



# How have housing associations in the city of Groningen translated contemporary housing market trends and regulations into effective housing strategies?

*An evaluative case study of decentralised social housing strategies in the city of Groningen*

## Environmental and Infrastructure Planning

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## List of abbreviations

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Full</b>
BZK	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties
CBS	Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
CSE	Case study evaluation
CWP	Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium
RO/EZ	Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening en Economische Zaken
Wmo	Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning
WOZ	Waardering onroerende zaken
Wvg	Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten
WWS	Woningwaarderingstelsel

## List of translations

<b>Dutch</b>	<b>English</b>
Artikel	Article
Brutering	Grossing and balancing operation
Bruteringswet	Act grossing and balancing
Gebiedsontwikkeling.nu	Area development (.nu)
Gemeente Groningen	Municipality of Groningen
Gemeentewet	Local government act
Grondwet	Constitution
Hoofdstuk	Chapter
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties	Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Ongedeelde Stad Gedeelde Toekomst	Undivided City Shared Future
Rijksoverheid	Government of the Netherlands
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Economische Zaken	Spatial Planning & Economy
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal	House of Representatives of the Netherlands, the States General (Dutch Parliament)
Tweede Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening	Second Spatial Planning Memorandum
Verhuurderheffing	Landlord tax
Waarderingskamer	Property valuation chamber
Wet balansverkorting geldelijke steun volkshuisvesting	Act balance reduction financial support for public housing
Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II	Act measures housing market 2014 II
Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning	Act social support
Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten	Act facilities for the disabled
Woningcorporaties.nl	Housing associations (.nl)
Woningwaarderingstelsel	Housing valuation system

**Note that the Dutch translations will be used throughout this thesis in order to keep a consistent narrative, and to preserve the integrity of referenced laws, regulations, and other source material.**





## **Abstract**

The Dutch housing associations and municipalities are becoming overburdened due to more responsibilities, while their budgets to intervene in the housing market decrease. Essentially, in recent years decentralisation of responsibilities in the social domain took place, whereby tasks of social care and housing were delegated from the State to municipalities. Similarly, neo-liberalisation in the housing market meant that the State was no longer responsible for the budgets of housing associations, and the intervention in the housing market. Subsequently, an increased opportunity space of housing associations and municipalities was expected. However, following this incremental shift in the Dutch housing sector housing associations and municipalities received more responsibilities with lower budgets. Evidently it is questionable whether the decentralisation of the social domain and neo-liberalisation resulted in more effective strategies on social housing, and an improved opportunity space. In order to understand this opportunity space, the city of Groningen is used for this research. The city is facing social housing shortages, while housing associations have to cope with increased costs, and limited development locations. Hence, the main research question is 'How has decentralisation of the social domain in the Netherlands affected the opportunity space of housing associations to carry out effective strategies aimed at construction, renovation, and making sustainable social housing in the city of Groningen since 2013?' To answer this question, a case study evaluation is conducted, where data is collected through literature research, and semi-structured interviews. Finally, it is reflected upon how the new regulations have affected housing strategies.

### **Key concepts**

Decentralisation of the social domain; opportunity space; local trap; housing associations; policy evaluation; social housing; effectiveness of policy

# 1. Introduction

The Dutch housing sector is well known for its heavily financialised social housing as part of the welfare state (Aalbers et al., 2017). The State was the primary actor in the social domain for many years dating back to the early twentieth century (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>). However, in recent years decentralisation of responsibilities in the social domain occurred (Boogers et al., 2008), and tasks of social care were delegated from the State to municipalities in the form of participatory support, and specialised shelters (Van Nijendaal, 2014). Consequently, multiple issues became apparent (Elsinga et al., 2008). First of all, there is a tension between enlarging the role and responsibilities of housing associations, and focusing on low income groups (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014). In a sense decentralisation of the social domain demands further expanding of housing associations' target clients in order to increase budgets and improve the quality of the houses (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014), however with the Woningwet of 2015 housing associations are restricted in their clientele (Rijksoverheid, 2015). Additionally, the majority of urban renewal projects are planned for areas where social housing is most prominent, mainly in post-war neighbourhoods. As such, housing associations are tasked with renovating, demolishing and replacing said houses, which is expensive and depends on revenue generated through selling plots to non-social housing actors (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014). On top of that, the liberalisation of rents in the Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II has given commercial providers free range, while housing associations are increasingly paying for both the quality of life and landlord taxes (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014). Thus, housing associations are forced to make conscious and comprehensive choices in regards to their primary tasks, decentralised responsibilities, and optimal investments (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014).

Expectedly, this pressure on housing associations leaves insufficient room to efficiently carry out their various tasks. Correspondingly, from an analysis in March 2016 by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdomrelations (BZK) on performance agreements between municipalities and housing associations, only 40% of the agreed upon social housing developments and renewal were realised (Swinkels, 2018). Purcell (2006) calls such phenomena 'local traps', where the local scale is inherently deemed more preferable a priori, and is advocated as the obvious choice for policy making. Notwithstanding, it is dangerous to view scales as "independent entities with pre-given characteristics" (Purcell, 2006, p.1921), on the contrary, each scale can produce an equally positive or negative outcome depending on those adapting a scalar strategy. From this local trap perspective, cities in the Netherlands are facing an increased housing shortage. Especially, the city of Groningen is experiencing difficulties with meeting social housing demands (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014), closely after the 2008 economic crisis. Social housing tenants are placed on waiting lists that extend to up to eight years (Poelman, 2017). Furthermore, the housing shortage has led to tenants and homeowners massively overpaying for lesser property similar to the housing market in Amsterdam (Aalbers et al., 2017; Van den Berg, 2017). With the recovery from the economic crisis after 2012, the central government is further pressuring the city of Groningen to accelerate its policy making for the housing stock (RTV Noord, 2018). Simultaneously, housing associations have to cope with increased construction costs (Van der Veen, 2019), limited locations for housing developments, and an unclear relationship with the municipality as the State still intervenes with neo-liberal national regulations such as the Verhuurderheffing (landlord tax) (Gebiedsontwikkeling.nu, 2019; Priemus, 2003; Van Nijendaal, 2014). Furthermore, there is an ever increasing segregation between the highest income and lowest income groups in society, with the middle income class falling in this figurative chasm (Vermeulen, 2017). Affordability of the housing stock is crucial in this segregation, as commercial actors are given free rein in the housing market they invest in real estate with high rental prices, but most prominently in owner-occupied dwellings (Leidelmeijer et al., 2018). Subsequently, the housing market becomes biased towards such dwellings, which make up 57% of the total Dutch housing stock (De Groot & Vrieselaar, 2019).

In an attempt to bring balance to this housing stock, the Municipality of Groningen aims to have twenty thousand new houses built by project developers, with the first eight thousand planned for the upcoming four years (Van den Berg, 2017), of which 1127 social rent housing developments have received a permit to be built by housing associations in the first quarter of 2019 (Veenstra, 2019). Nonetheless, housing associations are struggling to financially balance their expenses for the construction of planned social housing developments from the municipality (Van der Veen, 2019). Especially, the landlord tax since 2013 and the restriction to solely accommodate the lowest income groups have been most detrimental to local performance agreements (Koomen, 2018). The landlord tax implied that housing associations with a portfolio larger than fifty rental houses are obligated to pay taxes for the WOZ-value (cadastral value) of the respective dwellings (Rijksoverheid, 2019). Contrastingly, affordability and availability of social houses remain key objectives in housing visions, while costs increase and new building locations become scarce (Aalbers et al., 2017; Leidelmeijer et al., 2018). Such housing visions encompass multiple goals based on local housing demands, qualitative needs, and performance agreements with housing associations (*Woningwet*, 2018, hoofdstuk 4, §1, artikel 44, lid 2). Moreover, if housing associations experience delayed social housing constructions due to high costs, even greater waiting lists for tenants can be expected (Julen, 2018; Poelman, 2017). The goal of the retreating State was to increase the effectiveness of housing strategies and municipal policies in the social domain (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014); i.e. increased opportunity space (Dagnino, 2003). Here, effectiveness is defined as the extent to which a policy achieves its intended aims and meets the normative perceptions of the stakeholders involved in the policy making process with proficient resource management (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013). Nevertheless, it is debatable whether these incremental regulatory and administrative changes have allowed for more effective policies and strategies on social housing, and have improved the opportunity space of housing associations and municipalities (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014). Opportunity space can be viewed as all of the opportunities a firm or organisation can recognise, and seize given a time period (Dagnino, 2003) – or rather for policy makers the freedom of choice to develop context specific policies, and pursue local interests.

To understand which policies have led to the current decisions on social housing of the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen, the focus is placed on the period between 2008 and 2019. The research covers a time span from the year decentralisation was first operationalised in the Netherlands, 1993, up until 2008, and targets managerial power and the capacity of local governments to cope with decentralised tasks (Boogers et al., 2008). The chosen timeframe can further be supported by Meyer (2008), Van Nijendaal (2014), and Vermeulen (2017) who indicate that from 2007 onwards a significant change in the responsibilities of municipalities can be observed – with the introduction the *Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning* (2015, §2, artikel 1.2.1). Furthermore, the *Woningwet* 2015 explicitly placed housing visions under the care of municipalities and housing associations. Additional responsibility of housing associations to formulate performance agreements with municipalities on where, how, when, and for whom social houses will be built was also emphasised (*Woningwet*, 2018, hoofdstuk 4, §1, artikel 44, lid 2). Ultimately, the aim of this study is to evaluate the current state of the opportunity space for housing associations and municipalities to act upon the additional tasks that followed from the decentralisation of the social domain and neo-liberalisation since 2014. The relevance of the research lies in the exploration of the local scale, while scientists in the housing market often focus on the national scale (Tajani & Morano, 2015).

## 1.2 Research question

With regards to the main goal of this thesis, the aim is to evaluate effectiveness of social housing policy. This is done through three criteria of effectiveness: substantively, normatively, and transactively (see §2.3). In this manner, key restrictions in social housing policy can be identified – on the basis of the quality of the housing stock, the policy making process from the perspectives of housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen, and the resource management to achieve agreed upon goals by the housing associations. Distinctly, identifying the bottlenecks in the operational field of housing associations could provide useful tactics for planning practice to improve social housing policies and implementation. Further, the expected opportunity space (Dagnino, 2003) of the housing associations in relation to municipal housing visions should be evaluated, as it was assumed the decentralisation would lead to more creative and extensive solutions. Therefore, the central problem is that housing associations are struggling to meet the high demands for and of housing in the social domain due to issues related to decentralisation, including the local trap (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014; Purcell, 2006).

Naturally, the following primary research question can be formulated:

*How has decentralisation of the social domain in the Netherlands affected the opportunity space of housing associations to carry out effective strategies aimed at construction, renovation, and making sustainable social housing in the city of Groningen since 2013?*

To answer this research question a set of secondary questions has been devised to help break down the main problem, and to identify and evaluate factors and variables that influence the effectiveness social housing developments by housing associations.

- I. *How has decentralisation of the social domain influenced the relationship of housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen with regards to performance agreements?*
- II. *How have social housing policies and their implementation in the city of Groningen changed compared to before and after the decentralisation of the social domain in 2013?*
- III. *How does the experienced opportunity space differ between housing associations to construct, renovate, and make sustainable social houses in the city of Groningen?*
- IV. *What are the reasons for the differences regarding the experienced opportunity space of housing associations in the city of Groningen?*

## 1.3 Thesis structure


The thesis comprises of five chapters, including this one. Chapter 2 elaborates on the theoretical framework where crucial concepts in social housing visions and decentralisation are presented, and the main theory is explicitly proposed. To better understand the variables that will be observed to answer the primary research question, concepts like decentralisation, neo-liberalisation, opportunity space and effectiveness in social housing policies will be explained. Moreover, in the consecutive paragraphs the conceptual model is visualised. In Chapter 3 the data collection and analysis methods are discussed in detail, including ethical and scientific considerations. Then, in Chapter 4 the findings of the research are presented and analysed, and the secondary research questions are answered. Furthermore, the findings are illustrated through quotes from conducted interviews, and tables. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a discussion on the overall research and the findings, followed by conclusions and recommendations. The answer to the main research question is also given in Chapter 5.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

To answer the primary research question it is important to understand key concepts that lead to a particular outcome, and to link the concepts in a theory so as to create an open and recursive relationship amongst them (Turkington, 2010). Furthermore, the researcher should remain flexible to improve upon the proposed theory. Hence, in the subsequent paragraphs the crucial concepts will be discussed in detail, and then finally will be connected and visualised through a conceptual model. This model results from the various assumptions made by the researcher in order to explain how the natural system – the field of policy making for social housing – operates (Wohl, 2010). The main focus of the thesis is on decentralisation in the social domain, and whether it has led to an improved opportunity space for the housing associations in the municipality of Groningen for social housing visions. As such, the key concepts decentralisation (§2.1), opportunity space and with it path dependency (Dagnino, 2013) (§2.2), and effectiveness (§2.3) need to be defined, in order to promote comprehensive research design and data collection (Yin, 2009).

### 2.1 Defining decentralisation

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the late 1980s brought forth a paradigm shift in planning theory (Healey, 1996), with the notion that more context-dependent, relativistic views on spatial policies were needed to deal with the increasing complexity in society (Byrne, 2003; De Roo, 2015). From this paradigm a desire for less centralised, top-down, command-and-control emerged, and seemingly bottom-up, communicative planning took shape (De Roo, 2015; Healey, 1996). A phenomenon that resulted from this communicative turn (Healey, 1996) was that of decentralisation. Interestingly, decentralisation has a multitude of interpretations, notions, and definitions; therefore in this thesis the main definition used by De Vries (2000) is adopted. Simply put decentralisation is the “devolution of power and responsibility over policies from the national level to the local level” (De Vries, 2000, p.193). This is also in line with Allers and De Kam’s (2010) definition that focuses on the shift from a ‘higher’ to a ‘lower’ administrative level. What this means is that the governmental tasks – such as policy making for zoning developments; distribution and allocation of public goods and services – are transferred from the national State to lower authoritative layers (De Vries, 2000). Furthermore, this transfer is made successful through intergovernmental competition which in turn leads to policy innovation (Bardhan, 2002; Strumpf, 2002). Zuidema (2016) describes decentralisation more by adding the dimension of complexity, where it can be used as an adaptive measure to cope with increased complexity. Figure 1 illustrates this authoritative and communicatively rational decentralisation.



**Figure 1:** The process of decentralisation within the framework for planning oriented action (Zuidema, 2016, p.35).

By bringing decision-making to the local level, parties and people are facilitated in influencing policy making (Zuidema, 2016). The general claims of the advantages that decentralisation based on De Vries' (2000) definition can bring are as follows. Lemos and Agrawal (2006) indicate that when decentralisation is successful it holds three beneficial changes:

- I. greater efficiencies – in policies and government tasks – because of intergovernmental competition;
- II. promoting of more participation and accountability, since decision-making is brought closer to those affected by governance; finally,
- III. decision makers can more precisely allocate resources – public goods and services – in virtue of time- and place-specific knowledge (Barankay & Lockwood, 2007).

In regards to the Netherlands, decentralisation holds additional executive and regulatory tasks for local authorities (Boogers et al., 2008), e.g. constitutional caring tasks in the social domain. The administrative power necessary to warrant care in the social domain, can be divided into three components: executive capacity, decision capacity, and accountability. The first component includes the degree to which municipalities possess the proper knowledge needed to execute tasks such as providing houses for citizens in their respective cities or towns (Boogers et al., 2008). The second component refers to the capacity of municipalities to adjust decentralised housing visions to local needs and circumstances (Vonk, 2016; Vermeulen, 2017). The third, and last, component encompasses the extent to which municipalities can account for the realisation of national policy goals and standards – i.e. using more sustainable materials for housing constructions, and maintaining housing affordability (Leidelmeijer et al., 2018). Furthermore, the Dutch State is obligated to accommodate the opportunity for municipalities to perform their respective tasks, as per the *Gemeentewet* (1992, §2, artikel 117) – that obligates the Prime Minister to expedite decentralisation for municipalities.

In terms of decentralisation in the social domain, the introduction of the *Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning* (Wmo) in 2007 entails that tasks of caring for those who suffer from psychological or psycho-sociological problems were delegated from the State to municipalities (Van Nijendaal, 2014; *Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning*, 2015, §2, artikel 1.2.1). Examples of these tasks are: providing public participatory support, and allocating specialised housing. From 2015 and onwards – as per the *Woningwet* 2015 – decentralisation of core housing policies further placed municipalities in charge of housing visions (Rijksoverheid, 2015). Correspondingly, housing associations have to cope with more expectations from policy makers, while experiencing budget cuts and national policy hindrance to their financial performance of primary tasks as per the *Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II* (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014). Essentially, these primary tasks consist of renting social houses to lower income groups (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014), renovating houses as per the urban renewal movement (Boelhouwer, 2007), and allocating houses to those who are unable to do so for themselves (Priemus, 2003; Woltjer et al., 2014).

### 2.1.1 Decentralisation in social housing

With the general concept of decentralisation in the Netherlands defined, it is time to elaborate upon what decentralisation meant for the social housing sector. Therefore, an overview of laws and regulations, and their implications for housing associations and municipalities will be provided in this paragraph.


To begin with, social housing was first introduced in the Woningwet of 1901, but only in the 1920s did municipalities and housing associations become familiar with large scale building for the housing stock (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014). Subsequently, after the Second World War the massive housing shortage led to an increased role of planning for the construction of new housing (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014). This trend of technical planning (De Roo, 2015) reached its peak in the 1970s, because home ownership became more feasible (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014), and a new appreciation for suburban and rural-urban housing developments emerged (Woltjer et al., 2014). Specifically, the Tweede Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening [Second Spatial Planning Memorandum] of 1966 introduced the term 'bundled deconcentration' which limited urban development in terms of population, employment opportunities, and services to so called centres of growth (Ter Heide, 1965). As a result, suburban regions saw less development but increased property availability for home-owners (Pffug, 2016). Figure 2 illustrates this particular development in the housing market, where a gradual increase in owner-occupied dwellings can be seen for the period of 1947-2010. Conjointly, a peak in social rent ownership is noteworthy in 1985, with a slow decline afterwards. Elsinga and Wassenberg (2014) further observed this slow decrease from 2005 and onwards after the economic crisis.

	1947	1956	1967	1975	1985	1993	2005	2010
Owner-occupied	28	30	33	39	43	48	53	59
Private rent	61	46	31	20	14	11	10	9
Social rent	11	24	36	41	43	41	37	34

**Figure 2:** Overview of the housing stock between 1945-2010 (Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014, p.26).

However, the overall share of rental houses has regained some of its momentum with the economic recovery after 2011 (CBS et al., 2018). Respectively in figure 3 more social rental occupations of new houses built in 2011 and later are notable compared to the period of 1991-2010. Moreover, figure 3 illustrates the dilemma of urban renewal, with around 45% of the houses built between 1945 and 1970 falling under social housing stock it is difficult for housing associations to renovate given their limited revenue (CBS et al., 2018). Subsequently, the total housing comprises for 32% of social housing, which in relation to figure 2 indicates attempts by housing associations to generate cash flow through plot selling (Vermeulen, 2017).





**Figure 3:** Ownership of housing stock based on type of occupation and year of construction between 2012-2017 (CBS et al., 2018).

Aside from liberalisation (§2.1.2) and market related changes, a substantial amount of policy changes have led to the current social housing stock in the Netherlands (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014; Vermeulen, 2017). For instance, housing associations gained a key role in urban renewal, and in balancing the housing market between social and commercial landlords through facilitating lower income groups in social housing (Boelhouwer, 2007; Elsinga & Wassenberg, 2014). Additionally, the central government delegated more of its power and tasks to lower level authorities, which meant that the constitutional tasks of the State became municipal tasks over the last three decades (Woltjer et al., 2014). Especially, the three main government tasks with regards to the social domain in the *Grondwet* [Constitution] (2018, hoofdstuk 1, artikel 22) were increasingly decentralised (Van Nijendaal, 2014). The tasks are respectively:

- the government takes measures to improve public health;
- the government is responsible for guaranteeing and accommodating sufficient housing;
- the government stimulates conditions under which societal and cultural development and leisurely activities can take place (*Grondwet*, 2018, hoofdstuk 1, artikel 22).

In table 1 the specific laws and regulations, and policy programmes are depicted with regards to the decentralisation of the social domain and its impacts in the Dutch housing sector. Moreover, the implications for both the housing associations as well as for the municipalities are emphasised.

Type of administrative process	Laws, regulations and policies in the Dutch housing sector	Functions and meaning	Implications for municipalities	Implications for housing associations
<b>Centralisation of housing policy making</b>	<i>Woningwet 1901</i>	<p>The liberalisation of the nineteenth century had run its course, and as a result social issues were accumulating at the office of the central government.</p> <p>The State took on the issue of providing affordable houses for the lower income labour class (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>). The State was however not in charge of implementing the housing policies, rather the municipalities received loans to perform this task.</p>	<p>Although the State had the responsibility of public housing, it was the municipalities that were given the task of implementing housing policies (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>).</p> <p>Further municipalities were responsible for accommodating housing associations in their freedom to build, and for stimulating initiatives.</p> <p>In 1910 after the Woningwet 1901 was in full effect, municipalities ended up building a significant amount of social houses as the housing associations refrained from doing so (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>).</p>	<p>The market stock had become increasingly inaccessible for the lower income labourers, mostly due to commercialised housing developments that did not meet the high demand for affordable standardised public houses. As a result, housing associations were placed in charge of building and selling social houses (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>).</p> <p>New housing developments had to be initiated by housing associations (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>).</p>
<b>Decentralisation of public housing</b>	<i>Woningwet 1991</i>	<p>From the perspective of simplification and deregulation, a decentralisation in regulations for the building of public housing is required (<i>Woningwet</i>, 2018). Such regulations include building codes for the location and appearance of buildings; safety standards for building structures (Stibbe, 2015).</p> <p>Furthermore, the notion of urban renewal is pursued with the aim to improve liveability and safety, increasing the quality of the buildings, and facilitating economic, social and</p>	<p>Municipalities became responsible for defining building codes, as well as regulations on building plots, e.g. to counteract the development of housing on contaminated soil (Stibbe, 2015). In addition, the municipal council defines policy rules and criteria to meet the set building codes.</p> <p>What this generally meant, was that public housing regulations were delegated from the State to municipalities. Consequently, municipalities were allowed to make</p>	<p>Housing associations are categorised as ‘authorised institutions’ that focus on public housing developments and the related various interests (Stibbe, 2015). Generally, the relationship with the municipalities had not changed, although with the increasing scale of the social housing market many housing associations merged into larger organisations to cope with their responsibilities financially (Cobouw, 1995). The reason for this change was that with the Woningwet 1991 housing associations became explicitly responsible for the allocation of affordable rental houses for pre-eminently low income groups of people,</p>

		environmental support (Stibbe, 2015).	autonomous decision to intervene in the housing market in case of an emergency to improve the public housing stock (Stibbe, 2015).	who are not able to acquire houses on their own (Stibbe, 2015). The core tasks consisted of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• acquiring, building, encumbering and alienating real estate;</li> <li>• making provisions for homes;</li> <li>• renting out houses;</li> <li>• maintaining houses;</li> <li>• exploitation of housing property;</li> <li>• destination of credit balances;</li> <li>• financial policy and management;</li> <li>• process reporting;</li> <li>• administrative structuring;</li> <li>• meeting and informing tenants.</li> </ul>
<b>Decentralisation of the social domain</b>	<i>Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten (Wvg) 1994</i>	<p>The State withdraws from providing disabled people with housing provisions, housing allocation, and living facilities (<i>Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten</i>, 1993).</p> <p>Instead, municipalities are tasked with accommodating housing provisions, transportation arrangements, and wheelchairs (Van der Veer et al., 2011).</p> <p>Moreover, the municipalities received the aforementioned State responsibilities in the social domain with regards to the disabled (<i>Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten</i>, 1993).</p>	<p>The introduction of the Wvg 1994 resulted in a decentralisation of responsibilities and tasks in the social domain. Increasingly municipalities were placed in charge of providing specialised facilities and provisions for the physically disabled people (<i>Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten</i>, 1993, §2, artikel 2).</p> <p>Ultimately, this change led to housing policies that had to include plans and regulations for this group of people.</p> <p>Additionally, municipalities were held accountable for the expenses for the various measures that had to be taken; nonetheless it was possible to receive a benefit from the State up to a limit of twenty thousand Euros (<i>Wet voorzieningen gehandicapten</i>, 1993, §2, artikel 10a).</p>	<p>Although, the Woningwet 1991 marked an era of new responsibilities, and a large range of tasks for housing associations, the Wvg 1994 did not explicitly pertain to these authorised institutions.</p>

<p><b>Liberalisation in the social housing market</b></p>	<p><i>Wet balansverkorting geldelijke steun volkshuisvesting 1995 (Bruteringswet 1994)</i></p>	<p>Essentially the Bruteringswet consisted of two parts: first the State would provide subsidies to housing associations with future expenses in mind (brutering); second housing associations were expected to repay all State loans at once (Priemus, 2015). The aim was to reduce financial pressure on the State, since public housing made up 10% of the State total budget in the 1990s (Priemus, 2015). Additionally, the State saw an opportunity to ease the government debt as per the European union's requirements (Priemus, 2015).</p>	<p>Municipalities were responsible in coordination with housing associations to provide data in order to accurately determine the budget based on real estate and other property owned by housing associations within a given municipal junction (<i>Wet balansverkorting geldelijke steun volkshuisvesting, 1995, artikel 3, lid 2</i>).</p>	<p>Housing associations experienced an increased financial basis from 1995 onwards and therefore more freedom in their spending as well as contracting activities (Priemus, 2015). At the same time the State retreated from intervening in the housing market, while guaranteeing the alleviation of debt of housing associations if they were incapable of doing so themselves. This further meant that housing associations could apply for loans at a lower interest rate (Priemus, 2015).</p> <p>In general, the Bruteringswet arranged for more freedom in the social housing sector, and the housing market as a whole (Priemus, 2015).</p>
<p><b>Decentralisation and liberalisation in public housing</b></p>	<p><i>The Housing Memorandum: 'What people want, where people live' (2000-2010)</i></p>	<p>Improve housing quality:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "More freedom of choice;</li> <li>• attention paid to societal values;</li> <li>• an involved government and restrained market forces" (Priemus, 2001, p.320)</li> </ul> <p>Promote tailor-made housing policies (Priemus, 2001)</p>	<p>Municipalities have to formulate a clear distinction between when and how they select parties for the implementation of their policies and plans</p> <p>Distinguish in situations in which:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a competition model is applied: commercial parties dominate owing to municipal concessions</li> <li>• performance agreements are applied to ensure a partnership between housing associations (Priemus, 2001)</li> </ul>	<p>Housing associations should serve a differentiated group of tenants (lowest income) and improve housing quality</p> <p>Social tasks in the broader playing field of housing can only be entered through performance agreements with the municipality</p> <p>However, the client pool becomes one-sided, and more freedom is given in organising the relationship with the municipality (Priemus, 2001)</p>

<p><b>Regulated liberalisation in the housing market</b></p>	<p><i>Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II</i></p>	<p>Establishment of the 'Verhuurdeheffing' (landlord tax) with regards to social housing in order to improve rental and buyer property in the housing market (<i>Wet maatregelen woningmarkt, 2014</i>).</p> <p>Landlords are required to pay taxes in addition to their income tax on the basis of housing revenue, which comprises of the sum of the cadastral values of their social housing property (<i>Wet maatregelen woningmarkt, 2014, hoofdstuk 1, afdeling 3, artikel 1.6, lid 1</i>).</p> <p>The landlord tax amount to 0.561% of the taxable revenue (<i>Wet maatregelen woningmarkt, 2014, hoofdstuk 1, afdeling 4, artikel 1.7</i>), however landlords are eligible for tax reduction on the basis of their housing output type (<i>Wet maatregelen woningmarkt, 2014, hoofdstuk 1, afdeling 6, artikel 1.10</i>). Tax reduction can be as high as ten thousand Euros depending on the sustainability of the houses, and its type (<i>Wet maatregelen woningmarkt, 2014, hoofdstuk 1, afdeling 6, artikel 1.11</i>).</p>	<p>It is uncommon for municipalities to intervene in the housing market as landlords, and as such the <i>Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II</i> does not pertain to local governments.</p>	<p>With the introduction of the landlord tax housing associations have increasingly experienced a diminishing opportunity space to invest in the housing market (Van Nijendaal, 2014). As a result, cheaper social houses saw a decline, while more expensive rental houses saw an increase (BZK, 2016).</p> <p>Whereas affordability is the core principle in the housing market, it is apparent that a 3% increase in rent followed the period after 2014 (BZK, 2016). Presumably an attempt to cope with the landlord tax by housing associations.</p> <p>Contrastingly, commercial housing developers experienced an increased opportunity space, and therefore an advantage to compete with housing associations (Boelhouver &amp; Priemus, 2014).</p>
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<p><b>Decentralisation of the social domain</b></p>	<p><i>Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning (Wmo) 2015</i></p>	<p>The Wmo 2007 marked the beginning of the decentralisation of the duty of care from the State to municipalities (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>b</sup>). Its amendment in 2015 further aimed to accommodate citizens in their participation in society, especially those who are insufficiently self-reliant to partake in social activities (<i>Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning</i>, 2015). In particular people with chronic psychological or physic-social problems were to be facilitated by municipalities, and other general organised government support.</p> <p>Ultimately, the Wmo focuses on guiding, stimulating, and managing citizens personal capacities at the relevant scale – municipality (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>b</sup>).</p>	<p>For municipalities the <i>Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning</i> (2015, §2, artikel 1.2.1) entailed an increasing duty of care in aiding those who are incapable of independently functioning and participating in society due to a disability or psychological problems. Specifically for social housing policies, the municipalities were expected to provide protected housing, and shelters (<i>Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning</i>, 2015, §2, artikel 1.2.1).</p> <p>Although, the goal would generally remain to stimulate a bond between citizens, who would be willing to lend a hand to those less fortunate (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>b</sup>), the municipalities took on the responsibility in the social domain.</p>	<p>With a focus on specialised housing developments, like shelters, housing associations were at large the executors of projects (Elsinga &amp; Wassenberg, 2014). Therefore, the Wmo implicitly implied that housing associations along with the municipalities were in charge of providing specialised housing in addition to rental social housing (BZK, 2017).</p>
<p><b>Regulated liberalisation in the housing market</b></p>	<p><i>Woningwaarderingstelsel (WWS) 2015</i></p>	<p>The cadastral value system, also known as the point system, is used to determine the maximum rent for social houses. This point system does apply to the free commercial housing sector (Rijksoverheid, 2019<sup>b</sup>). The larger the floor area of a house, the higher the rental price (Rijksoverheid, 2019<sup>b</sup>).</p> <p>The point system holds some merit in the sense that social housing rental costs are distributed more fairly and legitimately, however it limits the capacity of housing associations to meet the norm of renting out 80% of</p>	<p>The WWS is an exclusive regulation on housing associations; the municipalities are not liable for the cadastral value of plots, nor tasked with imposing taxes (Waarderingskamer, 2019).</p> <p>Still, municipalities are responsible for annual reports on the cadastral value of real estate in the respective cities and towns, and are required to inform tenants on these values through an ordinance (Waarderingskamer, 2019).</p>	<p>In addition to core tasks, housing associations have to carefully allocate social houses to tenants that meet the requirements in regards to income, mental state, and societal status (Rijksoverheid, 2019<sup>c</sup>). Essentially, housing associations can freely distribute 10% of their social housing property in the free housing market.</p> <p>Furthermore, the cadastral value has increased due to the WWS and revitalisation of the economy (BZK, 2018). As a result, housing associations have to manage their assets so as to generate higher revenue than what is needed for core tasks. This puts more pressure on their performance as</p>

		their social housing property (Rijksoverheid, 2019 <sup>c</sup> ).		expectations and costs are increasing, while revenue is limited owing to the landlord tax (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014).
<b>Decentralisation in public housing</b>	<i>Woningwet 2015</i>	<p>The Woningwet 2015 aimed to simplify and reduce the number of regulations concerning the social housing market, and decentralise regulative responsibilities in regards to construction and public housing (<i>Woningwet</i>, 2018).</p> <p>Three key actors, housing associations, municipalities and tenants define a set of performance agreements to match the local housing demand and market (Rijksoverheid, 2015).</p>	<p>Municipalities received delegated administrative tasks and power from the State in the housing market, which include devising building codes, allocating plots for social housing construction; defining criteria which relate to technical and structural requirements of buildings (<i>Woningwet</i>, 2018, hoofdstuk II, afdeling 3, artikel 12).</p> <p>Subsequently, housing visions became more focused on the relationship with housing associations (BZK, 2017), wherein municipalities were responsible to specify themes such as construction of social housing developments for the total housing stock in a given municipality, affordability, and other related issues (Rijksoverheid, 2015).</p> <p>With the rise of housing visions, in recent years the performance agreements between municipalities and housing associations have become a prominent aspect of the Dutch housing system (BZK, 2017).</p>	<p>The core target groups for housing associations remain the lowest income groups of people, though the Woningwet further guarantees high quality of social housing, limited financial risks, and adequate allocation of social houses (Rijksoverheid, 2015).</p> <p>Additionally, housing associations return to the core tasks of constructing, renting and managing social houses in order to facilitate low income groups, or people who are unable to find appropriate housing on their own (Rijksoverheid, 2015).</p>

**Table 1:** Overview of crucial laws, regulations, and policy programmes with regards to decentralisation in the housing sector.

Evidently, table 1 illustrates a gradual decentralisation of core tasks in the social domain, and as a result a shift in responsibilities of housing associations in the social housing sector. As discussed earlier, detrimental laws and regulations for the current institutional landscape of the Dutch housing system include the Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II, the Wmo 2015, the WWS 2015, and finally the Woningwet 2015. Notably, the State is taking a distance from the housing market, while municipalities and housing associations are becoming increasingly more liable for housing visions and policies (Rijksoverheid, 2015; BZK, 2017). The question, however, arises whether more decentralisation of core tasks in the social housing sector is preferable and beneficial for municipalities and housing associations in terms of their performance and capacities. Moreover, the aforementioned laws and regulations aim to increase the integration and collaboration between municipalities and housing associations, but to what extent has this explicit relationship improved housing policy implementation? These two questions bring forth a set of hypotheses:

*Hypothesis I: more decentralisation of tasks in the social domain leads to a larger opportunity space to construct, renovate and allocate social houses for a differentiated target group.*

Especially, Purcell (2006) emphasises the local trap that results from decentralisation, which leads to diminished opportunity space (§2.2) because the local authorities become reliant on national regulations and support while becoming overburdened with additional tasks that outstrip their capabilities (Zuidema, 2016). Therefore, the potential negative aspects of decentralisation of the social domain are tested.

*Hypothesis II: the emphasis on collaboration between municipalities and housing associations as a result of the Woningwet 2015 leads to more effectiveness of performance agreements between the two parties in terms of legitimacy and transparency.*

Increased collaboration can be beneficial as municipalities have essentially become reliant on housing associations to implement policies, and vice versa (BZK, 2017). However, overreliance does not necessarily lead to better implementation of housing policies; rather it means that a more intricate relationship has to be established between the local actors (Zuidema, 2016). To test whether decentralisation of the social domain has increased the success rate of the implementation of social housing policies to meet desirable outcomes set by housing associations and the municipality, hypothesis II is formulated.

### **2.1.2 Neo-liberalisation in the social housing sector**

Concurrently, as can be seen in table 1 a trend of liberalisation in the social housing market is increasingly taking place. Liberalisation in the social housing market in the Netherlands began at large with the Bruteringswet 1994 (see table 1), this 'Brutering' ['Grossing and balancing operation'] meant that the State was no longer responsible for the budgets of housing associations and the intervention in the housing market (Priemus, 2015). In fact it disbanded the welfare state's explicit influence in the housing market, and placed housing associations 'to stand on their own feet'. Generally, this form of liberalisation is referred to as neo-liberalisation, because it involves a new mode of socioeconomic regulation and a shift from disruptive State policies and welfare considerations in the free market to providing room for market-oriented and market-dependent approaches (Allmendinger, 2017). In the early nineteenth century in the Netherlands the State saw a declining housing stock and an excluding housing market for lower income groups, which resulted from late eighteenth century liberalism (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>). However, as the welfare state emerged after the Woningwet of 1901, housing associations became more specialised in providing affordable houses for this distinctive group of people. Consequently, inequality in the housing market became an issue: active State interventions in the housing market increased the equality of housing occupants, but adversely decreased the freedom in that very same market (Allmendinger, 2017). Therefore in the 1990s (even as early



as the 1970s in certain fields of planning) new forms of liberalisation were introduced to both increase market freedom, and maintain an affordable and adequate housing stock (Aalbers et al., 2017; Allmendinger, 2017).

The latter attempt to bridge the market and government institutions in the 1990s is similar to the British social housing change since the 1970s (Malpass & Victory, 2010). With the term residualisation in social housing this process of neo-liberalisation is related to a change in the composition of the housing sector over time (Burrows, 1999). What this means is that with new regulations to allow more financial and market freedom for housing associations, while restricting their primary target group to low income tenants, an imbalance emerges between the groups entering the social housing market and those leaving it (Burrows, 1999). In general, those who enter are part of the lowest income demographic, whereas those who leave possess a higher income usually in the middle class. For housing associations this implied that while they were free to invest in diverse real estate like public schools (Rijksoverheid, 2015), their average revenue would be lower than commercial housing developers who would then see an increase in middle- to high income clients (Aalbers et al., 2017). Furthermore, in recent years with the *Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II* social housing associations have experienced increased costs like the landlord tax, and the cadastral value system (table 1).

Thus, it can be said that neo-liberalisation along with decentralisation of the social domain (§2.1.1) have led to a more limited opportunity space for housing associations. Even though, competition in the housing market can lead to better outcomes in terms of quality and affordability of houses (Allmendinger, 2017), housing associations are restricted in and to a certain extent disadvantaged against commercial competition. For instance, housing associations are not allowed to invest in schools. Hence, the following hypotheses can be formulated to reflect this opportunity space:

*Hypothesis III: regulated neo-liberalisation of housing association responsibilities in the social housing market has led to a smaller opportunity space for housing associations to invest in non-traditional real estate.*

## **2.2 Opportunity space and path dependency**

Dagnino (2013) focuses on a framework of strategic capabilities and opportunities within a capability research, and by introducing capability space and opportunity space both the supply and demand side are discussed. The main idea is that there is a gap between opportunity space and capability space, and that a bridge needs to be built. Similarly, Allers and De Kam (2014), and Zuidema (2016) discuss in their respective articles the paradox of decentralisation, where it is implied that in order for municipalities to utilise their opportunity for innovative policies central governments need to keep checks and balances so as to improve their capability. Therefore, it is critical to define opportunity space in the context of decentralised policy making (for social housing).

To begin with, Sugden (2003) sees opportunity as a good that can be distributed among individuals, and which should be given equally, or rather the access to this advantage should be equal. Essentially, opportunity is not about the choice that people can make, instead it is about the space for development and expression of individuality (Sugden, 2003). Principally, the individuality is a key factor in decentralisation, not in the sense that individuals pursue their personal goals, but that municipalities are given the space to develop personalised, context-dependent policies which reflect the interests of the individuals living at that level (Boogers et al., 2008; Zuidema, 2016). Dagnino (2013) elaborates upon this concept by theorising a co-evolutionary relationship between organisational capability space and opportunity space. Dagnino (2013) defines capability as the knowledge that organisations possess that enables them to perform old and new activities such as the creation of tangible products (houses), and


the provision of services (consultancy, social support, etc.). This definition is in line with Boogers et al.'s (2008) definition of administrative power, which helps bridge the two concepts for decentralised policy making. Following, the capability space is seen as a complex, "multidimensional, fluid and evolving space where all the possible strategic capabilities accessible to a firm at any one point in time and space are present" (Dagnino, 2013, p.6). Since local authorities are constantly entangled in an evolving space around them, their capabilities change with time (De Roo, 2015). This definition of capability space is paramount for understanding opportunity space. Dagnino (2013, p.9) envisions this concept as a complex, and evolving space that "encompasses all the opportunities a firm may recognize and grasp in any one time period". Specifically, the use of the words 'may recognise' is paramount in understanding how decentralisation can affect the opportunity space.

This is where path dependency emerges as an argument against decentralisation. How realistic is it to assume that municipalities make autonomous and conscious decisions for which policies to follow? Zuidema (2016) argues that choices relating to decentralisation are contingent upon the degree to which local authorities are willing and able to perform given decentralised tasks. Often there is a lack of expertise and finances to perform certain tasks, or there is less willingness due to a potential economic setback (Zuidema, 2016). As a response the central government keeps checks and balances – for instance, regulations on what qualifies as the bare minimum performance that a municipality can have – to stimulate local willingness. Additionally, the State can subsidise certain developments, which gives an incentive to municipalities to pursue policy making in that direction (Zuidema, 2016). Questionably, municipalities appear to serve as internal parties to implement national policies at the local level through housing associations or other contractors. Furthermore, municipal choices are based on the background of the policy makers, which can lead to path dependency (Hassink, 2005; Rauws et al., 2014; Sorensen, 2015). Path dependency implies that due to reliance on the past (Hassink, 2005), and increasing complexity of interlocking institutions (Sorensen, 2015) only a limited number of possible development paths can be pursued (Rauws et al., 2014).

In other words, there is a paradox in decentralisation that manifests from the idea that the more tasks are delegated by the State to the municipalities the more national policy makers have to devise regulations to keep municipalities in check (Van Nijendaal, 2014; Vonk, 2016). Besides, the administrative power of municipalities is oftentimes lacking due to decentralisation, and municipalities are forced to cooperate or to merge together which then leads to re-centralisation (Allers & De Kam, 2010). Likewise, choices are path dependent and recurrently steered by national agendas (Boogers et al., 2008).

### **2.2.1 The local trap**

Opportunity space, path dependency, and the decentralisation paradox are all components of what Purcell (2006) calls the local trap. This phenomenon stems from the notion that the local scale is intrinsically better than other scales for achieving positive localised outcomes. However, it is not wise to assume that a scale has positive or negative characteristics a priori the situation and issue at hand is fully understood (Purcell, 2006). It can be even debated that is a dangerous perspective to take on scales for developing strategy, as it can result in path dependency – or tunnel vision – since alternative scales to the local are dismissed a priori (Rauws et al., 2014). Also the local trap can be seen as the illusion that the opportunity space of municipalities is greater at the local level, without taking into account that opportunities may be overlooked by local policy makers (Zuidema, 2016). Figure 4 illustrates how local governments behave when they are given more control over their policy and strategic choices (Zuidema, 2016). An enriched opportunity space (Dagnino, 2003) in local governmental policy making results largely in adequate performance, with a high number of governments operating at the minimally tolerable level (Zuidema, 2016).



**Figure 4:** Possible spread of governance performance at the local level without (left) and with (right) checks and balances (Zuidema, 2016, p.38).

The reason for such a limited performance is seemingly due to the high investments required to surpass the minimum level – a burden to the local authorities and actors. Naturally, to reduce this burden a set of checks and balances is instated by the central government (Zuidema, 2016). Ironically, this is contradictory to decentralisation, because local authorities become overstressed and begin relying on the central policies and regulations to support their performance. In such cases, the question emerges whether centralised policy making would not have resulted in better policy making performance (Dagnino, 2003; Zuidema, 2016). Consequently, it can be further questioned whether increased opportunity space is necessary for effective housing policies implementation. As indicated by Dagnino (2003) ample opportunities do not automatically lead to the utilisation and pursuit of the given opportunities, rather it depends on the capacity of actors to recognise and seize the opportunity space. However, for housing associations such opportunities can be related to locations for building, type of tenants other than low income groups, and cash flow through other activities than renting (Aalbers et al., 2017). Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formulated on the basis of increased opportunity space for generating revenue off of social housing property:

*Hypothesis IV: housing associations experience less opportunity space for intervening in the housing market when they exclusively focus on their core tasks without straying away from the performance agreements with the Municipality of Groningen.*

### 2.3 Defining effective social housing policy

The concept of effectiveness of policy used in this thesis is adopted from Chanchitpricha and Bond (2013) – who divide effectiveness of impact assessment into four categories. For this research, social housing policies are substituted for impact assessments, as both – urban and environmental policies – can be seen as means and visions towards improving the living conditions of cities and people (Sadler, 1996). Effectiveness of policy is then defined as the extent to which:

- the policy works, and conforms to established provisions and principles (procedurally);
- its assumptions and goals contribute to decision-making for project developments – e.g. social rent apartments – and meet the demand in the housing market at the minimum cost of resources (transactively);
- the policy achieves its intended aims (substantively);
- the stakeholders are satisfied with their involvement, and the process of policy making (normatively) (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013).

Evidently, procedural effectiveness does not fit with the aim of this research, because this type of effectiveness focuses on what process took place, and which procedures were used (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013). However, the aim of this research is to evaluate the outcome of decentralised social housing visions, as opposed to the process of implementing said policies. Therefore, effectiveness of decentralised social housing policy uses the transactive, substantive, and normative dimensions of effectiveness of impact assessment.

To further explain what effectiveness means the three types will be discussed separately. First, transactive effectiveness is achieved when “resources in term[s] of human resources...” and where “cost and time are invested at the minimum level to achieve set or efficient outcomes” (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013, p.69). What this refers to in social housing policies is that the implementation process which consists of: the actions that housing associations should undertake like renovation, construction or allocation; carefully assessing for whom these housing developments or renewal are meant; which locations can be obtained for such activities (Rijksoverheid, 2015; Woltjer et al., 2014). So, housing associations are transactively effective when their property is allocated or developed within their capacities, while minimising costs and increasing revenue. Additionally, housing associations have to be able to adjust their resources in order to meet requirements in the social domain, such as 80% of their assets have to be rented to low income groups (Rijksoverheid, 2019c).

Second, substantive effectiveness can be considered when the set aims of the housing policy were achieved, and housing projects were built in the urban area (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013). Additionally, this type of effectiveness focuses on the performance and conformance of the policy makers, and their ability to satisfy local needs and interests, while allowing participation of housing associations (Sadler, 1996; Van Doren et al., 2012). Performance refers to whether a plan is working through a set of deliberations in the decision-making process of the plan (Van Doren et al., 2012). What this means is that the evaluation lies in the strategic policies of housing associations: when and how was the strategy implemented in the end? It focuses less on the outcome of the plan but rather more on the policies in social housing and how effectively housing associations could use the strategy’s contents given their capacities (Van Doren et al., 2012). Figure 3 illustrates how substantive effectiveness gradually increases as the conformity of the involved actors matures.




Figure 5: Gradual levels of substantive effectiveness of housing visions in the form of performance and conformance adapted from Van Doren et al. (2012, p.4).

Conformance is defined as the degree to which a determinate relationship between intention and outcome of a plan exists (Van Doren et al., 2012). In this sense conformity in the social

housing sector results from the deliberate choices made by housing associations and municipalities to meet intended outcomes. Using figure 5, if housing visions are accepted as the main tool used by municipalities and housing associations to develop performance agreements (Priemus, 2001) [note that performance agreements are not the same as substantive performance effectiveness], then following the gradual increase of conformity a housing policy is substantively effective when during its decision-making phase the housing visions were heavily consulted and the housing policy led to favourable social conditions for tenants (Van Doren et al., 2012). Such conditions can include affordable, sufficient, and differentiated housing (Zandstra, 2010). Figure 5 also illustrates that substantive effectiveness focuses on the process of policy making by housing associations (performance), and the implementation of these policies with regards to intended outcomes (conformance). Furthermore, substantive effectiveness can be acknowledged when the policy makers accurately predicted market trends – though it is not crucial (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013). Third, normative effectiveness relates to the widely accepted and desired status quo of a society (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013), and the extent to which the social housing policies succeeded in meeting the desired goals of the municipality responsible for the policy making. In addition, normative effectiveness focuses on the experiences of housing associations: how they coped with their core tasks given the decentralisation of the social domain, on what basis the key questions to undertake actions in the housing market were answered (Woltjer et al., 2014).

With effectiveness defined, it is time to turn to the outcome of effectiveness, and which goals the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen have set with the current housing vision. It is important to note that with the recent elections of the municipal council, there are no executive policies as of yet (Gemeente Groningen, 2018). Still, the draft housing vision contained within the Coalition Agreement 2019-2022 holds valuable information on which approach the new council has taken. These include the experienced relationship between housing associations and the municipality (normative effectiveness; substantive performance effectiveness), the implementation of social housing policies (transactive effectiveness) and which legislative trends have led to these policies (substantive conformance effectiveness); lastly the experienced opportunity space of housing associations taking into account the new laws and regulations (normative effectiveness) – see table 1.

The Municipality of Groningen aims for three characteristics of housing in the city of Groningen with the current housing vision, namely good quality, affordable, and situated in a liveable neighbourhood (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>). Subsequently, in terms of quantity, in the next four years the goal is to build more than eight thousand houses (Van den Berg, 2017), of which 1127 rent housing developments have received a permit to be built in the first quarter of 2019 (Veenstra, 2019). The Municipality of Groningen aspires to stimulate partnerships with housing associations, and more commercial and residential initiatives (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>). Furthermore, the Municipality of Groningen acknowledges that with the current national policy agenda of the ruling cabinet – Rutte III – private project developers have earned the highest revenue (Van Nijendaal, 2014). The latter is unfavourable as housing associations and the municipality have to spend more in order to assure that lower income tenants are facilitated (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>).

### **2.3.1 Conclusive thoughts**

Taking into account, the new housing vision of the Municipality of Groningen the outcome of effectiveness for the case of Groningen can be defined. For transactive effectiveness of social housing policies in the city of Groningen, the expenditure gap between housing associations and private project developers needs to be closed. Thus, new housing policies should reduce the cost of implementation for housing associations. In terms of substantive effectiveness the housing associations need to achieve all of the intended aims: generate sufficient and affordable housing, which are of good quality and reduce segregation between social tenants and commercial

tenants (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>). Lastly, normative effectiveness is reached once the Municipality of Groningen has established an inclusive housing market, which allows affordable housing projects throughout the city of Groningen without compromising the ability of housing associations to generate revenue in a differentiated market (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>). Appropriately, to evaluate how effective the current housing strategies of housing associations are, given laws and regulations in 2019, the following hypothesis can be tested.

*Hypothesis V: individual housing associations focus respectively on one of the core tasks in order to maximise the effectiveness of specialised housing strategies.*

Since the budget of housing associations is significantly declining due to the new laws and regulations (table 1), it is to be expected that housing associations will have to make contemporary choices to effectively allocate assets and resources (Woltjer et al., 2014).

## **2.4 Identifying key actors in social housing**

The final step in building a theoretical framework for decentralised social housing is to identify the key actors and stakeholders in the city of Groningen. Generally, there are four main players in this field of planning: the residents, the housing associations/project developers, the municipality; the State (Woltjer et al., 2014). The residents are seen as the most important stakeholder, because they set the demand for housing developments in both the rent and buyer sector of the housing system. For this research, however, the aim is to evaluate policy on social housing, and as such the residents will not be addressed as the main stakeholder. The housing associations are authorised institutions – as stated in the *Woningwet* (2018, hoofdstuk 4, artikel 60, lid 1) – which share certain privileges and are responsible for a substantial part of the Dutch housing stock (Woltjer et al., 2014). In the city of Groningen there are more than fifteen authorised housing associations, with the largest corporations being Nijestee, Lefier, Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium, De Huismeesters and Wierden en Borgen (Woningcorporaties.nl, 2019). Indeed, housing associations are an important stakeholder in the implementation of decentralised social housing policies (Priemus, 2001), and therefore are a key stakeholder in this research. Moving on to the Municipality of Groningen, this stakeholder in the social housing sector serves the role of developing policies, and establishing performance agreements with housing associations (Rijksoverheid, 2018; Woltjer et al., 2014). As was mentioned earlier in §2.1.1, a performance agreement is made between the two stakeholders to ensure proper and legitimate investments, permits, project developments, and interventions in the housing market (Priemus, 2001; Woltjer et al., 2014). Finally, the State is an important player in the decentralised housing system, since it is responsible for laws and regulations, and keeps checks and balances on municipalities and housing associations (Woltjer et al., 2014; Zuidema, 2016). Nonetheless, the State does retain a large influence in the housing system, mostly in the private housing sector (Woltjer et al., 2014). Concurrently, the State enables municipalities to carry out decentralised tasks, and can therefore be seen as the main ‘employer’ of the local authorities (Allers & De Kam, 2010; Boogers et al., 2008).

## 2.5 Conceptual model

Ultimately, the different concepts that were defined and explained in the preceding paragraphs can be seen as parts of a larger system (Wohl, 2010). Appropriately, figure 6 illustrates the relationship and interactions between each of the concepts. Essentially, opportunity space of housing associations and local actors in the housing market is central to this conceptual model. Dagnino (2003) supports the idea that the capability of the actors to seize the opportunity and develop effective housing strategies depends on external and internal effects that shape the opportunity space. Therefore, the model holds an exploratory nature, where the 'Unknown factors affecting housing associations' represent the internal and external characteristics, differences and similarities between housing associations in the city of Groningen. Hence, this variable is deliberately left open. Still, the primary aim of the research is to evaluate the effects of new laws and regulations on the opportunity space of housing associations to devise effective housing strategies. However, by assuming that only external administrative effects shape the opportunity space one becomes ignorant to less obvious but equally impactful factors (Dagnino, 2003).



**Figure 6:** Conceptual model: the effects of neo-liberalisation and decentralisation of the social domain on the opportunity space of housing associations to devise effective housing strategies.

The key concepts decentralisation of the social domain (§2.1.1), neo-liberalisation in social housing (§2.1.2), opportunity space (§2.2), and effectiveness of housing strategies and policies (§2.3) are thoroughly defined in the respective paragraphs. Subsequently, the interrelatedness of these concepts will be elaborated upon.

### 2.5.1 Opportunity space interrelatedness

This central concept of the model is related to the degree of neo-liberalisation and decentralisation of the social domain (Boogers et al., 2008); unknown factors that influence the capability of housing associations to capitalise on the opportunity space (Aalbers et al., 2017). The effect of the former variables is expressed with 'IN' for gain and 'OUT' for loss, which translates to the amount of laws and regulations that expand or constrict the opportunity space of housing associations to intervene in the housing market (Aalbers et al., 2017; Vermeulen, 2017). For instance, neo-liberalisation meant that housing associations were financially

independent and could spend their budgets accordingly (Van der Lans, 2017<sup>a</sup>); thus the opportunity space is improved. Conjointly, neo-liberalisation led to increased costs such as the landlord tax, which in turn degrades the opportunity space to invest in social housing (Van Nijendaal, 2014). Equivalently, decentralisation of the social domain implies an expansion of the core tenant groups for housing associations, namely people with a disability (Rijksoverheid, 2015). Consequently, the opportunity space improves. However, this intervention is double-edged since housing associations have to cope with a plethora of tasks, and may experience dwindling budgets (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014). In the end, however, it is a highly perception-based matter whether housing associations experience an enhanced opportunity space or not.

### **2.5.2 Types of effective housing strategies outcome**

Fundamentally, the outcome of the recognised and experienced opportunity space depends on the degree to which the opportunity space was increased, decreased or stabilised by the external (administrative) and internal (unknown) factors (Dagnino, 2003). Ergo, three distinctive types of housing strategies emerge where the size of the opportunity space is detrimental to the effectiveness of the strategy.

#### *Effective housing strategy*

Taking into consideration the primary characteristics as per the current housing vision, housing associations have to implement various elements into new and existing social housing (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>). Social houses have to be sustainable, affordable, and have to serve a differentiated group (Van Nijendaal, 2014). Additionally, the process of construction, renovation and demolition of social houses has to lead to a minimum net expansion of 225 houses in the social housing stock annually (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>). Evidently, housing associations struggle to find the budget and resources to tackle all of the primary requirements (Swinkels, 2018). Therefore, effective housing strategies are most likely achieved when a high increase in the opportunity space is experienced (Dagnino, 2003). Hence, the label '*HIGH NET IN*' is indicative of a high net gain given the independent variables. For example, this could occur when housing associations are able to exploit the freedom of neo-liberalisation, and the additional clientele due to decentralisation of the social domain. However, as Swinkels (2018) indicates only less than half of the housing associations in the Netherlands achieved this degree of effectiveness in practice.

#### *Ineffective housing strategy*

In contrast to effective housing strategies, this variant is reached when housing associations experience a highly diminished opportunity space (Dagnino, 2003), or '*HIGH NET OUT*'. As a result of higher taxation from neo-liberal laws and regulations, housing associations have a smaller budget to invest in all of the agreed upon requirements for social housing in the city Groningen (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014). To illustrate, ineffective housing strategies in the city of Groningen entail a high cost for production and rent, while low revenue is generated and low satisfaction in terms of sustainability and demand is achieved.

#### *Specialised housing strategy*

Finally, this type of housing strategy is met when housing associations experience a balanced opportunity space that is neither diminished nor increased. By specialising, housing associations make sure to capitalise on their strengths and financial capacity to intervene in the housing market (Woltjer et al., 2014). Moreover, explicit choices are made on which actions to undertake, like construction, renovation etc. (Woltjer et al., 2014). The effectiveness of the strategies is lower given their less inclusive nature (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013).



### 3. Methodology

To answer the main research question ‘How has decentralisation of the social domain in the Netherlands affected the opportunity space of housing associations to carry out effective strategies aimed at construction, renovation, and making sustainable social housing in the city of Groningen since 2013?’ a framework of data collection and analysis techniques is necessary (Clifford et al., 2010). Since the aim of this thesis is to evaluate decentralisation in the Dutch social housing sector, and to unveil how this has affected the opportunity space of housing associations in the city of Groningen, it can be said that a qualitative research design is appropriate (Clifford et al., 2010). To elaborate upon the choice for qualitative methods, the study is essentially focused on human behaviour (Clifford et al., 2010), and intersubjective relations within the Dutch planning and institutional system (De Roo, 2015). Policy making is less about tangible results, but rather about devising a strategy or programme that follows a normative desire for the – better – future (De Roo, 2015; Surel, 2011). Ultimately, the case of Groningen is specifically chosen for the complexity in its field of spatial planning (Van Nijendaal, 2014).

#### 3.1 Data collection

The research in this thesis takes form of an evaluation study on decentralisation in the social domain and neo-liberalisation in the social housing market. Here case study evaluation (CSE) is used as the method to investigate a contemporary phenomenon – decentralised social housing policies in the city of Groningen – within its real-life context – the city of Groningen (Yin, 2009). As Crabbé and Leroy (2008, p.59) specify, CSE is about “studying and evaluating government interventions in their specific setting” – in this case the interventions of the Municipality of Groningen in the housing market through housing associations. Benefits of using CSE range from the ability to deploy the technique at any phase of the policy cycle – which allows ex-post evaluation of existing policies (Schoenefeld & Jordan, 2017) – and the general use as a qualitative method that can yield in-depth results (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). Nevertheless, one of the main disadvantages to using CSE is that case studies are not very robust, and therefore the conclusions are restricted to the specific case (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). Fortunately, the lack of robustness of CSE is not a restrictive factor in this research, because as discussed in §2.4 there is a limited number of housing associations in the city of Groningen and therefore few potential participants (Woningcorporaties.nl, 2019).

Yin (2009) distinguishes between two variants of CSE on the basis of single or multiple units of analysis – embedded and holistic cases respectively. Since this qualitative case study will consist of semi-structured interviews with civil servants and housing associations involved in policy implementation for social housing, the scope of the study will cover multiple units of analysis within the city of Groningen – hence a holistic CSE is adopted. In addition to the interviews, a literature study – with regards to past policies on social housing in the city of Groningen – will be held in order to capture the overall effects of decentralisation of the social domain on policy making and outcome. Finally, it can be said that this evaluation study will be ex post – retrospective evaluation of a case(s) which leads to new insights in (social housing) policy development (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). The overall approach will consist of literature research and qualitative CSE. Correspondingly, the data collection process and research framework will follow a case study protocol – which comprises of multiple steps to structure a transparent and comprehensive line of inquiry (Yin, 2009). Within the case study protocol three relevant steps for this research can be found; see table 2 (Yin, 2009).

<p><i>Step 1. Adapting multiple sources</i></p> <p>As part of the overview of the case study project (Yin, 2009).</p>	<p>The aim of this step is to build a framework on top of existing case studies – literature – addressing social housing developments in the Netherlands.</p>
<p><i>Step 2. Devising a case study database</i></p> <p>Essentially, defining a method to store data (Yin, 2009)</p>	<p>The subsequent step is to help the research remain consistent and reliable in its conclusions. Therefore, a database was organised to contain raw data, like the interview transcripts and recordings – if given consent by the interviewee.</p>
<p><i>Step 3. Maintaining a chain of evidence</i></p>	<p>The final step is concerned with the readability of the final report, in specific the documentation of the fundamental methods, concepts and techniques used to derive a conclusion on the decentralisation of the social domain for social housing. Hence, it is crucial to provide a transparent research design, where the procedures for data collection were described in detail, and statements were substantiated by adequate references.</p>

**Table 2:** Case study protocol based on Yin (2009) for the research on social housing.

The collected data was analysed through Express Scribe transcription software. Express Scribe primarily serves as a tool to transcribe and code the semi-structured interviews. While the literature findings were expressed through maps, tables and charts. As for the evaluation of the case study findings, the design of the case study consists of testing the hypotheses against empirical evidence in the form of respondents' statements (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). Commonly, this is done through pattern matching, where two hypotheses are tested: in one the assumption is made that there will be an effect of decentralisation of the social domain on social housing policies, whereas in the other no effect is assumed (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008).

### 3.1.1 Semi-structured interviews

When evaluating policies on social housing it can be useful to look at how the Municipality of Groningen and housing associations have reached their primary goals, and whether decentralisation in the social domain has led to a better process of policy making and implementation (Priemus, 2003). The former is connected to effective housing policy (Chanchitpricha & Bond, 2013), where through recognition of the opportunity space housing associations have succeeded in reaching the intended goals (Dagnino, 2013; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). To collect such information and data, geographers often conduct semi-structured interviews (Longhurst, 2010), which contain a predetermined list of questions that follow a specific order, but still allow for flexibility in how issues are addressed by the informant. Accordingly, in this research on social housing policies in the city of Groningen local actors in the housing market were consulted. Consequently, two sets of questions have to be formulated to fit the knowledge and expertise of the potential respondents; these interview questions can be found in Appendix I.

To contact potential respondents, e-mails were sent to the appropriate actors. For housing associations the main strategic housing plan advisors were contacted, considering that they are involved in the development of performance agreements between the municipality and the respective housing association (Priemus, 2001). Furthermore, these advisors are responsible for the management and exploitation choices made by housing associations in a structured and transparent manner (Nieboer, 2005). This manner is expressed through the so-called 'strategic resources policy' which encompasses the goals of the housing association, the external interests (housing visions), market developments, rent and exploitation risks, and finally the suitability of the plan to the clientele (Nieboer, 2005). Since this research focuses on the choices made by housing associations, and how these choices were affected by the decentralisation in the social

domain, it is optimal to consult the strategic plan advisors. Hence, the five housing associations in the city of Groningen as identified in §2.4 have been contacted, and meetings were arranged as documented in Appendix IV. As for the civil servants who work at the Municipality of Groningen, a similar identification method was deployed. Specifically, an e-mail was sent to the department of Ruimtelijke Ordening en Economische Zaken (RO/EZ) [Spatial Planning & Economy] at the Municipality of Groningen. The RO/EZ is responsible for urban development in the city of Groningen, which ranges from arranging locations and contracting developers for housing developments to planning for cultural heritage and the public areas (Archieven.nl, 2019). Naturally, policy makers involved in the RO/EZ were approached for this research.

### **3.1.2 Number of respondents**

In total five respondents were interviewed: two strategic plan advisors respectively from De Huismeesters (B. Prickartz) and Lefier (M. Mooi), two real estate managers from Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium (K. Van den Berg) and Nijestee (R. Bouma); and one urban development policy maker at the department RO/EZ of the Municipality of Groningen (E. Bennen). With five respondents the data set is limited, and as a result cannot be used to generalise beyond the object of study (the city of Groningen) (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). Guest et al. (2006) conclude that a minimum of twelve interviews is desirable for an optimal data sample. In their study on optimal interview counts for qualitative research methods it was concluded that after around twelve interviews a substantial number of terms and themes would consistently reoccur during subsequent interviews (Guest et al., 2006). Although, it is true that a large data sample allows for generalisations and broader conclusions (Clifford et al., 2010), for the case of social housing in the city of Groningen the research is limited to the main actors in its social housing market (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>).

### **3.1.3 Ethical considerations**

It is important to consider the ethical aspects of research, namely a researcher is to hold justice, beneficence and respect to a high esteem (Clifford et al., 2010). By conducting oneself ethically the rights of individuals, communities and environments involved in the research are protected (Hay, 2010). In addition, ethical behaviour stimulates a favourable climate for scientific inquiry by treating participants with respect and holding no prejudices (Hay, 2010). Accordingly, participants were asked to sign a consent form prior to the interviews, as can be found in Appendix II. The consent form consists of three sections, where the first two serve to provide context for the research, and what is expected from the participant. The third section comprises of a table in which the participants have to permit separately to be recorded, documented in transcripts under their real name or pseudonym, and quoted in the findings. Subsequently, the participants received a copy of the consent form with the researcher's personal information and signature, and later a raw interview transcript. Thus, the integrity of the collected data was preserved, and participants were given the opportunity to opt out of the research.

## 3.2 Data analysis

As discussed above, this research comprises of a holistic CSE, which means that there are multiple units of analysis to be assessed (Yin, 2009). Accordingly, the units of analysis are determined by defining the spatial boundary, the theoretical scope, and the timeframe (Yin, 2009). To begin with, the spatial boundary is in principle the border of the municipality of Groningen, which mostly encompasses the city of Groningen (see figure 7). As per the goal of the Gemeente Groningen (2019<sup>a</sup>), new housing developments should be built within the existing city boundaries. Hence, figure 7 illustrates the municipal and city border of the area of interest. Note that due to recent elections the municipality of Groningen has merged with the municipalities Ten Boer and Haren (Gemeente Groningen, 2018). Nonetheless, the city of Groningen remains the primary target for this research. The timeframe is important to consider given the finite time to conduct research – starting in November 2018 and concluding in July 2019. The data collection took place between April 2019 and May 2019 (see Appendix IV). Ultimately, the results were based upon the availability of informants and their experience in the Dutch housing sector.

### 3.2.1 Criteria for evaluation

Evaluation criteria can be defined from the perspective of the policy stakeholders, and what they find most important for social housing policies (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). On the basis of the housing vision ‘Ongedeelde Stad Gedeelde Toekomst’ the Municipality of Groningen in cooperation with housing associations has set out criteria for new housing policies regarding development and maintenance (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>). For housing associations this entails a set of core questions which focus on the choices for investment (construction, renewal, maintenance), a differentiated target group, and the location of developments (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>). Essentially, three themes are presented in the aforementioned housing vision:

1. cooperation, performance and monitoring;
2. vital neighbourhoods, including affordability and availability of social houses;
3. safety and sustainability (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>).

Each theme brings a desired goal, the first theme recognises the capricious opportunity space of the municipality, housing associations and commercial actors, and emphasises flexibility in decision-making, and mutual trust between the involved parties (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>). The second theme aims for limited to no increase in rental prices, expanding the social housing stock with a net minimum of 225 houses annually, reducing time for social housing allocation; evenly spreading special needs tenants throughout the city (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>). Lastly, social houses are to become CO<sub>2</sub>-neutral in the next twenty years, this includes fossil-free heating. Subsequently, the housing vision seeks to make sustainable 6500 houses in the upcoming five years, with 1250 for the year 2019. In addition, the social housing stock should have a B-energy rating in 2020 (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>). To summarise, the following criteria can be defined: new strategies for social housing should:

- be flexible to cope with a changing opportunity space;
- reduce the costs for social tenants;
- generate in total a minimum of 225 additional houses annually;
- be sufficient to meet demand (for all tenants);
- increase the energy sustainability to a B-rating;
- contain new housing developments within city boundaries (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>).

Table 3 expresses these evaluation criteria in separate variables, and links the secondary research questions to the type of effectiveness that is investigated.

# Overview of the spatial boundaries of the area of interest

Based on the 2019 municipal and city borders of Groningen




Figure 7: The spatial boundary of the area of interest based on CBS data from Esri Nederland (2019).


Related question	Which information	Type of effectiveness	Evaluation criteria	Variables	Source
<i>How has decentralisation of the social domain influenced the relationship of housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen with regards to performance agreements?</i>	The extent to which performance agreements are mutually agreed upon: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What were the main reasons for the choices in these performance agreements?</li> <li>• How are goals and aims deliberated during meetings?</li> </ul>	Substantive performance	Flexibility	<u>Interval of meetings (relative)</u> <u>Consent of actors</u> <u>Type of agreement (financial or legislative)</u> <u>Deviation from housing vision</u> (measured as degree to which housing associations' goals were altered after agreed upon performance agreement)	Interviews with housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen
	The effects of decentralisation of the social domain and neo-liberalisation on the relationship between social housing actors	Normative	Trust	<u>Satisfaction of actors (verbally)</u> <u>Type of reciprocal opinion of actors</u> (the esteem to which actors hold each other: high or low)	
<i>How have social housing policies and their implementation in the city of Groningen changed compared to before and after the decentralisation of the social domain in 2013?</i>	The outcome of these housing strategies and policies between 2008-2019: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How many houses were actually built?</li> <li>• Where were these houses built?</li> <li>• What was the quality of these houses?</li> <li>• Did the quality meet the agreed upon standards given the strategies at the time?</li> </ul>	Transactive	Generate 225 additional houses annually	<u>Number of houses built</u> (relative; compared to past)	Housing vision 'Ongedeelde Stad Gedeelde Toekomst'; reports on social housing stock such as BZK (2018); Interviews with housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen
			Increase energy efficiency	<u>Average energy costs per household</u> (measured in Euros per kWh; compared to past)	
			Build within city boundaries	<u>Plot locations in Groningen (city)</u> (output ArcGIS map)	

	<p>The decision-making process behind the housing strategies of housing associations and the policies of the municipality</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent was housing demand taken into account?</li> <li>Which goals were more heavily emphasised?</li> <li>To what extent were the goals met without adverse effects on the housing tenants?</li> </ul>	Substantive conformance	<p>Reduce the costs for social tenants</p> <p>Meet demand</p>	<p><u>Rental price per month</u> (in Euros; compared to past prices)</p> <p><u>Costs for “landlord tax” per housing association</u> (measured relatively in Euros per month per property owned; and compared to past)</p> <p><u>Number of houses allocated to social tenants</u> (expressed in houses per housing seeker per year)</p> <p><u>Number of houses allocated to special needs groups</u> (expressed in houses per housing seeker per year)</p>	
<i>How does the experienced opportunity space differ between housing associations to construct, renovate, and make sustainable social houses in the city of Groningen?</i>	The experienced opportunity space of housing associations and whether it differs compared to other housing associations in the city of Groningen	Normative	Be sufficient	<u>Satisfaction of actors</u> (verbally)	Interviews with housing associations
<i>What are the reasons for the differences regarding the experienced opportunity space of housing associations in the city of Groningen?</i>	The main reasons for a difference between the experienced opportunity space of the housing associations	Normative	Be sufficient	<u>Satisfaction of actors</u> (verbally)	Interviews with housing associations

**Table 3:** Concise framework of evaluation criteria and variables


### 3.2.2 Causality of variables

This ex-post evaluative research aims for conclusions on whether the intervention – decentralisation of the social domain – had the consistent and desirable effects. Particularly, the implementation of the new housing policies and strategies can have side effects that lead to detrimental stress to policy makers as a result of the new laws and regulations (Swanborn, 2007). Appropriately, figure 8 illustrates the causality of the ‘intervention S’ and ‘goal variables S\*’ with ‘Context variables’ which can potentially alter the outcome, and bring forth (un-)wanted ‘Side effects’. Here, intervention S is defined as the decentralisation of the social domain, where the goal variables S\* imply an improved opportunity space (Dagnino, 2013) for housing associations. Additionally, the improvement is presumably achieved when all of the criteria as described in §3.2.1 given the variables in table 3. However, the city of Groningen is not a tabula rasa (De Roo, 2015), hence context variables have an impact on the goal variables. In specific, the regulated neo-liberalisation of the social housing market results in complications for housing associations to implement housing strategies related to intervention S. As elaborated in §2.1.2, housing associations have to cope with heavy financial levies which hamper their performance, and net output of houses per year (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>): i.e. side effects (Swanborn, 2007).



**Figure 8:** Model of the question of causality (Swanborn, 2007).

In figure 9 the Swanborn’s (2007) model is adapted to the CSE in this thesis, and the individual variables can be found in table 3.



**Figure 9:** The question of causality for the case of decentralisation of the social domain and the effects on social housing associations; adapted from Swanborn (2007).



## 4. Findings

In this chapter the results of the case study evaluation (CSE) are unveiled. As discussed in Chapter 3, interviews were conducted with experts in the housing market of the city of Groningen, and their responses are found as citations throughout the each section. Additionally, the CSE explores quantitative outcomes of social housing strategies, which are exhibited in tables. The structure of this chapter follows three main themes which form the main paragraphs:

### *I. Relations in the social housing sector of Groningen*

Here the emphasis is given on the business as well as the administrative and legislative relationship between the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen. Appropriately, the opinions and intricacies are carefully explored and presented. For instance, the considerations and cost-benefit analyses for the development and implementation of social housing policies, made by the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen, are probed in order to grasp their interplay.

### *II. Strategies of housing associations for the social housing sector in Groningen*

Following the previous theme, the focus shifts to the output strategies of the housing associations given their relationship with the Municipality of Groningen. The narrative delves into performance agreements, and the results of meticulous planning by the actors. Furthermore, the effects of the new laws and regulations such as the Woningwet 2015 are elaborated upon, and positive and negative impacts of such laws are revealed in the context of the housing associations.

### *III. Capacities of housing associations in the city of Groningen*

The final theme holds at its focal point the outcome of the various processes that have taken place during and after the economic crisis of 2008. The opportunity space as experienced by the housing associations is explicitly discussed, and opinions on the current state of the housing market are given by the various experts. Moreover, an overview is given of the realised strategies throughout the years. Subsequently, intriguing details about the unknown factors (§2.5) that affect the opportunity space of housing associations are disclosed.

Lastly, it is noteworthy to consider the referencing of the respondents (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). To maintain a comprehensive and consistent analysis of the data, table 4 is provided as an overview of the actors and their initials which are used for the citations in the text. The date of the interviews is also included to serve as context for future readers of this thesis. Further, an abbreviation system will be deployed to cite statements more concisely. Henceforth, please refer to table 4 for the necessary details and contexts of the respondents, and refer to Appendix III for the statements.

Abbreviation	Full name participant	Organisation	Function	Years at organisation	Total years of experience	Date of interview
B.P.	Bastiaan Prickartz	De Huismeesters	Strategic policy advisor	1.5	3	25-04-2019
E.B.	Eva Bennen	Gemeente Groningen	Urban development policy maker	1	5	01-05-2019
K.v.d.B.	Kees van den Berg	Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium	Real estate manager	0.8	18	22-05-2019
M.M.	Marcel Mooi	Lefier	Strategic policy advisor	4	10	29-04-2019
R.B.	Roelof Bouma	Nijestee	Real estate manager	36	36	28-05-2019

**Table 4:** Overview of details and contexts of the participants.

## 4.1 Relations in the social housing sector of Groningen

To begin with, the relationship between the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen is surprisingly well perceived by all actors. Various housing associations indicate that the municipality has developed a long history of good communication and actor engagement (table B, H4<sub>BP, MM, KvdB; RB</sub>). The Municipality of Groningen elaborates “[e]very year we try to improve the relationship. But you do notice that we all share a common goal for housing in the city” (table B, E.B., H4<sub>EB; 1</sub>). Furthermore, an explanation is given to this strong connection by E. Bennen (table B, E.B., H4<sub>EB; 2</sub>): “[t]he cooperation has been established beforehand, because we had an accord in Groningen, and from there the administrative relation flourished”. Bouma from Nijestee, who has over thirty years of experience with this relationship (table 4), agrees with Bennen by stating that “Groningen has a tradition that has existed since” he started working there (table B, R.B., H<sub>RB; 1</sub>). Still, more can be derived from the interviews by asking the question: How has decentralisation of the social domain influenced the relationship of housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen with regards to performance agreements?

The decentralisation of the social domain is primarily in the form of the Woningwet of 2015, which legitimised the housing associations as an admitted institution, and made housing visions legally binding for the involved actors and institutions (Rijksoverheid, 2015). In practice, these notions can be confirmed as most respondents indicate a more bureaucratic type of housing affairs (table B, W1<sub>BP, MM; KvdB</sub>). Lefier’s policy advisor M. Mooi explains that “for a long period of time housing associations were not familiar with such [administrative] mechanisms ... And now by making agreements in the public arena, their investments have also become legitimate” (table B, M.M., W1<sub>MM; 3</sub>). R. Bouma reckons that “the local cooperation has simply become more explicitly led by the Municipality, which leads to clear roles” (table B, R.B., W1<sub>RB; 1</sub>), as well as that “the introduction of the performance agreements is a good development, because in the municipality of Groningen there was already a strong relationship... and now this is everywhere [in the Netherlands]” (table B, B.P., W1<sub>BP; 1</sub>). However, some see the Woningwet as an introduction to more strict and controlled housing policy making, K. van den Berg expresses his opinion: “There is an administrative and monitoring burden... [which] have become extreme” (table B, K.v.d.B., W1<sub>KvdB; 4</sub>). Van den Berg further elaborates by stating that “[performance agreements] have become more explicit and disaggregated”, however he does not believe that this change “has led to more outcomes. Rather it is constricted by... various laws and regulations... and thus has become more complex” (table B, K.v.d.B., W1<sub>KvdB; 5</sub>). The latter is an interesting statement, because it mirrors the concept of the local trap, where local authorities become overburdened due to the increasing tasks (Purcell, 2006). Yet, there are other aspects that have to be taken into account before anything can be concluded with more certainty. Therefore, it is important to look at the housing visions that have resulted from these changes, and the performance agreements that naturally compliment the relationship between housing associations and the municipality.

First of all, a couple of variables can be investigated as defined in table 3 in order to better understand the effectiveness of the process of developing housing visions, namely the interval of meetings, deviation from housing visions, and type of agreements. As such, the interval of meetings can be gauged from some of the statements from the respondents. For instance, “[the housing visions] which we device each year, will start a new cycle soon. On the basis of the [housing] stock we will meet in the summer with the five housing associations and the municipality, in order to determine how we can arrange the performance agreements” (table B, M.M., H1<sub>MM; 2</sub>). This statement was taken in April of 2019, with the first meetings taking place in January of the same year (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>a</sup>). B. Prickartz reveals that “[the housing associations] sign the [housing vision] in December, but start over again in January. It is incredibly intensive, but I find it [a] very valuable [process]” (table B, S1<sub>BP; 1</sub>). It can then be assumed that annually between three to six meetings take place, which is quite intensive given the magnitude of the policy making (table B, B.P., W1<sub>BP; 2</sub>).

With the process behind arranging meetings unveiled, it is time to explore the contents of the housing visions and subsequently the performance agreements. As was discussed in §2.1.1, the housing visions are devised by the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen, however E. Bennen adds that “a housing vision is actually a product from within the Municipality wherein [the Municipality] states what [the Municipality] wants, and then housing associations can specify what they want and are able to contribute to the document” (table B, E.B., H1<sub>EB</sub>; 2). Expectedly, some housing associations confirm that their housing strategies are based on the housing vision, and are developed further from that point (table B, H2<sub>MM, RB</sub>). Though others focus more on the housing market, and then present goals and ambitions (table B, H4<sub>BP</sub>; H2<sub>KvdB</sub>). Overall, housing associations have stated that with the Woningwet 2015 the housing visions have become more integrated, and serve a greater purpose than before. The relationship between the stakeholders has remained the same throughout the years (table B, H4<sub>BP, MM, KvdB</sub>; RB); however the interdependence to devise housing visions and meet performance agreements has increased since the Woningwet 2015 (table B, H3<sub>MM, EB</sub>; KvdB).

An additional factor is the Wmo 2015, where emphasis is placed on special needs groups and elderly who want to remain independent in their households, has led to more attention to specialised housing projects to accommodate special needs persons (table B, W2<sub>BP, MM, EB, KvdB</sub>; RB). This has been valued by Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium the most due to their history with people who “carry a baggage” (table B, K.v.d.B., M1<sub>KvdB</sub>; 4). Van den Berg further illustrates this point, he places emphasis on this fundamental difference of C.W. Patrimonium compared to other housing associations: “we did a lot for special needs groups, like the Salvation Army, Lentis, etc. We have a rich background in [the social domain]” (table B, K.v.d.B., M1<sub>KvdB</sub>; 4). Fortunately, other housing associations did not mind the additional tasks of the Wmo. Bouma expresses this part of the social housing work field, and asks the question “what are we established for? We are established for people who are not capable of finding a suitable house” (table B, R.B., M1<sub>RB</sub>; 3) and continues with “we are becoming a safety net for the vulnerable groups of people. Which is fine, but we should not solely act as a net, we should care for” (table B, R.B., W2<sub>RB</sub>).

What these changes mean in terms of opportunity space for housing associations is that, with the introduction of the Woningwet 2015 and Wmo 2015 housing associations have to cover larger expenses while more performance is expected from them (table B, S1<sub>BP, MM, KvdB</sub>; RB). Coincidentally, this is in line with the proposed theory in §2.1.1, mainly that in theory the laws and regulation aim to increase the opportunity space through better coordination and cooperation, whereas in practice the budget of housing associations are compressed and less can be spend. Though, housing associations have stated that the Woningwet 2015 encourages more specialised housing strategies (table B, B.P., C3<sub>BP</sub>, 3; S1<sub>BP</sub>; 4).

Taking into account, the various statements of the housing associations the following hypotheses can be tested. Hypothesis I: more decentralisation of tasks in the social domain leads to a larger opportunity space to construct, renovate and allocate social houses for a differentiated target group. Based on the findings this hypothesis is rejected, indicating that more decentralisation of social tasks does not lead to a larger opportunity space. As for hypothesis II: the emphasis on collaboration between municipalities and housing associations as a result of the Woningwet 2015 leads to more effectiveness of performance agreements between the two parties in terms of legitimacy and transparency. The second hypothesis appears plausible, as the housing associations have emphasised the benefits of the legally binding housing visions. Still, it cannot be said whether the Woningwet has led to more effective performance agreements. In accordance to Van Doren et al. (2012), the performance agreements are effective in terms of substantive performance and normative effectiveness as housing associations have stated to have mutual consent on the use of the housing visions. However as can be seen in figure 5, this is merely part of the stages before the substantive conformance effectiveness.

## 4.2 Strategies of housing associations for the social housing sector in Groningen

To give an overview, housing associations indicate a massive shift from investment freedom to careful budget spending, and serving a differentiated target group (table B, W3<sub>BP, MM, KvdB; RB</sub>). Housing associations note that at the current rate the taxes will severely hinder further expansion of the social housing stock, as in the long term the responsibilities will increase while the spending budgets (after taxes) will decrease (table B, S1<sub>KvdB; RB</sub>). Naturally, the following question can be asked: How have social housing policies and their implementation in the city of Groningen changed compared to before and after the decentralisation of the social domain in 2013?

In 2008 the economic crisis hit the world, and led to a locked housing market (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2014). However, it is surprisingly the private actors in the housing market who were affected the most (table B, C2<sub>KvdB; RB</sub>). The housing associations stated that predominantly the construction companies and the project developers lost a large portion of their capacity, and as a result shortages of housing developments ensued. “[C]oncurrently you can see that the building capacity is too low, because [the construction companies] also stopped during the recession. Many construction workers went on doing something else... and even if we [Nijestee] had the investment capacity, the building capacity might not be sufficient” (table B, R.B., C1<sub>RB; 1</sub>). Construction companies are necessary for housing associations to expand their stock, however with shortages of labour capital in the construction sector this has become difficult (table B, C1<sub>BP, EB, KvdB; RB</sub>). Interestingly, the Verhuurderheffing had a crucial impact prior to its implementation. In anticipation of the Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II, many housing associations decided to reinvest in their internal organisation in hope of increasing their spending budget (table B, C3<sub>BP, MM, KvdB; RB</sub>). Van den Berg calls this response to the Verhuurderheffing in 2013 a “primary reaction of different housing associations to put everything on hold, and start working internally” (table B, K.v.d.B., C3<sub>KvdB; 3</sub>), though he is surprised that this happened since “housing associations are known for their ability to anti-cyclically continue investing [in the housing market]” (table B, K.v.d.B., M1<sub>KvdB; 2</sub>). Additionally, the city of Groningen has been facing plot scarcity for quite some time, and housing associations attributed this scarcity to the slow development of new social housing. Prickartz explains “what can naturally be seen in this market, is that the ground is scarce in the city, because everyone wants to live in the city...” (table B, B.P., C4<sub>BP; 1</sub>). Mooi elaborates by saying that “expansion is foremost difficult in the city, hence the edges of the cities are sought out... However, infringement is [also] difficult; thus, the slow development due to lack of locations” (table B, M.M., C4<sub>MM</sub>).

As for the Verhuurderheffing, the State aimed for housing associations to solely focus on the lowest income groups in society, while commercial market parties accommodate the middle and high income groups. However, it is apparent that the commercial parties show no interest in investing in this group (table B, M.M, W1<sub>MM; 5</sub>), as such housing associations are slowly allowed to develop middle income social housings (table B, M1<sub>RB, S1<sub>MM, EB, KvdB; RB</sub>; W3<sub>BP</sub></sub>). The housing associations see this change as an expansion of their opportunity space, while also stating that it is indicative of unreasonable demands from the State to focus on the lowest income groups (table B, B.P., W3<sub>BP; 3</sub>). The latter has been stated to negatively influence both the housing stock and the housing associations’ revenue. Van den Berg states that “[y]ou cannot always serve the social demand, because then the financial situation becomes pressured” (table B, K.v.d.B., S2<sub>KvdB; 1</sub>). Bouma outlines that “if you want to either build five hundred social houses or invest the money in order to limit the rent price increase... if you have money [for both]... then there is no problem. However when you can only spend the sum once, [the question becomes] what do I spend the money on” (table B, R.B., H2<sub>RB; 2</sub>). Consequently, it is made clear that with the limited budgets due to landlord taxes and other financial regulations as per the Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II it has become increasingly difficult for housing associations to integrate all of the performance agreements (table B, C4<sub>KvdB; H4<sub>BP</sub></sub>). Or at the very least dedicate an equal

portion of their budgets to honour all of the agreements. B. Prickartz exclaims “the Verhuurderheffing is a thorn in my eye” (table B, B.P., W3<sub>BP</sub>; 2) in response to the budget cuts. “The Verhuurderheffing has an enormous impact on our investment capacity ... fortunately you retain some of the money. However, that which remains, is increasingly decreasing” (table B, B.P., W3<sub>BP</sub>; 1).

In order to illustrate the statements from the housing associations, a comparison is made for the implementation of housing strategies since 2010. In table 5 a comparison between the four housing associations is given. Essentially, four variables are explored, namely the number of houses built, the the rental price per month, energy labels, and finally the plot development within city borders. To begin with the number of houses built, in table 5 it can be seen that in general the number of houses has remained the same, and has even seen a slight increase. Interestingly, a trend can be seen that parallels the housing market: one year houses are demolished, then the subsequent year more houses are built in their place (see De Huismeesters between 2011 and 2012 for instance). This matches with Prickartz statement “[y]ou build something at one point, you sell something at one point, but it remains approximately the same” (table B, B.P., W3<sub>BP</sub>; 1). As for the rental price, it can be expected that the price increases gradually over the years, which is indeed the case (table 5). Something that stands out is that De Huismeesters has the highest rent out of the four housing associations, but this could be due to portfolio size or even inter reorganisation during the anticipation of the Verhuurderheffing. Still, the price is surprisingly well contained below the six hundred Euros price top off. The housing associations have retained minimum rental prices despite the Verhuurderheffing, though a sharp increase in the years 2013 to 2014 can be seen for De Huismeesters and Nijestee. This is indicative of the effects of the Verhuurderheffing. Similarly, Bouma talks about how the housing associations “are swimming in a fish pot wherein everything that we want and that everyone finds important that we do can be found, [however] at one point we would not be able to pay for it” (table B, R.B., W3<sub>RB</sub>; 1).

Moving on, the number of B+ energy labels seems to have increased for De Huismeesters and Lefier from mere hundreds to around three thousand. Notwithstanding, the total number is very low in comparison to the total stock. Sustainability “mostly is draped in various requirements, administrative processes to realise it, and it is partly something out of your own pocket at the sectoral level because the landlord tax remains the same” (table B, R.B., W3<sub>RB</sub>, 2). Lastly, in figure 10 the most recent redevelopment plans are presented; this figure serves the variable plot development within city borders. Evidently, the edges are sought out, as mentioned by M. Mooi (table B, M.M., C4<sub>MM</sub>).

With these findings the following hypothesis can be tested, hypothesis III: regulated neo-liberalisation of housing association responsibilities in the social housing market has led to a smaller opportunity space for housing associations to invest in non-traditional real estate. The hypothesis can be confirmed as housing associations have indicated that the Verhuurderheffing is diminishing their opportunity space, and more specifically their investment capacity. As for the effectiveness of the housing strategies, based on statements, table 5 and figure 10, the strategies are moderately effective. In terms of transactive effectiveness, the housing strategies managed to increase the total housing stock, upgrade the energy status of the buildings to a B+ label, and remain within the city borders. From the substantive conformance perspective the rental price saw a sharp increase after the introduction of the Verhuurderheffing, but remained moderately low in general.

Housing association	De Huismeesters				Nijestee				C.W. Patrimonium				Lefier	Sources
	De Huismeesters	Nijestee	C.W. Patrimonium	Lefier	De Huismeesters	Nijestee	C.W. Patrimonium	Lefier	De Huismeesters	Nijestee	C.W. Patrimonium	Lefier		
Year	Number of houses owned (total units in social sector)				Average rental price per month (€)				Number of B+ energy labels (total units)				Sources	
2010	6,989	12,975	-	-	378	390	-	-	444	1,100	-	-		De Huismeesters (2011); Nijestee (2011)
2011	6,922	13,260	8,050	-	421	392	-	-	971	1,850	837	-	CWP (2016); De Huismeesters (2012); Nijestee (2012)	
2012	8,230	13,220	7,989	-	408	406	-	-	1,298	2,420	1,643	-	CWP (2016); De Huismeesters (2013); Nijestee (2013)	
2013	8,319	13,476	7,972	-	427	421	-	-	1,616` (78 A++)	4,400 (0 A++)	1,785	-	CWP (2016); De Huismeesters (2014); Nijestee (2014)	
2014	7,191	13,323	7,939	6,553	477* (4% landlord tax)	452	-	444	1,810 (106 A++)	4,330 (~20 A++)	1,838	3,178`` (inc. C)	CWP (2016); De Huismeesters (2015); Prins et al. (2016); Nijestee (2015)	
2015	7,230	13,225	7,941	6,498	489	473	479.43	492	-	-** (new energy-indices systems)	1,252	1154 (0 A++)	CWP (2016); De Huismeesters (2016); Lefier (2016); Nijestee (2016)	
2016	7,236	12,997	7,782	7,431	495	488	485.34	480	1,787 (~70 A++)	-	540*** (estimated)	2,141 (48 A++)	CWP (2017); De Huismeesters (2017); Lefier (2017); Nijestee (2018)	
2017	7,188	13,398	7,771	7,415	501	484	487.52	483	1,839 (0 A++)	-	481***	2,087 (47 A++)	CWP (2018); De Huismeesters (2018); Lefier (2018); Nijestee (2018)	
2018	7,216	13,515	-	7,366	511	483	-	471	3,730 (31 A++)	+450` (total unspecified)	-	2,780 (48 A++)	De Huismeesters (2019); Lefier (2019); Nijestee (2019)	

**Table 5:** Overview of key figures per housing association between 2011 and 2018.

## Notes for table 5

- \* Introduction landlord tax, 4% increase in rent price (De Huismeesters, 2015)
- \*\* Introduction of new Energy-Index system which is connected to the cadastral value system (WWS) (Nijestee, 2016)
- \*\*\* Estimated based on statement a minimum of 93.8% of houses have a C or higher energy-label. Here the reasoning is used that 6.2% have labels at the extremes (A++ and G), with a bias towards A++ (CWP, 2017; CWP, 2018).
  
- ` First documented use of the A++ energy label amongst the housing associations in the city of Groningen (De Huismeesters, 2014).
- `` The additional number of houses that meet the criteria for B and higher labels was increased by 450 housing units in the year 2018 by housing association Nijestee (2019). Unfortunately, the total number of B+ labels was not mentioned.
- ``` The presented amount in this instance includes C labelled houses, which could not be extrapolated for only A/B labels (Prins et al., 2016).

# Planned social housing developments in the city of Groningen 2019-2023

Based on the 2018 policy document on neighbourhood renewal projects




Figure 10: Overview of planned social housing developments in the city of Groningen within time frame of 2019-2023, based on Gemeente Groningen (2018<sup>a</sup>).



### 4.3 Capacities of housing associations in the city of Groningen

Having discussed the relationship in the social housing market, and the effectiveness of the housing strategies, it is time to reveal the capacity of housing associations to invest in the housing market in the city of Groningen. Since each individual housing association and the Municipality have a different mission in regards to their fundamental ambitions, the following question can be asked: How does the experienced opportunity space differ between housing associations to construct, renovate, and make sustainable social houses in the city of Groningen?

Overwhelmingly, the housing associations indicate dissatisfaction with the Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II, especially the increased taxes (table B, W3<sub>BP, MM, KvdB; RB</sub>). “Thus the Verhuurderheffing is indeed [dramatic], because A) it is a high sum to pay; B) it holds us back from investing more” (table B, R.B., W3<sub>RB</sub>, 2). The crippling budgets are what make it most difficult to make a breakthrough in the market. Particularly, some housing associations anticipated the landlord tax of 2013, and as a result did not invest into the already brittle housing market after the crisis. “We [were] ‘forced’ to reinvent ourselves. Which happens continuously, since each year we think to ourselves now it might be done, but then new regulations are introduced” (table B, B.P., C3<sub>BP</sub>; 3). What this meant for their opportunity space was that fewer investments could be made outside of the core tasks. As such the following hypothesis can be tested: Hypothesis IV: housing associations experience less opportunity space for intervening in the housing market when they exclusively focus on their core tasks without straying away from the performance agreements with the Municipality of Groningen. The hypothesis is assumed in this case, since various housing associations have indicated that the loss of their additional investments in public goods has led to lower revenue and cash flow (table B, K.v.d.B, S2<sub>KvdB</sub>; 1). Additionally, E. Bennen discusses that “[the housing associations] have many meetings in the upcoming years... every year you make performance agreements and you would much rather discuss the implementation of said agreements. Therefore, by reducing the process of policy making and expanding the time to execute the agreements... real goals can be achieved” (table B, E.B. W1<sub>EB</sub>; 3). Bennen elaborates by saying “one housing vision and concise agreements which we can tackle in the upcoming four years. Essentially some type of framework agreements ... And no new agreements.... rather the next year subtle changes can be made, and evaluations of the places that went well” (table B, E.B. W1<sub>EB</sub>; 4).

Following, the question ‘what are the reasons for the differences regarding the experienced opportunity space of housing associations in the city of Groningen?’ leads to the next findings. Most housing associations agree upon the stress from financial regulations such as the landlord tax. Though, differences might depend on internal management respective to the housing association; the real estate portfolio where size does come in to play and larger is more favourable. Figure 11 illustrates how housing associations differ in terms of investment. De Huismeesters has clearly chosen a specialised housing strategy that focuses on demolition. “De Huismeesters takes the initiative to make the first choice and we are going to be demolishing. It is necessary, because we cannot manage the investments anymore” (table B, B.P., H2<sub>BP</sub>; 4).

2019-2023: programma sociale huurvoorraad	Lefier	De Huismeesters	Nijestee	Patrimonium	Wierden en Borgen
Nieuwbouw	442 (1)	265 (2)	1780 (3)	389 (4)	158
Sloop	-32	-357	-454	0	-56
Verkoop	-120	-374	-300	-100	-58
Netto toevoeging	290	-466	1026	289	44

**Figure 11:** Net social housing stock contribution per housing association within the time frame of 2019-2023 (Gemeente Groningen, 2019<sup>b</sup>, p.22).

Using the findings above hypothesis V can be tested: individual housing associations focus respectively on one of the core tasks in order to maximise the effectiveness of specialised housing strategies. It can be confirmed that the housing associations with least capacity will invest in a single task, rather than attempt to cover all at once. Interestingly, Swanborn's (2007) model largely reflects the side effects of decentralised core tasks. As can be seen in figure 9, housing associations face performance and financial burden due to laws such as the Woningwet, which had the initial goal of increasing the opportunity space of housing associations.

## 5. Discussion and conclusions

The Dutch housing associations and municipalities are becoming overburdened due to more responsibilities, while their budgets to intervene in the housing market decrease. Essentially, these trends represent decentralisation of the social domain and neo-liberalisation, and should have resulted in more effective policies and strategies on social housing. In order to understand the underlying mechanisms that affect this opportunity space, the city of Groningen was used as the location for research where there are social housing shortages, and increased costs of construction and plot allocation. The main research question was aimed to be answered: How has decentralisation of the social domain in the Netherlands affected the opportunity space of housing associations to carry out effective strategies aimed at construction, renovation, and making sustainable social housing in the city of Groningen since 2013? Here follow the conclusions and discussion of the findings as well as the research.

### 5.1 Discussion of findings

To begin with, three key themes have been presented in chapter 4, namely the relationships in the social housing sector (§4.1), strategies of housing associations (§4.2), and capacities of housing associations in the city of Groningen (§4.3). These themes have each covered one of four sub-questions that are necessary in order to answer the main research question. Therefore the themes will be discussed individually where the answer to the sub-questions is given explicitly.

With regards to the relationships in the social housing sector, it can be said that the main actors the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen have a strong mutual respect that has a long history, and originates from longer than thirty years ago. This is not uncommon, but in case of Groningen, it is the one of the few cities where the new Woningwet did not necessarily improve the relationship between the actors. Rather as to answer the first sub-question: how has decentralisation of the social domain influenced the relationship of housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen with regards to performance agreements? The decentralisation of the social domain has led to a more concise and comprehensive relation between each individual housing association and the Municipality. What this means is that the process of policy making for the housing visions has become more bureaucratic and stringent. Subsequently, this has had positive as well as negative effects. First the positive, the housing associations have assumed a clear role, and the Municipality is legitimately assigned the role of monitor and coordinator. Fortunately, the housing visions have always been a true municipal policy document. Furthermore, the interdependence on devising housing visions has increased, the actors feel challenged but regard criticism as a way to become improve their housing strategies. As for the negative impacts of the Woningwet 2015, chiefly some housing associations, especially Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium, feel that the strict regulations and increasing monitoring have slowed down the implementation process as well as increased the expenses. Subsequently, meetings for the arrangement of performance agreements have become very intensive, leaving many of the housing associations gasping for air. Lastly, the decentralisation of the social domain also came in the form of the Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning, though apart from additional expenses, most of the housing associations are capable of taking on this task.

Moving on to the next question: How have social housing policies and their implementation in the city of Groningen changed compared to before and after the decentralisation of the social domain in 2013? Strikingly, the housing policies have not changed much in regards to their contents. After comparing all housing strategies from 2010 to 2018, the overall changes to the stock remained the same. Though it has to be mentioned that the data set was incomplete and the comparisons should not be generalised. Regarding the implementation certain processes have changed, namely the Verhuurderheffing has added an additional dimension. This dimension forces housing associations to reinvest in their internal organisations, and leads to

loss of staff and investments in the housing market. Appropriately, this could be identified as an unknown factor that influences the opportunity space of housing associations. Although it is known that the Verhuurderheffing diminishes the budgets of housing associations, it has not yet been discussed in detail that the anticipation of the Verhuurderheffing in 2013 led to complications for the implementation of housing strategies. Even though the housing strategies remained roughly the same, the budgetary cuts were devastating for the opportunity space of the housing associations. In general it could be said that the new laws and regulations have limited the investment capacity of housing associations to implement strategies. This is in line with Swanborn's model of causality, where the initial laws and regulations aimed to improve the opportunity space of housing associations end up causing side effects such as performance and financial burden.

Further, to answer the question: How does the experienced opportunity space differ between housing associations to construct, renovate, and make sustainable social houses in the city of Groningen? The opportunity space does not differ much in terms of housing developments, since plot scarcity and depression of construction companies has forced the housing market to a halt. Although, De Huismeesters remains optimistic about the opportunity to specialise internally and improve upon the dated housing stock, Nijestee is more sceptical about the opportunity space even if the Verhuurderheffing were removed. These perceptions carry over to Lefier and Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium respectively. Intriguingly, the final sub-question explores the reasons for these perceived opportunity spaces: What are the reasons for the differences regarding the experienced opportunity space of housing associations in the city of Groningen? Primarily, the ambitions and goals of housing associations lead to a differentiated experienced opportunity space. However, the portfolio of housing associations can have a large impact of how the opportunity space is perceived. The rule of thumb is the larger the portfolio the larger the robustness of the actor. Furthermore, some housing associations like Nijestee and De Huismeesters committed to internal reorganisation in anticipation of the Verhuurderheffing, whereas Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium and Lefier continued investing in the market without many internal changes. Hence, the opportunity space might appear smaller to those with less staff members.

Given these findings, the main research question can be answered. Decentralisation of the social domain in the Netherlands has largely decreased the opportunity space of housing associations to carry out effective strategies aimed at construction, renovation, and making sustainable social housing in the city of Groningen. Especially, the focus on core tasks has left little room for housing associations to invest in non-traditional real estate. In terms of effectiveness, it can be said that housing visions have not necessarily become more or less effective. Still, some housing associations have become devised more specialised housing strategies, like De Huismeesters, whereas Nijestee has been working on a more effective housing strategy which encompasses more core tasks such as housing development and selling of houses. The latter is also true for Lefier and Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium.

Ultimately, to complete the conceptual model, the unknown factors have been identified, though they are only valid for the case of Groningen as per this research. Regardless, it seems that internal reorganisations of housing associations, the loss of construction companies due the 2018 crisis, and ever prevailing plot scarcity in the city of Groningen can have a large effect on the opportunity space of housing associations.

## **5.2 Discussion of methodology**

Overall, the method of research used has been successful in predicting certain trends, and uncovering unknown factors. Moreover, the theory follows a relevant line of research, and contributes to the body of literature on housing associations in the Netherlands. However, there are some inconsistencies here and there. In particular, the case study evaluation requires much more data than was collected through the literature studies. Table 5 was incomplete and no clear result could be drawn from it outside of superficial ones. In similar future research it is recommended that a larger data set is used, with more clear variables. As for the semi-structured interviews, there were no complications. The data was recorded appropriately, and then coded using free-to-use software. On a different note, the conclusions could have been more in depth as well as the findings. In future research more emphasis could be placed on the findings rather than the theory.

## **5.3 Recommendations**

From this research multiple ways to improve the current opportunity space of housing associations can be mentioned. First of all, the housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen expressed their enthusiasm to devise housing visions, however they collectively mentioned the frequency of the housing visions. Oftentimes, the housing vision is completed in December of a given year, and the new housing vision cycle begins in January of the year shortly after. In order to improve this, as Eva Bennen suggested, the housing visions could be limited to one per four years, with the time from beginning to end of the process being used to implement parts of the housing vision. In addition, it would an evaluation of the progress could be beneficial for better housing visions in the future as well as improved housing strategies of housing associations. Generally, this could help eliminate the burden and intensity of the Woningwet 2015.

Furthermore, housing associations should counter-invest to market trends. As was mentioned by Kees van den Berg, housing associations are capable of anti-cyclically investing into housing stock. During the crisis of 2008, many of the housing associations continued expanding the social housing stock, and only were forced to stop due to the depression of construction companies. For instance, middle income housings are less and less facilitated in the city of Groningen due to low efficiency for private and commercial market investors. The Woningwet has been discussed in Den Haag for a multitude of changes, and it might become very plausible that housing associations are allowed to operate in the middle income housing market.

Lastly, housing associations have shown to be quite cooperative in the city of Groningen. However, as long as the Verhuurderheffing is draining their budgets not enough of their investment capacity is left. As a short term solution until the law is amended the housing associations could join forces and could develop a platform to support fellow housing associations through shared expenses in moderate amount. An example can be given from north and middle Groningen's housing associations in 2018, where large project were shared in order to suffice the housing stock. Still, it is important to note that not all housing associations in the city of Groningen have expressed interest in partnering other housing associations financially. This recommendation might therefore be the weakest, but it has proved useful in certain contexts.

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# Appendices

## Appendix I – Interview format

The questions here are presented in Dutch, because the target groups for this research are predominantly housing associations and the municipality in Groningen, the Netherlands where Dutch is the native tongue. Additionally, jargon in the housing sector will most likely consist of Dutch terms that are otherwise lost in translation in for instance the British context.

### Questions for housing associations

#### General questions

1. Hoe lang werkt u in de Nederlandse woningsector?
2. Wanneer bent u begonnen bij [naam woningcorporatie]?
3. Wat zijn uw taken binnen deze woningcorporatie?
4. Wat is de visie van deze woningcorporatie voor de komende jaren?
  - a. Wat zijn de voornaamste doelen van uw woningcorporatie? (Denk hierbij aan nieuwbouw, restauratie, etc.)
  - b. Hoe zijn deze doelen tot standgekomen?
  - c. Wat waren de meest bepalende factor voor deze visie? (U kunt hierbij denken aan wetten zoals de Verhuurderheffing van 2013)

#### Sub-question I

5. Hoe zijn de prestatieafspraken met de gemeente Groningen verlopen?
  - a. Hoe zijn deze afspraken tot stand gekomen?
  - b. In hoeverre zijn er conflicterende belangen? Wat wil de woningcorporatie? Wat wil de gemeente?
6. In hoeverre kunt u zeggen dat deze onderhandelingen tot success hebben geleid?
  - a. Welke aspecten van de relatie hebben de grootste impact gehad en tot dit standpunt geleid?
7. In hoeverre kunt u zeggen dat deze relatie veranderd is ten opzichte van toen u begon met werken bij deze woningcorporatie?
  - a. Wat was de invloed van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2015 (Wmo 2015) op deze relatie?
  - b. Wat is de invloed van de Verhuurderheffing vanaf 2013 op deze relatie?
  - c. Wat is de invloed van het WOZ-waarde puntensysteem op deze relatie?

#### Sub-question II

(Transition from question 8)

8. Hoe zijn de verplichte woningvisies sinds 2015 voor de sociale huurwoningen veranderd door de eerder besproken relatie?
  - a. Wat is het meest veranderd en op welke wijze? Wanneer merkte u deze veranderingen voor het eerst op?
9. Hoe worden deze taken door [naam woningcorporatie] uitgevoerd? Dus,
  - a. Hoe worden de vragen opgepakt: Voor wie zijn de huizen bedoeld? Wat moet er precies gebeuren (nieuwbouw, etc.)? Waar moet dit plaatsvinden (locatie stad, etc.)?

#### Sub-question III and IV

(Transition made from question 11)

10. Gegeven de nieuwe taken per de Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 2014 II (Wmw 2014 II): Hoe is [naam woningcorporatie] omgegaan met de toenemende verantwoordelijkheid?
  - a. In hoeverre was [naam woningcorporatie] in staat om de taken uit te voeren in termen van kosten, tijd en expertise?

11. Daarnaast heeft de Wmo 2015 de verantwoordelijkheid gedelegeerd om psychisch bemoeilijkte groepen onderdak te bieden. In hoeverre heeft [naam woningcorporatie] woningen voor deze groep mensen moeten produceren, dan wel aanwijzen?
  - a. Hoe heeft [naam woningcorporatie] voor deze taak haar vermogen beheerd? Was het mogelijk om de investeringen te verdelen?
12. Om terug te komen op de Verhuurderheffing en de WOZ-waarde punten. In hoeverre is er sprake van toegenomen vrijheid om als woningcorporatie te functioneren?
  - a. In hoeverre kunt u zeggen dat deze veranderingen positief dan wel negatief is geweest? En waarom was dat het geval precies?
13. Eerder is besproken hoe de gemeente Groningen en [naam woningcorporatie] de woningvisies opstellen. In hoeverre heeft de Woningwet 2015 geleid tot een betere realisatie van deze plannen?
  - a. Op welke wijze is bestloten wanneer, door wie en hoe de plannen zouden worden uitgevoerd?
14. In hoeverre zijn de afgesproken uitkomsten van de woningvisies (betaalbare, voldoende en duurzame woningen) gerealiseerd sinds het van kracht gaan van de Wmw 2014 en Wmo 2015?
  - a. Hoe tevreden bent u over deze vorm van realisatie van uitkomsten en waarom? (Vorm als in volledig gerealiseerd of gedeeltelijk gerealiseerd)

Final remarks

15. Heeft u nog vragen voor mij?
16. Heeft u nog tips voor mij?

## Questions for the Municipality of Groningen

### General questions

1. Hoe lang werkt u in de Nederlandse woningsector?
2. Wanneer bent u begonnen bij de Gemeente Groningen?
3. Wat zijn uw taken binnen de Gemeente Groningen?
4. Wat is de visie van de Gemeente Groningen voor de komende jaren?
  - a. Wat zijn de voornaamste doelen van de Gemeente Groningen? (Denk hierbij aan duurzaamheid, betaalbaarheid, etc.)
  - b. Hoe zijn deze doelen tot stand gekomen?
  - c. Wat waren de meest bepalende factor voor deze visie? (U kunt hierbij denken aan wetten zoals de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2015)

### Sub-question I

5. Hoe zijn prestatieafspraken verlopen tussen de gemeente Groningen en de woningcorporaties?
  - a. Hoe zijn deze prestatieafspraken tot stand gekomen?
  - b. In hoeverre zijn er conflicterende belangen? Wat wil de woningcorporatie? Wat wil de gemeente?
6. Wat is uw hoofddoel binnen deze verhouding met de woningcorporaties? (Denk aan betere woningen of betere implementatie van beleid)
7. In hoeverre kunt u zeggen dat deze zakenrelatie tot success heeft geleid?
  - a. Welke aspecten van de relatie hebben de grootste impact gehad en tot dit standpunt geleid?
8. In hoeverre kunt u zeggen dat deze relatie veranderd is ten opzichte van toen u begon met werken bij de Gemeente Groningen?
  - a. Wat was de invloed van de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning 2015 (Wmo 2015) op deze relatie? Dus doordat de gemeente een grotere rol kreeg in het verzorgen van psychisch zwakkere groepen, wat was het gevolg op de relatie?
  - b. Wat was de invloed van de herziene Woningwet 2015 die de gemeentes centraler stelde ten opzichte van woningcorporaties op deze relatie?

### Sub-question II

(Transition from question 8)

9. Hoe zijn de verplichte woningvisies sinds 2015 voor de sociale huurwoningen veranderd door de eerder besproken relatie?
  - a. Wat is het meest veranderd en op welke wijze? Wanneer merkte u deze veranderingen voor het eerst op?
10. Hoe worden deze taken gestuurd door de Gemeente Groningen? Dus,
  - a. Hoe worden de vragen opgepakt: Voor wie zijn de huizen bedoeld? Wat moet er precies gebeuren (nieuwbouw, etc.)? Waar moet dit plaatsvinden (locatie stad, etc.)?

### Sub-question III and IV

(Transition made from question 11)

11. Gegeven de nieuwe taken per de Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning (Wmo 2015): Hoe is de Gemeente Groningen omgegaan met de toenemende verantwoordelijkheid in het sociaal domein waaronder het onderdak bieden aan de psychisch zwakkeren?
  - a. In hoeverre was de Gemeente Groningen in staat om de taken uit te voeren in termen van kosten, tijd en expertise?
12. In hoeverre heeft de Gemeente Groningen woningcorporaties moeten aansturen om woningen voor deze groep mensen moeten produceren, dan wel aanwijzen?
  - a. In hoeverre was het voorzien van de woningmarkt voor deze groep mensen gunstig voor de Gemeente Groningen?

13. Om terug te komen op de Woningwet 2018. In hoeverre is er sprake van toegenomen vrijheid om als gemeente te interveniëren in de woningmarkt?
  - a. Welke aspecten in het proces van het uitvoeren van woonvisies en -beleid zijn veranderd in dit opzicht door de Woningwet 2018? (Bijvoorbeeld bevoegheid van de gemeenten om de grondprijs te verlagen wat weer inspeelt op het WOZ-punten voor woningcorporaties)
  - b. In hoeverre kunt u zeggen dat deze veranderingen positief dan wel negatief zijn geweest voor de gang van zaken binnen de Gemeente Groningen? En waarom was dat het geval precies?
14. Eerder is besproken hoe de Gemeente Groningen de woningvisies opstellen. In hoeverre hebben de Woningwet 2018 geleid tot een betere realisatie van deze plannen?
  - a. Op welke wijze is bestloten wanneer, door wie en hoe de plannen zouden worden uitgevoerd?
15. In hoeverre zijn de afgesproken uitkomsten van de woningvisies (betaalbare, voldoende en duurzame woningen) gerealiseerd sinds het van kracht gaan van de Wmo 2015?
  - a. Hoe tevreden bent u over deze vorm van realisatie van uitkomsten? (Vorm als in volledig gerealiseerd of gedeeltelijk gerealiseerd)
16. Hoe tevreden bent u met de huidige gang van zaken binnen en buiten de Gemeente Groningen gezien de toegenomen verantwoordelijkheden in de woningmarkt?

Final remarks

17. Heeft u nog vragen voor mij?
18. Heeft u nog tips voor mij?



## Appendix II – Consent form

### Toestemmingsformulier interview

#### Decentralisation in the Dutch social housing sector

An evaluative case study of social housing policies in the city of Groningen

#### Doel van het onderzoek

In de laatste jaren is er sprake geweest van een verschuiving van bevoegdheden vanuit het Rijk naar de gemeenten op het gebied van sociaal domein. Tegelijkertijd hebben er neo-liberale verandering plaatsgevonden, die voor woningcorporaties aanzienlijk meer prestatie verwachtingen betekenden. Het doel van dit onderzoek is het evalueren van de speelruimte van woningcorporaties in de stad Groningen na deze veranderingen. Tevens is dit onderzoek het afstudeerproject van Tsveti Mulder voor de master Environmental and Infrastructure Planning.

#### Wat wordt er van u gevraagd?

Doordat het onderzoek zich richt op de woningmarkt is er interesse naar uw werkevaring binnen uw organisatie en de algemene sector van sociale huurwoningen. Het interview zal ongeveer één uur van uw tijd in beslag nemen. Uiteraard is het mogelijk om tijdens het interview aan te geven dat u wilt stoppen, pauzeren of een vraag niet wilt beantwoorden.

#### Toestemming

Voorwaarden	JA	NEE
Ik aanvaard dat ik vrijwillig deelneem aan het onderzoek en dat ik op welk moment dan ook mij kan terugtrekken.		
Ik aanvaard dat het gesprek mag worden opgenomen en vertrouwd zal worden opgeslagen. Alleen de onderzoeker en zijn begeleider(s) kunnen toegang tot deze opname verkrijgen.		
Ik aanvaard dat mijn woorden geciteerd mogen worden in de uiteindelijke masterscriptie van de onderzoeker.		
Ik aanvaard dat mijn echte naam voor de citatie mag gebruikt worden. Indien ik dat niet wil dan mag daarvoor in de plaats een pseudoniem worden toegepast.		
Ik aanvaard dat de resultaten zullen worden gepresenteerd in de vorm van een posterpresentatie tijdens de Graduate Research Day van de FRW op 27 juni 2019 aan medestudenten, professoren en andere belangstellenden.		

Door het ondertekenen van dit formulier ga ik, \_\_\_\_\_, akkoord met de afgesproken voorwaarden:

Datum: \_\_\_\_\_

Handtekening deelnemer: \_\_\_\_\_

Datum: \_\_\_\_\_

Handtekening onderzoeker: \_\_\_\_\_

#### Contactinformatie

Dit onderzoek wordt begeleid door dr. B. Wind ([b.j.wind@rug.nl](mailto:b.j.wind@rug.nl)). Voor verdere vragen of opmerkingen kunt u contact opnemen met:

Tsveti T. Mulder E-mail: [t.t.tsvetkov@student.rug.nl](mailto:t.t.tsvetkov@student.rug.nl) Telefoonnummer: 0634463658

## Appendix III – Coded interview transcripts

### Codes used for transcribed information

Theme	Code	Abbreviation	Meaning	Relevance
Market	A1	<i>HOUMAR</i>	Housing market status	The state of the housing market is important to derive the context of the contemporary decisions made by housing associations.
	C1	<i>CONCOM</i>	Construction companies	In order to understand the Unknown factors that influence the opportunity space of housing associations external factors like the availability of construction companies and project developers plays a large role. As such, it is important to place emphasis on this topic in the interviews.
Unknown factors	C2	<i>CRISIS</i>	Economic crisis of 2008	The economic crisis of 2008 has had a significant impact on the Dutch housing market, for instance general shortages in the middle- and low-income houses resulted. Consequently, the crisis could be an imperative event that affected the choices of housing associations.
	C3	<i>REINV</i>	Reinvesting in the internal organisation of housing associations	Housing associations have had to increasingly focus on their core tasks, which has led to more specialisation and internal investments in the organisation. Subsequently, this factor could play a role in the current opportunity space of housing associations.
	C4	<i>SCARC</i>	Plot scarcity	As mentioned before, the city of Groningen is facing shortages not only in the housing stock, but also in the available land for housing developments. Interestingly, plot scarcity is not a direct result of new laws and regulations in the housing market, and therefore could play an external role in the opportunity space of housing associations. By exploring this subject the Unknown factors of the conceptual model could be revealed.
	H1	<i>HOUVIS</i>	Housing vision	With the new laws and regulations housing visions have become a legally binding document for all the public parties in the housing market. For the housing associations the housing vision holds a strong value to base their strategies upon. Accordingly, the information revealed in the interviews should be explored distinctly from other information.
Policy outcome and documents	H2	<i>HOUSTR</i>	Housing strategies	The research at large focuses on the effectiveness of housing strategies. Hence, it is important to distinguish information in the interviews by this code.
	H3	<i>PERAGR</i>	Performance agreements	As part of the housing visions the performance agreements hold the general rules and desires of the housing associations and the Gemeente Groningen. Appropriately, specific mentions of the performance agreements should be marked in the transcripts to allow for a better understanding of actor choices.
	H4	<i>RELSHI</i>	Relationship between housing associations and the Municipality of Groningen	The professional relationship between the primary actors in the housing market of Groningen is an important variable in the normative effectiveness of housing strategies. In order to understand this normative effectiveness it is necessary to elaborate upon the relationship between the actors. By marking this type of information an overview is unveiled of

				opinions and beliefs of the housing associations and the Gemeente Groningen, respectively.
<b>Ambitions</b>	<b>M1</b>	<i>MISSION</i>	Distinguished mission of a respective housing association	In order to understand the differences between the housing associations and their choices, it is helpful to elaborate upon the individual goals and ambitions that housing associations have. The goals and ambitions are collective grouped as a 'mission' in this case.
	<b>M2</b>	<i>SUSTA</i>	Sustainability agreements and goals	The Gemeente Groningen has set multiple sustainability goals for the upcoming twenty years. For housing associations these goals carry various tasks such as making houses energy neutral, and the sustainability of these houses is gauged through energy labels from A throughout F. Therefore it is important to assess the specific information provided by the respondents, in order to understand the impact of sustainability on the opportunity space of housing associations.
<b>Opportunity space</b>	<b>S1</b>	<i>OPPSPA</i>	Opportunity space to intervene in the housing market	The main focus of the research places emphasis on the opportunity space of housing associations in the housing market. It is a critical variable that needs to be addressed separately.
	<b>S2</b>	<i>INVCAP</i>	Investment capacity	The capacity of housing associations to invest freely in the housing market has decreased over the last five years to due stricter laws and regulations. However, it is crucial that the opinion of the housing associations is taken into to consideration to reflect whether these assumptions are acceptable.
<b>Laws and regulations</b>	<b>W1</b>	<i>WOWE</i>	Woningwet	The Housing Act of 2015 had a tremendous effect on the relationship between the municipality and the housing associations, the core tasks of the housing associations, and most importantly the housing visions. Thus, this subject requires great attention when conducting an analysis on the transcribed interview text. Moreover, the general impression of the 2015 Housing Act is that although it is ambitious, many mistakes could have been made.
	<b>W2</b>	<i>WMAO</i>	Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning (Wmo)	The Wmo has brought various additional tasks to the housing associations, most importantly the duty of care for the psychologically impeded groups in society. With this responsibility housing associations could lose some of their opportunity space, and become financially overburdened since this social group usually does not pay the expenses. On that account, the Verhuurderheffing is an important factor in determining the opportunity space of housing associations, and justifying the choices made by said associations in the housing market.
	<b>W3</b>	<i>VERHU</i>	Verhuurderheffing	The Verhuurderheffing [Landlord tax] is paramount in the diminishing opportunity space of housing associations. It is appropriate to focus on this aspect of the interviews in order to derive insights on how it has affected the choices that housing associations have made in regards to investments in the social housing market. Furthermore, it is assumed that the landlord tax has the largest impact on the opportunity space of housing associations which result in budgetary cuts.

**Table A:** Codes for distinguishing transcribed interview information, and for consistent referencing of citations.

## Interview transcripts

Please note that the codes are specified with the initials of the respective respondent similar to the abbreviations in table 4. Furthermore, tables B through to F will be cited in a special manner. For example, the method follows this in-text notation: “-quote- (table B, B.R., H1<sub>BP</sub>, 2)”. Essentially, the table of reference is succeeded by the initials of the respondent. Then the code refers to the column of the respective table, with the number indicating the row. When multiple respondents are cited only the table and code are referenced: (table B, H1<sub>BP, RB, KvdB: EB</sub>).

De Huismeesters: B. Prickartz, 25-04-2019; 13:00-13:48	
Code	Citations
A1 <sub>BP</sub>	“Dus voor je hele portefeuille dus al het woningbezit kijk je naar de samenstelling: verschillende prijsklassen, voor welke doelgroepen biedt je dat aan, hoe is het verspreid over de stad, hoe sluit het aan op de vraag van de woningmarkt en op de ontwikkeling die we verwachten”
	“Er zijn gewoon bepaalde type woningen... waar meer dan nog vraag is”
	“Maar over het algemeen kun je wel zeggen dat de vraag naar corporaties wordt groter. Dus alleen maar gewoon woning verhuren is niet meer genoeg, dit moet ook nog duurzaam zijn en steeds betaalbaarder zijn en energiezuinig en ... het moet een beetje verspreid over de stad gaan”
	“overall zie je de markt is overspannen en er wordt te weinig gebouwd. Ja dat is het gevolg, sorry, daar [Verhuurderheffing] kunnen wij helemaal niks meer aan doen”
C1 <sub>BP</sub>	En aannemers zijn ook moeilijk te krijgen en bouwen is heel duur geworden. Het moet gasloos nu, de nieuwbouw dus dat is ook weer een forse uitgave
C2 <sub>BP</sub>	
C3 <sub>BP</sub>	“wij hadden onze organisatie ingericht op wat we van plan waren namelijk het beheren van ons bezit. En nu hebben we een organisatie nodig die ook nieuwbouw projecten kan draaien en die ook op een moderne manier een aanbesteding kan organiseren”
	“je wordt heel erg gedwongen om af te wegen wat we intern nodig hebben en wat niet. En sommige dingen wel en sommige dingen niet”
	“Nou wij hebben onszelf... we worden gedwongen om onszelf opnieuw uit te vinden” En dat gebeurt eigenlijk doorlopend, want elk jaar als je denkt nu hebben we het zo'n beetje klaar, maar dan komt weer een nieuwe regel”
C4 <sub>BP</sub>	“En wat je natuurlijk in deze markt ziet, is dat grond is heel schaars in de stad, want iedereen wil in de stad wonen...”
	“De gemeente wil graag vanuit de kern van de stad versterken en uitbreiden, omdat er vooral vraag is naar wonen in de stad zelf”
H1 <sub>BP</sub>	“de gemeente stelt elke vier jaar een soort kadervisie vast. Een visie die van de gemeente uit op de stad en de wijken. ... Wij gaan in de prestatieafspraken met de gemeente en corporaties en de huurdersraad er afspraken over maken”
	“Eigenlijk is het een soort samensmelting van de doelen van de gemeente en de woningcorporaties met medewerking van de huurdersraden die dus zelf ook aangeven namens de huurders”
H2 <sub>BP</sub>	“En daarop maken de gemeente en corporaties samen met de huurdersraden afspraken elk jaar van wat gaan wij daar gezamenlijk proberen te bereiken”

	<p>“Ik zou zeggen dat we ... scherpe keuzes moeten maken en dat sommige dingen dus gewoon niet meer kunnen of pas later kunnen. En dat is het gevolg, en dat levert natuurlijk ook discussie bij de prestatieafspraken”</p>
	<p>“Dus je mag maar een beperkte huur vragen voor bepaalde doelgroepen. Dat draagt bij aan de beperkte investeringsruimte en daar lopen we nu ook tegenaan dat we met elkaar zeggen we weten het gewoon niet zeker meer en waarschijnlijk gaan we dit in ieder geval niet redden...”</p>
	<p>“En nu zie dat zo de Huismeesters als eerste een keuze maakt in wij gaan slopen. Er moet gesloopt worden, want we kunnen die investering niet meer opbrengen”</p>
<b>H3<sub>BP</sub></b>	<p>“het gaat dus heel duidelijk ook om de ambities van de gemeente bijvoorbeeld de duurzaamheidsambitie”</p>
<b>H4<sub>BP</sub></b>	<p>“Je merkt gewoon dat het best moeilijk is, zeker in zo'n stad waar het beleid met één gemeente met vijf corporaties”</p>
	<p>“hier zit je gewoon met vijf 'eigenwijze' corporaties: de een wil graag verduurzamen, de ander heel graag bouwen, wij willen graag een betere woonkwaliteit”</p>
	<p>“Ja en goed overleg. Goede standhouding onderling en ik ben daar altijd heel blij mee met hoe dat gaat en dat is echt leuk om dat te maken”</p>
	<p>“Ik weet dat zij [Nijestee] ... elk jaar vanuit de huurders het advies om de huur niet te verhogen of alleen het inflatiepercentage. Maar dat zij zeggen bedankt voor dat advies, maar we hebben die investeringsruimte nodig. Dus wij gaan toch die huur verhogen. Dat is dan best wel spannend vind ik om de doen”</p>
	<p>“wij [de Huismeesters] hebben gezegd een aantal jaren volgen wij alleen maar die inflatie, want betaalbaarheid is ook belangrijk. Maar je merkt ook dat gaat pijn doen in je portemonnee, dus ik vind die keuze die Nijestee maakt, ik snap hem wel”</p>
<b>M1<sub>BP</sub></b>	<p>“En vervolgens gaan we op de kaart kijken in welke wijk past wat, dat hebben we nu al staan. En daar is ook een stukje duurzaamheidsambitie bij. Dat komt allemaal bij elkaar, het gaat over leefbaarheid, woonkwaliteit, duurzaam, betaalbaarheid en beschikbaarheid. Dat zijn natuurlijk de twee belangrijke bij ons”</p>
<b>M2<sub>BP</sub></b>	<p>“Dat voor je ze kunt verkopen, je de energielabel naar B toe brengt. En daarvan zeiden de corporaties ‘Dat komt ons niet uit, want wij verkopen om meer investeringsruimte te krijgen (bijvoorbeeld voor nieuwbouw of verduurzaming van andere plekken) en dan kunnen we niet de helft van die inkomsten weer eerst nog daar in steken om een B-woning’ ”</p>
<b>S1<sub>BP</sub></b>	<p>“We tekenen ervoor in december, maar in januari beginnen weer opnieuw eigenlijk. Dus het is wel heel intensief, maar ik vind het ook heel waardevol”</p>
	<p>“Dus die tijd dat je zei ‘we doen ook nog een buurthuis’ en dat mogen dan gratis gebruiken bij wijze van spreken want dat is goed voor de wijk. Dat is veel moeilijker geworden. Dus we moeten zakelijker zijn dan we eerder waren”</p>
	<p>“een verandering eigenlijk van de manier van werken ... Je zit veel dichter bij de markt”</p>
	<p>“ik denk niet dat het [specialisatie] een achteruitgang is, want het concept is helemaal uitgedacht en dat is al tien keer ergens anders gebouwd en geperfectioneerd. Dus het is veel goedkoper, als onderdelen in de fabriek al klaar liggen”</p>
	<p>“Nou ik vind wel dat we worden 'gedwongen' ... om veel efficiënter te werken en heel goed te kijken naar hoe effectief is het wat wij doen. En dat is volgens mij niet slecht, wij worden gedwongen om heel goed de afweging te maken in wat vinden we nou echt belangrijk”</p>

<b>S2<sub>BP</sub></b>	"de vraag naar ons wordt groter en onze investeringsruimte wordt steeds kleiner, en dat levert
	"Wat het ons dwingt, is om veel scherper te kijken naar als wij een investering doen wat krijgen we daar voor rendement op terug"
	"het gevolg is dat wij wel wat achteruit gaan in aantallen, terwijl de druk op de markt wel hoog is"
	"we hebben nu gewoon te weinig geld om alles te doen wat nodig is, dat is wel wat zeker is"
<b>W1<sub>BP</sub></b>	"Ik denk zelf dat de introductie van de prestatieafspraken een goede ontwikkeling is, omdat in deze gemeente was er al een best wel sterke samenwerking tussen de woningcorporaties en de gemeente en nu is het overal zo"
	"Je kunt daar van best wat van vinden, namelijk dat het best een intensief traject is om het elk jaar met elkaar helemaal te doorlopen en dat is een geluid dat zowel van de corporaties als van de gemeente en de huurders komt"
<b>W2<sub>BP</sub></b>	"Volgens mij heeft het vooral effect op de wijken waar wij als corporaties veel bezit hebben, omdat je daar merkt dat die wijken moeite hebben om deze mensen op te nemen omdat er toch al veel mensen wonen met een laag inkomen en sociale vraag ... Vandaar het wijkvernieuwingprogramma wat is opgestart"
<b>W3<sub>BP</sub></b>	"De Verhuurderheffing heeft een enorme effect op onze investeringsruimte ... Je bouwt een keer wat, je verkoopt een keer wat, maar dat blijft ongeveer gelijk. En daarvan betaal je je planmatig onderhoud, je betaalt je personele lasten, je betaalt je rente voor de leningen en je hebt een stukje dat je vrij kunt investeren. Je houdt wat over gelukkig, anders kun je niks. Maar dat wat overblijft, wordt steeds kleiner"
	"die Verhuurderheffing is mij wel doorn in het oog"
	"je merkt ook de discussie in Den Haag volgend, dat ook de politiek de middenhuur ... heel erg op de agenda gezet heeft. De corporaties zijn daar eigenlijk vanaf gehaald ... Maar de markt doet de rest niet, want de markt kan ook duizend euro vragen voor een woning"
	"het verandert continu en dan moet die middenhuur er weer bij en dan kun je weer geld terugkrijgen voor verduurzaming uit de Verhuurderheffing als je duizend procedures en formulieren volgt. En subsidies op verduurzaming die houden dan ook weer op, dus je kunt ook je langjarige plannen niet met zekerheid vastbijten, want je weet gewoon niet wat er gaat gebeuren"
<i>Lefier: M. Mooi, 29-04-2019; 15:30-16:15</i>	
<b>Code</b>	<b>Citations</b>
<b>A1<sub>MM</sub></b>	"Wat wij dan zeggen is dat we met de markt meebewegen, dus we groeien en krimpen met de vraag mee. Ik denk dat we daarmee niet anders zijn dan andere woningcorporaties"
	"op het moment dat de markt groeit dus er komt meer vraag dan pakken wij daar met een raad op ons huidig marktaandeel het aandeel van op"
<b>C1<sub>MM</sub></b>	
<b>C2<sub>MM</sub></b>	
<b>C3<sub>MM</sub></b>	"wij hadden te maken met de nieuwe Woningwet, de gemeentes hadden in diezelfde tijd inderdaad te maken met decentralisaties dus je zag ook dat al die partijen heel erg ook naar binnen gekeerd waren. Dus dat iedereen een beetje met z'n eigen sores bezig was"

<b>C4<sub>MM</sub></b>	“uitbreiding is dan vooral hier in de stad lastiger, dus je ziet nu wel dat de randen van de stad worden opgezocht, de Suikerunie, Meerstad en dat soort locaties. Maar inbreiding is lastig, dus dat is een van de redenen waarop dat niet hard genoeg gaat omdat niet altijd genoeg locaties zijn”
<b>H1<sub>MM</sub></b>	“elk jaar nog een kaderbrief en die is eigenlijk geënt op vier thema's, namelijk betaalbaarheid, zelfstandigheid van onze huurders, verbinding met onze stakeholders vooral dus gemeente en organisaties waarmee we willen samenwerken, en [beschikbaarheid]”
	“Die we dan elk jaar doen, dus dat doen we binnenkort weer voor de nieuwe cyclus. En op basis van dat bod gaan we dan in de zomer met elkaar in gesprek, met de vijf corporaties en de gemeente, om te kijken hoe we van dat bod tot prestatieafspraken komen”
<b>H2<sub>MM</sub></b>	“op basis van de woonvisie van bijvoorbeeld de Gemeente Groningen kijken welke bijdrage wij daar voor de komende jaren aan willen leveren. Waar we dan altijd zelf mee beginnen is dat wij, iets wat afgelopen najaar dan weer afgerond is, een omgevingsanalyse waaraan wij elk jaar opnieuw in kaart brengen hoe de vraagontwikkeling van onze doelgroep eruit ziet”
	“als organisatie betaalbaar blijven ... dat is wel een puzzel. Dus dat is ook steeds het spel wat dan wordt gespeeld als je prestatieafspraken maakt. Wat is nog betaalbaar en wat vraagt de maatschappij van ons?”
	“hoe bepalen wij hoe ons bezit er over X aantal jaren moet uitzien, daarvoor doen we elk jaar een omgevingsanalyse ... Dus dan brengen we in kaart hoe die verschillende doelgroepen zich ontwikkelen, naar inkomen, naar gezinssamenstelling en hoe zich dat vertaalt in hun woningbehoefte... Daar ontstaat dan inderdaad op gemeente niveau dan een transformatieopgave, dus in Groningen betekent dat bijvoorbeeld dat we de komende jaren moeten gaan bouwen”
	“altijd meer begroten en meer plannen maken dan we feitelijk realiseren. Dus dat heeft soms te maken met onze eigen organisatie, het heeft soms te maken met dat er geen grondposities zijn in de gemeente of dat je in de bouw vertraging oploopt ... maar ik denk dat we zo ongeveer zo iets van zeventientig procent van de afspraken die we maken ook wel echt worden uitgevoerd”
<b>H3<sub>MM</sub></b>	“ik zeg wel dat de gemeente misschien weleens meer of sneller wil, maar het moet ook betaalbaar blijven voor ons als bedrijf. Dus niet alles kan op zo'n hoog tempo, dus daar maak je dan afspraken over, over wat realistisch en betaalbaar is ook voor ons op langer termijn”
<b>H4<sub>MM</sub></b>	“wat wij doen en wat de rol van de gemeente is om te beoordelen in hoeverre onze voornemens bijdragen aan de realisatie van hun woonvisie. Dus zij hebben een woonvisie en dat is dan ook voor ons dan het kader waarop ons bod en daarna de prestatieafspraken maken. En er zitten over het algemeen niet veel dingen in, dat wij verschillende belangen hebben”
	“het kan hooguit zijn dat de gemeente graag zou willen dat we nog meer zouden doen, maar het is niet zo dat zijn hele andere belangen hebben dan wij of zo, dat wel redelijk mee”
	“wat wij ook verwachten van andere corporaties dat zij ook gewoon hun aandeel oppakken, maar je ziet hier ook in de stad wel dat dat soms achter blijft bij andere corporaties en dan stellen wij onszelf wel altijd de vraag of we dan nog meer willen gaan doen. Maar alles wat je hier meer doet, gaat weer ook ten kosten van investeringen die je doet in andere gemeenten”
	“sinds een jaar, anderhalf jaar we wel merken ook bij gemeentes maar ook hier intern dat het stof een beetje is gaan liggen en dat we nu wel ook weer ruimte hebben om wat is er nog wel mogelijk binnen de kaders van de Woningwet”
<b>M1<sub>MM</sub></b>	“onze hoogste doelstelling is het bouwen en beheren van voldoende betaalbare woningen voor onze doelgroep van beleid, van voldoende kwaliteit ook. Dus daarmee heb je eigenlijk de drie belangrijkste peilers van de woningcorporatie wel te pakken, namelijk prijs, betaalbaarheid en de kwaliteit van woningen”

	“Ook weten we dat dit niet de enige gemeente is waar we afspraken maken”
<b>M2<sub>MM</sub></b>	“Dat [Verhuurderheffing] leidt natuurlijk ook tot spanning ... aan de ene kant ook de maatschappij, gemeente ook het Rijk zelf, vraagt best veel van ons als corporatie. Als je bijvoorbeeld nu kijkt naar vraagstuk duurzaamheid, eigenlijk wordt er heel snel gekeken naar woningcorporaties om een rol in te nemen als koploper, maar we vooral ook hier in de stad een enorme uitbreidingsopgave er moeten heel veel woningen bij”
<b>S1<sub>MM</sub></b>	“De gemeente ziet ook graag van ons dat wij investeren in ons woningbezit ... Wij willen ook graag van hun weten, wat wordt er nog door de Wmo gefinancierd en hoe kunnen we daarin een beetje samenwerken. Dus je ziet wel na die decentralisatie van 2015 dat samenwerken nog belangrijker wordt”
	“dus je moet overal ook verantwoording over afleggen aan de toezichthouder dus daar zit ook ontzettend veel tijd in. Overal moet je vinkjes en moet je kunnen uitleggen en daar zit veel tijd en veel geld in. Dus wij zijn heel erg doorgeschoten naar het andere en je ziet daar nu al een beetje een discussie van zouden corporaties iets meer moeten doen in de middenhuur”
<b>S2<sub>MM</sub></b>	“Wat [Verhuurderheffing] weer ook ten kosten gaat van onze investeringscapaciteit. Dus dat levert in die zin spanning op dat we heel goed moeten kijken waar we nog investeren kunnen en in welk tempo en dus ook de verwachtingen bij bijvoorbeeld ook gemeentes wel een beetje temperen”
<b>W1<sub>MM</sub></b>	“ons kader is en dat wij een maatschappelijke organisatie zijn die in feite daar uitvoering aan geven. Dus voor een heel gedeelte is het gewoon al in de wet vastgelegd en ze zijn tot stand gekomen in het overleg met onze stakeholder, vooral de gemeente en huurdersorganisaties”
	“op het moment dat ik hier kwam, dus ik weet niet zo goed hoe Lefier daarvoor deden of ze daarvoor prestatieafspraken maakten of niet. Het werd in ieder geval in 2015 ook verplicht, dus in die zin is het vrijblijvende er nu af en dat is volgens mij ook goed”
	“wanneer je op een moment bij de gemeente werkt, heb je te maken met een gemeenteraad die besluiten neemt ... Op het moment dat je in het bedrijfsleven werkt, heb je aandeelhouders die daar iets over te zeggen hebben. En bij een woningcorporatie was het heel lang zo dat die dat soort mechanismen niet kenden ... En door daar nu afspraken over te maken met de maatschappij ... zijn de investeringen die je dan doet ook maatschappelijk gelegitimeerd. Dus dat vind ik wel een grote meerwaarde”
	“organisaties moeten daarmee akkoord gaan, dus het is in die zin, als je vraagt van 'Wat is er veranderd?', is het allemaal wat strikter geworden en minder vrijblijvend. Dus allemaal wat formeler en daarmee ook wel wat bureaucratischer”
	“Het geldt bijvoorbeeld ook voor bouwen in de middenhuur, dat is hier in Groningen nog wel een dingetje. Dat is iets wat marktpartijen moeten doen ... maar de markt pakt het ook niet op. Dus je ziet nu alweer een beetje een beweging ook bij het Rijk dat ze zeggen ... voor die corporaties moeten weer iets makkelijker maken om ook daarin te investeren”
	“nieuwe wetgeving, wat eigenlijk heel erg streng wordt, dus dat we dan eigenlijk doorschieten naar de andere kant, want zoals het vroeger was, was het ook niet goed dan had je een soort van absolute vrijheid waardoor al dit soort incidenten hebben kunnen plaatsvinden. Dan zie je dus dat als reactie daarop het Rijk komt met hele strenge wetgeving, waardoor je zeg maar ook soms het kind met het badwater weggooit”
	“het is nu veel duidelijker wie we zijn, waar we voor staan, wat onze taak is, maar het is wel heel nauw en strikt ook geformuleerd met dan heel weinig ruimte om af te kunnen wijken”
<b>W2<sub>MM</sub></b>	“Mensen die moeten uitstromen naar zelfstandig wonen, dat zijn vaak woningen van een woningcorporatie, nou daar maken we nu dus bijvoorbeeld afspraken over. Om dat met elkaar te organiseren, maar dat geldt ook voor het langer zelfstandig thuiswonen voor ouderen die ook een beroep doen op de Wmo”
	“nu met die decentralisaties van de Wmo hebben we wel meer dan in het verleden afspraken gemaakt over



	de inzet van die Wmo gelden en bijvoorbeeld ook de uitstroom van beschermd wonen, maatschappelijke opvang. Dat deden we vroeger minder, maar daar ligt nu het belang van de gemeente dat die mensen uitstromen en dus merk je ook dat gemeentes daar ook graag afspraken over maken”
<b>W3<sub>MM</sub></b>	“er liggen genoeg maatschappelijke vraagstukken aan de ene kant waar van corporaties wordt gevraagd om daar een rol in te spelen, aan de andere kant zien je inderdaad dat het Rijk ons ook verschillende heffingen oplegt”
	“alles wat je afdraagt aan het Rijk kun je niet investeren in het bezit ...Dus dat is zeker van invloed. Dat betekent ook dat we minder investeren als dat we hadden gedaan op het moment dat we die heffingen niet hebben”
<i>Gemeente Groningen: E. Bennen, 01-05-2019; 13:00-13:43</i>	
<b>Code</b>	<b>Citations</b>
<b>A1<sub>EB</sub></b>	
<b>C1<sub>EB</sub></b>	“wel sociale grondprijzen voor woningcorporaties, maar of daar veranderingen in zijn geweest de afgelopen jaren weet ik eerlijk gezegd niet. Dat is altijd al wel zo geweest, je ziet nu vooral dat de bouwkosten heel hoog worden en dat daar vooral het probleem zit om bij te bouwen. Dus die druk op de bouwproductie qua capaciteit als qua kosten die is gewoon op dit moment heel hoog”
<b>C2<sub>EB</sub></b>	“je ziet bijvoorbeeld de woonvisie van vier jaar geleden, die is... toen was de crisis, nou die was langzamer aan aan het verdwijnen, maar je zag de gevolgen daar nog wel van. Zo zag je heel erg de nadruk op de bestaande voorraad, er was weinig investeringsruimte”
<b>C3<sub>EB</sub></b>	
<b>C4<sub>EB</sub></b>	
<b>H1<sub>EB</sub></b>	“Eigenlijk doen we dat elke keer in de woonvisie. Daarin schrijven we eigenlijk op wat we belangrijk vinden en waar we willen dat de gemeente naartoe wil op het gebied van wonen en daar staan eigenlijk onze doelen in omschreven. En vanuit onze woonvisie maken we elk jaar uitvoeringsafspraken met de woningcorporaties: hoe willen we daar ook uitvoering aan geven”
	“woonvisie is eigenlijk echt een product vanuit de gemeente waarin wij zeggen hier willen we naartoe en dan kunnen woningcorporaties vanuit hun bod aangeven van dit willen wij en kunnen wij hieraan bijdragen. Dus het is wel echt een gemeentelijk stuk, maar om tot goeie afspraken uiteindelijk te komen, wil je woningcorporaties hierin wel mee laten denken en meenemen zodat het niet iets onrealistisch wordt”
<b>H2<sub>EB</sub></b>	“Niet dat iets afvalt zeg maar, maar wel dat je keuzes moet gaan maken, je kunt niet meer en bijbouwen en verduurzamen van de woningvoorraad. Terwijl als dat wel mogelijk zal zijn, zou je veel meer goeie dingen kunnen doen”
<b>H3<sub>EB</sub></b>	“altijd de afweging tussen voorraadontwikkeling, dat is een belangrijke, dus in een prestatieafpraak speken we af dat we proberen elk jaar netto tweehonderdvijfentwintig extra woningen in de sociale huur te bouwen”
	“Dat je ook een beetje hetzelfde streven hebt, dus eigenlijk probeer al een stapje eerder met elkaar gezamenlijk tot een doel te komen dan wel onderdeel van de woonvisie. Daarnaast gaan wij natuurlijk ook aangeven wat wij belangrijke doelgroepen vinden”
<b>H4<sub>EB</sub></b>	“denk eigenlijk dat we onderling best wel een hele goeie samenwerking hebben, samen met woningcorporaties, samen met de gemeente, samen met de huurdersorganisaties en dat probeer je elk jaar ook wel weer te verbeteren. Maar je merkt eigenlijk wel dat we eigenlijk allemaal het doel hebben om het wonen in eerder de stad”

	<p>“Die samenwerking was er vooraf ook al wel eigenlijk, want we hadden altijd het Nieuwe Lokaal akkoord in Groningen en vanuit daar was er ook altijd al bestuurlijk overleg tussen de woningcorporaties en de wethouder. Dus die samenwerking is er eigenlijk altijd al wel geweest en nu zie je ook wel dat het maken van afspraken steeds belangrijkere rol ook hebben gekregen”</p>
	<p>“qua samenwerking denk ik dat de samenwerking altijd al goed is geweest tussen de woningcorporaties. Nu je heb je het iets meer geborgd in prestatieafspraken, maar dat is meer een proces en een... Dat moet nooit je doel zijn zeg maar prestatieafspraken, maar het is meer een middel”</p>
<b>M1<sub>EB</sub></b>	<p>“wij als gemeente hebben ook wel een doel rondom de verduurzaming en eigenlijk alles overkoepelend wil je eigenlijk gewoon vitale wijken hebben waar iedereen op een goede manier samen kan wonen”</p>
<b>M2<sub>EB</sub></b>	<p>“Wat vinden we dan ook de kwaliteit die een verduurzaamde woning moet hebben en je ziet elk jaar eigenlijk dat er flink geïnvesteerd wordt in de verduurzaming. Het kan natuurlijk nooit snel genoeg maar daar zijn we wel hard mee bezig”</p>
<b>S1<sub>EB</sub></b>	<p>“een combi is: ontwikkelingen gewoon op de woningmarkt en wetgeving is altijd van invloed natuurlijk. Bijvoorbeeld de Verhuurderheffing dat heeft heel veel invloed op de investeringsruimte van corporaties, dus ik denk dat een... Ja ontwikkeling, nieuwe wetten, dat dat allemaal invloed eigenlijk wel heeft”</p>
	<p>“Je ziet wel dat ruimte vanuit de Woningwet dat daar minder ruimte is zeg maar om dingen te kunnen doen. Nu langzamerhand zie je wel weer iets meer kunnen doen, dat sommige woningcorporaties iets in de middenhuur zouden willen doen. Dus die ruimte komt langzamer aan wel een beetje, maar er is wel heel veel ruimte weggehaald op deze manier door woningcorporaties om de goeie dingen eigenlijk ook te doen”</p>
	<p>“heel vaak schuift een plan drie maanden door of dat is niet het probleem want het doel behaal je uiteindelijk wel. Dus niet altijd elk jaar heb je de aantallen die je hebt benoemd zijn dan ook gerealiseerd als je het over aantallen hebt, maar soms schuift et door. Dat is niet erg op zich of er komt toch iets tussendoor en dan komt een ander plan”</p>
<b>S2<sub>EB</sub></b>	<p>“het moet voldoen aan allemaal regels, Verhuurdersheffing waardoor er minder investeringsruimte is, controle op budgetten vanuit leefbaarheid waar gaat dat precies heen. Dus er is heel veel controle waardoor je minder op de inhoud echt de goeie dingen met elkaar kunt doen”</p>
<b>W1<sub>EB</sub></b>	<p>“Het gaat vooral om het gesprek zeg maar, hoe ga je dit ook voor elkaar krijgen en wat vinden we met elkaar belangrijk? Door daar goed in te steken, deels vanuit de prestatieafspraken, maar eerder al vanuit de woonvisie. Ik denk dat dat onderdeel heel belangrijk is en dat het dan uiteindelijk in een prestatieafpraak komt die ondertekend wordt, dat is mooi zeg maar als eindresultaat en is een mogelijk middel om te gebruiken als corporaties onvoldoende bieden om de woonvisie tot realisatie te krijgen”</p>
	<p>“dat is wel een opgave hoor, want je ziet nu bijvoorbeeld vanuit beschermd wonen dat er best wel een deel kan uitstromen, maar dat daar toch nog geen plek voor is omdat gewoon die druk op de woningmarkt heel hoog is op de sociale huurwoningmarkt ook. Dus die druk is wel echt hoog”</p>
	<p>“je merkt nu dat we best wel veel afspraken hebben en eigenlijk wil je voor de komende jaren meer... Je bent nu heel erg bezig met elk jaar weer afspraken maken en eigenlijk wil je het hebben over het uitvoeren van afspraken en daarmee aan de slag gaan. Dus door iets minder elk jaar processen groot op te tuigen en meer tijd te hebben voor de uitvoering van afspraken, ik denk dat dat voor nu het belangrijkste is om mee aan de slag te gaan. Dus dat je af en toe het proces heel uitgebreid doet en dan een aantal echte doelen en afspraken met elkaar hebt en dan de komende jaren daar ook vooral mee aan de slag kan en niet dat jaar daarop alweer bezig moet met nieuwe prestatieafspraken”</p>
	<p>“een woonvisie en daar dan een duidelijke afspraak van nou hier gaan we de komende vier jaar mee aan de slag. Dat inderdaad een soort kaderafspraken ... En niet weer hele nieuwe afspraken maken met elkaar. En dan het jaar daarop kun je kijken nou misschien moeten we een paar aanpassingen doen, dit loopt goed dit loopt niet goed, dit zijn nieuwe ontwikkelingen die een plek moeten krijgen en dat je niet elk jaar het zo</p>

	uitgebreid doet als dat je het nu moet doen”
<b>W2<sub>EB</sub></b>	“Nieuwe wetten rondom passend toewijzen dat heeft bijvoorbeeld invloed op wat woningcorporaties doen, maar het heeft ook heel veel invloed op de opbouw van de wijken. Want als je passend gaat toewijzen, zie je op een gegeven moment dat een bepaalde doelgroep in de goedkopere woningen komt en die goedkopere woningen staan allemaal heel vaak in bepaalde wijken bij elkaar”
	“psychisch zwakkeren dat is meer bijvoorbeeld de uitstroom vanuit beschermd wonen, dus die vanuit een zorgplek zeg maar toch op een gegeven moment zelfstandig kunnen gaan wonen in een sociale huurwoning. En dat is natuurlijk weer een ander vraagstuk en hoe gaan we daarmee om. Nou ja dat je in buurten wel een menging krijgt en niet een concentratie van bepaalde doelgroepen... meer een soort huisvestingsstrategie die je daarop moet hebben van hoe zorgen we voor een beetje ongedeelde wijken en buurten”
<b>W3<sub>EB</sub></b>	
<i>Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium: K. van den Berg, 22-05-2019; 8:42-9:30</i>	
<b>Code</b>	<b>Citations</b>
<b>A1<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	
<b>C1<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	“de crisis heeft zeg maar nog dieper geraakt voor de bouwbedrijven in Nederland”
	“Dat had ook met de crisis te maken natuurlijk, want de gemeente wilde ook natuurlijk koop bouwen en middenhuur bouwen en dat ging ook paf door die crisis, want daar was geen vraag meer”
<b>C2<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	“En dat corporaties midden in de crisis op eens niet meer gingen investeren, omdat ze zichzelf opnieuw gingen uitvinden omdat die Verhuurderheffing aankwam. Dus er waren ook heel veel corporaties die niet meer gingen investeren”
<b>C3<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	“organisatieplan geschreven samen met een aantal externe consultants. En een 'reshuffling' van een aantal afdelingen wilde bewerkstelligen en dat betekent dat we nu een afdeling Klant en Maatschappij hebben, daar zitten alle klantprocessen, dus daar zit degelijks onderhoud, daar zit bewonerszaken, dus overlast zaken en daar zitten de verhuurzaken”
	“er zijn ook wel corporaties kritisch naar hun personeel aan het kijken van hebben we niet te veel”
	“een hele primaire reactie van verschillende corporaties van stop even, we gaan eerst intern aan de gang. Dat vond de gemeente natuurlijk ook heel spannend, van: Hé die corporatie gaat zich even intern beraden, maar dat komt al onze ontwikkelingen in de stad ... komen tot stilstand”
<b>C4<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	“Alleen je ziet vaak dat door allemaal soorten omstandigheden van schaarste van locaties, ecologische wetgeving, hogere bouwkosten, bezwaren vanuit omwonenden, dat prestatieafspraken op het gebied zowel duurzaamheid als nieuwbouw helemaal niet gehaald worden in deze stad”
<b>H1<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	
<b>H2<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	“Wij moeten ook een bepaald aantal woningen onder die zeshonderd euro grens toewijzen en daardoor met de hogere bouwkosten stijging wordt dat best wel problematisch. Dus je moet echt gaan kijken hoe je dus ook rendement binnen je portefeuille om langjarig investeringen te borgen”
<b>H3<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	“Wat wel zo is, is dat soms ambities van bestuurders en aantallen in die prestatieafspraken, dit is een persoonlijke mening, vaak te ambitieus zijn en niet gerealiseerd worden. Dus je zou wel eens

	<p>prestatieafspraken, wat nuchter en reëler moet insteken”</p> <p>“Wat je wel eens ziet prestatieafspraken en de kwaliteit ervan, is dat we soms beperkt worden in de ambities door verschillende wetgevingen. Dat heeft soms te maken met bezwaren van omwonende, soms met moeilijke parkeernormeringen waardoor er vertraging optreedt. Dus dat zijn dingen die wel zorgelijk zijn”</p> <p>En de prestatieafspraken hebben er natuurlijk toegeleid dat je duidelijke inzichten maakt en steviger inzichtelijker maakt van waar je als stad samen met de corporaties voor staat, dat is helemaal niet verkeerd. Dus dat is goed</p>
<b>H4<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	<p>“Gemeente Groningen doet dat heel zorgvuldig. Eva Bennen is dan de projectleider van de prestatieafspraken vanuit de Gemeente Groningen en de corporaties zitten daarbij aan tafel. En bij ons is dat de beleidsmedewerker uit de bestuurskamer en daar is een duidelijke cyclus voor, hoe je met elkaar omgaat en wat je met elkaar afsprekt”</p> <p>“Nou ik denk dat deze stad heeft altijd een vrij linkse coalitie gehad, dus daar was altijd een hele goede relatie tussen de corporaties en de gemeente. Die is nog steeds heel goed, daar is nog steeds een coalitie die sociale woningbouw een warm hart toedraagt”</p>
<b>M1<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	<p>“deze corporatie werkt met vijftig mensen op dit moment en dat waren er veertig, dus die hebben wel tien meer mensen aan moeten nemen om die hele controletaak op zich te pakken en wat meer strategie en wat beter op inkoopbeleid in te richten”</p> <p>terwijl corporaties juist bekend om staan dat die ook anticyclisch zeg maar kunnen blijven investeren</p> <p>“de voornaamste is natuurlijk gewoon goede woningen bieden aan mensen die een laag inkomen hebben en die dat niet zelf kunnen organiseren. En zorgen voor leefbare wijken, dus dat zijn eigenlijk onze voornaamste doelen om die beschikbaarheid en betaalbaarheid voor de doelgroep waar wij voor opgericht zijn om die ter beschikking te stellen, die na te streven”</p> <p>“wij deden wel veel voor bijzondere doelgroepen als het Leger des Heils, Lentis, etc. Dus we hebben wel veel ervaring met mensen met, zeg maar, een rugzakje. We zitten sinds twee jaar ook op verzoek van de gemeente op Woningnet, daarmee maak je afspraken over kwetsbare doelgroepen”</p> <p>“We zullen niet dusdanig hoog sloopgetallen presenteren als de Huismeesters. Eén omdat dat niet nodig is in ons vastgoed, onze vastgoed heeft op zich prima plattegronden, de verhuurbaarheid is goed en het onderhoud is ook wel aardig geweest en het binnenklimaat hebben we vaak via maatregelen afgelopen jaren of die nu gepland staan, is voor ons voldoende om vijftwintig jaar door te exploiteren. Dus daarin verschillen wij wel van mening”</p>
<b>M2<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	
<b>S1<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	<p>“want je wil aan de ene kant je investeringsruimte efficiënt benutten, maar als de voorbereiding heel veel tijd kost of je dwars wordt gezeten door diverse elementen, zoals net benoemd, dan wordt het ook steeds duurder. Stijgende bouwkosten en schaarse arbeid komt daar nog eens overheen. Dus de complexiteit wordt steeds groter”</p> <p>“Het is enorm veranderd. Enorm. Je ziet op het gebied van controle veel meer controle, dus we moeten veel meer aanleveren en bewijslasten aanleveren aan accountants. Accountants zijn ook toegescherpt in Nederland op het gebied van bewijslast, dus de accountants vragen veel meer van ons”</p> <p>“Wij zijn wat beperkt in onze investeringsruimte door de Verhuurderheffing maar ook omdat we niet in openbaar gebied meer mogen investeren en alleen nog maar in onze kerntaken mogen investeren. Dat is voor de gemeente best moeilijk, omdat zij vaak corporaties gebruikte voor de herstructurering van wijken en daar zaten ook winkels in, daar zat een openbaar gebied in”</p>

	<p>“Dus dan gaan we ook praten, wil je misschien middenhuur introduceren, hebben we onze data wel goed op orde, op het gebied van huurpunten hebben we dat wel goed op orde en vragen we moeten we misschien meer gaan vragen, iets zakelijker worden om uiteindelijk ook die Verhuurderheffing ook te kunnen betalen”</p> <p>“aan de ene kant worden we gekort en aan de andere kant moeten we meer werk leveren... We doen het wel en het wordt ook wel van ons gevraagd, maar het is wel een uitdaging. Dus de bezuinigingen die bij de Rijksoverheid zijn geweest op dat gebied die raken rechtstreeks onze werkzaamheden en moeten wij soms meer doen om dingen te bewerkstelligen. Dus aan de kostenkant leidt dat tot meer investeringen en meer exploitatiekosten zonder dat wij daarvoor iets terugkrijgen. Dus dat is best moeizaam”</p>
<b>S2<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	<p>“Je kan niet altijd maar dat maatschappelijk belang dienen, want dan komt de financiële situatie onder druk te staan. Dus daar moet je een goeie discussie over voeren”</p> <p>“financieel moest je beter in controle zijn, dus meer verantwoording kunnen afleggen. Dus daar zitten we nu nog midden in en de marktwaarde introductie is daar natuurlijk een van”</p>
<b>W1<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	<p>“de hele Woningwet zeg maar, die in 2015 is geïntroduceerd, heeft voor enorme veranderingen binnen de woningcorporatie wereld gezorgd en in deze corporatie ook. En dat kan je op meerdere onderwerpen zien, bijvoorbeeld in controle zijn, dus de accountants, de autoriteit wonen en de WSW die vragen veel meer van ons op het gebied van controle”</p> <p>“de prestatieafspraken zijn op zich heel helder en vrij expliciet opgenoemd en worden ook elk jaar herijkt in goed proces, dat heeft de Gemeente Groningen heel goed op orde. Alleen ik vraag mij wel eens af of de realiteit van de getallen beter kan”</p> <p>“de gemeente probeert daardoor te sturen op een bepaald programma in de stad. Ik denk dat dat op zich positief en dat we ook met corporaties en de gemeente afstellen wat wij doen, wie waar”</p> <p>“Dus je moet je administratieve last en je controlelast... Dat is extreem geworden, dat enorm toegenomen ten opzichte van twintig jaar geleden, kan je niet meer vergelijken. En dat heeft natuurlijk met de introductie van de Woningwet te maken”</p> <p>“nu wat explicieter en meer uitgesplitst. Maar ik denk niet dat tot meer resultaten heeft geleid, dat geloof ik niet. Het wordt bemoeilijkt door al die dingen die ik noemde, het vertraagd gewoon door allemaal soorten wetgeving, door hogere bouwkostenstijging. Dus het is veel complexer geworden”</p>
<b>W2<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	<p>“we krijgen steeds meer thuis wonen achter de deur, dus heel veel ouderen met psychische problemen ... Nou dat leidt ertoe dat wij op dat gebied veel meer aandacht moeten hebben”</p>
<b>W3<sub>KvdB</sub></b>	<p>“Als je naar de belastingheffingen kijkt dan kregen we natuurlijk te maken met de Verhuurderheffing, met de ATAD en dat legt behoorlijk beslag op je investeringscapaciteit. Dat heeft direct gevolgen voor je nieuwbouw en de mate van verduurzaming van je vastgoed, maar ook heeft dat bij corporaties geleid, niet bij deze corporatie, tot gezond kijken naar je bedrijfsvoering van hé kunnen we daar niet bezuinigen om uiteindelijk die Verhuurderheffing te kunnen betalen”</p> <p>“daar was voor ons niet zo veel te verdienen om die Verhuurderheffing te laten landen zeg maar, dus bij ons hoefden er geen gedwongen ontslagen te zijn wat bij andere corporaties wel is gebeurd midden in de crisis”</p> <p>“in die crisistijd toen zijn al die corporaties gestopt met investeren en die zeiden van ‘Hé we moeten meer belasting betalen, we mogen alleen nog maar sociale woningbouw maken, we hebben een enorme verduurzamingsopgave, hoe houden wij ons business case gezond’ ... “</p>

Code	Citations
A1 <sub>RB</sub>	“Wij zien Groningen wat steeds aantrekkelijker, dus het wordt ook steeds duurder om in Groningen te komen wonen en je ziet ook eigenlijk dat de mensen met een grotere portemonnee hebben meer keuze en mensen met een kleinere portemonnee hebben minder mogelijkheden. Als je dat, als je de markt zijn werk laat gaan dan krijg je de tweedeling die er sowieso er al wel is, wordt alleen maar versterkt”
C1 <sub>RB</sub>	“tegelijktijd zie je dat de bouwcapaciteit veel te laag is, want die zijn ook stilgevallen in de recessie. Veel bouwvakkers zijn wat anders gaan doen en je ziet nu bijvoorbeeld dat op dit moment, ook al zouden we financieel meer ruimte krijgen, dan is nog maar de vraag of er voldoende bouwcapaciteit en dat zijn zowel aannemers als bouwrijpe grond beschikbaar is om dat te doen. En dat is niet alleen hier in Groningen, maar in de Randstad is dat ook echt een probleem”
	“de Verhuurderheffing is wel een belangrijk element daarin. Als het erop aankomt dat de woningproductie deels stil valt of de verduurzamingsproductie stil valt doordat corporaties niet meer kunnen investeren als echt investeringscapaciteit het probleem is dan gaat er wat met de Verhuurderheffing gebeuren. Als het probleem is van daar zijn niet voldoende aannemers, als wij er dan miljoenen [euro's] bij krijgen daar hebben we niet meer aannemers van”
C2 <sub>RB</sub>	“hebben natuurlijk de crisisjaren gehad en dat heeft ook bij Nijestee toegeleid dat wij, omdat wij heel veel nieuwbouwprojecten toen niet meer konden financieren en betalen, is dat niet helemaal stilgelegd maar aanzienlijk verminderd”
C3 <sub>RB</sub>	“Collega's die zeg maar in die sector zaten bij ons die zijn ontslagen, dat was voor het eerst in al die jaren dat ik hier gewerkt heb. Dat [heb ik] nog nooit gehad, dat mensen om die reden ontslagen moesten worden”
C4 <sub>RB</sub>	“Je leest bijna elke dag in de krant dat er te weinig woningen worden gebouwd en natuurlijk heeft het ook te maken met gebrek aan locaties, als je vandaag beslist om ergens woningen te bouwen dan ben je drie jaar verder voordat ze ook echt staan of vier. Dus dat is altijd de traagheid die in de markt zit”
H1 <sub>RB</sub>	
H2 <sub>RB</sub>	“als je kijkt naar volkshuisvestelijke doelen dan is het de vraag altijd tussen betaalbaarheid, beschikbaarheid en kwaliteit, dat zijn ook de drie poten waarop wij willen presteren en dan ook leefbare wijken, vitale wijken hoort daar zeker bij”
	“Een belangrijke discussie is: vind je belangrijk dat er, ik noem maar iets, vijfhonderd sociale huurwoningen bijkomen of dat geld wat het kost stoppen in dat de huur minder gaat stijgen. Nou dat is een... en dat is gemakkelijk als je zegt ik heb én geld om die vijfhonderd woningen te bouwen én ik heb geld om die huur met een tientje te verlagen, dan is het geen probleem. Maar als je zegt nee ik kan het maar één keer uitgeven, waar geef ik dat dan uit”
H3 <sub>RB</sub>	
H4 <sub>RB</sub>	“Nou zeg ik het er direct bij, in Groningen was dat wellicht minder nodig dan elders, want Groningen heeft gewoon de traditie echt al zolang ik daar werk, van een goede samenwerking tussen gemeente en corporaties. En ook hebben wij al een lange traditie als Nijestee een goede samenwerking met onze huurdersorganisaties”
	“in die zin is er ook in die nieuwe samenwerking het feit dat de gemeente echt een woonvisie moet hebben, op basis waar wij een bod doen, dat vinden wij echt een winstpunt. Dat is in de stad relatief, dat weet ik ook gewoon als ik dat vergelijk met de rest van Nederland, is dat hier redelijk goed geregeld. Maar het is ook belangrijk dat het goed geregeld is”
	“ik vind dat de samenwerking kan altijd beter, dat is altijd zo natuurlijk, maar ik vind dat we dat afgelopen

	jaren ook zeker stappen in hebben gezet en ik weet gewoon, ik kom ook nog wel eens in de rest van het land, dat we hier [Groningen] absoluut op voorop zitten”
	“Corporaties zijn groot hebben heel veel woningen en corporaties omdat we een toegelaten instelling zijn, zijn we als het ware min of meer ook wat om te sturen door de overheid. Dat zijn marktpartijen niet, ze zijn te verleiden met geld, want die kun je niet verplichten om...”
<b>M1<sub>RB</sub></b>	“die tweedeling vinden wij heel slecht, dat leidt tot stigmatisering, dat leidt dat als je als kansarme steeds minder keuze hebt in welke woning en wij zeggen wij zijn enorme voorstander dat de sociale sector een brede sector is zodat er voor mensen wat te kiezen valt. Maar dat je ook, ja niet meer een soort uitzondering bent of een uitzondering wordt, als je in een sociale huurwoning zit, maar dat dat gewoon een gedegen sector is, want dat vinden wij belangrijk”
	“wij willen meer woningen bouwen, we willen groeien en als we meer woningen bouwen dan dat we verkopen of slopen, wij vinden belangrijk dat onze woningen ook qua energielasten betaalbaar blijven. Dus de hele verduurzaming, het zei ook door sloop, vervanging of door verbetering ... de betaalbaarheid van onze huurders staan voorop en wij vinden ook dat wij moeten kijken of wij in bestaande wijken waar veel sociale huur is of wij wellicht door herstructurering daar wat dure huur in kunnen krijgen”
	“waar zijn wij voor opgericht?, wij zijn opgericht voor mensen die niet op eigen kracht aan een woning kunnen komen. En de mensen met inkomens, met een middeninkomen kunnen zo langzamerhand ook niet aan een woning komen”
<b>M2<sub>RB</sub></b>	
<b>S1<sub>RB</sub></b>	“corporaties worden nu geacht om ook middenhuurwoningen te bouwen, worden geacht als startmotor voorop te lopen in de verduurzaming van de woningvoorraad in Nederland. Daar wordt heel veel investeringsvraag bij ons neergelegd en wij dat maar beperkt doen of we zouden dat veel meer kunnen doen als die Verhuurdheffing daar wordt ingezet”
	“Nu mogen wij alleen [rond] de sociale huur bezig zijn, dat betekent dat als de Gemeente een gebied wil ontwikkelen waarin ze zeggen van "Ja maar wij willen ook andere, hé wij willen ook vrije sector huur en koop dan moeten andere partijen erbij zijn en dat moet van het begin af aan helemaal vastgelegd zijn. Dus je bent veel minder flexibel, nou ja flexibiliteit is een sleutelwoord in projectontwikkeling. Als je dat [flexibel] niet bent dan loop je gewoon achter, dan heb je gewoon minder kans en zijn de risico's veel groter en als de risico's veel groter zijn dan ga je minder gauw iets doen”
	“in theorie mochten wij nog middenhuurwoningen bouwen maar in de praktijk is dat zo ingewikkeld dat het bijna nergens in Nederland van de grond te krijgen. En je ziet dus nu, anderhalve maand geleden heeft minister Ollongren een brief naar de kamer gestuurd waarin voor de evaluatie van de woningwetten staat: ‘Dit werkt niet’ ”
	“het zijn altijd golfbewegingen en dat laats [niet bestaan] gaat niet gebeuren want de corporaties hebben meer dan tweemiljoen woningen, dus die sector is dermate groot en belangrijk die gaat niet omvallen, dat gaat gewoon niet gebeuren. Dat is net zo goed als de bankencrisis dat in grote systeembanken mogen niet omvallen, corporaties mogen ook niet omvallen. Dus dat gaat ook niet gebeuren, de vraag is natuurlijk wat gaat er dan wel gebeuren?”
	“de dynamiek in onze sector heel groot en als je nagaat dat in 2015 de Woningwet en nu worden daar al veranderingen aan gepleegd, dus dan denk ik in vier jaar tijd gebeurd er gewoon heel veel”
<b>S2<sub>RB</sub></b>	“Wij betalen meer aan de Staat dan de Staat aan ons bijdraagt via borging van leningen of wat dan ook en dat maakt het wel heel erg raar temeer daar ook nog, en natuurlijk”
<b>W1<sub>RB</sub></b>	“Maar echt om stedelijk met die drie partijen op te trekken dat was in Groningen nog niet echt... de huurdersorganisaties van andere corporaties met elkaar dingen te bespreken dat is wel van toegevoegde waarde, maar wij vinden het wel heel goed dat die lokale samenwerking gewoon veel duidelijker wordt

	aangestuurd, dat de gemeente ook daar een regie rol in heeft”
	“het is absoluut verbeterd en daar zijn wij zowel hoe de gemeente het oppakt, hoe de andere corporaties daarin staan, de huurdersorganisaties, onze eigen participatieraad nou ja die heeft daar ook een hele slag in gemaakt”
	“Woningwet heeft meer dan honderd jaar bestaan, die is vrij fundamenteel veranderd en dan zie je in de werkelijkheid de dynamiek is zo groot die kun je wel in een wet willen vastleggen maar de werkelijkheid is soms heel anders. Ik denk dat wij als corporatie dit soort punten wat dichterbij de werkelijkheid [brengen], wij moeten het doen, dus dan voorzie je gewoon als er een nieuwe wet komt van hier gaat die gewoon knel”
<b>W2<sub>RB</sub></b>	“Daar proberen we altijd heel strikt in te zijn, maar wel de huisvesting. Nou dat is waar ik in het begin zei van een van de dingen die we zien dat door dat soort ontwikkelingen en door passend toewijzen dreigen wij een soort vangnet te worden voor de meest kwetsbaren. Het is prima dat we daar een vangnet voor zijn, maar we moeten niet alleen maar een vangnet zijn, we moeten ook zorgen...”
<b>W3<sub>RB</sub></b>	“Die een enorme hap neemt uit onze investeringsruimte en eigenlijk zeggen wij van ja, wij zwemmen in een soort fuik waarin alle dingen die wij willen en die iedereen nog belangrijk vindt dat wij dat doen, kunnen wij op een gegeven moment niet meer betalen”
	“Vooral ook als het ingekleed is met allerlei voorwaarden, administratieve processen om dat dan te realiseren en het is deels op sectorniveau een sigaar uit eigen doos, want de totale heffing blijft gelijk. Het is dat je op corporatieniveau, kun jij een aftrek krijgen, maar uiteindelijk betaal je het met z'n allen, breng je het wel weer op. Dus die Verhuurderheffing is wel, ook omdat het: A) het is een heel fors bedrag, B) het houdt ons tegen dat we heel veel investeringen kunnen doen omdat het zo'n bedrag is niet kunnen doen, en daarnaast is het ook, meer de principiële kant, dat je kunt zeggen van: : Ja maar wat gebeurt hier nou, corporaties worden gewoon of verhuurders brengen dat in feite op”

**Table B:** Coded citations from interview with housing associations.



## Appendix IV – Timetable of progress

<b>Activities</b>	<b>Week</b>	<b>Deadline</b>	<b>Time</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
<i>Contact potential supervisor</i>	45	07-11-2018	10:00	Completed	Potential supervisor: dr. F. Niekerk
<i>Meeting with potential supervisor</i>	46	14-11-2018	16:00	Attended	Informal meeting after course lecture
<i>Pre-proposal</i>	47	23-11-2018	23:59	Reviewed	Writing between week 45 and week 47
<i>Workshop: towards a full research proposal</i>	49	05-12-2018	9:00	Attended	Improving intermediate pre-proposal version 2
<i>Contacting interim supervisor</i>	49	07-12-2018	13:00	Completed	dr. B. Wind
<i>Workshop: towards a proper research design</i>	50	12-12-2018	9:00	Attended	Working on full research proposal
<i>Intermediate full research proposal</i>	51	17-12-2018	13:00	Incomplete	Exchanging updated proposal with interim supervisor (dr. B. Wind) and secondary supervisor (dr. F. Niekerk)
<i>Working on Full research proposal</i>	51				
<i>Christmas vacation</i>	52	22-12-2018			Working on Full research proposal
	1	06-01-2019			
<i>Full research proposal</i>	3	19-01-2019	12:00	Completed	Writing during week 2
<i>Contacting potential informants</i>	4				Identifying key actors in social housing policies
<i>Contacting potential informants</i>	5				Identifying key actors in social housing policies
<i>Supervisors are assigned</i>	6	05-02-2019		Completed	
<i>Workshop: writing skills</i>	6	05-02-2019		Not attended	
<i>Meeting with supervisor (dr. Wind) – I</i>	7	12-02-2019	15:00	Completed	Decision through email
<i>Draft thesis: introduction, theoretical framework</i>	10	07-03-2019	23:59	Completed	Hand in intermediate version of thesis to dr. Wind as preparation for meeting II.
<i>Draft thesis: methodology</i>	10	10-03-2019	23:59	Completed	Hand in intermediate thesis version containing an improved methodology, in preparation for a meeting with dr. Niekerk
<i>Meeting with dr. Wind – II</i>	11	13-03-2019	10:30	Attended	
<i>Meeting with dr. Niekerk – I</i>	12	18-03-2019	15:00	Attended	
<i>Draft thesis: version 2</i>	12	21-03-2019	23:59	Incomplete	Did not find sufficient time to incorporate all feedback


<i>Draft thesis: version 2.1 and potential interview questions</i>	13	25-03-2019	11:00	Completed	
<i>Meeting with dr. Wind – III</i>	13	27-03-2019	10:00	Attended	
<i>Draft thesis: version 3</i>	16	21-04-2019	23:59	Completed	
<i>Meeting with dr. Wind - IV</i>	17	25-04-2019	10:00	Attended	
<i>Interview: De Huismeesters</i>	17	25-04-2019	13:30	Attended	Data collection
<i>Interview: Lefier</i>	18	29-04-2019	15:30	Attended	Data collection
<i>Interview: the Municipality of Groningen</i>	18	01-05-2019	13:00	Attended	Data collection
<i>Interview: Christelijke Woningstichting Patrimonium</i>	20	22-05-2019	9:00	Attended	Data collection
<i>Draft thesis: version 4</i>	21	23-05-2019	23:59	Completed	
<i>Meeting dr. Wind – IV</i>	22	28-05-2019	9:00	Attended	Poster design draft
<i>Interview: Nijestee</i>	22	28-05-2019	11:00	Attended	Data collection
<i>Graduate Research Day registration</i>	23	04-06-2019	17:00	Completed	
<i>Working on draft</i>	10 – 25				Working on computing data etc.
<i>Preliminary poster design</i>	24	10-06-2019	23:59	Completed	Poster design finished week 24
<i>Poster Graduate Research Day</i>	25	20-06-2019	23:59		
<i>First full draft thesis</i>	25	21-06-2019	23:59	Incomplete	Working on poster presentation
<i>Graduate Research Day</i>	26	27-06-2019	12:00		
<i>Full draft thesis</i>	27	01-07-2019	17:00	Completed	Extended date to work on full draft
<i>Work on Full master thesis</i>	27				Take into account feedback GRD
<i>Meeting dr. Wind – V</i>	27	03-06-2019	13:00	Attended	Final meeting
<i>Full master thesis</i>	28	12-07-2019	23:59	Completed	
<i>Full master thesis (resit)</i>	33	16-08-2019			Assume insufficient mark on full master thesis

## **Appendix V – Maps**

1. Overview of the spatial boundaries of the area of interest: Based on the 2019 municipal and city borders of Groningen – 1:90000
2. Planned social housing developments in the city of Groningen 2019-2013: Based on the 2018 policy document on neighbourhood renewal projects – 1:39500

# Overview of the spatial boundaries of the area of interest

Based on the 2019 municipal and city borders of Groningen




0 1,25 2,5 5 7,5 10 Kilometers

1:90.000

# Planned social housing developments in the city of Groningen 2019-2023

Based on the 2018 policy document on neighbourhood renewal projects



## Legend

-  Redevelopment neighbourhoods
-  City boundaries



0 0,5 1 2 3 4 Kilometers

1:39.500