drainage, building parks, etc. There is no serious intention for securing kampung in the formal zoning system”* (Interviewee 1). Here, it is rather clear that the government has no intention in fixing the real issue of kampung through their lack of commitment. This condition is conflicting with UPC as their

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government’s point of view, Interviewee 3 (representative of Jakarta Housing Agency) admits that the government has a lack of legal reference in recognizing kampung as it is an informal settlement. It affects how government institutions are distributed to manage the governance of kampung in Jakarta.

ultimate goal is to ensure tenure security of kampung. What makes it even more conflicting may also relate to the means of conduct. Interviewee 1 argues that there is very little community participation in the program-based approach because it is mostly planned and implemented by hired private parties (consultant and contractors), while in the UPC's community-based approach, the community plans for themselves and collaborates with other stakeholders for the funding and construction process.

## **Interviewee 2**

Interviewee 2 as the executive director of Rujak Center for Urban Studies (RCUS) explains the NGO's interest in promoting urban ecological transition, in which ensuring housing rights as part of the agenda. RCUS mostly involves in the technical processes<sup>5</sup>, such as mapping and participatory spatial design of kampung where the results will be advocated to the government along with UPC and the community.

### Governance Issues

First, Interviewee 2 views the governance issues from the internal dynamics in the community. Inside the community, communication processes among the grassroots communities can be complicated when there are too many local actors involved. These local actors can vary, including religious groups/leaders and individuals that are perceived as influential among community members. The more actors involved, the more complicated the flow of information usually becomes: *“Community organizing process can be challenging, especially when the information is not equally spread across the community members. The influential actors and local organizations can distort the information, turning it into gossip or even opposition with other community members. This adds complexity to the governance process sometimes”* (Interviewee 2).

Second, Interviewee 2 sees the governance issues from the performance of the local government, Jakarta Housing Agency (Dinas Perumahan Jakarta) as it is one of the main agencies that responsible for Jakarta urban kampung governance. Interviewee 2 criticizes their means of conduct which relates to their paternalistic and pragmatic attitude towards regulations: *“They only care about what's written in the Key Performance Indicator (KPI). If we advocate bottom-up aspirations, they would not respond to it because it simply is not there in their KPI. They seem reluctant to innovate with regulations [which they can actually do as part of government]. So I can say that their bureaucratic process prevents progressive ideas from being implemented”* (Interviewee 2).

### Stakeholders Relations

According to Interviewee 2, stakeholder relations among grassroots organizations are neither conflicting nor rapidly progressive. This may relate to the territorial nature of community-based organizations (CBOs) as these CBOs are place-based. For example, Forum Komunikasi Tanah Merah Bersatu (FKTMB) is mostly focused on

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<sup>5</sup> The process resembles the PLUP concept.

their kampung community in North Jakarta, while Ciliwung Merdeka is mostly centered in kampungs along the Ciliwung River in East and South Jakarta. These CBOs tend to focus on their own community, especially when it comes to PLUP activity. Furthermore, Interviewee 2 argues that CBOs must collectively create their own vision in order to collaborate together, which is somewhat lacking in her view: *“Good stakeholders relations may as well depend on the community’s vision and what they want to achieve together”* (Interviewee 2).

In terms of stakeholders relations between RCUS and the local government, the Jakarta Housing Agency, Interviewee 2 argues that there is a substantial distrust that often hinders their collaboration. Lack of accountability of the agency’s staff also complicates the dissemination of information process: *“A lot of complication when we collaborate with them. When it comes to design, for instance, we cannot trust their words without putting it into a written agreement. They seem reluctant to give us information just about everything”*. In addition, Interviewee 2 perceives that there is a deep rooted distrust of the agency to work together with RCUS: *“I see that they are partnering with universities [non-profit stakeholders], but not necessarily initiate a cooperation with us or UPC”* (Interviewee 2).

When asked about institutional relations with private stakeholders, Interviewee 2 admits that disputes with private companies do not necessarily occur with RCUS. Rather, disputes often happen with the kampung residents they advocate in cases of land dispute (*sengketa lahan*). In this position, RCUS as an NGO tries to mediate the process by assisting the residents to act strategically using regulatory framework and knowledge on spatial planning: *“We are currently giving training to Jakpro [construction and property development company] to do a participatory socialization with the community in Kampung Bayam because they have been in dispute for 2 years. We want to show them that participative approach is not taking too much time as assumed. For RCUS, I do not see a necessity to have bad relations with companies. I think it is better to limit it just between the affected residents and the companies. If it is unsolvable at the local level, we help them through capacity building”* (Interviewee 2).

### Conflict of interests

Interviewee 2 puts heavy emphasis on informality because informality often attracts conflict of interests between opportunistic individuals and the community’s interests. In this context, informality is mainly judged from land status (legal or illegal occupation per land plot). She argues that the more obscured the land status is, the more complex is the internal politics in the kampung. Such dynamics happen in at least three ways.

First, obscured land status invites the possibility of opportunistic behaviours as everyone can have a claim on the land. Influential individuals in particular can become abusive to land use and control. Participatory planning is difficult to achieve with these individuals as they are more reluctant to cooperate on behalf of the community: *“Although they are not necessarily rightful towards the land they occupy, they can act as informal landlords who will hardly give up their lands in*



*the participatory process*” (Interviewee 2). However, when these actors do get involved in the governance process, decision-making usually becomes more complicated as they are able to influence opinions within the process of decision-making: *“It could be that in one kampung, there will be opposing decisions out of the interest of these actors. These influencers would try to contest their power in this process”* (Interviewee 2). Second, the informality may trigger conflict of interests with what Interviewee 2 refers to as *middlemen*<sup>6</sup>. The middlemen offer administration services with agencies outside the kampung. The residents cannot do it by themselves as the informality status prevents them from gaining formal access to the city administration system. The middlemen often operate in community groups where like the influencers, they can complicate the decision-making process.

Third and finally, kampungs with illegal land status tend to be less prioritized by the government for their improvement compared to kampungs with legal occupation. Thus, once a program is given to these kampungs, opportunistic behaviour occurs as the residents are afraid of running out the benefit: *“This thing happens in Kampung Marlina when they receive the Collaborative Implementation Program (CIP). The program came to their kampung with construction materials and workers so that the community can build together with the provided resources. But instead, the residents in Marlina took the materials for their own house renovation. The governance was a mess as the local leader also couldn’t do anything about it”* (Interviewee 2). At the end, Interviewee 2 concludes that the internal politics of kampung due to informality complicates the process of kampung governance at the grassroots level.

Looking at the government side, Interviewee 2 argues that lack of information transparency by the government can also trigger the conflict of interests among the community. She sees that if only a handful of people are informed, the tendency to abuse the information can emerge for certain interest: *“In Muara Angke, for instance, some residents who knew in advance about the water installation plan cooperated under the radar of the community to privatize the water infrastructure. Such opportunistic behaviour was undetected and therefore unmonitored because most residents did not know such information”* (Interviewee 2). Moreover, the conflict of interests does not stop at this level. Cooperating with the government is often conflicting with existing interest inside the government agency. She perceives that these interests are embedded in practices of nepotism through which relates to their highly paternalistic attitude towards regulations. Saliently, Interviewee 2 implies that the agency’s paternalistic attitude towards status quo may pertain to their interest in perpetuating nepotism, thus making them reluctant to reformative change.

The relation between keeping the practice of nepotism through maintaining the status quo becomes clearer when the grassroots advocate their initiative. For

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<sup>6</sup> To understand the context of *middlemen*, Milbert (2006) observed the presence of *Pradhans* in slums of New Delhi, India. These men obtain their position thanks to their social skills and their ability to mediate between the various administrative bodies and the slum population. Milbert (2006) argues that these skills may come from their participation in a political party, religious membership or simply personal qualities.

example, one of the initiatives by RCUS and other grassroots organizations is to establish an independent institution to address the issues in kampung governance (land security, spatial planning, etc), which is often fragmented and time-consuming in the current practice. According to Interviewee 2, the Jakarta Housing Agency (*Dinas Perumahan*) as part of the local authorities refused the proposal. For the agency, authorizing such an independent institution would jeopardize their relations with consultants they hire for projects, where the consultants used to be their former coworkers or even former head of departments in the agency<sup>7</sup>. Maintaining this practice undermines any progressive initiative within kampung governance by stringent regulations, lack of transparency and paternalistic attitude: *“In terms of kampung design, for instance, they often give partial information on almost everything. We think they cannot be fully trusted so we must always push our agenda through written agreements [to avoid misconduct by the agency]”* (Interviewee 2)”



Figure 5. PLUP process in Kampung Aquarium community organized by UPC and RCUS  
Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/>

### **Interviewee 3**

#### *Governance Issues*

Interviewee 3 is a representative from Jakarta Housing Agency. By de jure, she admits the legal framework for *kampung* itself has not yet existed within Jakarta

<sup>7</sup> The accused nepotism on this claim is not found in academic or mainstream literature. To confirm the validity of this statement, a brief informal discussion with an Indonesian law practitioner was conducted. The source argues that even when both parties have a past political/bureaucratic relationship, the current regulation does not interfere with the partnership between them to work on public projects. To conclude, such nepotism may possibly happen.

spatial planning (RDTR). Due to this unrecognition, policies on the governance of kampung are imposed using the existing infrastructure housing standards, where these regulations apply to all housing types in Jakarta: *“By institution, we are more concerned about the physical condition of settlements in Jakarta as a whole. Our institution has not yet regulated the kampung but currently we are trying to accommodate regulations on this type of settlement. Kampung is not there yet in our governance term”* (Interviewee 3). From her testimony, it is clear that absence of legal frameworks still hinders the governance of kampung.

In the governance of kampung, Interviewee 3 highlights the issues of land asset and registry, which include the issue of coordination with the state government and local community. In practice, intergovernmental land ownership is possible where the land can be owned by local authorities and the property upon the land owned by the national government or vice versa. However, this transfer of authority (whether land or property) can be complicated and time-consuming: *“The coordination with the state government [for this matter] is never simple. For example, we had this case from six years ago and the process still has not been done until now”*<sup>8</sup> (Interviewee 3).

The issue of asset registry creates another issue for the kampung community<sup>9</sup>. According to Interviewee 3, many kampungs with illegal occupation in Jakarta either settled in lands that belonged to the state or local government agencies. Fixing land security in kampungs is therefore not a simple process as many of these communities have stayed in the place for decades: *“There is one kampung community that has settled in the KAI land [state owned train company] for 20-30 years. We cannot simply request the state government to grant them the land rights. They may also have their own policy there”* (Interviewee 3). This may add to the complexity of kampung governance in Jakarta as fixing the land issue also requires state involvement in the process.

### Stakeholders Relations

Contrary to Interviewee 1 and 2, Interviewee 3 perceives that there are no substantial issues regarding the relations with NGOs or CBOs as long as they follow the current regulations: *“We are trying to accommodate what they want and we also communicate the rules. Sometimes with RCUS, we also have our opposing opinions. But after we discuss it, we find alternatives. We also now learn how to accommodate bottom-up voices, unlike in the past with top-down governance”* (Interviewee 3). Moreover, issues in stakeholders relations may also not be the case with private sectors such as developers or consultants, especially when they want to contribute in corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs.

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<sup>8</sup> Transfer of assets is important in the governance of kampung, especially if resettlement is involved in the process. Interviewee 4 refers to the case of relocation of Kampung Pulo community to social housing in East Jakarta, in which the land belongs to the local government, while the building belongs to the state. The project was started in 2016, meaning that the transfer of assets has been going on for 5 years.

<sup>9</sup> Many government's lands in Jakarta are inhabited by squatters and illegal settlers due to years of abandonment.

Interviewee 3 puts more emphasis on the relationship with the state government. Coordination is not an easy process due to the institutional programs and agendas. Lack of human resources may also prevent cross-collaboration between the state-local government: *“Each agency would be more likely to prioritize their own program, thus subordinating the coordination process among us and matching our common priority. I think it is also because of a lack of human resources to do so. In my institution, some staff handle administrations in both local and national agencies. No one is specially in charge of integrating our coordination”* (Interviewee 3).

#### Conflict of interests

Limited regulatory framework often alters conflict of interests between the local government and grassroots initiatives in terms of conflict over modes of conduct in the governance of kampung. Interviewee 3 emphasizes that any intervention should start with a legal framework. As long as it remains unchanged, the agency can only refer to existing regulations. Under this limitation, paternalistic attitudes emerge as changes can hardly be implemented within rigid regulations. Interviewee 3 is also aware that strict penalties apply to government agencies if they overstep the rules, thus creating a highly paternalistic attitude towards regulations and higher authorities. This makes the agency hesitant to make any breakthrough on the governance of kampung, which further draws a conflict of interests with grassroots' initiative.

Contrary to paternalistic attitudes, grassroots' initiatives often attempt to make a progressive step outside the frame of existing regulations. As it is beyond the regulatory reference, conflict of interests between maintaining the status quo and moving towards reformative changes occurs when the advocacy enters the bureaucratic process: *“When the initiatives are good but undetermined by rules, this will cost us a problem. Making any progressive movement requires changes in the regulations as well, in which the process cannot be done simultaneously. The rules need to be changed first so the initiative can be implemented. We as a government agency must strictly follow this protocol”* (Interviewee 3). However, to some extent, these limiting regulations can be modified if there is an authorization by higher authorities. For example, if the initiative is set up as a pilot project by the governor, then the government agency can have a justification to crosscut the legal barrier. Yet, this conflict over means cannot be easily reduced between the opposing institutions.

#### **Interviewee 4**

##### Governance of kampungs in KOTAKU program

Interviewee 4 represents the national government, Ministry of General Works and Public Housing (Kementerian PUPR). Interviewee 4 is responsible for the implementation of a national slum upgrading program called KOTAKU (Cities

Without Slums)<sup>10</sup>. As the Interviewee 3, kampung settlement is most likely seen from regulatory framework such as National Regulation No. 1/2011 on Housing and Settlement, President Decree No. 14/2016 on Housing Administration and Settlement and Ministry of General Works and Public Housing Act No. 14/2018 on Slum Prevention and Improvement. These national regulations refer to the kampung as equal to slum settlement with high population and building density and low quality and quantity of infrastructure. From this framework, kampung is mainly judged by the national government from its deteriorating physical conditions with at least 7 indicators; buildings, roads, waste management, drainage, sanitation, drinking water and fire prevention facilities.

In the implementation of KOTAKU, the land status of a kampung defines the type of upgrading treatment given under this program. Referring to National Regulation No. 1/2011, Improvement (*Pemugaran*) is given to kampungs with a legal land status, Renewal (*Peremajaan*) for both legal or illegal kampungs (with consideration of local spatial planning) and Resettlement (*Pemukiman Kembali*) for kampungs with illegal land status. Generally, kampungs with legal land status have no problems with the KOTAKU program. Consequently, the implementation of this program is more challenging for kampungs with illegal (informal) occupation status (will be discussed in the conflict of interests section).

### Stakeholders Relations

Inherently, the division of authority between the national and local government should not become the challenge, yet stakeholders often struggle to integrate the coordination among them. This division refers to National Regulation No. 23/2014 on Decentralisation and Regional Autonomy. Based on the regulation, the national government no longer has a grip on how local authorities manage their own municipality. Thus, decisions regarding governance of kampung in each municipality entirely depend on the local authority. Despite KOTAKU being a national program, its implementation across Indonesia is decided by the local government in each municipality. In other words, the implementation of KOTAKU is optional, not mandatory.

However, when the local authority agrees to participate in the KOTAKU program, a holistic coordination is sometimes difficult to achieve. For instance, the 7 indicators of KOTAKU slum assessment represents the coordinating agencies that should be involved in the governance of kampung, such as building density under Jakarta Housing Agency, and wastewater and drainage under the Waterworks Department, etc. Interviewee 4 evaluates that coordination with these departments is sometimes not happening simultaneously due to absence of participation of some agencies: *‘The implementation of KOTAKU is difficult without integrated cooperation. Elements of settlement are not working separately as if we build the house now and then install the water infrastructure the next year. It should all be*

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<sup>10</sup> KOTAKU is a national slum-upgrading project (NSUP) initiated by the New Urban Agenda (NUA) and funded by the World Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the State Budget/APBN (PUPR, 2021).

*integrated for people to live properly. Therefore, it is hard to fully address the slum issue within a coordination like this” (Interviewee 4).*

### Conflict of interests

Resettling kampungs with illegal land status attracts conflict of interests with the local community. Resettlement (*Pemukiman Kembali*) pertains to permanent relocation due to illegal land status of the previous occupation<sup>11</sup>. In Jakarta, the resettlement happened in Kampung Pulo. In the city spatial planning (RDTR), Kampung Pulo inhabited the Ciliwung riverbank which is illegal by regulation. The resettlement was also part of a river normalization program by the Jakarta government. However, the process of resettlement was disputed between the local community and local authorities in which the community had the collective interest to defend their livelihood and socioeconomic life. At the end, the community was forced to be relocated to a vertical social housing provided by the ministry under the KOTAKU program.

In other cases such as Renewal (*Peremajaan*), many conflicts of interests happen when the local community refuses to consolidate their land plot. Even though Interviewee 4 realizes that this will trigger the conflict of interests with the land owner, however, the responsibility to redeem the conflict is entirely under the control of the local government. Despite the conflicting process, the ministry does not necessarily feel responsible to manage the conflict. As stated by Interviewee 4, local authorities should fully mediate the conflict as the national government has no authority to intervene in the process: *“We are not allowed to suddenly come and disrupt the resettlement process by ourselves. We don’t have the authority to do so according to decentralization in National Regulation No. 23/2014”* (Interviewee 4).

## **Interviewee 5**

### Developers’ Interest in Kampung Areas

Interviewee 5 is the executive director of Jakarta Property Institute (JPI), a membership-based organization that consists of real estate corporations in Jakarta to bridge the interest between the private and public stakeholders. When asked about how real estate developers view the existence of kampung, she argues that developers are not necessarily targeting the land of kampung if the profit value is not attractive: *“Developers always seek the [land] opportunity, regardless if it is the kampung area or not. As long as the potential is there and the profitability is good in that location, developers will try to acquire the location. So, it’s not because it is kampung and developers are trying to buy the area. It’s not the case here”*

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<sup>11</sup> Resettlement also applies to kampungs that are located in disaster-prone areas and the ones that are not regulated in the spatial planning, regardless of land status (Azhari, 2018). Under the regulation, it is unsure whether this program can guarantee the ethical principle enacted by New Urban Agenda (such as ensuring no-forced eviction in the process). It is accused by community-based coalition, Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan (KIARA) that KOTAKU seems to target to evict slums, particularly coastal slums (Haryanti, 2019). To confirm this validity, the case of Kampung Pulo was identified. Kampung Pulo was evicted in 2015 due to its illegal occupation in Ciliwung riverbank. Although the eviction was implemented by the Jakarta administration, KOTAKU legitimated this process under ecological reasons such as flood control.

(Interviewee 5). In other words, Interviewee 5 makes it clear that developers do not have a particular interest in the governance of kampung.

Although developers may not be directly involved in the issues of kampung, acquiring kampung lands can become their interest for future property investment. Interviewee 5 explains that by regulations, developers have no barrier to acquire kampung lands because of obscured land status<sup>12</sup>. In practice, many kampungs have a *girik* status<sup>13</sup>, but as Interviewee 5 claims, *girik* is no longer recognized in the official land registry<sup>14</sup>. With vague land status, developers can easily buy the land plots from the kampung residents<sup>15</sup>. Once the land is owned by developers, the land status will be turned into *hak milik* (freehold ownership). However, it is a long-winding process that can take years and enormous cost to achieve: “*Developers usually acquire kampung lands in a very long process, plot per plot. This is especially true for kampungs with obscured land status. Developers need to investigate the rightful land owner and certificate the land by themselves. This process is very expensive and time consuming [up to 10-20 years]*”<sup>16</sup> (Interviewee 5).

#### Developers’ Involvement in Non-profit Projects

Furthermore, Interviewee 5 argues that it does not mean that developers cannot be involved in non-profit projects (may it be in improvement of kampung or other forms of social projects). Such projects can be put into a PPP scheme. However, she admits that developers often become reluctant to participate in social projects due to several factors.

First, this relates to lack of incentives. She argues that social projects can be as expensive as commercial projects. Thus, developers should be incentivized to do the work. She suggests that incentives can be given in a form of permit requisitions or tax reduction. That way, developers are encouraged to build for non-profit projects because the incentives stabilize their expenses. Second, the developers’ reluctance to

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<sup>12</sup>With Interviewee 4, she mentioned that kampungs will be gradually gentrified by developers by referring “*that’s how the developers work [namanya pengembang, pasti gitu]*”. Interviewee 4 implies that there are no limiting regulations that prevent developers from acquiring kampung lands everywhere, even if the land holds informal status. This conclusion is supported by document checking, in which there is no regulation that refers to this matter.

<sup>13</sup> *Girik* can refer to *semi-formal tenure* according to Kusno (2020). In the past, the status of *girik* was authorized by the local government, not the national government. It is associated with customary lands and inherited ownership rights. Kusno (2020) argues that most land status of kampung belongs to this category.

<sup>14</sup> According to Zhu and Simamarta (2015), lands with *girik* status can possess full property rights similar to freehold ownership. Until this research is written, there is not yet any confirmation that the government has abolished the *girik* status from the official land registry.

<sup>15</sup> The process of land acquisition by developers on kampung is studied by Leitner and Sheppard (2017), which they refer to as “negotiated displacement”. The process starts when developers and land brokers pursue the residents to sell their land, triggering sometimes a lengthy negotiation over the land price. Local leaders of kampung sometimes help smoothing the transaction process by helping residents obtain land certificates so they are able to negotiate better with the developers and brokers (Leitner & Sheppard, 2017).

<sup>16</sup> However, as explained earlier by Interviewee 1, the land acquisition process by companies can trigger a conflict of interests with the kampung residents if the community refuses to give up their land. Process of community organizing can also be impacted as developers are not necessarily consult with local organizations about the on-going dynamics inside the community.

contribute to urban social projects is influenced by the government's stringent regulations. Interviewee 5 expressed her dissatisfaction as many penalties would be applied to developers for building social-use property. If counted, these penalties would burden the construction cost, expensive enough to make developers withdraw their participation in social projects.

Third, this further relates to implementation of obligation<sup>17</sup>, in which the process is not that simple. According to Interviewee 5, developers are only responsible for building the physical property, meaning that pre-construction phase such as land permit and acquisition of location should be the responsibility of the government. This role division between developers and the local authority should be clear at this point. However, the implementation of the obligation is obstructed because the government often puts their own responsibility in developers' hands: *"Developers only need to do the construction. After the location and design are approved by the government, developers then execute the construction. It should be as simple as that. Yet, the government wants us to also do the permit, finding the location, etc when it must be their responsibility. When it comes to kampung improvement, for example, they expect the developers to do all the work [land acquisition, permit, etc], while it should also be their portion. Developers would not do all these works"* (Interviewee 5). Therefore, due to these factors, developers tend to refuse to be involved in any social project, let alone for the governance of kampung as the Interviewee 5 claims.

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<sup>17</sup> Obligation is applied to developers as a form of social contribution to the city. To fulfill the obligation, developers can build social housing or public facilities in any location within the city, depending on what type of commercial property they build. Usually, obligation is a prerequisite to get a building permit (*Izin Mendirikan Bangunan/IMB*) for their commercial use. According to Governor's Decree 228/2016, developers are (only) responsible for constructing the physical building. Other terms and conditions outside this responsibility are not being mentioned further.



## Chapter 5: Analysis

Central to this analysis is to answer the research question, which is to explore how the conflict of interests of stakeholders influence the governance process of Jakarta's urban kampungs. In this section, the table is interpreted to narrow down the degree of conflict of interests that happen at different scales of multilevel governance of informal settlements in Jakarta. The analysis mainly elaborates on the colored squares in the table, in which the pattern of conflict of interests and how it affects the governance process is scrutinized under the theoretical views and the author's interpretation towards the issues.

Table 3. Correlation Between Conflict Of Interests And Governance Issues

Stakeholders (summary of interviews)	Conflict of Interests			
	Governance Issues			
	Bottom-up program: PLUP		Top-down program: KOTAKU	
	Grassroots	Local Government (Jakarta Housing Agency)	National government (Kementerian PUPR)	Developers
Grassroots (UPC, RCUS, kampung community)	Individual gains, opportunistic behaviours <hr/> Unified vision, dissemination of information	Program-based approach vs. participative approach <hr/> Paternalistic and pragmatic attitude towards regulations, lack of commitment, lack of transparency	(no cooperation between grassroots and National Government)	Land dispute
Local Government (Jakarta Housing Agency)	Conflict over means <hr/> Regulation vs. informal planning	Nepotism practice <hr/> Absence of regulatory framework for kampung governance	Lack of coordination	(developers are not involved in the governance of kampung)
National Government (Kementerian PUPR)	Conflict of land rearrangement, place-based attachment <hr/> Unilateral eviction	Fragmented coordination, inaction of local agencies	-	(developers are not involved in the governance of kampung)
Developers	(developers are not involved in the governance of kampung)	Conflict over business interest vs. incentives <hr/> PPP is unlikely to occur	(developers are not cooperating with the National Government in this matter)	-

Source: Author's analysis

## **Grassroots**

At the grassroots level, the conflict of interests affects how the local residents come together as a community in PLUP process, clashing between the individual and collective interests (Sen, 1977). The conflict of interests come from many interested parties inside the kampung community that includes *middlemen* and informal landlords. Referring to Milbert (2006), the presence of these interested parties can trigger a conflict of interests in the process of governance of informal settlements. The interested parties may use the PLUP to achieve their own interest where opportunistic behaviour may occur. This is because they have the ability to influence other community members for their own gain, in which their influential manner comes from their social skills in bridging formal and informal institutions (Milbert, 2006). Any intervention regarding the kampung, such as PLUP will certainly affect any interests they have in the kampung. Therefore, these interested parties would try to saturate the decision-making process. As a result, the governance process (community participation in PLUP) can take longer as the facilitator such as RCUS and UPC will also try to counterbalance these interests. Another side effect is these interests often complicate the PLUP process because they might obscure the dissemination of information among community members and fragment the collective vision of the community as a whole.

## **Grassroots - Developers - Local Government**

Although there is no direct participation of real estate developers in the governance of kampungs, developers may intrude the process of PLUP at the local level. As part of their business interest (Deng, 2017), developers will try to acquire areas that are profitable for future property development. Kampung areas, especially the ones that reside in strategic locations may as well become the target of the developers (Leitner and Sheppard, 2017). When this happens, land dispute with the local communities can be inevitable, particularly if it involves violence in the process. Land commodification can sometimes decelerate the community participation in the PLUP because the developers will try to bribe the residents out of their kampung as said by Interviewee 1.

Such disruptive land commodification happens within a lack of governance by the local government. First, it is caused by a lack of de jure recognition in the city spatial planning. When kampung settlements are not officially recognized in the administration system (marked as grey areas), developers may perceive it as an opportunity to privatize the areas, especially without official land status. Second, the loss of opportunity in maximizing the PPP with the developers. Developers tend to be reluctant in this project because PPP is perceived as a profit-loss for them. Interviewee 5 argues that the incentive given by the local government counterweights the expenses for the developers to participate in non-profit PPP projects. The reason why PPP has not yet been utilized for the governance of kampungs is that there is no standardized conduct for this type of PPP (Kwak, et. al., 2009). Therefore, PPP for kampung improvement in Jakarta rarely occurs.

### **Grassroots - Local Government**

Moving to another level of stakeholder relations, the conflict of interests between the grassroots and local government comes as a result of conflict between conflict over means versus conflict over goals (Druckman and Zechmeister, 1970). Such conflict affects the governance process because it relates to the absence of transfer of sovereignty and decision making competencies which is central in multilevel governance (Devas, 2014). This conflict comes when the informal practices of PLUP by the grassroots efforts fail to be accommodated in the face of public policies. Between grassroots and local government, the conflict is reflected around the means of governance, where it clashes between program-based approach and participatory planning. From the government's point of view, the grassroots often conduct their own version of planning outside the standard rule set by the government, while from the grassroots perspective, the government seems reluctant to accommodate new ways of governing the kampungs. In theory, multilevel governance is less likely to happen in this case because it prevents the collaboration of top-down and bottom-up approaches (Rhodes, 1997). Thus, it is reflected in the governance process where paternalistic and pragmatic attitudes of government's officials often hinder the implementation of PLUP along with a lack of commitment and transparency.

Furthermore, another factor is added to understand the keen reluctance of the government officials to integrate local approaches to public policies. As witnessed by Interviewee 2, there is on-going nepotism inside the government agency that prevents any progressive action towards the current governance of kampungs. The interest to protect nepotism affects the governance of kampung because it obstructs the bottom-up process of PLUP through stringent regulations and intricate administration. The effect of nepotism practice in the regulatory framework does not stop at this level. To keep this practice, regulations must be kept in the status quo in order to prevent subversive interventions. This may explain why Interviewee 3 mentions that there is not yet a specific regulatory framework for kampung governance in Jakarta (page 33). If this is correct, this finding can conclude that the source of conflict of interests is nepotism that goes as follows: nepotism bears another conflict between conflict over means versus conflict over goals (Druckman and Zechmeister, 1970). The latter conflict is manifested between the grassroots and the local government towards informal practices versus formal bureaucracy. This conflict happens as granting recognition to informal processes can jeopardize the nepotism practices (status quo) inside the government agency. It further confirms why the local government officials tend to have paternalistic and pragmatic attitudes to regulations, unwilling to move progressively in the PLUP process.

### **Grassroots - Local Government - National Government**

In the next level of stakeholders' relations in multilevel governance, the relations among grassroots, local and national governments are bounded by decentralization. According to Gwaleba and Masum (2018), the national government should be involved in the bottom-up process of PLUP, yet in this case, the detachment of the national government is prevalent due to the decentralization policy. Under

decentralization, the national government has no direct authority in the governance of informal settlements (not just in Jakarta but nationwide). This makes the local government a center of authorization where the local authorities ought to act as a mediator between the grassroots and national government and the main administrator with the local communities in their municipal authority.

Apart from the PLUP framework, the national government has an agenda to improve informal settlements with a nation-scale program, KOTAKU. The program has three main interventions, consisting of Improvement (*Pemugaran*), Renewal (*Peremajaan*) and Resettlement (*Permukiman Kembali*). Taking a point of view from Milbert (2006), approaches like these are prone to be morally vague. This ambiguity attracts a slight difference between “fighting slums” versus “fighting the community” through evictions and non-negotiable rule of law. Furthermore, these approaches often trigger a conflict of interests, especially between the planned communities and the local government, where the national government is absent to resolve the conflict due to decentralization authority. This is especially true in the process of Renewal (*Peremajaan*) and Resettlement (*Permukiman Kembali*). In Renewal, many communities refuse to consolidate their land plot for land rearrangement and this often triggers a local protest to the local government. In Resettlement, Milbert’s critique on the ambiguity of this practice is embodied through the case of forced eviction. To decide whether Resettlement is necessary depends on criteria such as land status and the location of the kampung(s). Many kampungs in Jakarta with illegal occupation status have gone through unilateral eviction, accompanied by place-based conflict with the local government due to place attachment of the community towards their home and the people (Marzano, 2015).

Implementing this policy creates a governance issue in itself. Due to decentralization, coordination with the local government is often fragmented because it limits the national government to take part directly and holistically in the process. This fragmented coordination includes the lack of participation of both parties for certain administration processes, which is complained by Interviewee 3 and 4 as the representatives of the government. In multilevel governance, decentralization does emphasize the transfer of authority among government tiers (Rondinelli, 1981) and should integrate both hierarchical and horizontal interactions (Homsy, et. al., 2018). However, the implementation of decentralization in this case appears as an absence of authority of the national government, leaving what should be a collective responsibility to the local government. In other words, decentralization creates a gap among governmental agencies to work together with the community in the KOTAKU program, enabling the conflict of interests between the local community and local authorities to be solved on their own.

## Chapter 6: Conclusion

### Answering the research question




Figure 6. Stakeholders' relations in multilevel governance of kampungs in Jakarta  
Source: author's analysis

The gradual increase of the urbanization rate requires every stakeholder to participate in tackling its impact on the livelihood of the city. Here, multilevel governance is relevant as a means to achieve inclusive participation of stakeholders due to the transfer of authority and competencies between the top-down and bottom-up governance (Andrews, 2006; Stavins, 2010; Homsy, et. al., 2018). Therefore, the role of multilevel governance is imperative and necessary to tackle the complex impact of urbanization, such as the emergence of informal settlements, where this challenge is more prevalent in cities with high urbanization rates in the Global South, including Jakarta, Indonesia.

However, this study found that the implementation of multilevel governance is not without challenges, specifically because of the stakeholders' conflict of interests that influence the governance process. In the case of Jakarta's urban kampungs, for instance, the conflict of interests among stakeholders are manifested variously in every level of stakeholders' participation as shown in Figure 6. From the grassroots level (1), the conflict of interests starts when the opportunistic behaviour of some local parties influence the decision making in the participatory planning processes for tenure security (PLUP). The complexity of community organizing is escalated due to the possessive behaviour of opportunistic individuals (middlemen, informal landlords). The form of conflict in this context lies within a concept of liberal paradox (Sen, 1977), a contestation that occurs when keeping personal gains would be conflicting with collective interests. This influences the PLUP process because it complicates the decision-making of the community in shaping the vision of the kampung community.

Moving on to the next level of stakeholder participation among real estate developers, grassroots and local government (2), the conflict of interests begins when developers try to expand their business interest by acquiring kampung areas in the city. This often triggers a land conflict with the grassroots community, an embodiment of conflict of interests between keeping the residents' home versus accelerating business interest (Deng, 2017). The land conflict affects the PLUP process as it creates another lengthy negotiation, if not complicated with the internal politics of the kampung(s) with the middlemen and informal landlords. To what extent the developers seem to be autonomous in the process of the land acquisition lies within the fact that kampung(s) are not legitimately protected in the current spatial regulations where this responsibility belongs to the local government. In other words, the local government can act as a mediator to the conflict of interests between the developers and the grassroots. First, the conflict can be prevented if the local government is willing to integrate kampung(s) in the city spatial planning system (RDTR) so the process of land acquisition by the developers can be less disruptive due to spatial regulations. Moreover, PPP can also be used as a collaborative tool among the three tiers of stakeholders. Yet, due to the strong business interest of developers and lack of standardized incentives given by the local government, PPP is less likely to take part in the multilevel governance process.

Nevertheless, the most saturated conflict of interests is when the grassroots cooperate with the local government in the PLUP process (3). The relevant conflict in this case is conflict over the means versus conflict over the ends (Druckman and Zechmeister, 1970). The paternalistic attitude of the government agencies towards regulations hinders the informal practices and local competencies that have been worked by the grassroots initiative. From the theoretical perspective, this is in accordance with Kombe and Kreibich (2000) and Huchzermeyer (2009) where they acknowledge that the self-initiative of the urban poor community becomes less recognized and is complicated through neglect, refusal and stringent regulations by the government.

To understand the reason behind the paternalistic attitude and stringent regulations of the local government agency, several accusations are pointed by the grassroots as follows. One of the most provocative reasons is to protect nepotism inside the agency. This may prevent the local government from making progressive movements on the governance of kampung as it would jeopardize the established practice. On the other hand, the local agency admits that their paternalistic attitude comes as they must strictly follow the protocol due to legal inspection and monitoring. Regardless of what the reason might be, the conflict of interests here is rather clear between maintaining the status quo versus bottom-up efforts for breaking it to reach a better kampung governance.

Finally, when multilevel governance involves the national government, there is a gap among grassroots, local and the national government in the process (4). Due to decentralization, first, the national government has neither authority nor urgency to participate in PLUP (which is the reason why PLUP only involves the grassroots and local government). Instead, the government is completely moving away from this

process and implements their own slum improvement program. The program is state-led, if not authoritative, as there is no meaningful negotiation on the means and ends of the implementation with the local community. Moreover, the governance of the program is mostly oriented towards coordination with the local government, which is fragmented and instead produces a conflict of interests with the planned community with issues of land rearrangement and forced eviction in the most extreme case.

### *Implication for theory and practice*

From the author's view, discussion regarding stakeholders' in the governance of informal settlements is somewhat lacking as the majority of scientific literature understands informal settlements from land and administrative status, spatial characteristics and ethnographic perspective. To fill this gap, this research, as objectively stated, emphasizes the governance issues in the process of governing kampungs in Jakarta. As much as describing the spatial conditions matter, this research would like to see how the subjective side influences kampung governance from the emerging conflict of interests among stakeholders.

Although Homsy, et.al., 2018 build the core principles of multilevel governance in terms of mix-institution modes of governance, this research realizes that mix-institutional approaches are not only about how stakeholders participate in the process, but also to understand its application in certain urban contexts. For instance, in the governance of kampungs, the implementation of multilevel governance is more complex because stakeholders already have different interpretations of "informality" both in their personal view and institutional framework. Milbert (2006) supports this argument by stating that there is a substantial fragmentation when it comes to defining slums and informal settlements. Therefore, further research on this topic must consider that the applicability of the multilevel governance framework may as well depend on urban characteristics, such as occupation status, locality and geographical contexts.

Theoretically, multilevel governance emphasizes the co-production of knowledge, where the citizens can influence and motivate the government action and vice versa (Homsy, et.al., 2018). However, this research finds the counterproductive argument. In practice, it is still challenging for top-down planning to recognize the competencies of bottom-up approaches in the governance of kampungs, let alone to integrate it as one unit of governing mode. Several factors such as modes of conduct (regulations, policy and program), spatial characteristics (formal/informal occupation) and the subjective influence (interests, institutions and stakeholders) suggest that achieving multilevel governance may not be a simple, straightforward process. As shown by this research, this governance process is even more complicated when these factors become fragmented, especially when it comes to modes of conduct. These factors may also influence one another, such as when the informal occupation in the city attracts conflict of interests among grassroots stakeholders.

However, the biggest challenge in integrating top-down and bottom-up approaches is found within the conflict of interests among stakeholders. This research reveals that conflict of interests is found in every level of stakeholders' relations in the multilevel governance of kampungs in Jakarta. Inclusive participation within the principle of multilevel governance is less likely to be achieved due to conflict of interests that hinder the integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Reflecting from Druckman and Zechmeister (1970), the conflict of interests in their view aligns with the findings of this research as the conflict of interests emerges from opposing values and ideologies within differences in institutional interests and attitudinal dispositions of individuals. In this research, conflict of interests are manifested variously in the form of abuse of formal/informal authority, nepotism practices, and business interests. These conflicts of interests put the governance of kampungs between hierarchical and horizontal modes of governance, formal versus informal procedures and program-based versus participation-based approaches.

Finally, this research argues that although multilevel governance seems appropriate to address the complex issues of informal settlements, emerging interests among stakeholders should be resolved at the initial phase through consensus building before focusing on the technical and policy aspect. Otherwise, the practice of multilevel governance cannot be achieved holistically in every level of stakeholder participation. Additionally, implementing multilevel governance should also be accompanied by good governance principles such as transparency, participatory, consensus-oriented, equitable and inclusive (Elahi, 2009), especially in the current era where countries participate to achieve sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11) and other SDGs goals by 2030.



## **LIST OF INTERVIEWEES**

Interviewee 1 - Kampung Representative from Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), online personal interview, April 17, 2021

Interviewee 2 - Executive Director of Rujak Center for Urban Studies (RCUS), online personal interview, March 22, 2021

Interviewee 3 - Head of Settlement Department at Jakarta Housing Agency, online personal interview, April 15, 2021

Interviewee 4 - Head of Urban Settlement Subdirector at Indonesian Ministry of General Works & Public Housing, online personal interview, April 11, 2021

Interviewee 5 - Executive Director of Jakarta Property Institute, online personal interview, April 13, 2021

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## APPENDIX A. Interview Questions Guide (Interviewee 1-4)

### *Introductory Questions*

1. How do you view the existence and value of kampung settlement in Jakarta as the capital city?
2. How do you describe your role in the governance of kampung?

### *Part 1: Governance on kampung*

3. Do you agree that the governance of kampung has been going well? If not, what makes it challenging?
4. Are you satisfied with the approach that has been taken so far in governance of kampung?
5. According to your institutional perspective, what is the best way for governing the kampung?
6. If you have an initiative on the governance of kampung (namely program/policy), what makes it challenging to implement?

### *Part 2: Stakeholder Relations*

7. Do you agree that institutions are cooperating well in the process of kampung governance?
8. To some degree, what makes it challenging for institutions to integrate and coordinate with one another?
9. Is there any institution that you think is easy and challenging to work with?

### *Part 3: conflict of interest*

10. What is your institutional interest in the governance of kampung?
11. Can you describe the conflict of interest within your institution?
12. Do you agree that your institution's interest in kampung will affect the interest of the other stakeholders?
13. Does your institutional interest ever trigger a conflict with the other stakeholder?
14. Can you describe the conflict of interest between your institution and other stakeholders?
15. Is there any disadvantage that affects your institution due to the certain interest or intervention of other stakeholders?
16. Aside from interest, what is the other source of conflict within the governance of kampung?

### *Closing Questions*

17. What is your suggestion to improve the collaboration among stakeholders?
18. Do you have anything to add? Or do you want to adjust any of your statements?

Thank you for your participation.



## APPENDIX B. Interview Questions Guide (Interviewee 5)

### *Part 1: Land Commodification of Kampung*

1. Is there any relationship between the informal character of kampung and developer's decision to commodify the kampung area?
2. How is the process of acquiring kampung lands in Jakarta?

### *Part 2: Involvement in Non-profit Projects*

3. Are developers involved in non-profit or community development projects?
4. What makes the developers reluctant to participate in social projects in Jakarta?
5. How is the role of PPP in social projects?
6. How is the role of developers' obligations in funding urban social projects?
7. Do developers have a certain concern for kampung?
8. To what extent developers can be involved in the governance of kampung?

### *Closing Questions*

9. What is your suggestion to improve the collaboration among stakeholders?
10. Do you have anything to add? Or do you want to adjust any of your statements?

Thank you for your participation.

## APPENDIX C. Interview Transcriptions

### 1. Interviewee 1 (Kampung Resident – Urban Poor Consortium)

**Interviewer:** Mas sendiri melihat eksistensi dan nilai dari kampung itu seperti apa sih mas sebagai warga?

**Interviewee 1:** Setidaknya aku melihat dari apa yang aku alami di kota. Eksistensi kampung di dalam kota itu satu, kalo dia itu di dalam kota yang terus berkembang kalo kita bandingkan dengan kota-kota lain yang lebih maju dibanding jakarta seperti seoul, itu ada perbedaan. aku mungkin mengawali dari keterkaitan relasi hubungan antar warganya. yang kulihat di kota besar itu individualisnya lebih kuat, sedangkan di perkampungan itu hubungan sosial masyarakatnya masih kuat. itu satu perbedaan yang menurutku penting bagi kota. jadi kota itu berkembang tapi bukan berarti kemudian individualis, jadi berkembang secara infrastruktur, mobilitas, ekonomi, tapi ternyata relasinya tidak berkembang malah mundur karena hubungan sosialnya menjadi mundur, perkenalan dan interaksi orang jadi menurun. itu memang masalahnya apa? kalau relasi sosialnya berkurang, yang kubandingkan dengan seoul tadi, angka bunuh dirinya tinggi ya karena bunuh diri bukan cuma aspek ekonomi tapi juga aspek perhatian, kepedulian antar warga, ngerasa sendiri dan tidak peduli dengan yang lain. pada akhirnya menyerahkan nasib pada diri sendiri, masing-masing. kalau orang-orang miskin itu salah satu modalnya kan modal sosial yang bisa membuat orang itu bertahan. nah dengan individualistis, itu justru hanya akan menguntungkan mereka yang modal kapitalnya gede. karena dengan begitu, mereka bisa membeli apapun, sedangkan yang miskin semua dikembalikan kepada negara. padahal kan negara belum tentu bisa mengakomodir semua kebutuhan masyarakat. mungkin kalau di korea selatan ada subsidi pendapatan, tapi apakah itu cukup? nyatanya kan tidak. makanya kemudian seoul itu menggencarkan rekomunalisasi/rekomunitas, menghubungkan orang kembali gitu loh dengan anggaran koperasi yang segitu gede supaya orang terhubung kembali. itu satu ya terkait eksistensi. jadi kampung itu menjaga relasi sosial warga kota supaya kota itu ga kehilangan interaksi warganya. yang kedua, eksistensi kampung di dalam jakarta ini menjaga keterjangkauan dalam hal banyak ya. satu, kebutuhan disebut rantai kebutuhan, khususnya di orang miskin sendiri. dari urusan makan, di kampung itu menyediakan harga makan yang lebih terjangkau. dari urusan tempat tinggal, ada kontrakan, kos-kosan yang lebih terjangkau. dari pakaian, ada yang jual pakaian bekas. dalam hal perabotan rumah tangga, ada barang-barang bekas yang bisa didapatkan dengan lebih terjangkau, jasa, perbaikan, reparasi, tenaga kerja juga lebih terjangkau. kalau secara ekstrim contoh kebutuhan seksualitas, prostitusi untuk kalangan orang miskin itu banyak sekali di kolong-kolong jembatan. contoh ini untuk menunjukkan bahwa di antara mereka sendiri itu ada pemenuhan-pemenuhan yang memang terjangkau bagi orang-orang miskin. nah kita bisa membayangkan kalau kehidupan kampung itu berubah semua jadi apartemen, komplek yang tersekat-sekat, memisahkan satu sama lain, semua serba diatur oleh para pengembang, kita menghilangkan potensi-potensi dari kampung tadi yang terkait dengan keterjangkauan. akibatnya, kota semakin tidak terjangkau buat orang miskin sehingga orang-orang lokalnya tersingkir keluar kota. akhirnya kota itu hanya diisi oleh orang-orang yang secara ekonomi mampu, tetapi kan akibatnya kota kehilangan akarnya.

**Interviewer:** berarti Mas merasakan sendiri ya manfaat dari relasi sosial itu ya?

**Interviewee 1:** Ya betul

**Interviewer:** Mas ini kan terlibat dalam pengorganisasian ya, bisa dijelaskan gak peran Mas sendiri dalam tata kelola kampung itu lebih seperti apa?

**Interviewee 1:** ini begini. aku mungkin berangkat dari latar belakangnya dulu ya. orang-orang kampung (yang miskin) itu dianggap sebagai beban kota, beban pemerintah. kekumuhan itu dianggap sebagai beban yang harus disingkirkan karena itu malu-maluin, ngabisin anggaran, dsb. nah itu lalu memunculkan stigma kepada orang-orang kampung; mereka ini sampah, gak ada gunanya untuk kota ini, menjadi beban, sarang kriminal, bodoh dan pantas untuk digusur dan tidak dapat kue pembangunan. nah stigma yang sedemikian kuat itu membentuk pemikiran, tindakan, sikap dari teman-teman di kampung. mereka jadi minder, tidak punya harapan terhadap perubahan kota sehingga minim sekali harapan bahwa pemerintah akan baik. itu udah ga mungkin sehingga mau ga mau saya hanya bertahan untuk mempertahankan apa yang saya punya. itu aja udah cukup, sampai berpikir bahwa tanahnya menjadi legal, kehidupan kampung menjadi lebih baik itu kemewahan baru. baru membayangkan saja sudah kemewahan. jadi tugasku pertama kali ada mengembalikan kepercayaan diri teman-teman di kampung miskin itu bahwa; satu, mereka bisa dan kedua, mereka punya hak. mereka bagian dari kota ini. membangkitkan kepercayaan diri karena itu yang dari sejak jaman orde baru sampai sekarang dihancurkan dan direndahkan. nah itu cara membangkitkan kepercayaan diri gimana? satu, mereka tidak boleh sendiri-sendiri. kalau sendiri-sendiri maka minder. mereka harus bersama-sama dengan yang lain. jadi dihubungkan dengan senasib, sepenanggungan dengan orang-orang yang mengalami nasib yang sama sehingga mereka ngerasa aku ga sendiri, aku ada temen. kedua, dihubungkan dengan lintas kelas, profesi, dengan teman-teman arsitek, lawyer, yang diluar dari senasib tadi itu. itu untuk tunjukin bahwa ada dukungan, selain tidak sendiri, ya dia juga didukung. tidak semua warga kota itu berpikir mereka salah, sampah. selanjutnya untuk meningkatkan kepercayaan diri mereka adalah peningkatan kapasitas. kalo mereka dibilang bodoh, dll ya berarti untuk membuktikan itu ya kapasitasnya yang harus ditingkatkan. kapasitas yang dibutuhkan dalam konteks tertentu, tidak dalam arti orang secara sendiri-sendiri, naik kelas, tidak. tidak cuma kapasitas keterampilan tiap-tiap orang, tapi juga kapasitas dalam hal berinteraksi sosial. jadi ada jaringan dan juga peningkatan kapasitas. kapasitas ini termasuk pengetahuan tentang hak mereka, tidak hanya keterampilan memasak, menggambar, tetapi juga kemampuan berpikir kritis terkait hak, politik, hak ekonomi, budaya. berarti ada pelatihan, diskusi pengembangan kapasitas. tapi apakah itu cukup? tidak. tapi yang begitu-begitu tadi bisa kita sebut pengorganisasian. nah pengorganisasian itu tujuan utamanya adalah meningkatkan kesadaran, kemudian berjejaring dengan yang lain, mengumpulkan kekuatan yang tadinya sendiri-sendiri bisa kerjasama. lalu kemudian kemampuan yang mencukupi juga (cerdas dan berkapasitas).

**Interviewer:** jadi pertama ada identitas kolektif, kedua ada keberagaman dan ketiga kapasitas kalau saya boleh ringkaskan.

**Interviewee 1:** ya dan itu lingkupnya kalo peningkatan kapasitas, kesadaran, pengetahuan, berbagi peran, kerjasama, itu lingkupnya pengorganisasian. sedangkan jaringan lintas kelas, profesi itu lingkupnya pengembangan jaringan. tapi itu tidak

cukup karena bisa jadi terjadi perubahan secara drastis di internal warga. mereka jadi lebih cerdas, punya organisasi, kerjasama, punya jaringan lintas kelas tapi kebijakan kotanya belum berpihak pada mereka. maka kekuatan pengorganisasian dan jaringan tadi harus digunakan untuk mengubah kebijakan yang dirasa tidak adil supaya menjadi lebih adil. jadi kekuatan di dalam ini tidak hanya bisa disimpan tapi juga harus dikeluarkan untuk mengubah kebijakan supaya manfaatnya bisa dirasakan oleh lebih banyak orang. jadi pengorganisasian 1000 orang itu harus digunakan untuk 1 juta orang. tidak bisa hanya untuk mengubah 1000 orang. nah itu yang disebut sebagai advokasi. jadi kalau mau dirangkum ada 3 tugas saya itu, melakukan pengorganisasian, advokasi, dan mengembangkan jaringan. cuma peranku dalam 3 hal itu bukan sebagai pelaku langsung. tapi aku mentoring, monitoring diskusi supaya organisasi masyarakat spt JRMK bisa melakukan 3 hal itu. jadi aku fasilitasi para pengurus JRMK, pengurus kampung supaya bisa lakukan 3 hal itu.

**Interviewer:** supaya mereka mandiri juga ya mas?

**Interviewee 1:** betul, menjadi pelaku langsung.

**Interviewer:** ini saya mau tanya soal tata kelola kampung. kan kalo mas sendiri setuju ga sih mas tata kelola kampung itu sudah berjalan baik? kalau engga apa sih mas yang jadi tantangannya? entah tata kelola dari pemerintah, mungkin ada intervensi dari developer juga.

**Interviewee 1:** belum ya, belum terjadi dengan baik ya. bahwa saat ini kampung itu menjaga relasi, menjaga keterjangkauan itu iya. tapi soal tata kelola itu belum terjadi karena secara nyata di banyak kampung itu warga masih mementingkan kepentingannya masing-masing dalam beberapa hal. misalnya, kampung itu kan tumbuh ya. dulu di awal masih ada beberapa tanah kosong, lalu tiba-tiba ada yang bangun rumah, rumah lagi, rumah lagi. nah dia tidak direncanakan dalam arti rigid seperti developer merencanakan permukiman. dia adalah permukiman yang tumbuh, tapi permukiman tumbuh ini ternyata tidak dibarengi dengan pikiran bersama bagaimana mengelola kampung itu secara bersama, kebutuhan kampung seperti mobilitas orang, ruang terbuka, pengaturan air belum dipikirkan. kalau di Marlina, rumah lebih luas dibandingkan jalan. jalannya kecil-kecil sekali sehingga untuk satu motor lewat kadang harus kesulitan, bahkan ga ada motor yang bisa lewat. kalau kita jalan kaki kadang harus hati-hati kepala bisa mentok. nah lalu contoh lain adalah dalam hal mengatasi banjir. ada yang mengambil inisiatif menguruk depan rumahnya secara mandiri, menggunakan uang sendiri supaya rumahnya tidak tergenang. tapi kan dampaknya rumah sebelahnya jadi lebih tergenang, lebih rendah. kemudian diikuti rumah sebelahnya nguruk lagi, tapi supaya tidak kalah, maka dia akan uruk lebih tinggi dari sebelahnya lalu akan ngaruh lagi ke rumah sebelahnya sehingga di kampung itu jalannya mirip jalanan offroad yang naik turun gitu karena pengentasan banjir tidak dilakukan secara bersama, jadi lebih kepada penanganan individu-individu. dalam beberapa hal tata kelola kampung itu masih individualis. belum terkelola bersama.

**Interviewer:** kalau tata kelola dari pemerintah sendiri, Mas melihatnya seperti apa?

**Interviewee 1:** menurutku tata kelola permukiman dari pemerintah menimbulkan gap antara kampung, tidak kampung, antara rumah kecil dengan rumah besar dan menimbulkan segregasi. contoh di RDTR itu kan ada kode R1, R2, R3. permukiman ditentukan dengan luasan rumah. jadi kalau rumahnya kecil ya ditaroh di kawasan ini, kalau rumah gede di taruh di kawasan ini. padahal kalau kita liat aktual di lapangan luasan rumah itu menunjukkan kelas ekonomi, di Jakarta ya. siapa yang ekonominya lebih kuat, dia bisa kuasai tanah lebih luas, rumah-rumah yang lebih gede gitu. nah artinya secara sengaja pemprov DKI menempatkan orang-orang miskin berkumpul dengan orang-orang miskin dan orang kaya berkumpul dengan orang kaya. lalu kemudian orang-orang kaya ini dibatasi dengan pagar, one gate system. nah ini yang menimbulkan segregasi terpisah antara orang kaya dengan orang miskin karena hanya keseragaman ekonomi sehingga sangat mungkin terjadi ketegangan sosial antara yang kaya dan miskin karena sejak pengaturan tata ruang sudah dipisahkan. jadi belum terjadi tata kelola yang baik.

**Interviewer:** kalau tata kelola kampung sendiri, misal program CAP atau KOTAKU gitu, Mas liatnya gimana?

**Interviewee 1:** ya ini kan baru ya, selama ini kan negara tidak hadir dalam tata kelola kampung karena dianggap ilegal. hal ini kan baru ya CAP dan mereka hadir tetapi hadirnya pun masih dalam bentuk setengah-setengah, artinya tidak betul-betul percaya pada kemampuan masyarakat, mereka menggunakan konsultan. jadi pendekatannya sama kayak proyek, bukan pendekatan kolaboratif, partisipatif. tetapi ya kalau kita lihat perubahannya ya sudah cukup lumayan hanya saja perlu ditingkatkan dan itupun masih pada wilayah infrastruktur belum pada ruang-ruang privat seperti rumah sedangkan permukiman kan ga hanya infrastruktur. ketika pelaksananya pun tidak maksimum, menggunakan kontraktor, pendekatannya proyek lagi. padahal ini berbeda sama sekali antara permukiman kompleks, apartemen, rumah susun dengan penanganan kampung itu berbeda. tidak bisa dikerjakan dengan kontraktor atau konsultan mesti ada pelibatan warga karena kalo engga, maka akan dianggap sebagai bagian yang berbeda, si kontraktor itu. bukan milik si orang kampung. ketika ada infrastruktur disitu, maka itu dianggap bukan miliknya, dianggap miliknya pemerintah/orang lain. maka keberlanjutannya, pemeliharannya, dsb, jangan berharap warga mau lakukan itu karena sejak awal penanganannya dilakukan oleh mereka sendiri.

**Interviewer:** sejauh ini puas ga sih mas dengan pendekatan-pendekatan yang diambil untuk tata kelola kampung sendiri?

**Interviewee 1:** kalau puas belum, bahwa happy ada perubahan ini, tapi kalau puas, belum

**Interviewer:** berarti kan Mas ini mewakili UPC ya begitu. Kalau dari sudut pandang institusi menurut UPC, tata kelola kampung yang baik itu seperti apa sih mas?

**Interviewee 1:** ini yang dari kampungnya atau dari pemerintahnya?

**Interviewer:** dua-duanya boleh

**Interviewee 1:** oke. pertama, mesti ada kesepakatan antara warga dan pemerintahnya. tiap-tiap kampung kalau menurutku harus punya planning. planning itu maksudnya tidak harus rigid betul ya, tapi visi bersama, mimpi bersama, kampung itu mau jadi kampung apa sih? lalu ada beberapa hal prinsipil yang secara ketat, kaku, memang harus dijaga. ga bisa semua dilonggarin karena kalo engga kita membuka peluang individu-individu untuk melanggar itu, memanfaatkan celah. jadi harus ada yang ketat dan ada yang longgar. contohnya soal lebar jalan. kalo memang sudah disepakati, itu harus dijaga ketat karena kalo engga ada yang memanfaatkan celah itu, karena kampung-kampung di Jakarta ini beda dengan yang di desa. kampung di Jakarta ini kan pertemuan berbagai etnis, budaya, latar belakang, pendidikan, ekonomi, daerah, nah ini untuk proses penyatuannya itu butuh waktu yang panjang. nah masalahnya medium-medium untuk menyatukan ini belum tentu ada semua. dan pada individunya bisa berbeda-beda. oleh karena itu, mesti ada pengetatan dalam beberapa hal tapi ada beberapa hal yang boleh dilonggarkan. tapi poinku adalah antara pemerintah dengan warga harus punya kesamaan visi di dalam suatu kampung, maka harus ada visi. contoh kampung ku deh. Contoh, Tongkol akan menjadi kampung pinggir sungai yang menjaga sungai tapi juga menjadi destinasi wisata kota tua. itu kan mimpi ya yang kemudian itu mesti diterjemahkan ke dalam tindakan-tindakan. apa tindakan-tindakan itu orang bisa ngukur, apakah tindakan-tindakan ini akan bertentangan dengan mimpi yang besar tadi apa engga? nah itu bisa diukur. tapi kalo ga ada mimpi bersama, orang akan jalan sendiri-sendiri, bangun lagi yang mepet sungai, akan buang sampah lagi ke sungai. kayak itu lagi, pengetatan. ga boleh buang sampah ke kali, itu fix, ga boleh ditawar. jadi ada beberapa yang bisa ditawar dan ada yang engga. setelah itu, membuat perencanaan bersama. apa saja yang mau dilakukan, dijaga, sepakati dengan pemerintah, itu kalo mau membuat tata kelola kampung secara bersama. lalu dibagi perannya. ini dilakukan oleh pemerintah, ini oleh warga sendiri atau dengan pihak-pihak lain. ini kita yang ga ada. adanya visi kota, visi kampung ga ada. ini yang kita coba lakukan.

**Interviewer:** berarti lebih ke soal persepsi dan negosiasi begitu ya mas?

**Interviewee 1:** ya betul. jadi kan negosiasi itu kan menemukan titik dimana pemerintah punya rencana, kampung punya rencana. selama ini kan hanya pemerintah punya rencana dengan warga punya visi/misi buat kampungnya, maka kampung memiliki rencana. itulah kemudian jadi alat negosiasi dengan pemerintah, dicari titik bisa ketemu.

**Interviewer:** kalau misalnya nih mas, kayak UPC atau kampung punya satu inisiatif untuk tata kelola kampung, biasanya yang bikin sulit diimplementasi itu apa sih mas?

**Interviewee 1:** ketidakpercayaan kepada warga. begini, apakah ini bisa terjadi, kepercayaan diri ini apakah bisa terjadi? jadi itu yang paling sulit sebenarnya karena pengalaman panjang di masa lalu itu mempengaruhi sekali. sekarang kan kenapa yang miskin ini cenderung terkalahkan, tersingkir karena cara berpikrnya hanya mempertahankan apa yang dipunya, tidak berpikir ekspansif. sedangkan mereka-mereka yang punya modal berpikrnya ekspansif. "rumahku tidak digusur aja sudah terimakasih banyak". nah tapi yang modalnya gede-gede kayak PIK 1, sekarang udah bikin PIK 2, dan sudah direncanakan PIK 3, mereka udah beli-beli tanah. ekspansi terus kan. makanya yang miskin kalah terus, karena untuk bermimpi

aja ga berani. maka itu tantangan pertama yang terbesar karena membuat orang berani bermimpi. akhirnya ketika ga berani bermimpi, tindakan yang dilakukan ya tindakan minimum bukan maksimum. pokoknya rumahku tidak digusur, perbaiki sedikit karena tidak berani bermimpi.

**Interviewer:** dari keraguan itu ya mas yang masih jadi tantangan?

**Interviewee 1:** tapi aku pahami itu adalah peristiwa di masa lalu puluhan tahun ditindas sehingga orang merasa ga digusur aja udah bagus banget apalagi kok ngomongin ekspansi, bisa mempertahankan yang dipunya aja udah kemenangan, kemewahan juga

**Interviewer:** kalau dari segi relasi institusi, menurut Mas institusi-institusi bekerjasama dengan baik ga sih mas, misalnya antara UPC, Rujak, dinas-dinas, menurut mas koordinasinya sudah baik?

**Interviewee 1:** ini antara NGO di luar dinas atau sesama NGO atau gimana?

**Interviewer:** overlap semuanya gitu, misalnya UPC dengan Rujak, instansi pemerintah, bagaimana mas?

**Interviewee 1:** kalau yang sesama organ di luar pemerintah kan relasinya cair ya. ya kita bekerja berdasarkan kepercayaan ya. diskusi-diskusi, pertemuan-pertemuan itu kan menyatukan pemahaman, ideologi, jadi masih cair dan menurutku justru lebih baik cair begini daripada harus mengikatkan pada aliansi tertentu. tapi bukan berarti cair itu tidak ada pengaturan, contoh kalo di kampung-kampung JRMK sudah ada pengaturan pembagian wilayah. wilayah kerja antara Rujak, UI dan ASF, hanya saja kekurangannya adalah kita tidak punya monitoring secara rutin. itu belum terjadi jadi secara komunikasi itu masih UPC dengan Rujak, UPC dengan UI, UPC dengan ASF. belum terjadi komunikasi Rujak dengan ASF, Rujak dengan UI atau ASF dengan UI, masih bilateralnya UPC dengan berbagai organisasi. itu untuk evaluasi. kalau dengan pemerintah buruk ya, maksudku bentuk strukturnya Gugus Tugas. Gugus Tugas itu tidak jelas karena hanya posisi institusi. nah itu institusi bisa mendelegasikan kepada siapapun. beda kalau ditetapkan nama, pertanggungjawabannya juga sulit. katakanlah gugus tugas penataan kampung lalu sekarang gugus tugas reforma agraria, mereka ini SKPD ini udah punya kerjaan masing-masing dan tupoksi di tempatnya masih ditambah kerjaan di gugus tugas. jadi itu membuat inisiatif nya menjadi kurang, tidak ada inisiatif dari masing-masing anggota gugus tugas. jadi gugus tugas penataan kampung itu tidak jalan, tidak ada penganggaran di dinas perumahan karena dianggap penataan kampung itu tupoksinya dinas perumahan. nah dinas yang lain ngerasa ga punya kepentingan walaupun masih dalam anggota gugus tugas, makanya macet gugus tugas penataan kampung. lalu juga GTRA begitu sehingga kalau tidak ada tim penggerak yang merumuskan jalan, ngajakin rapat, mengusulkan ini, ga akan jalan juga. nah di reforma agraria itu untungnya ada tim penggerak. tetapi seharusnya bukan tugas tim penggerak. tim penggerak tugasnya menggerakkan, mendampingi, tapi mereka ga ada inisiatif sama sekali. itu lah maka harusnya bentuknya bukan gugus tugas

**Interviewer:** entar jadinya lempar-lemparan ya mas.

**Interviewee 1:** itu terbesar itu ga ada inisiatif, saling tunggu aja.

**Interviewer:** kalau ada intervensi lain dari pihak lain, itu bikin rumit ga sih mas?

**Interviewee 1:** ya. umm.. kebijakan ya, rencana kota ya. rencana kota itu masih belum menempatkan kampung sebagai arus utama. kampung itu ya masih dianggap program gitu aja. ya ini ada gubernur mencanangkan program penataan kampung, yaudah dijalankan. berbeda kalau ini arus utama, jadi kesadaran bahwa kita harus menyelamatkan kampung-kampung di Jakarta itu beda sekali. kalau itu program, maka hanya lokasi-lokasi yg dipikirkan, yang dilakukan perbaikan, penataan, tapi esensi untuk menyelamatkan kampung itu gak ada. jadi yang dicari adalah titik-titik kompromi. oh disini mau dibangun waduk, jalan, taman, sodetan. dikurangi dampaknya, bukan diselamatkan. berbeda dengan menyelamatkan kampung. menyelamatkan itu sangat kasuistis karena dia program. beda kalau dia menjadi arus utama maka langkah-langkah strategis kebijakan yang diambil. contoh menetapkan seperti yang kita lakukan, zonasi kampung kota di RDTR. nah itu langkah menyelamatkan, arus utama. berarti di dalam kebijakan di tata ruang, maka kita harus berikan zonasi kampung kota. jadi kalau ada rencana, pembangunan yang lain-lain itu tidak bisa menabrak dari zonasi kampung kota. jadi ya belum ada arus utama, masih bersifat program saja.

**Interviewer:** kembali lagi mas ke institusi. institusi pemerintah mana yang relatif lebih mudah untuk diajak kerjasama atau diajak diskusi?

**Interviewee 1:** di pemprov?

**Interviewer:** oh di mana aja, mau di tingkat pemprov, pusat, yang relatif mudah untuk diajak kerjasama? atau memang sulit semua?

**Interviewee 1:** ya sekarang ini kan dengan pemprov ya. tapi begini. karakternya itu masih harus disentil dari atasan. jadi inisiatif dari SKPD itu minim sekali dan kami harus mengusulkan, harus nagih, kami harus desak ketik mentok kami harus lapor gubernur, itu kami masih harus lakukan sampai sekarang. itu hampir di semua SKPD, instansi. jadi inisiatif untuk mengambil pekerjaan, mengusulkan terobosan itu hampir tidak ada. jadi bekerja kalau hanya ada perintah. itu masih kuat sekali di birokrasi. kalau mentok, ga nyari solusi. mereka menyerah pada peraturan perundangan yang menghambat. kan harusnya kalau menghadapi tantangan oh ini ada peraturan yang tidak sesuai, ya aturannya diubah. bukan kemudian menyerah pada peraturan yang ada.

**Interviewer:** berarti ini secara umum cukup sulit ya mas untuk bekerja sama kalau caranya seperti nungguin atasan?

**Interviewee 1:** kalau hanya menggantungkan perubahan itu pada SKPD atau PNS atau birokrasi saja, ga bakal tercapai. kecuali rakyatnya yang aktif bergerak, aktif nagih, nekan dan mengusulkan nah baru bisa ada perubahan. dan selama ini prakteknya begitu.

**Interviewer:** kalau institusi non pemerintah yang mungkin enak diajak diskusi, ga terlalu banyak dinamika ada gak?

**Interviewee 1:** ya semua teman-teman ini lah yang sudah terjalin. udah enak semua



**Interviewer:** berarti kalau dinamika terjadi itu ga terlalu jadi masalah gitu ya ?

**Interviewee 1:** ya engga lah, kan itu wajar aja. biasa aja.

**Interviewer:** kalau misalnya di dalam UPC sendiri nih mas, ada ga sih mas konflik-konflik kepentingan yang pernah terjadi?

**Interviewee 1:** pernah. aku tidak menutupi ya, tapi itu udah terjadi di beberapa waktu yang lalu. ada anggota UPC yang korup, yang bekerja sama dengan sebagian warga melakukan tindakan yang tidak dibenarkan. itu pernah terjadi, tapi ya ujungnya pemecatan.

**Interviewer:** kalau yang kerjasama dengan warga itu maksudnya dalam hal apa mas?

**Interviewee 1:** contoh, pernah ada kasus anggota UPC malah justru ikut jual beli rusun. itu pernah terjadi tapi ya kita kan engga mentolerir tindakan-tindakan seperti itu. mesti kita pecat. dua-duanya, termasuk yang dari warga tadi juga dikeluarkan.

**Interviewer:** mas sendiri setuju ga sih kepentingan UPC dalam tata kelola kampung itu bisa menyinggung stakeholder lain?

**Interviewee 1:** ya pasti toh. pasti menyinggung. ya kalau seumpama di tingkat masing-masing kampung pasti menyinggung. jadi orang per orang yang punya kepentingan untuk memiliki aset mendominasi atau mengakumulasi aset dalam suatu kampung karena tidak kita pungkiri di dalam kampung itu juga ada orang per orang yang ingin menguasai begitu ya. yang bertentangan/tidak sejalan dengan ide-ide kebersamaan. ya sekali lagi ini kan pengaruh-pengaruh banyak hal ya. kedua yang pasti dengan pihak luar, seperti rencana pemerintah atau rencana swasta, rencana pembangunan, dll ketika kampung ini semakin eksis, perencanaan tata kelola sendiri yang kuat, pasti juga ada hambatan dengan orang luar maupun yang di dalam.

**Interviewer:** kalau dari UPC sendiri pernah ga sih mas memantik konflik dengan stakeholder lain karena pendekatan UPC?

**Interviewee 1:** sering.

**Interviewer:** misalnya gimana tuh?

**Interviewee 1:** contoh sekarang di Muara Angke ya. kita minta supaya sekitar 5 hektar itu di dalam PRK itu diplot untuk penataan kampung. waduh ribut orang cool storage, industri perikanan, dinas KPKP, ribut semua mereka ga mau tanah itu digunakan untuk penataan kampung karena mereka maunya kampung-kampung itu kan dibawa ke pinggir, masukkan ke rusun 18 lantai. tapi pada akhirnya kita menang, tapi kan itu bikin ribut. lalu kayak di kampung ku sendiri. itu ada kepentingan SDA (pelebaran sungai), cagar budaya yang ingin daerah itu bersih ga ada permukiman. nah tapi ketika kita usulkan konsep berbagi antara sungai, manusia dan cagar budaya itu juga menimbulkan konflik kepentingan dengan orang lain. tetapi pada akhirnya kita menang. ya itu akan selalu menimbulkan benturan kepentingan.

**Interviewer:** biasanya kalo konflik-konflik kepentingan ini kan terjadi karena mereka punya sesuatu di dalam lahan itu, overlap misalnya tadi dengan perusahaan?

**Interviewee 1:** engga. kalo Muara Angke itu justru kita mengkombinasikan. itu lahan belum jadi cool storage, jadi kita juga ga asal ketika mengusulkan usulan. lahan orang dicaplok kan ga gitu. kita lakukan juga pertimbangan lain. jadi cool storage yang sudah ada tidak kita masukkan dalam lokasi penataan kampung. kita tetap mengakomodir itu. nah tetapi kan para stakeholder ini ngincer lahan itu yang direncanakan untuk cool storage. benturannya disitu. mereka belum memiliki, belum jadi. tapi ini kan kayak rebutan. si para pengusaha dengan pemerintah maunya Muara Angke itu dibagi secara horizontal. nah kita mengusulkan dibagi secara vertikal. diparoh gitu loh, supaya sama-sama bisa mengakses ke laut. kalo dibagi secara horizontal, warga dialihkan ke selatan, yang dapet laut hanya pengusaha sedangkan warga ga dapet laut. dengan dibagi secara vertikal maka dua-duanya bisa dapet. jadi ga asal kita rebut hak orang. dari pengalaman kami itu mengkombinasikan berbagai kepentingan itu. jadi kalau ada kepentingan apa ya itu jadi bagian dari negosiasi

**Interviewer:** pernah ga sih mas intervensi dari stakeholder lain merugikan UPC, ada ga mas? atau menyinggung kepentingan UPC juga?

**Interviewee 1:** ya ada. contoh kasus di Lengkong. itu kan perusahaan ya. nah kepentingan kita kan menyatukan warganya ya supaya walaupun pindah tetap masih bisa sama-sama. menyelamatkan komunitas gitu lah. tidak menyelamatkan orang per orang, tapi yang dilakukan perusahaan pendekatan orang per orang. dirayu supaya ngambil kompensasi, akhirnya jebol lah. dari seraturan orang sekarang tinggal 16. nah itu merugikan kepentingan UPC.

**Interviewer:** merugikan dalam hal apa mas?

**Interviewee 1:** itu tadi. mempersulit pengorganisasian, tujuan UPC supaya warga tetap berkomunitas, karena pendekatannya orang per orang. terus contoh lain, dengan warga ya sekarang. kepentingan UPC yang lain itu nilai ya, nilai kebersamaan terkait dengan sertifikat tanah. kalau kami mengusulkan sertifikat tanah itu bersama, tidak boleh tanah itu disertifikatkan individual, supaya ada kontrol bersama dan tanah itu kan barang common. harusnya tidak diperlakukan secara individual dan dikomodifikasikan. harus menjadi barang publik yang dikelola bersama sehingga ketika ada sertifikasi maka harus untuk koperasi gitu. nah tapi kan ada beberapa individu yang ngerasa ngapain gua beli tanah kok kemudian dimiliki koperasi? karena orang berpikir investasi. ketika harga tanah naik, dia jual. nah nilai-nilai itu yang dari UPC, public tadi itu.

**Interviewer:** oh ya mas. kalau menurut mas sendiri sumber-sumber dari konflik itu apa aja sih mas?

**Interviewee 1:** kalau dengan yang luar tadi kan jelas; kuasa, sumber daya, ekonomi. perusahaan pasti ingin menguasai sumber daya dan dia akan lakukan dengan berbagai cara; merayu, mengintimidasi supaya mau melepaskan. itu jelas kepentingannya. nah di dalam kampung pun juga ada yang gitu. ini kan perebutan sumber daya, orang mau menguasai sebanyak-banyaknya. tapi di luar itu, juga ada peran kapitalisme yang sudah mencengkram kuat sampai ke alam pikiran orang per

orang. bahwa tanah, air, itu menjadi barang komoditas. alat untuk mendapat keuntungan. terus orang ditanamkan untuk mencari keuntungan dan keselamatan diri sendiri. tidak secara komunitas. nah itu bagian yang menjadi tantangan dan itu terjadi selama puluhan tahun sehingga wajar kalau itu sudah masuk dalam alam pikiran bahkan kadang-kadang tanpa terasa berlaku demikian; individualis dan cenderung ingin menguasai semua. jadi memang ideologi properti dalam arti kepemilikan itu memang menghancurkan komunalitas. dengan memiliki itu lalu kemudian merasa menyingkirkan yang lain. itu kan lebih dalam ya soal ideologi dan itu udah berlangsung kalau gue engga makan ya gue dimakan orang lain. pemahaman itu udah berat banget. itu berasa banget di perkotaan sehingga orang akan melakukan segala cara untuk bisa menang dalam kompetisi. jadi bukan bekerja sama tapi berkompetisi lah ya.

**Interviewer:** mas sendiri ada suggest ga sih untuk memperbaiki kolaborasi di tengah-tengah kapitalisme?

**Interviewee 1:** yang pertama menetapkan dulu barang-barang publik harus kembali ke publik; tanah, air, ruang bersama dan tidak bisa diprivatisasi supaya tidak menjadi perebutan kembali. yang kedua membuat perencanaan bersama. tidak mungkin kan tanpa perencanaan kalau hanya mengandalkan pada respon spontan, itu sangat bergantung pada individu-individu. orang siapa, rezim siapa yang berkuasa saat itu. jadi harus ada perencanaan jangka panjang yang memang ditetapkan. tapi perencanaan itu tidak harus rigid ya supaya perencanaan itu tetap bisa mengakomodasi aktivitas. perencanaan seperti visi, mimpi, nilai-nilai itu yang kemudian harus ada dan itu mesti dilakukan oleh warga setempat. bukan berarti dilepaskan ke warga, tapi difasilitasi supaya warga setempat bisa melakukan itu. kemudian, adanya pengarusutamaan/penyelamatan kampung setidaknya di dalam satu peta tata ruang yang kemudian ada di aturan pertanahan. minimal 2 itu lah ya (perencanaan dan pertanahan). tapi aturan pertanahan kita itu juga sangat positivistik. celakanya, positivistik itu juga hanya mengandalkan pada dokumen. teknis aja, belum melihat pada keadilan sosial. nah setidaknya ini lah. mungkin masih banyak yang lain.

## 2. Interviewee 2 (NGO - Rujak Center for Urban Studies)

**Interviewer:** gimana Ibu mewakili Rujak melihat eksistensi dan nilai kampung di Jakarta sebagai ibukota?

**Interviewee 2:** ya pada saat melihat eksistensi kampung yang agak sulit adalah memisahkan dengan romantika soal kampung itu sendiri. kita ga bisa memungkiri ada sisi negatif di kampung tapi juga ada sisi positifnya. sisi positifnya jika di kampung itu masih ada kekerabatan, saling tolong satu sama lain, itu kalo dari segi sosial maka disitu ada demokrasi, toleransi dan sebagainya. lalu kalo sisi ekonomi kan banyak sekali dijelaskan Pak Jo ya bahwa dia supply hunian terjangkau, bahwa disitu membuat kita mendapatkan harga barang di pasar dengan lebih terjangkau, termasuk makanan, cemilan. tapi kita juga ga bisa mungkiri seperti layaknya semua kehidupan yang lain, aspek permukiman yang lain pasti selalu ada rent seeker nya. kalo rent seeker di kampung kan macem-macam ya tergantung seberapa parah kondisi suatu kampung. parah dalam artian semakin dia dianggap ilegal, informal, semakin pemerintah ga hadir, maka rent seeker nya semakin besar. mulai dari yang jualan air, yang negatif kan mencegah suatu infrastruktur air bersih air itu ditreat sebagai resource yang sangat langka, akibatnya dia akan coba sebisa mungkin untuk menghalangi infrastruktur bener yang masuk. lalu rent seeker yang lain mungkin yang abusive sama ruang, kayak kos-kosan. itu kan sebenarnya kuat-kuatan power ya. begitu ada lahan kosong, kamu power nya kuat, punya koneksi kuat, maka kamu mendadak bisa bikin kos-kosan besar dengan status tanah yang ga jelas, sehingga bisa membuat orang jadi tuan tanah, yang bikin kesenjangan selalu ada kalo terkait soal begitu. ada juga rent seeker yang terkait lingkungan hidup karena saking formalnya suatu kampung, membuat berbagai kegiatan industri bisa jadi gak diterima kalo dia dalam kampung formal, mulai dari industri yang kecil-kecilan (barang bekas) sampai ada yang dampaknya ke polusi (aki bekas). itu kan terjadinya di kampung. ga mungkin terjadi di kawasan industri Pulo Gadung. jadi selalu ada dualisme berpindah-pindah nilainya itu. tapi saya selalu ngeliatnya asal-muasalnya itu semakin dia informal, ilegal, dianggap buruk, dia malah makin memungkinkan rent seekernya makin besar. sebenarnya bisa diteliti lebih lagi sih, bisa dinilai juga kampung ini ilegal score nya berapa. lalu nanti diliat indeks kekumuhannya oleh standar DKI, jangan-jangan bisa berkorelasi.

**Interviewer:** kalau perannya Ibu sendiri dalam membantu tata kelola kampung ini lebih seperti apa sih?

**Interviewee 2:** ini perannya saya apa perannya Rujak?

**Interviewer:** peran Ibu dalam Rujak

**Interviewee 2:** kalau Rujak sih sebenarnya memposisikan diri dari dulu membantu transisi ekologis. ya sekarang sama sedang melakukan itu. kita pokoknya ga bisa memungkiri bahwa kampung itu ada sisi negatifnya yang sebenarnya bisa dibenahi menjadi lebih ekologis, di saat bersamaan juga membantu mengurangi kesenjangan ekonomi dan sosial secara keseluruhan jadi perannya Rujak seperti yang Angel tau kan berusaha meningkatkan kualitas hidup dan pemukimannya melalui misalnya memastikan hak atas bermukimnya, mau dia Hak Pakai, HPL, HGB di atas HPL, atau apa yang penting hak bermukimnya ada, lalu besar permukimannya juga

kehidupan sosialnya, mau kampung apa selalu tujuannya itu. jadi menjalankan misi Rujak aja.

**Interviewer:** kalau perannya Ibu berarti lebih ke mensinkronkan ya kalo dari pengalamanku sih?

**Interviewee 2:** kalau di saya sendiri, saya berusaha satu, tidak terjebak dalam romantika si kampung. pokoknya kita musti tau dan selalu sadar bahwa ada politik kecil-kecilan kalau ada orang yang berusaha kooptasi, dll. kedua, kadang-kadang dalam perjuangan soal apapun itu, kita tuh selalu ada di 2 sisi yang legal dan ilegal. pokoknya kalau berurusan dengan pemerintah, segala sesuatu tuh harus jelas gitu, formal, legal, ada suratnya, mungkin ada perubahan di Perda-nya. nah itu harus selalu ada, jadi kenapa saya selalu cerewet "suratnya jangan lupa dikirim", karena kalau sampe ada apa-apa di pengadilan yang didebatkan itu tanda terima suratnya, bukan soal kita omongan apa. jadi lebih ke arah sana. ya itu juga sebagai bagian membuat kampung formal di perencanaan dan di dokumen tata ruang.

**Interviewer:** kalau aku boleh ngomongin tata kelola kampung yang selama ini berjalan, Ibu setuju ga sih tata kelola kampung udah berjalan dengan baik? kalau engga, yang menjadi tantangannya tuh apa sih Ibu?

**Interviewee 2:** kayaknya sih tergantung kampungnya ya. kampung yang terorganisir, bahkan kayak Marlina aja ga bisa dibilang terorganisir sekali. bahkan jika ada akar rumput kayak JRMK juga belum bisa dibilang terorganisir. sampe dia skala tertentu, itu pengorganisasian masyarakat di wilayah geografis tertentu itu akan sangat sulit jika dilakukan secara akar rumput. apalagi jika alur informasinya tidak merata, misal gini mungkin Amel, dia di 4 kampung di Muara Angke. jika ada satu informasi yang ga nyampe di bawah koordinator kampungnya, itu bisa menimbulkan kabar burung maupun gosip, pertentangan dari orang lain. jadi semakin banyak aktor dalam suatu kampung, saya melihatnya akan semakin sulit untuk mengorganisirnya. kalo Muara Angke kan aktornya banyak banget, bisa jadi JRMK tidak akur di kampung ini lalu akibatnya Rujak dibawa-bawa. itu sering terjadi begitu, lalu ada yang kalau dia jawara atau tokoh agama. itu selalu ada di tiap kampung dan kerap kali, tokoh kuncinya beda-beda, tapi kadang ada yang sama tapi mereka tersebar. nah itu yang agak menyulitkan. tapi balik lagi sih, kalau saya lihat kampungnya cenderung homogen, dan ga punya masalah kompleks secara agraria, yang masalah kayak gitu ga sering terjadi sih. tapi begitu dia punya masalah mendasar terkait agraria, kependudukan, dianggap ilegal, maka dia semakin kompleks, karena orang-orang itu butuh middle men untuk ngurusin sesuatu dan tampilnya middle men itu ada banyak organisasi yang melakukan itu. nah ini yang membuat kompleks pengorganisasian. tata kelolanya bisa jadi kalau kamu tanya JRMK jawabannya A, ada FPI jawabannya B meskipun di kampung yang sama. itu yang menurut saya kompleks. contohnya di Akuarium. dulu dan sampai sekarang ada beberapa aktor yang berbeda yang kadang kita gatau suaranya kayak gimana. cuma untungnya aja sekarang Bu Yani lagi mendominasi. kalau aktornya terlalu banyak, belum tentu jadinya seperti itu. Bu Yani dan kelompoknya itu mampu merangkul administrasi RT, keagamaan, Pak Ustad, dan tokoh jawaranya. kalau itu tiga-tiganya beda, itu pusing dah. kayak di Gedong Pompa itu bisa beda, RT, orang Mesjid nya sendiri, tokoh pemudanya sendiri. itu yang pusing

**Interviewer:** Tapi Ibu setuju ga tata kelola kampung di Jakarta sudah baik?

**Interviewee 2:** maksudnya tata kelola apa sih?

**Interviewer:** tata kelola itu kalau semisal ada program dari pemerintah juga, bisa juga dari pengorganisasian, kan beda-beda definisinya.

**Interviewee 2:** nah itu balik lagi. semakin dia ga jelas informalitasnya, itu semakin buruk. tapi paling gampangnya gini deh. kemaren saya denger testimoni yang di Marlina. mereka kan dapet CIP kan. CIP itu dateng berupa tenaga dan bahan bangunan. pada saat itu semua dateng, orang-orang pas tau, itu pada diambilin trus mereka bikin sendiri di depan rumahnya karena mereka takut ga dapet. itu kan tata kelolanya kacau banget dan koordinator JRMK tinggal disitu. itu bisa macem-macem sih, bisa karena terlalu banyak tokohnya sampe gatau mau denger siapa, atau ga percaya sama pemerintah karena mereka terlalu sering dibohongin sama pemerintah jadi siapa cepat, siapa yang dapet. jadi susah sih kalau bicara tata kelola. sayangnya yang Rujak tanganin itu kampung-kampung yang problematik semua. Kampung Akuarium udah paling ideal lah. jadi kalau menuju kampung yang tadinya problematik ke kampung hampir ideal itu Akuarium. Gang Lengkong masih lumayan, Kunir juga lumayan tapi karena itu mereka kecil dan cuma 33 KK. tapi begitu isinya 900 KK kayak Marlina.. aduh.

**Interviewer:** menurut Rujak ya, cara yang paling layak untuk tata kelola kampung sendiri bagaimana?

**Interviewee 2:** sebenarnya ga ada yang paling efisien/efektif/paling cepat. tiap kampung itu pasti beda ya. terus terang, saya ga bisa kasih mana yang paling baik. cuma gini, untuk pengorganisasian kampung menurut saya, kalau kampung itu terlalu banyak konflik tokoh-tokoh, akan lebih baik kalau kita sebagai organisasi pendamping berhasil menggaet pemerintah. pemerintah ini bisa sebagai mediator dari semua tokoh-tokoh yang begitu banyak. kalau pemerintah ga ada disitu, maka akan kuat-kuatan terus antara orang-orang ini, saling deceitful, saling mencari pengikut, saling mempengaruhi pemerintah di level bawah (pelaksana) UP3, UPT nya di kampung-kampung supaya pro terhadap tokoh-tokoh kampung. tapi kalau pemerintah nya hadir dalam berupa otorita, mereka ikut apa dan menengahi, itu sebenarnya bisa mempermulus terutama mempermulus proses informasi yang vital, misal rencana tata ruang dan rencana pertanahan. itu beda kalo misalnya disampaikan pemerintah langsung dibandingkan jika disampaikan dengan Rujak, UPC atau JRMK. itu yang paling penting. jadi saya ga percaya kalau masyarakat bisa berdaya tanpa pemerintah. pemerintah nya tetap harus ada karena kalau engga, mereka akan terus fight di bawah, cari mana yang paling kuat dan itu ga sehat.

**Interviewer:** tapi bukan berarti pemerintah nya jadi dominan kan bu?

**Interviewee 2:** jadi pemerintah itu pertama kan mereka harus menyampaikan informasi yang benar. kalau informasinya hanya dikuasai sama sebagian orang, itu kemungkinan terjadinya kolusi. contohnya saat Ciputra mengetahui rencana pembangunan Jalan Panjang, yang akhirnya membuat dia beli tanah di Pondok Indah. contoh lagi Koperasi Air. kan cuma segelintir yang tau kalau PAM mau buka kios air, yaudah yang satu bikin koperasi tandingan, kontak dari belakang PAM yang akhirnya halangin akses Blok Empang untuk dapat air. kalau informasinya disampaikan secara terbuka dan fair oleh pemerintah, itu kan minimal dari trusted source kepada semua. jadinya ga ada ketimpangan informasi yang bisa dimanfaatkan

untuk segelintir. jadi bukan untuk membuat si pemerintah dominan. yang kedua, dia bisa jadi mediator orang yang bersengketa. selama ini Rujak (Amel) berhasil membuat orang-orang Muara Angke yang punya kontrakan 7 rumah sama orang yang cuma tinggal di rumah ukuran 8m2 jadi punya hak yang kurang lebih sama. nah tapi kan itu proses nya lama dan fragile. begitu aktor yang kuat, yang punya kontrakan ga support lagi dengan rencana itu ya bubar jalan. lain kalau misalnya prosesnya itu diaminin sama pemerintah, yuk kita sama-sama duduk bareng. setelah ini kita bikin berita acara ya, proses ini. jadi kalau misalnya proses ini di ujungnya dibuat berita acara dengan lurah atau siapapun, itu aktor-aktor yang kegoda untuk menang sendiri kemungkinan terjadinya akan kecil.

**Interviewer:** tapi kalau dari segi pemerintah, akar rumput, mungkin dari developer juga, apakah institusi-institusi ini sudah bekerja dengan baik untuk menuju tata kelola kampung yang komprehensif?

**Interviewee 2:** kalau yang pemerintah sih belum ya. pemerintah tuh tergantung dengan kemauan masing-masing eksekutornya, misal ada di level suku dinas, kayak CAP yang menjalankan itu Kasudin nya bukan Kadis nya. kalau kasudinnnya ga cuma tender doang lalu kasih ke konsultan atau ke universitas, dia sebenarnya bisa punya pekerjaan yang bermakna dengan si kampung itu. misalnya daripada cuma bikin dokumen tender doang, mending jadi mediator dari persengketaan kampung-kampung ini untuk nyelesain masalah perencanaan tapi kan ga terjadi. nah tapi di satu sisi yang lain. misal walikota jakarta utara ke kecamatan apa sih itu. si camatnya jadi mediator antara si kampung lengkong dengan perusahaan yang bersengketa dengan lengkong untuk cari solusi sama-sama, termasuk negosiasi untuk kompensasi kepada warga kampung. nah posisi pemerintah sebenarnya bisa seperti si camat itu. nah kalau yang perusahaan, sebenarnya Rujak lagi lakukan bareng Jakpro. Jakpro tuh tadinya mau gusur Kampung Bayam, yang mau jadi international stadium itu kan. cuma akhirnya dia mau tuh untuk mengakomodasi Kampung Bayam, cuma tinggal 50-55 KK tapi akhirnya nambah jadi 135 KK. ini kan korporasi jadi dipaksa untuk bernegosiasi langsung dengan kampung. yang dilakukan Rujak melatih si Jakpro supaya gimana caranya pertemuan partisipatif, gimana seharusnya Jakpro memahami mereka dari sisi ini. udah sebulan kita training Jakpro, karena kalo perubahannya cuma di level kampung aja tapi ga di level korporasi dan pemerintah, ya selama ini satu arah terus.

**Interviewer:** kalau yang bikin sulit untuk institusi ini berintegrasi dan bekerja sama itu apa?

**Interviewee 2:** biasanya karena mereka semua menganggap proses partisipasi itu lama.

**Interviewer:** semuanya ini siapa bu?

**Interviewee 2:** terutama yang swasta ya. padahal kalau misalnya mereka ga lakukan itu, pasti diprotes kan, bikin lebih lama lagi. pada akhirnya antara 2 nih kalo ga partisipatif; digusur atau balik lagi ke partisipasi. itu udah abis buang waktu di awal gitu. digusur bikin sakit hati dan masalah berikutnya kan. kalau balik ke partisipasi awal kan iya buang waktu juga jadi ya sebenarnya kesalahpahaman bahwa proses partisipasi itu lama padahal enggak. yang menjadi masalah itu orang takut, kayak Jakpro itu takut sama proses partisipasi di awal karena dia takut

melanggar hukum lah, saling ga percaya, jadi solusinya kalau mau proses partisipasi yang cepet, itu harus sama-sama percaya, buka informasi secara jujur. begitu Jakpro buka informasi secara jujur, itu beda banget. malah warga yang jadi ngeburu-buruin Jakpro.

**Interviewer:** di luar organisasi akar rumput, ada ga sih bu yang paling bisa diajak bicara atau kerjasama?

**Interviewee 2:** ya kalau sesama akar rumput, misalnya Ciliwung Merdeka, atau FKTMB, cuma masing-masing punya interest yang berbeda ya. misalnya CM lebih peduli pada nasib Bukit Duri teritorialnya mereka. kalau FKTMB itu mereka kan dulunya memperjuangkan supaya warga punya KTP. sekarang berhasil lalu juga kontrak politik kayak JRMK juga. tapi setelah itu mereka ga punya visi bersama seperti JRMK dalam melegalisasi kampung-kampung supaya tidak dianggap ilegal. FKTMB ini engga, ke depannya seperti apa setelah punya KTP. ini sih yang agak repot. jadi hubungan baik itu kadang tergantung dari visi ke depannya dia maunya seperti apa. kalo engga ya cuma jadi ngobrol warung kopi doang.

**Interviewer:** tau visinya supaya jalan ya?

**Interviewee 2:** lebih ke apa yang bisa dikerjain bareng-bareng.

**Interviewer:** kalau dari institusi pemerintah yang enak diajak bicara?

**Interviewee 2:** kalau kita lihat sih Bappenas ya. walaupun mereka ngerencanakan perencanaan ya karena sumber perencanaan itu dari Bappenas. kalau KemenPU kerap kali cuma bilang mereka sebagai pelaksana program. perencanaanya tetep Bappenas. jadi kalau kita lihat strategis jangka panjang, yang perlu kerjasama adalah Bappenas. mereka udah ngurusin collective housing, perumahan komunitas gitu juga, mereka udah sepakat kalau rusun bukan solusi dan memberatkan anggaran publik. mereka udah tau kalo rusunisasi itu bahaya, mereka tau manfaat kampung. memang udah ada perubahan sikap juga dari beberapa program nasional, terutama yang terkait soal kampung dan rusun. siapa tau nanti untuk nomenklatur di APBD, rusunawa bukan jadi prioritas lagi untuk penyelenggaraan pemenuhan hunian layak.

**Interviewer:** kalo yang rada unik diajak kerjasama? let's say Dinas Perumahan?

**Interviewee 2:** memang dari dulu si Dinas Perumahan punya keengganan untuk melakukan sesuatu yang progresif. dia bisa kerjasama dengan universitas tapi dia cenderung enggan kerjasama dengan Rujak, UPC, JRMK, bahkan dengan Rujak yang sudah punya persyaratan administrasi. tapi dengan adanya Akuarium sebagai pendobrak yang menyalahi semua pakemnya Dinas Perumahan, itu ngebuka jalan. tapi prosesnya masih sangat administratif dan otoritatif dari gubernur. jadi untuk mereformasi Dinas Perumahan itu terlalu sulit, bahkan yang dulu-dulunya orang pensiunan situ masih berkepentingan, mulai dari yang menang tender, atau yang berdiam di dewan tertentu. mau ga mau, kita perlu buat badan di luar itu sebagai otoritas/pelaksana, makanya mulai mau dibuat kayak CODI, sudah mulai ada studinya, sampai gubernur ngeluarin instruksi untuk segera bikin. bayangan saya tuh akan seperti Transjakarta, mungkin minimal mengurangi hal-hal bermasalah di Dinas Perumahan tadi, sama seperti tata ruang.



**Interviewer:** terlalu birokratis ya bu?

**Interviewee 2:** birokratis sih ga masalah ya, tapi warisan yang buruk-buruk itu masih ada dalam rupa pensiunan, praktek lama, dll. kadang untuk lepasannya susah. bikin kayak Transjakarta yang dikelola murni secara profesional di luar itu. bukan privatisasi ya, tetep aja anggarannya dari si APBD dan tetep ngikutin kaidahnya pemerintah. secara kebijakannya Jakarta tapi Transjakarta yang melaksanakan.

**Interviewer:** Ibu setuju ga sih pendekatan Rujak itu menyengol pemangku kepentingan lain?

**Interviewee 2:** oh iya. iya itu, pasti

**Interviewer:** menyinggungnya secara gimana tuh?

**Interviewee 2:** kayak misalnya membentuk badan yang tadi ya yang kayak CODI. itu otomatis mengurangi konsultan-konsultan ga jelas yang ikut tender di Dinas Perumahan. karena nanti kan skema perbaikan kampung dilaksanakan mirip CODI, yang di dalamnya ada hibah yang diberikan, arsiteknya juga disediakan dan agrariannya dibenerin disitu semua. ini kan pasti nyengol kepentingan konsultan-konsultan tadi. kedua, kalau peran si badannya kuat, mungkin bisa nyinggung universitas yang biasa bikin proyek-proyek di bawah konsultan itu. konsultan itu kan setelah dapet tender, dia ngebagi lagi yang biasanya ke universitas. saya merasa mungkin itu salah juga ngambil lahannya dosen-dosen. kadang-kadang kalau kita terlalu besar, namanya sering disebut gubernur, itu juga ngerugiin Rujak karena bikin sirik orang. ada orang-orang yang ga seneng nama Rujak terlalu sering disebut gubernur. dimana-mana yang hegemoni akan membawa kontra juga

**Interviewer:** kalau sampai men-trigger konflik pernah ga?

**Interviewee 2:** mungkin ada tapi kadang, pertama kita ga tau atau terjadi di luar pengetahuan kita. kadang kita ga peduli juga. misal secara de facto, kita udah jadi pendamping di Muara Baru, contohnya Gedong Pompa. trus ada universitas lain yang bikin MoU dengan Pemprov DKI di kampung itu tapi dia minta datanya ke kita. jadi kayak gitu loh. ada juga waktu itu pernah mau bikin rusun hybrid waktu Sandiaga Uno jadi wagub. ada kelompok CSR dari Belanda yang sebenarnya menunggangi reklamasi (NCICD), dia datang ke Jakarta bareng sama Slum Dwellers Initiative (SDI), lalu bikin pemetaan di Muara Baru dan karena inisiatif itu diaminin sama wagub dan dibilang mau dibuat rusun hybrid, otomatis kan ada sengketa tanah ya. gara-gara rencana itu, tiba-tiba banyak muncul ahli waris ngeklaim tanah-tanah di Marlina yang lalu bersengketa dengan warga. sebelumnya karena si SDI ini tau-tau bikin pemetaan dan bikin masalah. akhirnya kita kirim email protes ke SDI itu, pertama lu engga koordinasi dengan JRMK, UPC soal ini. lu mau aja ditunggangin sama proyek reklamasi. nah yang parahnya, data pemetaannya ga dikasih ke warga. trus datanya kita minta, dia bilang minta ke warga tapi dia ga kasih tau warganya yang mana. menurut saya itu yang jadi konflik ya. ga masalah mereka mau pemetaan tapi kegiatan mereka berujung pada konflik tanah yang justru membuat kisruh pengorganisasian di Marlina. yang begitu-begitu bikin kerja kita di Marlina makin susah, tambah konflik tanah yang tadinya ga ada dan efeknya sampe sekarang. si ahli waris yang klaim-klaim tanah warga ini kan sempet mempengaruhi warga, sempet daftar hadir dianggap persetujuan, dsb.

**Interviewer:** kalau konfliknya sama pemerintah sendiri gimana sih bu?

**Interviewee 2:** ya banyak ya, terutama sama Dinas Perumahan terkait desain ya. omongan mereka tuh ga bisa dipegang, makanya sama mereka tuh musti ada surat-menyurat tertulisnya, apapun. ya itu karena ga ada informasi yang jelas ya, pokoknya mereka ga niat untuk kasih informasi yang jelas untuk apapun. mereka selalu beranggapan warga pasti protes padahal mereka protes nya kalau ga dikasih info yang jelas.

**Interviewer:** kalau konflik sama developer gitu pernah ga?

**Interviewee 2:** nanti kita liat ya yang bener-bener developer kan Jakpro ya, yang Kampung Bayam. tapi ada kemungkinan nasib Kampung Bayam ini lebih baik dibandingkan yang lain. karena ada Rujak sebagai pendamping Jakpro dan Kampung Bayam didampingi UPC dan JRMK. kita dampingin Jakpro supaya mereka ga melenceng/dzolim, dikasih tau kenapa warga begini, kamu harus ajak warganya, ada caranya begini, dsb. jadi kita kasih tau resepnya. sempet 2 tahun mereka berantem-berantem mulu sama Kampung Bayam sama tokoh utamanya sampe ga mau ketemuan, nah sekarang udah mendingan. nah di Dinas Perumahan kan ga ada yang ngedampingi, jadi ga ada reformasi di Dinas Perumahannya.

**Interviewer:** tapi so far belum pernah ada konflik sama developer gitu ya bu?

**Interviewee 2** ada sih tapi yang konflik itu warga dampingan kita. kita dampingin warganya karena warganya yang konflik, misalnya kasih saran ke warga bahwa developernya melanggar ini lalu ada SIPPT buat PIM 3,4,5, kita kasih amunisi ke warga supaya mereka tau gimana bersikap, bersurat, protes, kita saranin mereka kirim surat ke gubernur. jadi kita ga konflik sama developer karena buat apa juga ya, sebaiknya yang berkonflik kan yang kena dampak ya. bahkan yang konflik reklamasi itu bukan Rujak tapi kita kasih informasi-informasi soal reklamasi.

**Interviewer:** lebih ke assist warga ya bu?

**Interviewee 2:** iya assist mereka dengan pengetahuan, strategi, bacaan-bacaan.

**Interviewer:** tapi kalo Rujak sendiri pernah terdampak dari intervensi-intervensi di luar itu ga sih bu?

**Interviewee 2:** ya terutama karena politik elektoral DKI ya, jadi dikira yang engga-engga. itu paling menjengkelkan dari semua itu. ini kan konflik yang ga berkaitan dengan Rujak. yang pemilihan mereka berdua, kenapa kita yang kena. yang lain sih rasanya ga ada. itu yang paling besar sih dampaknya.

**Interviewer:** misalnya ada yang mau mengintervensi kampung dampingan Rujak, itu pernah sampai bikin Rujak risih?

**Interviewee 2:** paling universitas yang punya MoU sama DKI ngedampingi Gedong Pompa tapi ga bilang-bilang Rujak, cuma minta data aja. tapi buat Rujak sendiri sih karena kita ga teritorial seperti JRMK, ya silahkan aja kalau mau ngulangin proses yang ada di Gedong Pompa. tapi ada misalnya Akuarium. itu kan ada caleg, Dinas Perumahan berusaha mengklaim desain sesuatu disana. yang paling

besar tuh waktu pilgub yang juga barengan dengan pemilihan DPRD. itu keponakannya Prabowo bawa desain juga yang akhirnya bikin masalah karena ada kedekatan antara Gerindra dengan Kampung Akuarium karena yang bantu mereka waktu tergusur, ngasih tenda, itu kan Prabowo jadi ada rasa ga enak. itu gubernur terpilih kan karena Gerindra juga. jadi keponakannya Prabowo bisa potong compass dari gubernur untuk presentasi desain, ga pake bilang ke warga juga. itu sempet bikin proses desain akuarium lama sampai 6 bulan. begitu selesai pilpres, ga kepilih kan. akhirnya ilang aja tuh. sampai Dinas Perumahan bikin 3 alternatif desain, yang pertama yang dibuat warga dengan Rujak, satu nya lagi yang dari caleg itu (keponakannya Prabowo), ketiga dari proses CAP pemerintah yang desainnya kayak country house. kita tau sendiri mana yang bener-bener serius, mana yang didampingin, tanpa ngarepin kepilih apa-apa, ya akhirnya akan keluar sendiri.

**Interviewer:** misal Rujak punya inisiatif, biasanya yang bikin sulit diimplementasi tuh apa sih?

**Interviewee 2:** tergantung kampungnya ya. kalau yang solid kayak Kampung Akuarium itu bisa cenderung mudah. tapi buat yang susah kayak Kampung Rawa, kalo JRMK nya ga tertarik bisa ga ada meeting untuk Kampung Rawa itu, bisa ga jalan. atau soal Tanah Timbul, udah kita undang JRMK. padahal Tanah Timbul itu untuk kepentingan mereka bersama. tapi JRMK ga ngeliat potensi itu, padahal mereka selalu ribut soal tanah. yaudah kalo merekanya ga punya visi yang sama mungkin susah. tapi mungkin beda ya, kalo Rujak mungkin ga punya attachment sama lokasi, kita bisa ngeliat potensi-potensi kan, tapi buat JRMK pendekatannya ngeliat kampung yang kecil-kecil. ya ga salah juga dan mungkin mereka ga punya energi berlebih untuk ngeklaim itu, balik lagi karena teritorialitas itu. Bu Yani cuma peduli sama Akuarium, Bu Eni sama Marlina.

**Interviewer:** yang jadi sumber-sumber konflik di tata kelola kampung gimana sih menurut Rujak?

**Interviewee 2:** kayaknya tadi udah deh, yang semakin informal, semakin banyak middle men and women disitu, itu yang bikin konflik.

**Interviewer:** itu dari kampung kan. mungkin source of conflict yang dari Rujak sama institusi mungkin?

**Interviewee 2:** misalnya?

**Interviewer:** kalo kayak yang aku interview ke yang lain, mereka jawab source of conflict nya karena beda persepsi, kepentingan sendiri-sendiri. kalo dari Ibu sendiri gimana?

**Interviewee 2:** misalnya kayak Dinas Perumahan. mereka ngelakuin sesuatu bukan karena beda persepsi atau apa tapi dia tuh punya KPI yang ditentukan kayak melaksanakan CIP di berapa kampung. tapi masalah pelaksanaan CIP ini ga peduli caranya gimana. soal kualitasnya bagus apa engga, itu lain soal. yang penting dilaksanakan. misalnya juga kayak pembuatan draft modul Akuarium. meskipun mereka udah tau secara de facto kalo Rujak lagi bikin, dan karena itu ga ada di KPI nya mereka, mereka ga bikin-bikin, ga tergerak untuk bikin sampe gubernur memerintahkan untuk bikin. jadi mereka tidak ada keinginan untuk berbuat lebih.

begitu tidak ada di KPI atau di perintah kerja, dia ga akan jalankan. ya itu bisa karena birokrasi ya dan itu menghambat inovasi. lain kalo kita bicara soal perencanaan, misalnya Bappeda atau Bappenas, nah mereka masih memungkinkan untuk ruang-ruang inovasi itu. jadi memang scope nya harus dibedain. pada saat kita ngomong sama si Dinas Perumahan, kita mesti formal, ya kita suratin. lain kalo kita ngomong sama Bappenas dan Bappeda. nah yang sulitnya, kebijakan perumahan DKI itu ga sinkron sama di Bappeda. sayangnya karena si Bappeda ga bikin gimana cara mencapai ke tujuan bersama. jadi ya tetep jatuhnya ke Dinas Perumahan lagi.

### **3. Interviewee 3 (Government of Jakarta - Jakarta Housing Agency (Dinas Perumahan))**

**Interviewer:** Dinas Perumahan sendiri kalau melihat keberadaan kampung di Jakarta seperti apa ya?

**Interviewee 3:** Sebenarnya untuk definisi kampung dalam peraturan-peraturan memang belum ada ya seperti di RDTR. Bahasa "kampung" mungkin bahasa sehari-hari ya tapi kami mengenalnya justru sebagai permukiman. Kalau kata "kampung" sendiri dalam tata kelola pemerintahan memang belum masuk. Kelihatannya yang akan kita dorong itu definisi kampung kota seperti apa. Tapi ini sedang berupaya sih. jadi kalau kampung itu yang seperti kita ketahui, baik yang di daerah maupun yang di kota Jakarta rasa-rasanya sih harusnya antar individu itu lebih akrab secara sosial. Pastinya lingkungan juga harus memenuhi persyaratan ya, misalnya sarana/prasarana, kesehatan, dsb. kalau itu sudah pasti mengikuti peraturan permukiman tapi kalau konotasinya dalam "kampung", harusnya secara sosial dia lebih baik lah dibanding kalau kita masuk ke kompleks, Rasa individunya terasa masing-masing.

**Interviewer:** berarti itu melihat kampung ini positif ya bu secara sosial? oke. kalau ibu mendeskripsikan peran ibu di dinas perumahan terkait tata kelola kampung, ini bisa dijelaskan sedikit?

**Interviewee 3:** sebenarnya sih gini ya, kalo Dinas Perumahan itu untuk penanganan perumahan/permukiman ya. kalau kampung kayaknya belum menjurus kesana secara tata kelola. tidak hanya bidang permukiman saja sih, berkaitan ya semuanya. kami harus berkaitan dengan teman-teman RPM (Regulasi dan Pelayanan Masyarakat), malah justru kelihatan ada 2 penanganan terkait kampung. di samping fisiknya, ada sosialnya yang berkaitan dengan masyarakat. lebih ke pendampingan masyarakat dan itu dilakukan oleh RPM. kalau kami sebenarnya lebih ke fisik lingkungan. kemudian juga penanganan perumahan/permukiman tidak hanya di dinas perumahan saja, tapi sebenarnya banyak SKPD yang terlibat, mencakup fisik, sosial dan ekonomi yang harus kami benahi bersama, misalnya bersama dinas sosial, UMKM, dinas PPAP (perempuan dan anak). saya belum bisa menyebutkan kampung karena secara institusi kami belum begitu familiar dengan kampung. nanti kalau sudah ada peraturannya. sekarang ini baru mau kami coba di beberapa rusun yang partisipatif ya (rusun Kampung Akuarium).

**Interviewer:** ibu setuju ga sih bu tata kelola kampung ini sudah berjalan dengan baik? kalau belum, apa yang masih menjadi tantangannya?

**Interviewee 3:** kalau sudah baik, rasa-rasanya sih pasti ada kekurangannya ya. kalau sudah baik, malah ga ada jalan untuk memperbaiki. banyak sekali sih yang harus kami benahi terkait penanganan kampung, mulai dari masalah asetnya, masalah alas haknya dan itu juga tidak hanya bisa diselesaikan di pemerintah daerah, tapi juga pemerintah pusat. mungkin regulasi-regulasi yang bisa mengarah ke percepatan itu yang harus dibenahi biar penanganannya cepat dan jelas.

**Interviewer:** contoh regulasi yang mempercepat itu bisa disebutkan ga sih bu?

**Interviewee 3:** ya sekarang gini. terkait dengan aset ya, untuk aset pempus dan pemda, koordinasinya ga semudah yang kita kira gitu. contoh, untuk aset penanganan rusunawa jatinegara barat. alas hak tanahnya itu punya pemerintah daerah, kemudian fisik bangunannya pemerintah pusat, ngurus asetnya aja belum selesai sampai sekarang. itu masih salah satu kendala juga. kedua, ketika masyarakat menempati aset pemerintah daerah, atau tanah negara yang dikelola pemerintah daerah, prosesnya ya lebih mudah dibandingkan dengan aset negara yang dikelola oleh pemerintah pusat karena beda" persepsi dan pemanfaatan. mungkin bisa aja aset milik pempus akan dimanfaatkan karena program mereka tapi di lapangan digunakan oleh masyarakat. banyak banget kan yang kayak gitu. contohnya PT KAI punya pemerintah pusat. kita ga bisa langsung minta ke KAI untuk hibahkan tanahnya ke masyarakat karena masyarakat sudah menempati 20-30 tahun. kan tidak sesederhana itu. pasti PT KAI punya kebijakan yang rigid juga disana.

**Interviewer:** kalau ibu melihatnya yang masih menjadi tantangan di dalam Dinas Perumahan terkait tata kelola kampung sendiri bagaimana? mungkin dari regulasi yang dikeluarkan Dinas Perumahan?

**Interviewee 3:** yang paling susah itu terkait dengan aset. kalo asetnya sudah jelas, ngebangun apapun bisa.

**Interviewer:** kalau dari instansi ibu sendiri, ada ga sih bu yang masih menyulitkan untuk tata kelola kampung?

**Interviewee 3:** selama ini sebelum aturannya berubah, kita ngikutin aturan yang ada. kalo pun bisa itu diubah, kan tidak semerta merta berjalannya paralel. aturannya dulu diubah baru kita bisa eksekusi. itu lah pemerintah. kalo pemerintah kan mutlak, harus aturan dulu dibenahi, kalau aturannya dirasa kurang pas, ya aturannya diperbaiki dulu baru setelah itu bisa kita eksekusi.

**Interviewer:** kalau Dinas Perumahan punya program/kebijakan, yang bikin sulit untuk diimplementasi selain masalah aset tadi itu apa ya bu?

**Interviewee 3:** jadi peruntukkan juga sangat penting, RDTR, RTRW. ketika kita membangun di lahan yang tidak sesuai RDTR/RTRW kan juga berarti kita menyalahi aturan karena RDTR/RTRW adalah Perda. jadi selain aset, ada rencana tata ruang. itu pun menjadi hal yang tidak sesederhana yang kita kira.

**Interviewer:** ibu sendiri setuju ga instansi/organisasi (NGO, pemerintah, swasta) sudah bekerja sama dengan baik dalam tata kelola kampung?

**Interviewee 3:** mungkin dengan NGO baru tahun ini kami lakukan seperti yang di Kp Akuarium, di Kunir, Bukit Duri. menurut saya sih ga ada masalah, sepanjang kita saling mem-back up. ketika program/rencananya bagus, tapi kalau tidak sesuai dengan aturan kan itu jadi masalah di kemudian hari. nah hal-hal kayak gini juga harus disadari bersama. prinsipnya pemerintah bisa bangun apa aja ketika aturannya sudah sesuai dengan apa yang kita eksekusikan. terkait dengan kerjasama dengan swasta atau NGO, kita memang sangat welcome sekali. yang penting prinsipnya untuk kebaikan dan sesuai aturan karena kita PNS harus ikut aturan. kalau engga, kita nya yang bakal bermasalah di kemudian hari.

**Interviewer:** kalau institusi lain punya inisiatif lain tapi ini belum diregulasi dengan perundangan yang ada, itu bagaimana sih proses negosiasinya?

**Interviewee 3:** kalau ada sesuatu hal yang baru, artinya harus ada ketetapan bahwa ini sebagai pilot project. ada pimpinan di atas yang bisa menentukan ini pilot project. pilot project kan harusnya memperbaiki apa yang sudah ada. nah itu yang harus kita lakukan tapi ini belum terjadi. ketika ide atau program itu tidak sesuai, akhirnya jadi mental-mental lagi. namanya juga pilot project, pasti kan semua hal yang baru. artinya kita semua yang melaksanakan, terutama kami sebagai ASN, tidak ada ketakutan (jika pemimpinya menetapkan kalau ini pilot project), ya semacam SK Gubernur lah.

**Interviewer:** jadi kalau suatu program dijadikan pilot project, berarti bisa "melawan" aturan-aturan yang sudah ada ya bu?

**Interviewee 3:** iya itu menurut saya ya.

**Interviewer:** ini saya liatnya luas ya bu. menurut ibu, apa yang menyulitkan institusi/organisasi (baik pemerintah/non pemerintah) untuk berkoordinasi satu sama lain?

**Interviewee 3:** misalnya gini kak. ada salah satu NGO, mungkin disana untuk NGO hanya mementingkan komunitas ini saja. tapi kami sebagai pemerintah kan tidak bicara soal komunitas ini saja tapi juga lingkungan di komunitas tersebut, lebih luas lagi ke masyarakat di luar sana. jadi dari pemerintah bagaimana menetapkan ini sebagai kebijakan yang tidak hanya dilihat dari satu golongan tapi harus semuanya. ini yang agak berbeda mungkin ya.

**Interviewer:** kalau berkoordinasi dengan swasta ada kesulitan ga sih bu?

**Interviewee 3:** selama ini kita bekerja sama dengan swasta udah sering banget. untuk pihak ketiga juga dengan swasta dan ga ada masalah dengan hal tersebut. ketika ada swasta yang ingin memberikan CSR atau bantuan dana atau ketika mereka ingin melaksanakan kewajibannya sebagai pengembang, kita ga ada masalah, sepanjang sesuai dengan aturan yang berlaku.

**Interviewer:** lalu bagaimana koordinasi dengan pemerintah pusat yang programnya overlap dengan program di bawah Dinas Perumahan? misalnya dengan program KOTAKU dengan CAP/CIP.

**Interviewee 3:** kalau overlap sih ga mungkin karena kami sama-sama pemerintah dan kami selalu berkoordinasi dengan hal tersebut, misalnya terkait dengan lokasi mana yang dikerjakan oleh KOTAKU kemudian mana yang dikerjakan oleh pemprov DKI Jakarta. jadi ga mungkin overlapping, pasti ada pembagian kewenangan. kalau pun overlapping, pasti kena di BPK. kemudian terkait dengan koordinasi, ya memang yang dirasakan selama ini cukup sulit karena mungkin kami sama-sama sibuk dengan urusan masing-masing. kadang jadinya menomorduakan koordinasi.

**Interviewer:** menomorduakan maksudnya gimana bu?

**Interviewee 3:** ketika pemerintah pusat punya program, pasti mereka memprioritaskan program mereka. kemudian kami di pemda pasti juga punya program yang kami prioritaskan dulu. jadi akhirnya koordinasi keliatannya agak susah, menyamakan prioritas. lalu koordinasi kenapa sulit? kalau menurut saya sih karena memang keterbatasan SDM. bolak-balik lagi masalahnya SDM. kita nih PNS juga masih sangat-sangat kurang. misalnya Mbak Qabila, dia bisa nanganin yang kadang di pemerintah pusat, dsb. jadi ga ada yang in charge khusus. harusnya seperti itu.

**Interviewer:** ada ga sih selain koordinasi tadi, yang menimbulkan konflik-konflik kepentingan?

**Interviewee 3:** kalau konflik yang vulgar banget sih engga ya. begitu ada yang keliatan kurang pas, berarti ada yang pelaksanaannya ditunda. kalau ada yang ga sesuai aturan juga paling kita alihkan pekerjaan. ga sampe berkonflik yang terlalu parah.

**Interviewer:** pernah ga sih bu intervensi dari stakeholder lain menyinggung domainnya Dinas Perumahan? mungkin dari organisasi mana yang ga setuju dengan pendekatan Dinas Perumahan, trus itu sampe mengganggu, mungkin?

**Interviewee 3:** kayaknya selama ini ga ada deh. contohnya kayak gimana kak?

**Interviewer:** misalnya ada satu organisasi, dia juga punya inisiatif program dari organisasinya dia terhadap kampung, trus ini agak melanggar aturan apa gimana, itu biasanya seperti apa sih penyelesaiannya?

**Interviewee 3:** belum pernah sih.

**Interviewer:** kalau dalam proses koordinasi tadi, mungkin pernah memicu "wah kayaknya agak sulit nih kerjasama dengan organisasi ini"?

**Interviewee 3:** kalopun agak susah, mungkin terkait dengan aturan gitu ya. tapi selama ini sih kalo kita komunikasikan terkait dengan aturannya apa dan maunya seperti apa, ya pasti mereka akan mengerti. pasti yang namanya aturan harus kita taati bersama. belum ada sih kak. kami pun dengan Rujak kadang beda pendapat, tapi setelah diskusikan bareng-bareng, nanti akhirnya ada titik temu juga. misalnya pada saat mendiskusikan desain, awalnya jarak antar blok itu tidak memikirkan/memperhitungkan mitigasi kendaraan kebakaran, namun di aturan itu harus ada. awalnya memang saling berpendapat dari teman-teman, "wah nanti kalau begini, nanti lahan hijaunya berkurang atau seperti itu". tapi setelah didiskusikan bersama dengan Dinas Damkar yang pastinya expert disana, ya akhirnya ada jalan keluarnya juga. jadi implementasi di lapangan selalu kita sesuaikan dengan aturan yang ada.

**Interviewer:** bisa dibilang ga sih bu kadang aturan ini yang mengurangi fleksibilitas?

**Interviewee 3:** engga sih. kalopun kita merasa aturan tersebut tidak berjalan dengan lancar, pasti akan dievaluasi, kenapa seperti ini. akhirnya nanti kita



sesuaikan baiknya seperti apa dengan instansi terkait. kalau disini kan ada biro hukum, inspektorat, dsb.

**Interviewer:** kalau menurut Dinas Perumahan, mungkin ada ga sih bu cara-cara yang layak untuk tata kelola kampung sendiri?

**Interviewee 3:** menurut saya sendiri sekarang lebih baik lah, semakin hari semakin baik. yang dulunya mungkin semua perencanaan sifatnya top-down, sekarang kita belajar dan mengimplementasi usulan dari bawah. masyarakat butuhnya seperti apa, kemudian kami akomodir disesuaikan dengan aturan. jika aturannya memungkinkan, ayo kita teruskan. tapi ketika aturan itu ga ada yang dukung, kita ubah aturannya jika memang ada kesempatan baru diimplementasikan. jadi menurut saya sih, cukup memadai sih dalam pelaksanaannya ya.

**Interviewer:** pokoknya Dinas Perumahan mengakomodir aja dari bawah ide-idenya, trus diliat aturannya. mungkin seperti itu ya kalau saya boleh ringkaskan.

**Interviewee 3:** Iya betul karena kami sebagai ASN memang harus taat aturan kak. namun ketika aturan itu kurang sesuai, ya bisa nanti kita usulkan revisinya. misalnya rdtr itu kan aturannya pake perda, namun tiap setahun sekali atau 5 tahun sekali, itu akan ada evaluasinya, apakah memang masih sesuai dengan kondisi yang sekarang. kalau ada yang tidak sesuai, mana yang harus direvisi. jadi semua aturan boleh dievaluasi.

#### **4. Interviewee 4 (National Government - Ministry of General Works and Public Housing)**

**Interviewee 4:** saya merepresentasikan kementerian, jadi saya bicaranya dari kebijakan dulu, apa aja kebijakan yang ada lalu program-program kita apa saja lalu nanti baru masuk ke penanganan-penanganan yang ada di kampung-kampung kota. kita bicara dulu dengan aspek normatif. apa saja aturan dan regulasi yang ada terkait dengan penanganan permukiman kumuh. kampung kota ini dalam artian kampung-kampung yang padat, dari sisi kepadatan bangunan sangat tinggi, dari sisi sarana dan prasarana memerlukan peningkatan kualitas sehingga definisi ini di peraturan perundangan adalah perumahan dan permukiman kumuh. kita berangkat dari UUD 1945, Pasal 28H ada kewajiban negara untuk memberikan hak hidup sejahtera bagi seluruh masyarakat, di dalamnya termasuk papan (rumah yang layak). rumah yang layak tentu bicara sarpras di dalamnya (air minum, sanitasi) itu adalah hak dari setiap warga negara karena itu diturunkan kepada dari UU No 1 Tahun 2011, lalu ke UU PKP, itu ada amanah terkait dengan bahwa kita harus melakukan pencegahan dan peningkatan kualitas permukiman kumuh lalu didetailkan lagi ke PP No. 14 Tahun 2016 tentang penyelenggaraan kawasan perumahan dan permukiman, ada amanah bahwa setiap pemerintah daerah harus bisa menjaga agar lokasi-lokasi di kawasan permukiman di setiap kabupaten kota itu tidak serta merta mudah berubah menjadi permukiman kumuh dan jika memang ada lokasi-lokasi kawasan yang telah menjadi kumuh maka harus ditingkatkan kualitasnya karena tugas kita sebagai negara. lalu amanah dari PP 14/2016 ada turunannya Permen PUPR 14/2018, ini tentang pencegahan perumahan dan permukiman kumuh yang di dalamnya ada aturan-aturannya, indikator, dsb. ini dasar-dasarnya sehingga ketika kita mengatakan suatu kawasan permukiman itu padat dan bermasalah maka yang harus kita lakukan apa, tata cara seperti apa, ini sudah diatur pedoman-pedoman ini. untuk mendefinisikan kampung, apakah dia bagian dari satu lingkungan atau kumpulan hunian atau kawasan permukiman. karena nanti ketika definisinya seperti apa, maka sarprasnya akan beda. misalnya standard permukiman, berarti harus ada apa, di lingkungan hunian harus ada apa, dsb. jadi didefinisikan dulu kampung kota dan kalau dibidang bermasalah, bermasalahnya karena apa. pasti kan karena PSU nya kurang; sanitasi, air minum, fasilitas (definisikan dulu lalu penanganannya seperti apa). selanjutnya, konsep kita itu kan 2; pencegahan dan peningkatan kualitas. dari segi pencegahan (preventif), secara kebijakan kita sudah berusaha mencegah dengan mengecek perizinan, standar teknis bangunan, kelaikan fungsinya, trus kita juga melatih, membimbing masyarakat. nah apakah sudah berjalan pencegahan ini? teman-teman di lapangan kan harus ditanyakan, apakah benar-bener bisa dicegah nanti bisa keluar rekomendasinya bahwa pencegahan itu tidak optimal karena tidak berjalan dengan rutin. kalau peningkatan kualitas (kuratif) kan yang udah terjadi. setelah penyakitnya ada, baru kita tentukan kualitasnya. kita lakukan dengan nomor 2 itu, kalau masalahnya sedikit ya hanya dipugar, kalau berat seperti di Kampung Akuarium itu diremajakan, permukiman kembali seperti yang kita pindahkan ke rusun yang pinggir Sungai Ciliwung karena kan lokasinya illegal settlement. kalau di Jakarta kan rata-rata di tepi air dan pusat kota (dataran rendah). bicara soal KOTAKU, ini kan kegiatan pemberdayaan bahwa penataan kampung itu tidak bisa hanya kita pemerintah yang melaksanakan karena penataan kampung harus self-awareness dari masyarakat. mereka harus paham bahwa hidup bersih dan sehat adalah hal yang utama, mereka harus ngerti ketika drainase depan rumahnya mampet karena sampah, mereka harus gotong royong membersihkan. itu sebenarnya esensi dari kegiatan penataan kampung ini

dari tahun 1974-2021 berproses pada prinsipnya ingin melakukan penguatan dari kelembagaan di masyarakat karena kampung kita ini sangat banyak contoh di Jakarta. itu (kampung) sangat banyak sehingga kita sebagai pemerintah tidak mungkin melakukan pengawasan di kampung-kampung tersebut jadi inti dari kegiatan penataan kampung adalah kegiatan/penguatan kelembagaan di masyarakat. fisiknya itu hanya stimulan, jadi fisik bukan output sebenarnya. jadi penguatan kelembagaan adalah output utamanya. fisik itu hanya stimulan sebagai bagian dari reward untuk penguatan kelembagaan. karena dari sisi SDM, tentu kita tidak bisa mengawasi kampung-kampung ini supaya terjadi peningkatan kualitas, kita tidak seimbang lah antara jumlah kampung di Jakarta dengan kita. dari sisi anggaran juga tidak mungkin langsung kita tangani kalau ada masalah kecil di masyarakat yang belum berdaya dengan anggaran pemerintah itu sangat berat. jadi harapannya dari 1974, KIP sampai ke sekarang KOTAKU masyarakat bisa berdaya. sebenarnya itu esensi dari penanganan kampung-kampung kota kita. nah yang kita tekankan ini lebih ke siklus, bagaimana pada saat persiapan temen-temen itu mampu mengidentifikasi permasalahan di lapangan. itu nomor 1 sosialisasi, nomor 2 pembentuk tim inti perencanaan (TIPP) untuk melakukan perencanaan, mengidentifikasi masalah di lapangan. jadi semisal di kampung ada masalah genangan, tim ini harus mampu mengidentifikasi (ini kenapa kok ada genangan). masyarakat harus mampu mengidentifikasi permasalahannya sendiri. setelah itu, mereka melakukan perencanaan. saat ini karena kita ada anggaran, maka dari apa yang direncanakan bisa kita biayai dari pemerintah., nomor 3 pelaksanaan. namun kalau sudah selesai dari kita, kita tidak lagi punya anggaran untuk membiayai, mereka sudah punya kemampuan untuk mempersiapkan, membuat rencana sedangkan nanti dari anggaran bisa beragam, apakah dari hibah, CSR, dsb. intinya mereka sudah bisa mencari penganggaran untuk membiayai penanganan kampungnya sendiri. lalu poin 4 ini yang utama; keberlanjutan. jadi kita dari pemerintah berharap sangat keberlanjutan ada kelompok namanya KPP (Kelompok Pemanfaat Pemelihara), ini yang settle di masyarakat sehingga apapun yang sudah selesai dibangun bisa dibangun betul-betul dijaga dan dirawat. siklus ini yang paling utama, jadi memintarkan masyarakat kampung-kampung kota supaya mereka berdaya karena dari SDM kita ga sanggup, dari sisi anggaran juga kita ga sanggup kalo terus-terusan kita jaga kampung ini supaya infrastruktur dasarnya bagus semua. di Jakarta pun yang selalu disampaikan Pak Anies itu kan CAP yang ditekankan, bahwa apapun itu CAP, kita ga bisa handle semua masalah di kampung kalo bukan masyarakatnya sendiri yang kuat.

**Interviewer:** berarti ini orientasinya lebih ke fisik ya bu?

**Interviewee 4:** sebenarnya kalau mengidentifikasi itu karena kita bicara soal permasalahan, paling mudah dilihat pertama kan dari fisik. tapi kalau dibuka di Permen 14/2018, di dalamnya ada juga kriteria sosial ekonomi masyarakat jadi nanti dimerge antara identifikasi PSU yang bermasalah digabung dengan sosial-ekonomi dan juga lahan. jadi termasuk legalitas lahan.

**Interviewer:** kalau ibu sendiri dengan kapasitas ibu untuk penanganan permukiman kumuh, ibu mendeskripsikan peran ibu seperti apa sih?

**Interviewee 4:** jadi sesuai dengan kewenangan pemerintah pusat, ada pembagian wewenang antara pemerintah pusat dengan daerah. misalnya untuk permukiman kumuh di atas 20 hektar, itu di pemerintah pusat. kalau 10-15 hektar, itu ditangani

pemerintah provinsi. kalau misal ada banjir di kampung, tugasnya pemerintah pusat apa, provinsi apa. misal lagi ada kampung yang ga punya air minum. kan mesti ditarik dari sumbernya misal di gunung mana. nah itu tugasnya pusat. nanti setelah sumber air bakunya ditarik sampai ke dekat kampungnya, baru tugas provinsi narik sampai ke rumah-rumah. membagi-bagi itu semua diatur di UU 23/2014. jadi positioning saya sebagai pemerintah pusat, ya kita menyusun sistemnya seperti apa, menyusun aturannya seperti apa, kalau ada lokasi kampung kota yang memang di atas 15 hektar, kita tangani fisiknya, menguatkan peran-peran kelembagaannya. jadi sesuai lah kewenangan yang diatur di 23/2014 ini. nanti Jakarta buat apa sebagai yang punya provinsi.

**Interviewer:** kalau ibu dengan jabatan dan kapasitas ibu yang sekarang, ibu lebih kemana sih, mungkin di teknis atau operasionalnya?

**Interviewee 4:** penyiapan bahan, kebijakan, mengawasi dan mengendalikan fisik-fisik yang ada di lapangan, pemantauan/evaluasi NSPK (ada kewajiban pemerintah daerah untuk menyusun Perda kumuh, itu kita awasi sudah nyusun belum? kalau sudah, apakah sudah sesuai? seperti SK penetapan lokasi kumuh itu kita cek, evaluasi, mana yang sesuai, mana yang engga. kadang pemerintah daerah netapin lokasi tapi asal. tidak mengikuti standar cara menetapkan yang benar), bimbingan teknis kepada pemerintah daerah, fasilitasi KOTAKU. lalu kalau ada bencana seperti sekarang, kita juga harus terjun ke lapangan. jadi tugas kita di pusat itu mulai dari planning, programming, budgeting, lalu melakukan perencanaan sendiri, ada survey nya, investigasi, mendesain, mengecek kesiapan lahan, mengendalikan pembangunan fisik dan konstruksi, lalu mengecek bagaimana kelembagaan di daerah. kalau sudah dikerjakan, harus ada yang memanfaatkan dan memelihara. nah ini proses yang dilakukan. jadi pembagiannya itu per wilayah; 1,2,3. jadi tugas kita adalah terselenggaranya perencanaan dan peningkatan kontribusi penataan kawasan. kampung kota itu adalah salah satu.

**Interviewer:** kalau ibu sendiri, setujukah tata kelola kampung sudah berjalan dengan baik? kalau belum, apa yang masih menjadi tantangan, khususnya di Jakarta?

**Interviewee 4:** pada intinya mungkin bukan opini tapi hasil evaluasi terkait implementasi kebijakan yang sudah berjalan, mulai dari perencanaan hingga ke pemanfaatan dan pemeliharaan. jadi evaluasi kita selama melaksanakan penataan di kampung-kampung ini, kita rasa masih perlu banyak stakeholder yang terlibat (karena 7 aspek kekumuhan). contoh ada sampah, air minum, kebakaran, itu saja penanganannya di dinas (SKPD) itu tidak ada di dalam satu dinas. contoh sanitasi dan air minum itu ada di Dinas Pekerjaan Umum, lalu terkait perumahan ada dinas perumahan, kebakaran ada di dinas mana, ruang terbuka di dinas pertamanan. jadi ketika mau melakukan penanganan di satu kampung, misal 10-15 hektar berarti dikerjakan full oleh provinsi. dalam menangani 10-15 hektar, provinsi harus bisa mengarahkan banyak dinasnya untuk bisa bekerja sama di lokasi tersebut. itu betul-betul tantangan yang besar. apa yang dilakukan tidak akan berjalan dengan optimal tanpa dukungan dan komitmen dari semua pihak, termasuk masyarakat karena ketika kita mau menangani kampung kota A, di kawasan A ternyata ada masalah sampah, rumah dan air minum, berarti harus melibatkan 3 dinas; pekerjaan umum, perumahan dan pertamanan. belum tentu ketika pimpinannya menugaskan semua dengan full, mungkin yang masuk hanya perumahan sehingga

permasalahannya tidak benar-benar tuntas, sehingga kekumuhan tetap tidak selesai. ketika kita melakukan penanganan terhadap kampung, tidak bisa anggaran itu dibagi-bagi. harus betul-betul pada saat bersamaan, 2-3 tahun selesai tuntas sehingga masyarakat benar-benar bisa mendapatkan manfaat tidak dibagi-bagi tahun ini rumah, tahun depan air minum. manusia kan ga bisa gitu. kita hidup dalam satu rumah, rumahnya harus bagus, air minumnya layak, sanitasinya layak. jadi betul-betul menanganinya harus keterpaduan (kata kuncinya). itu yang cukup complicated hasil evaluasi kita.

**Interviewer:** kalau yang di Jakarta, ada yang spesifik ga sih bu masalahnya?

**Interviewee 4:** kalau di Jakarta hampir semuanya challenging ya. contohnya ketika ada banjir Jakarta tahun lalu, terjadilah konflik antara Pak Anies yang mengatakan bahwa airnya dari hulu tapi kita di PU berharap sungai itu bisa dinormalisasi. yang bikin challenging itu sekarang baru 16 km dari 33 km yang ternormalisasi, itupun juga pas jaman Pak Ahok, yang warganya dipindah ke rusun. susahnya normalisasi itu ya karena masih ada 17 km permukiman kumuh di pinggir sungai itu. kita dari PU berharap pemerintah di Jakarta bisa ambil action, bahwa lokasi-lokasi yang ilegal kita mukimkan kembali. jadi bener-bener Jakarta itu bisa layak, tidak ada permasalahan banjir, dsb karena lokasi-lokasi kumuh itu kan di tepi sungai, ga bisa kita apa-apain lagi. ini tantangannya, apakah pemprov DKI berani untuk melakukan terobosan-terobosan. dari 5 tipologi lokasi kumuh ini, yang paling krusial untuk diselesaikan oleh Jakarta yang di tepi air. imbasnya ga cuma ke yang tinggal tapi ke satu kota. sekarang ini, kita juga lagi ingin fokus ke yang dataran rendah. dataran rendah ini, misalnya kampung yang di Sudirman, yang harga tanahnya udah puluhan juta, pasti kan akan tergentrifikasi. yang namanya pengembang itu pasti begitu, tinggal menunggu waktu. jadi kita maunya gimana warga yang kerjanya di daerah Ciliwung tetap kerja disitu tapi gak tinggal di badan sungai. kan kehidupannya dia disitu, nanti kalo dipindah ke tempat yang jauh, habis mata pencaharian. prinsipnya mereka ga boleh kehilangan itu tapi permukimannya yang kita tata. yang sekarang berjalan misalnya Kampung Akuarium, lalu yang di Kampung Pulo, sisanya banyak yang pemugaran-pemugaran.

**Interviewer:** sejauh ini ibu puas ga sih dengan pendekatan tata kelola kampung yang udah berjalan?

**Interviewee 4:** kita lihat dari 2 hal ya, kebijakan dan implementasi. kalo dari sisi kebijakan, kita sudah mencoba membuat berbagai macam aturan supaya mempermudah orang punya tahapan yang clear, bahkan kita membuat semua kabupaten/kota ini punya Perda. Perda ini adalah alat/instrumen untuk mengamankan pemerintah kalau mengambil keputusan/kebijakan. misalnya lokasi itu ilegal lalu ingin dipindahkan seperti Kampung Pulo. kalau dia punya Perda, dia aman. cuma sekarang kembali lagi ke implementasinya. implementasinya ketika kita ingin menjaga masyarakat supaya tidak tinggal di bantaran kali. jelas-jelas itu ilegal. setiap hujan, Ciliwung itu banjir. tapi masyarakat kan ga mau pindah karena mata pencahariannya disitu, butuh tadi pimpinan-pimpinan daerah yang berani untuk berhadapan dengan masyarakat, menyadarkan masyarakat bahwa mereka perlu tinggal di tempat yang layak supaya ga setiap banjir mereka aman. itu tantangan yang cukup besar. ketika bicara tata kelola, itu bicara soal komitmen juga. komitmen pemerintah daerah itu bisa dilihat mulai dari komitmen pemimpin daerah, misal dari gubernurnya, kepala dinasnyanya, sampai dengan pejabat-pejabat di daerahnya.

tambah lagi, di Jakarta juga complicated mungkin karena banyak pendatang, berbagai macam suku, dsb. jadi kalo dilihat dari kebijakan yang sudah ada, kita sudah sangat-sangat komplis. kita sudah punya rujukan dan aturan. pada saat kita ingin melakukan penataan kampung, prosesnya seperti apa, sudah kita buat step dan aturannya, sampai misal kalau dia harus pindah, itu dihitung juga apakah pendapatannya masih sama apa engga dibandingkan sebelum dan sesudah dia pindah. jadi betul-betul dihitung, tidak ada permasalahan sosial. jadi dibuat dulu feasibility study nya. kita sudah membuat guidelines untuk melakukan tata kelola kampung. cuma kembali lagi, beda-beda jadi kayak di Jakarta sendiri, Pak Anies kan sangat CAP banget. Makanya Kp Akuarium sebagai pilot, kita lihat lah setelah akuarium bisa berjalan apa tidak. kalau ini berhasil mungkin nanti orang yang di bantaran kali ini mau pindah, mengikuti apa yang dilakukan Pemprov di Kp Akuarium. Pak Anies ini pendekatannya kan tidak mau menggusur, lalu masyarakat betul-betul harus dijaga, dicoba dulu sama Kampung Akuarium. kita intinya mensupport apa yang dilakukan di Kampung Akuarium sehingga yang di sepanjang Ciliwung bisa segera selesaikan dengan Kampung Akuarium lainnya.

**Interviewer:** berarti kalau dibilang puas dengan tata kelola yang sudah terjadi, sepertinya belum ya bu dengan cara mereka mengeksekusi plannya?

**Interviewee 4:** kalau dengan Jakarta (dan kampung-kampung lainnya secara nasional) ya belum puas lah karena tantangannya cukup besar, mulai dari stakeholder, mestinya pemerintah daerah harus mau di depan. kita ga bisa dari pemerintah pusat tiba-tiba dateng trus memindahkan atau mensosialisasikan kan tidak boleh dan tidak punya kewenangan disitu. kembali lagi ke UU 23. jadi masih semua, ga hanya Jakarta. semua lokasi kampung kumuh di Indonesia ini kita belum puas lah. kalau ditanya mana yang bener-bener tuntas ya mungkin baru sedikit kayak Jogja. tapi Jogja pun juga karakteristik warganya juga enak ya, Solo, Jogja bisa diatur lah. itu mulai kelihatan penataan kampung-kampung kita. kalau lokasi-lokasi kota metro kayak Jakarta, Medan, Banjarmasin, ini masih banyak tantangannya lah.

**Interviewer:** semisal kalau dari kementerian punya proposal program/kebijakan atau ide-ide baru, yang bikin itu sulit untuk diimplementasi apa sih?

**Interviewee 4:** kembali lagi ke komitmen pemerintah daerah karena kalau merujuk ke UU 23 soal otonomi daerah, pemerintah pusat itu sudah tidak punya wilayah kerja lagi gitu. jadi kita ga punya kewenangan pusat yang ada di daerah. beda dengan Bina Marga, SDA yang bisa melakukan itu selama ada dananya sedangkan di permukiman kita ga bisa melakukan itu. ini benar-benar adalah milik dari pemerintah daerah. ketika kita punya kegiatan apapun tapi pemerintah daerahnya tidak berkenan, dalam artian dari sisi keberanian dan sumber daya manusia di lapangan mungkin tidak capable. misal kita punya dana 30 milyar untuk melakukan penataan di Balige, Aceh. pemerintah daerahnya bilang ke kita bahwa mereka ga bisa akomodir ini karena masih ada konflik. yasudah, dananya kita alihkan ke kegiatan lain karena kegiatan kita di kampung ini ya memang miliknya pemerintah daerah. kalau pemerintah daerahnya belum berkenan dengan berbagai alasan, ya kita ga bisa masuk.

**Interviewer:** kalau misalnya bekerja sama dengan pihak lain di luar pemerintahan, kayak misalnya kerjasama dengan NGO, bahkan developer, itu apakah pernah terjadi di KOTAKU?

**Interviewee 4:** kalau kegiatan-kegiatan kita yang sama CSR, NGO banyak ya. kayaknya dengan Rujak sudah beberapa kali, Solo Kota Kita juga pernah, banyak sebenarnya. jadi mereka mendampingi, bahkan yang dibantu dengan anggaran mereka seperti Habitat For Humanity juga ada kayak di kampung di Mauk, Tangerang. banyak sih contoh-contoh itu. lalu juga dengan CSR BUMN, misal di Pontianak dengan Sarana Multi Finance (milik Kemenkeu) membantu penataan rumah di kampung-kampung kotanya di Pontianak. jadi kita bangun jalan, rumahnya dibangun PT SMF.

**Interviewer:** lebih mudah kerjasama dengan pemerintah daerah atau justru sama organisasi di luar pemerintah?

**Interviewee 4:** kalau pemerintah daerah itu bukan pilihan. jadi memang pertama ya mereka dulu gitu, mau nanti ada NGO masuk, BUMN masuk atau siapapun, kalau pemerintah daerahnya ga mau, ga bisa. intinya gitu. jadi itu bukan opsional. makanya kalo kita lihat perkembangan kota Surabaya, itu kan karena pimpinannya Bu Risma. dan ini sifatnya wajib. nomor 1 itu ditanya dulu ke mereka, mereka ga mau ya ga bisa. jadi mau kita udah siapkan uang berapapun, tapi kalo pemerintah daerahnya tidak berminat atau lihat masalahnya complicated, saya ga bisa berbenturan dengan masyarakat nanti mereka marah, udah gitu-gitu aja, itu sering kejadian. ya udah ya kita bawa uangnya lagi. intinya kalau pemerintah daerah mau, baru bisa kita masuk.

**Interviewer:** berarti penentu jalannya program KOTAKU ini tergantung pemerintah daerah aja ya?

**Interviewee 4:** betul, jadi ga hanya KOTAKU. seluruh kegiatan di perumahan/permukiman tergantung pemerintah daerah. kalau pemerintah daerah ga mau, mau apapun itu ya, bikin sanitasi, air minum, jalan, pasar, rumah karena kita kan directorate of human settlement kan, jadi human.. berurusannya sama manusia. pasti kalau kita mau melakukan pengembangan infrastruktur pasti akan ada gesekan dengan manusia di sekitarnya, akan ga nyaman. yang bisa berhadapan dengan warganya kan, bupati/walikota atau kalau Jakarta, si gubernur. kita ngerti pasti ada aja yang komplain, namanya juga kebijakan, kebijakan apapun kan pasti ada plus-minusnya. jadi ketika sudah ada dihitung pro-kontranya, terus pimpinan daerahnya menyampaikan kalau kontranya terjadi, saya ga mau, yaudah ga jalan gitu.

**Interviewer:** kalau untuk lingkup Jakarta, apakah pemprov DKI ini mudah diajak kerjasama untuk soal ini? karena kan KOTAKU dan CAP mirip-mirip, sama-sama menangani permukiman kumuh, fisik dan sosialnya juga. nah ini jadi gampang ga sih bu kerjasama dengan pemprov?

**Interviewee 4:** sebenarnya kalau kita dengan pemprov, intinya pemprov support ya dengan program KOTAKU ini, bahkan Pak Anies pernah bertemu dengan Pak Menteri dan berdiskusi dengan tim kita itu sudah beberapa kali. sebenarnya sangat support, hanya itu tadi, karena dinamika masyarakat di Jakarta itu kan perlu perlakuan khusus. misal kalau Kampung Akuarium ini jadi, bisa ditunjukkan ke masyarakat baru nanti direplikasi ke tempat lain. menunggu momen-momen seperti ini. kalau untuk penanganan permukiman di dataran rendah (tengah kota) berjalan semua, karena kan hanya pemugaran, benerin jalan, nambah tempat sampah. itu

berjalan terus sampai sekarang. yang sulit itu di bantaran sungai. alhamdulillah lah pemprov sudah mencoba.

**Interviewer:** status lahan itu ngaruh juga kan ya yang aku inget tuh kalo informal, mereka dimukimkan kembali?

**Interviewee 4:** ya. ilegal.

**Interviewer:** masuk ke section akhir, aku mau ngomongin conflict of interest. kalau di teori kan negara itu punya karakter bisa memaksa supaya social order bisa tercapai, nah interest PUPR ini selain menjalankan konstitusi apa sih bu? ada ga sih bu interest-interest tertentu?

**Interviewee 4:** (interest kita) untuk 5 tahun ke depan, tujuan kita ini. nanti ganti pimpinan, kebijakannya diubah. prinsipnya kalau di kita, PUPR, tugasnya adalah melakukan pembangunan, konstruksi (air, jalan, perumahan/permukiman). untuk 5 tahun ini, Pak Presiden mengarahkan kita agar anggaran yang ada ini selesaikan lah untuk kegiatan utama seperti membangun kawasan strategis pariwisata nasional, (bisa dilihat di dokumen). setiap tahun 5 tahun itu pasti ada perubahan. misal tahun ini ceritanya tentang kampung kota, tahun depan untuk apa, dsb. jadi 5 tahun ini fokusnya ke kawasan strategis pariwisata nasional.

**Interviewer:** kalau di beberapa kasus, pernah sampe ada conflict of interest ga sih bu dengan institusi lain, mungkin yang di daerah mau nya begini, yang di pusat maunya begitu, kayak gitu kejadian juga di Jakarta, mungkin?

**Interviewee 4:** kalau kita dengan pemerintah daerah, kalau pemda tidak mau, kita pasti ga bisa masuk kalau untuk urusan perumahan/permukiman ya. jadi ketika kita ingin melakukan penataan di kawasan X dan mereka ga mau, yaudah selesai. jadi konflik kepentingan pada saat program sudah berjalan ini ga pernah terjadi. kita tuh berargumentasi dan bernegosiasi itu di tahap perencanaan. tadi kan ada tahap perencanaan, pembangunan, pemanfaatan, pengendalian. nah jadi proses kita meyakinkan, setuju/ga setuju, itu di tahap pertama. begitu tahap kedua berarti sudah dilaksanakan ya berarti emang pemda nya mau. mau itu (endingnya) adalah mereka mengeluarkan surat bahwa mereka berminat untuk kegiatan ini, lalu ada surat bersedia menerima infrastruktur, mau melakukan pengelolaan setelah ini dibangun.

**Interviewer:** berarti conflict of interest nya dissolve dulu di awal?

**Interviewee 4:** betul.

**Interviewer:** berarti ini gak mentrigger konflik karena sebenarnya kayak ditawarkan dulu ya ke pemda, kalo mereka mau, diambil, kalo engga yaudah? jadi memang ga ada possibility of conflict dari yang aku tangkep?

**Interviewee 4:** ya. ini kalo antara pemerintahnya ya. paling pas implementasi di lapangan, mungkin kan ada masyarakat yang tiba-tiba berubah pikiran, tiba-tiba menolak, ya biasalah namanya juga manusia ada yang mempersuasif, menghasut pada saat proses, itu mungkin terjadi. tapi kalau antara pemerintahnya engga karena



syarat dan ketentuan terjadinya pembangunan adalah pemda berminat untuk kegiatan tersebut.

**Interviewer:** pernah ada ga sih bu intervensi dari pihak lain (NGO, developer, dsb) yang sampai mengganggu berjalannya KOTAKU di Jakarta?

**Interviewee 4:** bagusnya nanti kita tanya aja sama temen-temen KOTAKU Jakarta, karena datanya ga pegang juga selama ini seperti apa.

**Interviewer:** oke. kalau menurut ibu nih, sumber-sumber dari konflik dalam tata kelola kampung ini seperti apa sih, selain dari framework?

**Interviewee 4:** yang paling pasti ya, kan tadi polanya 3 ya, ada pemugaran, peremajaan dan pemukiman kembali. dan ini kan ada 7 indikator yang kita tangani (air bersih, sanitasi, rumah), nah yang paling berpotensi untuk menjadi konflik dari sisi ketika kita ingin membuat suatu rumah menjadi layak. misal pas sebelum rumahnya ditata, rumah orang ini luasnya X, lalu ketika ditata, luasnya akan berkurang. nah ini akan butuh pendekatan sehingga masyarakat berkenan. proses-proses seperti ini kan butuh pendekatan, waktu, kesabaran supaya masyarakat mau karena ketika bangunan mereka terdampak, otomatis kenyamanan mereka juga terdampak. dalam tim kita ini juga ada tim komunikasi yang mengkomunikasikan hal-hal seperti ini. kalau ada konflik-konflik seperti ini, yang turun itu harus pemerintah daerahnya. nah ga semua pimpinan kabupaten/kota yang punya pimpinan seperti ini. kan harapannya ketika ada konflik, masalah, pemerintah daerahnya turun ke lapangan. jadi kalau bicara soal Jakarta, tinggal keberanian lah.

## 5. Interviewee 5 (Private Developer Representative - Jakarta Property Institute)

**Interviewer:** Apakah bisa dibilang informalitas jadi justifikasi bagi para developer untuk mengakuisisi lahan-lahan kampung?

**Interviewee 5:** maksudnya lahan-lahan informal karena tidak dilegalisir?

**Interviewer:** iya. bisa dibilang ga sih informalitas ini jadi justifikasi para developer untuk "oh ini ada lahan-lahan kampung, kita akuisisi aja" karena status lahannya juga ga jelas?

**Interviewee 5:** justifikasinya terbalik. mereka kan harus berkembang (developer), kita ga ngomongin warga kampungnya sekarang. developer kalo mau berkembang, mereka akan cari potensi lokasi. mau di lokasi itu ada kampung atau tidak, dia lihat opportunity nya. everything is bottom line driven for developer. bottom line maksudnya dari keuangannya. selama dia beli tanah dimana, atau misalnya dia mau bersihin lahan dari warga-warga kampung, whatever it is. apapun juga bentuknya lahan itu. selama bottom line nya masih hijau, profitnya bagus, dia akan jalankan. jadi bukan karena disitu ada kampung makanya dia ambil disitu, bukan. karena lokasi ini potensinya bagus, tapi ada kampung, oke kita bersihin atau lokasinya udah clear nih tapi di tengah-tengahnya ada danau, tapi saya bisa urug, oke saya jalanin. bukan karena ada kampung atau engganya. jangan conflicting itu nya. developer is the simplest person kalau menurut saya, simple business model nya. disitu ada opportunity, dia liat lokasinya bagus, ada potensi pengembangan, dsb, ya dia kembangin disitu.

**Interviewer:** pertimbangannya hanya itu ya?

**Interviewee 5:** mau itu ada kampung apa engga, ga ada urusan dengan itu.

**Interviewer:** ada ga sih mbak proyek-proyek developer yang sifatnya non-profit atau community development gitu?

**Interviewee 5:** saya ga bilang ga punya, tapi saya bisa bilang itu bukan sesuatu yang di on top of their mind karena yang seperti itu kompleksitasnya tinggi. mestinya yang kayak gitu dari pemprov. mereka yang harus bisa nengahi. kayak misalnya mindahin mereka dari horizontal ke vertikal. itu musti pemprov nya yang mediasi. kalau suruh developer yang mediasi, ga akan kejadian.

**Interviewer:** soalnya aku lihat juga di Jepang, banyak developer yang kerja sama dengan warganya, misal untuk bangun social housing. kalau di Jakarta ini kenapa ga arahnya kesana ya mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** kamu musti nanya nya ke pemprov itu. jadi developer atau warga kampung, kita sama-sama warga Jakarta, sama-sama punya KTP.

**Interviewer:** ada kaitannya sama regulasi ga sih mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** ya pasti.

**Interviewer:** misalnya gimana mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** developer tidak akan menjalankan hal-hal yang bikin dia rugi. jadi kalau saya sebagai developer mau membangun sesuatu, trus disuruh bangun rusun, benahin ini, benahin itu, dsb, lalu saya hitung dan ternyata saya rugi, saya ga jadi bangun. itu ongkos tambah kan. simple kan cara berpikirnya. nah berarti yang musti ada itu insentif buat developer menjalankan itu. kalau sekarang pemprov sekarang tidak bisa benahin kampung dan butuh bantuan swasta untuk benerin kampung, dia perlu incentivized swasta untuk lakukan itu. ini dimana pun juga, mau di Singapore, atau di negara-negara berkembang lain, kalau pemerintahnya tidak sanggup, dia butuh teknologi, kearifan dalam hal pengembangan, pengetahuan dan pendanaan dari pihak swasta, pemerintah harus incentivized swasta untuk membantu mereka. insentif nya berupa apa? perubahan KLB, kemudahan perizinan. simple things. kamu tau sekarang perizinan 3 tahun ya. buat kita itu semuanya dijalankan setengah-setengah, makanya tanggung, ga bisa optimal

**Interviewer:** jadi kalau developer mau bantu, dalam tanda kutip harus ada imbalan ya mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** we can talk about imbalan but not exactly about it. it's an incentive. sebenarnya bukan sesuatu yang ilegal. jadi kalau misalnya perizinan gedung butuh 3 tahun, dengan saya membantu bangun rusun di Jakarta, perizinan saya bisa dipercepat dengan mengikuti semua aturan yang ada tapi selesai dalam 2 tahun. bukan ilegal tapi diberikan red carpet nya aja karena saya ngebantuin kamu nih, jadi kamu bantu saya juga.

**Interviewer:** waktu itu Mbak pernah cerita kalo bangunan yang sekarang terbangun ini adalah hasil akuisisi lahan 10-20 tahun lalu. teman-teman developer ini pernah cerita soal proses akuisisi nya ga sih mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** ya beli-beli dari orang kampung. biasanya begitu. tanah-tanah yang semua tidak ada sertifikat, dia liat ada potensi ke depan. misalnya nih 20 tahun lagi Sudirman akan sampe ke Ancol (misalnya jalannya akan nyampe sana). di kita kan ada RTRW (20 tahun) dan RDTR (5 tahun), sebenarnya secara general kamu tau kira-kira pengembangannya kemana, tapi kapan eksekusinya kamu ga akan tau. so orang-orang ini mulai beli lahan secara kecil-kecil. ada orang nawarin dari calo-calo, dia bisa bebasin 5000 m<sup>2</sup> di lokasi kampung A, nawarin ke developer, mau ga beli 5000, biasa gitu dikit-dikit. tapi proses dari 5000 ke 6000 m<sup>2</sup> nya susah dan lama. makanya itu bisa 10-20 tahun. satu per satu, karena perkampungan itu kan, apalagi tanah-tanah yang ga jelas kepemilikannya, kamu usut dari mulai yang tinggal, itu ribet, makan waktu dan makan uang. jadi kalau dibilang waktu dulu ngebebasinnya murah. it's actually not murah kalau kamu faktorin the amount of time dan ongkos untuk bebasin yang kecil-kecil itu. udah kumpulin segitu banyak lalu disertifikasi. itu ongkos lagi. nah yang bisa gitu biasanya developer gede, karena dia napas nya panjang ya dan kemampuannya ada untuk bisa liat daerah-daerah yang orang belum bisa liat (potensinya). visinya harus jauh.

**Interviewer:** jadi mau tanah itu formal atau engga, proses pembebasannya sama aja ya mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** sama. katanya BPN sekarang menyatakan kalau tanah girik itu tidak diakui. tapi in practice, tetep ada orang jual tanah girik, cuma itu bukan sesuatu yang diakui lagi, tapi ya ada. kita cuma 11 jenis status tanah, banyak loh aneh-aneh itu. ngebersihinnya ribet. pertanahan kita is very weak dan weak nya terhadap pemilik tanah. jadi gini, kalau orang tinggal di suatu lahan yang kamu gatau siapa yang punya dan kamu bangun sesuatu disitu dan kamu tinggal disitu selama 30 tahun. suatu hari si tuan tanahnya dateng, bilang itu punya dia dan dia bisa buktikan itu. They Have To Buy You Out. aturannya menyatakan kalau sudah lewat dari periode itu, kamu harus di buy out.

**Interviewer:** jadi meskipun yang punya mau klaim balik, dia harus tetep bayar in si occupier nya ini ya?

**Interviewee 5:** iya. tapi dibilangnya 30 tahun. cuma ini in practice, mau 5, 10 tahun, begitu udah ada yang tinggalin, kamu tetep mesti bayar in. polisi ga kuat kalo itu, udah deh pak bayar aja.

**Interviewer:** biasa dikasih harga NJOP atau patokannya apa sih mbak? ini juga merujuk ke akuisisi lahan biasa ya.

**Interviewee 5:** oh itu konyol kalo begitu. nah ini kalo pemprov tidak ikut dalam hal seperti ini, mereka yang rugi. contohnya, kalau sekarang ada pembangunan gedung tinggi, yang dibelakangnya ada perkampungan ilegal, lalu salah satu yang harus dikerjakan pengembang sebagai fasilitas umumnya adalah bangun jalan. kan kalo bangun jalan, mau ga mau harus ngusir warga kampungnya. harus digeser orang kampungnya. orang kampungnya bisa minta per m2 50 juta. jalannya ga akan jadi. developer ga akan mau. pemerintah suruh developer bangun jalan, sementara itu ga diclear untuk bangun jalan.

**Interviewer:** meskipun lokasi jalan itu ditentukan sama pemerintah?

**Interviewee 5:** iya. tapi pemerintah tidak mampu membersihkan hal-hal tersebut. i should say ini kerugian dalam hal infrastructure development di Indonesia karena hal-hal seperti ini. saya ga bilang orang yang disitu harus dipindahkan karena dia miskin. bukan itu masalahnya. the point is, if you wanna build right, hak pertanahan/perkampungan itu harus diberesin. jadi waktu saya musti ngelebarin jalan karena itu tata kota, berarti kan orang itu udah berada di tempat yang salah. nah kalau sekarang makanya berantem sama orang kampung. mereka bilang gua disini sekian lama tapi gua diusir karena mau dibangun jalanan, sementara pengembangnya bilang dia disuruh bangunin jalan sama pemerintah. bukan masalah pengembangnya iseng banget. dia ga akan ngusik/niat ngeganggu hal" yang akan nambah ongkosnya dia, di luar dari premisesnya.

**Interviewer:** berarti ini ada misinfo juga dari pemerintah, si warganya ga dikasih tau dan tau-tau si developernya disuruh bangun?

**Interviewee 5:** kalau kamu liat case-case kayak Kampung Karet, sebenarnya peruntukkan dia zona hijau dan akan jadi jalanan. jadi suatu hari dieksekusi bikin jalanan tembus, itu akan harus minggir semua. siapa yang mau ngusir kalo gitu? sementara waktu itu kita pernah bring the case ke pemprov dan mereka jawabnya "oh ibu silahkan turun ke lapangan dan mulai bicara dengan masyarakat". loh kok

kita? kalian yang pemerintah, kalian yang musti benahin. kita yang ngebangun, ongkos dari kita, ga masalah. tapi masalah sosialnya harus dibenerin pemerintah. nah mereka ga mau tangan kotor, ga mau capek karena harus menjelaskan ke banyak kepala keluarga. itu capek.

**Interviewer:** kalau dalam tata kelola kota, apakah PPP bisa digunakan untuk proyek non pengembangan properti? misalkan kayak skema Semanggi dan peningkatan KLB tapi manfaatnya bukan untuk kepentingan properti?

**Interviewee 5:** terserah pemerintah nya sih, dia punya program kemana untuk ini. ini program bisa diPPP-kan selama pemerintah bilang ga sanggup dan perlu tangan swasta, pasti bisa. but it should be a fair game. swasta ga akan mau dirugikan, kayak tadi kamu tanya soal community itu. bukan masalah ga mau, tapi kalau itu nambah ongkos mereka dan mereka jadi rugi, mereka ga akan bangun. simple as that. orang pernah nanya sama saya kenapa kita ga ngebangun concert hall/tempat kesenian? satu, karena ongkosnya besar sekali untuk bangun itu. dua, dia tidak diberikan insentif/keleluasan untuk keterbatasan bangunan. kamu tau kita punya keterbatasan bangunan itu banyak sekali. jadi ujung-ujungnya, untuk bangun itu, itu rugi besar. semestinya peraturan itu harus encouraging developer untuk mau keluar dari pembangunan-pembangunan yang monoton. jadi dia harus mau bergerak ke arah sosial, kayak tadi dia bangun tempat entertainment untuk masyarakat, tempat pusat kesenian, museum. nah kalau kamu di luar negeri, aturan-aturan yang mengakomodir itu banyak sekali insentifnya. malah kadang insentifnya kayak dibebasin pajak. income nya improving the city livelihood. nah kalo di kita kena penalti ini, penalti itu, jadi ga ada yang bangun. bukannya mereka ga mau bangun. jangan disalahkan yang ngebangunnya, tapi kenapa mereka ga mau bangun. kalo dia bisa enhance the development, saya punya mall, apartment, office, hotel trus di dalamnya ada pusat kesenian. secara aset lebih bagus kan. kenapa kamu persulit kesannya? malah tadi kalau mau bangun pusat kesenian, malah banyak penalti. ya diilangin udah sama developernya.

**Interviewer:** batas threshold ini disebut mahal sampe developer ga mau bangun itu apa sih mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** they're looking at the net profit about 20%. kalau dia ga dapet itu, dia ga akan jalan.

**Interviewer:** ada kayak payback periodnya ga mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** tergantung yang kamu bangun itu apa. pokoknya profit itu harus dapet kira-kira 20% or more. di bawah itu, dia ga akan bangun.

**Interviewer:** kayak tadi berarti yang gedung kesenian itu mesti 20% juga ya mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** no. those kind of things cuma tambahan. hal-hal seperti itu harus ada insentif, menjadi sesuatu yang diencourage supaya developernya mau bangun. itu kalau dihitung, harusnya gratis. kalo engga, ga akan make sense. gedung kesenian is a lot of CSR work. gedung kesenian di seluruh dunia ga ada yang make money. makanya to have a building like that to make money, it's a bullshit lah. jadi karena itu improving the livelihood the residents of the city, itu harus diberikan insentif. jadi hal-hal yang baik, kesenian-kesenian itu bisa terjadi. gapapa, karena waktu

dibangun, dia punya ongkos ketutup sama insentif-insentif tadi. musti ada timbal baliknya.

**Interviewer:** berarti bisa dibilang untuk hubungan pemerintah dengan private belum mengakomodir hal-hal yang seperti ini ya? masih rigid aja gitu.

**Interviewee 5:** ya.

**Interviewer:** oke. misalnya nih mbak. developer mau bangun di zoning yang ga sesuai dengan rencananya. misal developer mau bangun komersial di zona fasos/fasum. itu negosiasi nya seperti apa sih mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** bukan negosiasi. dia mesti mengajukan overall plan yang mau dibangun. nanti dari sisi pemerintah akan diliat dampak lingkungannya akan seperti apa perubahannya, apakah sesuatu ini bisa digantikan. kalau jalanan sih ga terlalu sulit karena itu bisa dipindah. kalau kayak rumah sakit, itu ga mudah. jadi mesti diliat dulu, ada yang mudah, ada yang ga mudah. biasa kalau possible, ya dijalankan aja. tapi ada juga yang dampak lingkungannya ga memungkinkan, yaudah berarti ga bisa. you have to do a lot more physical support untuk bisa menanggulangi dampak lingkungan itu.

**Interviewer:** kalau kayak gini, dimonitor ga mbak sama pemerintah?

**Interviewee 5:** kan ada SLF. jadi sesudah kamu bangun, kan ada sertifikat laik fungsi. ada yang ngecek di lapangan.

**Interviewer:** tiap berapa tahun sekali mbak di cek?

**Interviewee 5:** SLF itu diperbaharui tiap 5 tahun.

**Interviewer:** kalau developer itu liat pragmatisnya aja ya?

**Interviewee 5:** very pragmatic. misal ada pertokoan jadul tapi di sekelilingnya udah jadi komersial modern semua. ketika mau dibeli sama developer, pasti protes. prosesnya panjang, mesti ngomong sama pedagang satu-satu, ngomong sama pemerintah. kamu kalau dipindah dari rumah kamu juga pasti protes.

**Interviewer:** tapi ada ga mbak developer yang tertarik sama isu sosial perkotaan? trus mereka ngeliat ada kampung perlu ditata nih. pernah approach gitu ga sih ke Mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** Kampung Karet itu kan kita kerjain atas dasar para pengembang yang waktu itu lumayan concern. gini, kalau kota nya ga bisa manage kampung-kampung, overall kota nya ga bagus. secara overall, value kota ga akan naik. jadi harus dibenahin.

**Interviewer:** nah yang di Kampung Karet itu pendekatannya shared privatization gitu ya mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** bisa aja. bisa begitu, bisa pemprov semua yang jalanin. kita terserah tapi tolong dibenahi. itu di tengah SCBD. kok ga ada yang benahin. sekarang ngusir mereka udah susah, mereka minta nya mahal sekali.

**Interviewer:** berarti ini tricky juga ya mbak kalo developer mau terjun ke proyek-proyek pengembangan yang ada unsur sosialnya?

**Interviewee 5:** biasanya sih mereka ga mau. kalo repot begitu biasanya mereka minggir. ya itu, pemerintahnya karena ga mau tangannya kotor, makanya dilempar ke swasta terus kan. swasta nya bilang ga mau kalo dia yang direpotin. disana beresin dulu baru swasta turun.

**Interviewer:** kalo aku berkaca dari Akuarium, itu kan fundingnya juga dari developer dari hasil kewajiban. misalnya di masa depan ada kampung-kampung Akuarium lain, sebenarnya developer mau-mau aja ya mbak?

**Interviewee 5:** dia diberikan kewajiban. kewajiban ini mutlak diberikan kepada dia. kadang-kadang dia pilih mau A,B, atau C yang kira-kira nominal nya sama dengan kewajiban dia. biasa ada pilihannya. yang developer kerjakan kan cuma ngebangun. jadi dia ga ada masalah untuk itu.

**Interviewer:** oh jadi bentuk konkrit kewajiban itu adalah ngebangun (konstruksi)?

**Interviewee 5:** yes. dia ga punya isu, mau sosialnya gimana, dia ga mikirin. nanti mau ada koperasi, ya dia ga mikir. saya punya kewajiban misalnya satu triliun untuk bangun Kampung Akuarium 5x4. selama lahannya udah diberikan, desainnya diapprove pemprov, dia tinggal eksekusi. yang namanya ngebangun (physical construction) itu paling gampang.

**Interviewer:** jadi selama ini aku pikir kewajiban developer itu holistik gitu loh sampe ngurus sosialnya juga, ternyata cuma konstruksi aja.

**Interviewee 5:** dia diminta ngebangun jalanan (fasos/fasum), ngebenahin kali, ngebangun rusun, sekolah, fisik semuanya. skemanya ini lahan ditentukan, trus desain diapprove, dsb jadi dia tinggal eksekusi doang. ga ada masalah. jadi masalah sosialnya beresin dulu. kamu percaya ga, banyak sekali yang disuruh bangun (rusun) begitu ditanya dimana, belum ada katanya. trus katanya pengembangnya pada berhutang. lah gimana tanahnya ga ada.

**Interviewer:** jadi masalah sama warga, permit, itu semua udah harus pemda nya dulu baru next nya nagih ke developer ya?

**Interviewee 5:** misalnya saya bangun gedung tinggi di Sudirman, trus saya punya kewajiban adalah bangun rusun di Daan Mogot. berarti saya ngurus semua perizinan saya di Sudirman kan. lalu saya musti ngebangun di Daan Mogot. segala perizinan yang di Daan Mogot itu saya juga yang mesti urusin.

**Interviewer:** padahal mesti nya ga gitu ya?

**Interviewee 5:** makanya. itu double. ongkos lagi. eksekusi kewajiban di negara ini tidak mudah. sesudah bangunannya selesai, serah terima, ada beda 10 cm, tidak

diterima. dibenahin lagi. you have to be exact. itu crazy nya seperti itu. kalau ada perbedaan, nih kalau kita ngukur jalanan, kamu ngukur saya ngukur, itu hasilnya bisa beda. itu udah common practice. nah kalau begitu, kapan bisa samanya? dia mau nya exact. kalao maunya exact, itu ga akan bisa terjadi. yang namanya serah terima bangunan yang udah jadi itu ampun, semua developer pada tepok jidat, gimana caranya serah terima udah selesai dibangun, udah izinnya susah, ngebangunnya juga udah sesuai permintaan mereka, eh ga mau serah terima. alasannya ada aja. karena gini, semua nya itu terlalu rigid, ga ada fleksibilitas. kalau ukuran itu ga akan sama antara satu orang dengan yang lain, berarti harus ada fleksibilitas. misalnya range 5% masih bisa diterima, itu ga ada. misalnya kontraktor gedung tinggi, saya pemilik tanah, saya bangun gedung tinggi dengan Total Bangun Persada (kontraktor terbaik di Jakarta), dia yang bangun dengan ongkos multiple daripada orang-orang lain, saya digambar ukuran 3 cm, di lapangan bisa 3,001 cm, itu bisa. kita bukannya ga mau presisi, tapi pasti ada yang begitu. orang-orang pemerintah itu tidak terlatih, ga mau disalahin, takut ditangkep BPK, dll jadi dia ga mau serah terima. kalau gitu, balik lagi hutang pengembang tidak pernah diselesaikan.

**Interviewer:** wah rumit juga ya kalo harus presisi sampe zero tolerance.

**Interviewee 5:** nah. jadi pengembang sakit kepala. untungya gede tapi ke dokter terus tiap hari. makanya untungya harus gede karena sakit kepalanya banyak.

**Interviewer:** trus nasib yang udah terbangun tapi mereka bilang ga sesuai itu gimana dong? kan udah terlanjur nih.

**Interviewee 5:** akhirnya nanti ada nego-nego nya, ada yang tetap mesti diperbaiki, ada yang dinego, ah itu panjang ceritanya. jadi tidak straightforward, barang jadi, di-inspect, langsung serah terima itu tidak. membangun itu yang termudah. di luar dari physical itu yang kompleks. pre and post. itu yang kompleks (middle nya itu di construction process)

**Interviewer:** kalau menurut JPI sebagai institusi yang menengahi kepentingan private sector, sebaiknya governance kota yang masih punya kampung seperti apa sih? mungkin dari segi regulasi atau masyarakatnya?

**Interviewee 5:** pertanahannya dulu aja diberesin. tata kota ga bisa ngapa-ngapain kalau tanahnya belum beres. jadi ini bukan masalah Jakarta aja tapi masalah nasional. kita punya pertanahan harus diberesin.

**Interviewer:** kalau dari sisi developer sendiri, untuk berperan dalam tata kelola kampung, itu berupa apa sih mbak? kayak misalnya yang di Kampung Karet dengan shared privatization?

**Interviewee 5:** ini scheme bisa dijalanin. ga ada yang harus begini, harus begitu. kalau bicara tentang Rujak, Rujak mau nya dibentuk koperasi seperti di Kampung Akuarium. itu bisa-bisa aja. any scheme is possible. tapi ngomong kesana itu kejauhan karena tanahnya dulu yang kudu dibebasin. kalo Akuarium kan jelas karena akan jadi milik koperasi, yang bangunin developer, fisiknya udah ada. nah kalo sekarang yang ga legal, gimana? percuma ngomongin penataan kampung kalau tanahnya semua ga bener.



**Interviewer:** tapi kalau developer ingin involve dalam tata kelola kampung, dari JPI sendiri punya arahan ga sih mbak misalnya kayak Kampung Karet "oh sebaiknya arahnya kesini"?

**Interviewee 5:** engga sih. itu opsinya terbuka. kita cuma bilang itu bisa divertikalisasi. ada 1000 KK di Karet di tanah 5 ha. sebenarnya untuk 1000 KK itu bisa jadi cuma 3 tower. paling per tower itu 10.000 m<sup>2</sup>. sisa 4 hektar. jadi kita bilang ke pemprov, you can work together with swasta, kamu beresin itu, kita bangun untuk 1000 KK, sisanya buat kita. bisa kan? sisanya buat kita, kita bisa bangun untuk yang lain-lain. atau kalau ga begitu, bisa juga untuk bangun rusun-rusun dari kewajiban pengembang yang lain. semuanya aja taroh disitu, semua rusun. siapa yang bangun? swasta juga, atau pemerintah maunya bangunin disitu, silahkan. mau jadi rusun semua, food court semua, bisa. tanahnya beresin dulu. skemanya apa, gampang.

**Interviewer:** jadi kalo aku mau wrap up, ini sebenarnya untuk kerja sama PPP, memang timbal balik dan balik lagi ke pertanahan. basic banget masalahnya.

**Interviewee 5:** kalau ga ada yang mau ngeberesin. mungkin disana ga bisa total legal sertifikat dan orang-orang disana udah lama banget tinggal disitu. jadi musti ada badan khusus yang beli orang-orang keluar dari situ. kalau gak membeli orang-orang itu keluar, berarti harus diberikan tempat tinggal lain atau kita kompensasikan. untuk menjalankan itu, musti ada badan sosialnya. dia musti bisa ngomong sama orang-orang ini yang terjun ke lapangan. kalo menunjuk ke kita, ya kita tunjuk balik. kalo kita semua yang kerjain, trus kalian ngapain? gak deh, lu aja.