Who is Watching the Kid Tonight?

The Effects of Informal Childcare on First Childbearing Decisions in Sweden

Bridgit Hebner

S4225856

Human Geography & Planning Bachelor's Project

Supervised by Dr. Adrien Remund

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Summary

Families in Sweden are having their first child at a later age, despite an abundance of government support with childcare. This is due to an increase in control over family planning for women, as well as participation in the workforce. How these family policies providing institutional care work to balance careers and family life must be investigated. Through a literature review and series of multiple linear regression models, this research seeks to answer the question: *How does the reception of informal childcare influence the age of first childbearing in Sweden?* It may be seen that the current policies to make institutional childcare in Sweden are effective, causing no significant relationship to exist between informal care and age at first birth. Sex also does not moderate this, meaning that the policies are fairly equitable. Proximity to family does play a role in this analysis, with couples having a significantly different age at first birth due to the spatial presence of family. In the final model, no significant difference was found between the use of institutional care and informal care in Sweden on the age of first childbearing. Institutional childcare in Sweden is effective.

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1. Introduction

Throughout the European Union, the average age at which women have their first child is rising (Eurostat, 2021). This is due to many factors including economic, social, and personal reasons. This, in combination with lower overall fertility, has caused demographers to research trends in fertility as developed nations enter uncharted territory beyond the first demographic transition model (Bongaarts, 2002). Understanding why couples are making different choices about when they start a family is crucial. Demographic changes will lead many countries in the European Union to face an ageing population coupled with a fertility rate lower than replacement fertility. How this is affecting Sweden, where the average age of women at first childbearing is 29.5 and rising ("Women ... later," 2021), will be focused on.

The Swedish government understands the costs of raising a child. For both parents, a total of 480 days of parental leave is offered after a birth or adoption (Swedish Institute, 2022). During this period, parents can bond with their newborn and raise their child without work-related stress. After this initial period, the assistance continues. Until the child turns 16, parents are given an allowance of SEK 1,250 (~€110) a month (European Commission, 2023). On top of the measures mentioned above, childcare is heavily subsidized once the parents return to work. An average of 11% of the cost of institutional childcare is paid for by parents in Sweden (Secretary-General of the OECD, 2005). These generous family policies allow a better work-life balance, but at a cost. Roughly 2.8% of Sweden's GDP goes towards paying for these measures (Secretary-General of the OECD, 2005). It can be questioned whether these supportive measures encourage couples in Sweden to have children at a different age than those who use informal childcare systems. Informal childcare can be defined as assistance received from anyone that does not care for children as a job (Thomson & Andersson, 2019). This care may be from friends or family, and is anything other than institutional, paid childcare. This leads to the study focusing on the main research question of: *How does the reception of informal childcare influence the age of first childbearing in Sweden?* The hypothesis for this question is: *In the Swedish population, there is no linear relationship between age of first childbearing on one hand and reception of informal childcare on the other.*

In Sweden, the summative gender gap is not as large as in most countries. In the World Economic Forum's ranking of the gender gap through indicators on health, education level, economic state, and politics, Sweden has always been ranked fifth or higher (Swedish Institute, 2022). This means that women are relatively less disadvantaged than in most countries. Taking time off to give birth and raise children is one of the many reasons for this gap in economic stability, educational level, and health. A stagnant career path and 1/3rd of women working part time leaves women with less earnings (Swedish Institute, 2022). Despite the continuous child-related support measures that Sweden offers, this gap still exists. Due to the history of women being left with most child raising responsibilities, it is possible that intergenerational ties may be stronger for a woman when she has a child. It is important to note that for the purpose of this research, gender and sex are considered as synonymous due to data availability. This raises the question of: *Does the sex of the parent moderate the reception of informal childcare?* This secondary question will be addressed within the data analysis. It has the hypothesis of: *In the Swedish population, there is no linear relationship between age of first childbearing on one hand and the sex of the parent and reception of informal*

childcare on the other. It is important to research this question as today it may be assumed that the maternal side of the family may offer more support due to the position of women in the workforce. In the historical context of Sweden, however, it was found that proximity to paternal grandparents increased both fertility rates and maternal survival rates between 1900 and 1910 (Willführ et al., 2022). To investigate which of these factors are stronger today, the secondary question of: *Does proximity to the grandparental home influence the reception of informal childcare?* will also be researched. Through this question, it will be investigated whether general grandparental support lowers the age at which couples have their first child today. For this sub question, the hypothesis is: *In the Swedish population, there is no linear relationship between age of first childbearing on one hand and proximity to the grandparental home and reception of informal childcare on the other.*

For the final sub question, the effectiveness of these measures will be questioned in terms of promoting childbearing at a younger age: *Is there a significant difference between use of institutional childcare and reception of informal childcare on the age of first childbearing?* This research aims to explore whether there is a difference in age at which parents choose to start a family based on the availability of childcare resources to them. The following hypothesis will be tested for this sub question: *In the Swedish population, there is no linear relationship between age of first childbearing on one hand and use of institutional childcare and reception of informal childcare on the other.*

A large body of literature exists surrounding parenting decisions and child raising habits. These factors have been explored in comparison to many socioeconomic characteristics in Europe. This research seeks to fill a gap in the literature that is becoming more urgent to discover as demographics shift, and expenses rise. With high inflation and the cost of living increasing in Europe, how will this affect family formation decisions? Researching the effects of receiving informal care in a country where institutional care is accessible creates a baseline. If families in Sweden are affected by informal care despite the subsidies and allowances available, then even more can be done to facilitate childcare access. This research will seek to verify if the measures taken by Sweden are effective. This research will include financial, social, and family aspects to explain the age at which couples welcome their first child.

To best answer these research questions, a quantitative analysis of secondary data was performed. Before beginning this process, the relevant theory was explored through Swedish and international literature. Presenting the methodology for data collection and processing follows this section. Results are then displayed, discussed, and concluded on. The paper finishes with a reflection on the research process and recommendations for further research on this topic.

2. Theoretical Framework

To establish this research, the theories surrounding the questions will be explained. Through a literature review, the following theories were found in the key subject areas of research. These theories were then conceptualized and displayed in Figure 1. This conceptual model visualizes the research question at the end of this section.

2.1 Age and Childbearing Decisions

The age at which someone has their first child is subject to many variables. The increasing maternal age in Europe can be partially attributed to postponement (Beaujouan & Toulemon, 2021). Instead of lowering fertility outcomes, postponement shows that people delay childbearing (Beaujouan & Toulemon, 2021). The age of first childbearing is rising due to different opportunities, instead of an overall lower proportion wanting to have children. Childbearing under the age of 30 may be postponed because of financial factors such as attending higher education, ability to find housing together as a couple, and labor market fluctuations (Beaujouan & Toulemon, 2021; Blossfeld et al., 2005). Sociopolitical factors have had an additional effect through the availability of contraceptives and options to legally terminate pregnancies (Beaujouan & Toulemon, 2021; Blossfeld et al., 2005). Together, these factors partially explain the raised age of first childbearing.

Two theories seek to explain postponement. The uncertainty in the transition to adulthood in a globalized world is one of these explanations. Young people are now economically dependent for a longer period, which postpones partnership formation and starting a family (Blossfeld et al., 2005). In combination with shifting values and goals due to higher levels of education, the flexible partnership hypothesis proposed by Blossfeld et al., explains that young people maintain a more flexible state of partnership in response to uncertainty of the future (2005). With uncertainty driving the life choices of young people, this theory explains that family formation is delayed. Another theory seeking to explain postponement is related to the second demographic transition. The second demographic transition is largely pushed by individualistic and progressive norms that no longer prioritize family formation (van de Kaa, 1987). In Europe, there is less stigma of having children outside of marriage and cohabitation as the choice to have a child becomes increasingly deliberate (van de Kaa, 1987). These habits have continued over the last decades. Postponement can be attributed to either new uncertainties in young adulthood or the shift to having children outside of traditional family structures.

There is an additional shift towards changing the construction around terms such as geriatric pregnancy due to the availability of assistance in fertility (Catenaccio, 2023). As the period associated with pregnancy has greatly shifted from being biological to social, social fertility has been termed (Catenaccio, 2023). Postponement has created this new social fertility. To help couples balance their lives and work out where they fit into the expanded range of social fertility, countries have developed policies to assist in childbearing decisions. If these policies are successful, fertility will continue to become increasingly social, greatly making age at first childbearing dependent on only personal factors.

2.2 Social Policy and Childcare

Fertility outcomes and intentions are influenced by a plethora of life course factors. The desired age of family formation and childbearing is the subject of policy in many countries today. In the Nordic countries, policies to encourage men and women to have equal caring and working responsibilities are standard (Ikonen et al., 2022). This model of supporting family and economic participation seeks to lower the uneven workload of childcare on women who have careers.

Equalizing this aspect of work life balance aims to provide another level of choice when it comes to starting a family.

While government spending is currently lower on family policy allowances than it was at its maximum, significant measures remain in place and spending is again rising (Ferragina, 2022; Wiß & Wohlgemuth, 2022). There are 480 days of paid parental leave with the first 195 paid at 77.6% of regular earnings and the rest at a flat rate of SEK 180 a day (~€16.91) (Duvander & Löfgren, 2022). These days can be taken flexibly in blocks or all at once any time before the child turns 1.5 years old (Duvander & Löfgren, 2022). As an affluent social democratic country, Sweden has many reasons for these extensive support measures. Left-liberal politics were found to be the most influential in creating and maintaining childcare policy (Wiß & Wohlgemuth, 2022). As a welfare state, Sweden has made its policies as equal as possible. In contrast to Christian-Democratic policies in other countries, policy in Sweden is created on the basis of gender equality (Wiß & Wohlgemuth, 2022). The left-liberal politics that often support childcare have led to family policy focusing on reconciling work with family life, rather than focusing on paternal leave (Wiß & Wohlgemuth, 2022). The pursuit of gender equality in Sweden makes a large difference on how these family policies are developed. Supportive childcare offers more choice for women, as will be explored in the following section.

2.3 Gender Roles and Childcare

The role of childcare has largely fallen on women. With policies designed to encourage women to continue to participate in the labor market, navigating the dynamics of work and family require mothers to be more flexible than their partners (Breitkreuz et al., 2021). To understand the relationship between sex and reception of informal childcare reception, gender roles and their effects must be considered.

With such strong family policies in Sweden, the importance of informal care is understudied (Ikonen et al., 2022). With a heavier burden of responsibilities in combining childcare with work (Breitkreuz et al., 2021), it was investigated if the existing policies in the Nordic countries are enough (Ikonen et al., 2022). Their report is one of the few studies that has investigated whether more support is needed in countries that already have a significant amount of government support. In Ikonen et al.'s findings, institutional childcare was not enough for women in intensive careers (research, development, and innovation) (2022). To be able to place enough emphasis on these intensive jobs to remain competitive in the field, mothers generally needed grandparental help, especially to cover hours where institutional childcare was unavailable, or during emergencies (Ikonen et al., 2022). The social aspect of what is considered good mothering for young children also encouraged grandparental care (Ikonen et al., 2022). Stigmatization on relying on formal care systems for young children is often frowned upon in western contexts, despite pressure to maintain a career and raise a family. To balance the demands of a full-time job and raising a child, mothers need more support than what is only provided by the government. The theories surrounding grandparental care are next examined.

2.4 Familial Proximity and Childcare

Having grandparents nearby may contribute to the availability of informal childcare. This varies based on family dynamics, but often presents an option for parents. Familialism remains as a cause for this childcare, promoting contact, establishment of family values, and intergenerational care (Dantis et al., 2023). While investigated in the context of religious practice, familialism was found to have increased the chances of having a second child (Dantis et al., 2023). The connection between family and childcare exists, so positioning it outside of religion will expand the body of research to where a gap exists. In the case of international migration, it has even been found that the lack of familial support while being in a foreign country discourages childbearing (Ortensi, 2015). If lack of family nearby discourages having a child, it is possible that the opposite encourages it.

This idea is based on the cooperative breeding hypothesis, which suggests that raising a child is eased by access to family and community (Willführ et al., 2022). Considering behavioral evolution, reproductive success was linked to the support of others since pre-agrarian times (Willführ et al., 2022). In a more contemporary light, this is still present through the demand for care systems. In a study by Scelza and Hinde, this concept was specified to the role that maternal grandmothers take on (2019). The experience and assistance provided by maternal grandmothers to their daughters improve the health and wellbeing of the new family (Scelza & Hinde, 2019). This contribution to childcare is one that is well observed, but correlations remain less studied (Scelza & Hinde, 2019). The specification of the maternal grandmother is again related to traditional gender roles.

To examine this relationship in the historical Swedish context, Willführ et al. took a sample of women from 1900-1910 (2022). In connection to characteristics of health and socioeconomic standing, proximity to family was correlated with fertility behaviors (Willführ et al., 2022). In contrast to Scelza & Hinde (2019), Willführ et al. reported this correlation only with paternal grandparents (2022). Both correlations suggest that proximity to family influences fertility choices and effects but are moderated by sex. Ikonen et al. found in Nordic cultures that grandparents would travel far or move to help with a grandchild (2022). When institutional care is insufficient, it has been observed that families will choose to live in greater proximity to one another. It is possible that the presence of grandparents nearby may increase the reception of informal care.

2.5 Conceptual Model

The theories from the sections above have been conceptualized in Figure 1. In this conceptual model, the relationships are visualized between each factor and its effect on the age at first childbearing. Reception of informal childcare is proposed to be the most significant factor. Familial proximity and the use of institutional childcare mediate this relationship. Sex as a moderating variable will influence the overall strength of the relationship.

Figure 1: Conceptual model of childcare reception and factors on age at first birth (made by author, 2023)

From these theories and concepts, it is possible to design the research process.

3. Methodology

To investigate the relationship between informal childcare reception and age of first childbearing, a large and representative dataset was needed. Secondary data from the Generations and Gender Survey was used for this purpose. Primary data collection would have resulted in too few results to be able to consider fertility trends. Quantitative data analysis was preferable to qualitative because of the ability to see the effects of policy throughout the Swedish population. While qualitative analysis could have provided more insight into family formation decisions, the research is aimed at addressing public policy and its effects. With this statistical analysis, inferences can be made that do not refer to the life stages of an individual or their choices. With this secondary quantitative data, it may be generalized that the population of Sweden follows similar patterns to these results.

3.1 Dataset Background

The Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) collects demographic, economic, and policy indicator panel data from an average of 10,000 individuals per country in about sixty countries (Generations and Gender Programme, 2023a). Individuals offer insight on generational relations, with the age range of respondents being between the ages of 18 and 79 (Generations and Gender Programme,

2023a). This data is collected at both the national and regional levels, combined with a description of the policies from the country at the time (Generations and Gender Programme, 2023a). The extensive data collection process points to a high quality of data that is recognized across the European Union. With funding from both the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in the past and the EU currently, as well as other national research institutions, the data is collected with a high standard of concern about ethics and management.

There are currently two GGS rounds, the first with data from 2004-2012 and the second taking place since 2019 (Generations and Gender Programme, 2023a). Within the first GGS, there are three waves of data, with surveys from the same individuals at three-year intervals (Generations and Gender Programme, 2023a). For this research, GGS-I Wave 1 data was used. GGS data must first be requested through a standard procedure. Users must sign a statement agreeing to proper management and usage of the data to maintain confidentiality.

3.2 Data Analysis

To answer the main research question, the data was sorted to include Swedish born parents. To accurately investigate if care was given, the parents were selected by those who have a child aged eight or younger at the time of the interview. This age was chosen because Swedish parents have access to most government benefits and flexibility in work until this age (Duvander & Löfgren, 2022). All other cases were excluded from analysis. Swedish born is relevant because of the reception of government benefits. While most migrants can receive the same parental leave and childcare benefits, there are some exceptions.

In answering the main research question, age at first birth was calculated. The age of the oldest child and the age of the parents were calculated within SPSS to give the dependent variable, age at first birth. The primary independent variable was then selected as the reception of informal childcare. The first multiple linear regression was performed with these variables. Multiple linear regression tests are performed to see if a linear relationship exists between a ratio variable and one or more other ratio, ordinal, or nominal variables. If there is no linear relationship between variables, the output of the test is not significant. With a significant result, the model may be useful for predicting (Burt et al., 2009). To run this test, the normality, independence, homoscedasticity, and randomness of errors are assumed as well as linearity (Burt et al., 2009).

The secondary research question regarding the moderating effect of sex was answered by selecting for the sex of the respondent. For the next sub question, a variable showing how long it takes to travel to the home of each grandparent was used. Adding the variable about usage of institutional childcare into the original regression was used in the final test.

In these analyses, level of education, financial security, and location of residence (urban versus rural) were controlled for. Financial security was controlled through a variable asking the respondents if they usually have money to put into savings after regular expenses. This variable was chosen as it separates those who have the ability to save versus those who do not, as a

rudimentary show of financial security. The other two control variables were direct in purpose and use.

In Figure 2, the data analysis scheme is modeled. In this model, the overall steps to be able to replicate this research are shown.

Figure 2: Data analysis scheme for relationships in fertility and migration (Made by author, 2023)

3.3 Ethics and Positionality

As secondary data was used, the ethics of data collection were not applicable during this research. The Generations and Gender Programme (GGP) took the appropriate measures to keep the collected data safe and anonymized, as prescribed by the General Data Protection Regulation (Generations and Gender Programme, 2023c). To achieve this, the methodology and data management of the GGP is always approved by its own Ethics Board as well as the Dutch Royal Academy of Arts and Science Data Protection Officer (Generations and Gender Programme, 2023c).

For this research, data handling, positionality, and impact of results were considered as the researcher's duty. All data was processed for the purpose of only this research with the intent of no harm. It was stored on only the researcher's computer and was deleted after the project's completion. For the duration of the research, the data was encrypted with a password.

In terms of positionality, having no children may have impacted the way in which this is researched. While the financial costs of having children are understood, all the effects of having children and deciding to be closer to family for help with raising them cannot be understood by the researcher. In addition, familial childcare has different levels of importance in different cultures. In looking at anonymized data of only one country, it does not address the fact that the role of grandparents can vary vastly based on culture, religion, and social class. Therefore, it is important to present the findings only in the context of this research.

4. Results

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

The dataset from the GGS contains 1013 cases after following the steps outlined in the methodology. This is the number of respondents who have children under the age of eight and responded to the variable asking about their reception of informal childcare. 50% (N=507) of these selected respondents are female and 50% (N=506) are male. Due to availability of each control and chosen test variable, there are a varying number of cases in each analysis chosen from the 1013 valid cases. Multiple imputations were chosen as the best way to ensure an equal number of cases for each test. Shown below in Table 1 are the variables for which imputations were performed.

Table 1: Number of missing values and performed imputations (Made by author, 2023)

Variable	Number of Missing Cases	Imputations
Reception of informal care	1	3
Distance to grandmother's house	90	270
Distance to grandfather's house	158	474
Region of residence	11	33
Financial stability	317	951

4.2 Influence of the reception of informal childcare on the age of first childbearing in Sweden

The primary research question operated on the null hypothesis of: *In the Swedish population, there is no relationship between the reception of informal childcare and the age of first childbearing.* From the results of the multiple linear regression, this hypothesis fails to be rejected. Illustrated in Figure 3*,* the mean age of first childbearing for those who do receive informal childcare is 28.22 compared to 28.82 for those who do not.

Figure 3: Distribution of age at first childbearing and whether informal childcare is received (Made by author in SPSS with GGS data, 2023)

The distribution of ages seen in Figure 3 is commented upon in section 5.2, as the shortened left tail is representative of cases that were removed due to a young age at first childbirth.

The statistical test on the original data resulted in a probability value of 0.625 and an F value of 0.653, presenting that there is hardly any difference on the age of first childbearing from receiving informal childcare. None of the imputed regressions were significant either, as seen below in Table 2. For complete tables, see Appendix A.

Table 2: Overall F and p values for the regression of the primary research question (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model		F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	.653	.625[b]
		Residual		
		Total		
1	1	Regression	1.456	.213[c]
		Residual		
		Total		
2	1	Regression	.941	.440[d]
		Residual		
		Total		
3	1	Regression	1.569	.180[e]
		Residual		
		Total		

After controlling for the effects of financial stability, urbanity, and education level, the R square of this test was 0.4% (see A2), showing that the model does not account for much variation between variables.

With unstandardized coefficients ranging between 0.067 and 0.246 for the data and its imputations, parents who receive informal care have a slightly higher age at first childbearing than those who do not. This is not significant with the original data (p=0.560), nor with any of the imputations. The results of the original data are displayed below in Table 3. The imputations can be found in Appendix Table A4.

Table 3: Coefficient table for the primary research question (Made by author in SPSS, 2023

Imputation Number	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
			B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Original data	1	(Constant)	-207.881	295.792		-.703	.482	-788.648	372.887
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.246	.423	.022	.583	.560	-.584	1.076
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.136	.169	-.031	-.806	.421	-.469	.196
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.082	.102	.031	.804	.422	-.118	.282
		Normally money left for savings	-.441	.483	-.035	-.913	.362	-1.390	.508

With no significant difference, receiving informal care does not seem to lower the age at which parents in Sweden have children. This shows a possible success of the policies in place to encourage freedom in fertility decisions.

These results could support the theory of social fertility becoming more common in comparison to biological fertility (Catenaccio, 2023). Work-life balance and access to care (both institutional and informal) provides couples with control over their family planning decisions. Even with socioeconomic and regional factors controlled for, there is no significant relationship between the variables. Parents receive informal care regardless of the age at which they have children, showing

that stigmatization over ideas such as geriatric pregnancy (Catenaccio, 2023) may be decreasing. Next, it will be explored if the sex of the parent changes this relationship, as women have long faced more responsibility in providing for care (Breitkreuz et al., 2021).

4.3 Moderation of sex on the reception of informal childcare

In investigating whether the sex of the parent moderates the reception of informal childcare, no significant result was found. Stratifying and testing each sex independently resulted in no significant relationship between the age at first childbearing and the reception of informal care for either women or men. Performing imputations lowered the p-values by a large amount, but no results became significant as seen below in Tables 4 and 5 (see B3 & B7). The p-vales were lower for women than for men.

Table 4: Overall F and p values for women (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model		F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	.833	.505[c]
		Residual		
		Total		
1	1	Regression	2.062	.085[d]
		Residual		
		Total		
2	1	Regression	1.729	.142[d]
		Residual		
		Total		
3	1	Regression	1.910	.107[e]
		Residual		
		Total		

Table 4: Overall F and p values for men (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model		F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	.456	.768[e]
		Residual		
		Total		
1	1	Regression	1.140	.337[d]
		Residual		
		Total		
2	1	Regression	1.097	.357[e]
		Residual		
		Total		
3	1	Regression	.878	.477[e]
		Residual		
		Total		

Slightly more of the variation is explained in the model for women than for men, based on the R Square values seen in Table 5 and 6.

Table 5: Model summary for women (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model	R Sex Respondent = female (Selected)	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.098[a]	.010	-.002	5.177
1	1	.127[b]	.016	.008	5.107
2	1	.117[b]	.014	.006	5.114
3	1	.122[a]	.015	.007	5.110

Table 6: Model summary for men (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model	R Sex Respondent = male (Selected)	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.074[a]	.005	-.006	5.739
1	1	.095[b]	.009	.001	5.768
2	1	.093[c]	.009	.001	5.769
3	1	.083[c]	.007	-.001	5.774

With the non-significant result of this test, the aims of Sweden's family policies may be well met. With policy created to provide an equal balance between partners with work and family life, Sweden has sought to erase differences in fertility decisions on the basis of sex (Wiß & Wohlgemuth, 2022). Since sex creates no significant difference between the reception of informal childcare on the age at first childbearing, this aspect of fertility may be roughly equal in Sweden. This shows the importance of policy in addressing the gap between men and women in parenting.

Receiving informal care may no longer be linked to either the maternal role of family (Scelza & Hinde, 2019) nor the paternal (Willführ et al., 2022). Informal care is often offered by family, and these results support a roughly equal distribution of care to both mothers and fathers. Mothers may not be reporting as much overwork in familial matters. This is supported by Ikonen et al., the research of which focused on only women in certain careers needing familial care (2022). Overall, this non-significant result shows that parents in Sweden may receive equal amounts of support.

4.4 Influence of proximity to the grandparental home on reception of informal childcare

Significant results were found in the multiple linear regression investigating the effect of proximity to grandparents on the reception of informal childcare. With a probability value of 0.031 for the

original data, 0.002 for two imputations, and 0.052 for the last imputation (see Table 7; C3), the research may reject the null hypothesis.

Table 7: Overall F and p values for regression on proximity to grandparents (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model		F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	2.329	.031[b]
		Residual		
		Total		
1	1	Regression	3.459	.002[c]
		Residual		
		Total		
2	1	Regression	2.088	.052[c]
		Residual		
		Total		
3	1	Regression	3.556	.002[d]
		Residual		
		Total		

Being close to both the grandmother, with an original probability value of 0.023, and grandfather, with a probability value of 0.002, had a significant result (see C4). This is in line with the findings of many research papers investigating intergenerational care (Dantis et al., 2023; Scleza & Hinde, 2019; Willführ et al., 2022). There may be a linear relationship between age at first birth, the reception of informal childcare, and the proximity to grandparents. In the context of the dataset, the average days per month that grandparents helped care for grandchildren was 3.7. There was a large range, with some grandparents not helping at all and some helping every day.

Table 8: Coefficient table showing effects of proximity to the grandparental home (Made by author in SPSS, 2023

Imputation Number	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B	
			B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Original data	1	(Constant)	-180.646	306.471		-.589	.556	-782.673	421.380
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.240	.438	.023	.548	.584	-.620	1.101
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.077	.178	-.018	-.431	.667	-.427	.274
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.072	.106	.029	.687	.493	-.135	.280
		Normally money left for savings	-.881	.498	-.076	-1.769	.078	-1.860	.098
		Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	.003	.001	.113	2.288	.023	.000	.006
		Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	-.002	.001	-.155	-3.141	.002	-.004	-.001

In Table 8, the coefficients are shown. For every hour of travel to the grandmother's home, the age at first birth is raised by 0.003 of a year while it is lowered by 0.002 of a year with every hour to the grandfather's home. Proximity to both grandparents has a significant effect on age at first birth.

Familialism and availability of intergenerational care are often valued because of the safety parents can feel with their own parents looking after a child. Being able to rely on close family members for informal care can be used in times of emergency when formal care is not available (Ikonen et al., 2022). Couples knowing that they have access to this informal care may give a sense of security that promotes a childbearing choice without concern for special occasions or emergencies.

4.5 Difference between using institutional childcare and receiving informal childcare on the age of first childbearing

It is not possible to reject the null hypothesis for the final sub question. Table 9 shows that the results were not significant. The p-values, however, were lowered by the imputations.

Table 9: Overall F and p values for final regression (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model		F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	.522	.760[b]
		Residual		
		Total		
1	1	Regression	1.252	.282[c]
		Residual		
		Total		
2	1	Regression	.852	.513[d]
		Residual		
		Total		
3	1	Regression	1.340	.245[c]
		Residual		
		Total		

With no linear relationship between age of first childbearing, the use of institutional childcare, and reception of informal childcare, the type of childcare may not affect childbearing age.

While not statistically significant, performing imputations changed values by large amounts. The probability value nearly halved between the original data (p=0.980) and the imputations (p=0.508, p=0.479, p=0.515) (see D4).

Very little of the variation is explained through these models, though, despite the controlled variables and imputations. Table 10 presents the low R Square values, which means that only 0.4%-0.7% of the variance in age at first childbearing can be predicted by reception of formal and informal care.

Table 10: Model summary for the final test (Made by author in SPSS, 2023)

Imputation Number	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.062[a]	.004	-.003	5.520
1	1	.079[b]	.006	.001	5.524
2	1	.065[c]	.004	-.001	5.529
3	1	.081[b]	.007	.002	5.523

With no effect from these variables, it may be said that there is no difference between use of institutional childcare and reception of informal childcare on the age of first childbearing. With highly accessible and equitable family policy in Sweden, this result speaks to its strengths (Duvander & Löfgren, 2022). There being no difference could mean that stigmatization of using informal is lessened with these care policies (Ikonen et al., 2022). If the differences between informal and institutional care are not significant, Sweden has implemented a successful set of family policies that allow for equitable care standards.

5. Conclusions

To investigate how the reception of informal childcare influences the age of first childbearing in Sweden, four multiple linear regression tests were conducted after a literature review. The literature review was crucial to establish key terms, theories, and policies in the study. The current policies in Sweden aim to create an equal balance of caring and working for all parents. These policies help to ameliorate the overwork of mothers while also promoting paternal involvement with children. The overall effects of familialism and the availability of informal care from grandparents were present in the literature as well, with its general positive effects for new parents. Once these papers were reviewed, it was possible to begin statistical analysis.

In testing the primary research question of *How does the reception of informal childcare influence the age of first childbearing in Sweden?,* no significant linear relationship was found. This means that ages at first birth for parents are not significantly affected by the reception of informal care. For Sweden, this means the policies designed to create affordable and accessible institutional childcare may be working.

This relationship was then tested with the moderating variable of sex. With another non-significant result, it is possible that Swedish policy is effective in creating an equitable access to institutional care, so that neither women nor men feel the need to rely more on informal care.

The next test had a significant result in the linear relationship between proximity to the grandparental home and reception of informal childcare on age of first childbearing. The spatial closeness of grandparents to the couple may change the age at which they decide to have children.

In the last linear regression, no significant result was found. There is no significant relationship between use of institutional childcare and reception of informal care on the age of first

childbearing. From this result, it may be concluded that Swedish family policies may be successfully accessible to their population.

5.1 Recommendations

For further research, it can be recommended to perform qualitative data collection with couples in Sweden. Since the reception of informal care does not significantly change the age at first childbearing, it is important to find out what factors, other than the proximity of grandparents, now influence couples in the new age of social fertility. Couples who have at least one child can be interviewed to find out what affected their decisions on when to start a family.

It can be recommended that the current family policies in Sweden stay in place. Many welfare states in Europe have experienced a shrinking of policy due to neoliberalism. With the results seen from this research, the value of the policy is clear in helping couples balance work and family life.

5.2 Reflection

A limitation of this paper is its focus on the financial and social aspects of choosing when to have a child. This is available from secondary data. Personal decisions and their impact on family formation could be explored through qualitative research.

An additional limitation in this paper is the reliability of the data. Within this analysis, there were 111 cases that are questionable in reliability. These 111 cases show the parents to have had their first child at an age of 15 or younger. While biologically possible for a few of these cases, this is extremely unlikely. This large number is probably to do with a wrong date being given or entered in the data collection process. While these dates are more clearly wrong, this raises the issue of other dates being incorrect, yet still blending into the data because of plausibility. This unreliability in listed age has been noted by the GGP (Generations and Gender Programme, 2023b).

The most significant change to the paper occurred midway through the timeline of researching and writing. Initially, the main research question was: *Does proximity to place of birth influence the age of first childbearing for women in Sweden?* This question had a spatial focus in comparison to only having a spatial secondary question in the end. Initial research, conceptualization, and theoretical framework building were done for this question. Once the dataset was received, it was found that this was no longer possible. The relevant variables that would have allowed place of birth and current residence to be compared were on different scales (urban area size versus exact municipality) and therefore the research question was shifted. With the new research question on which this thesis was written, similar concepts were kept, as well as the country of focus, but significant changes were made during the process.

6. Acknowledgements

7. References

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8. Appendices

8.1 Appendix A: Output from SPSS for main research question

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics

Imputation Number		Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Original data	Age at first childbearing	29.51	5.511	690
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.55	.498	690
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.67	1.246	690
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.90	2.066	690
	Normally money left for savings	.74	.437	690
1	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.035	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.443	1013
2	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.042	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.74	.440	1013
3	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.058	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.442	1013
Pooled	Age at first childbearing	29.55		1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54		1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85		1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83		1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73		1013

Table A2: Model Summary

Model Summary

Imputation Number	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.062[a]	.004	-.002	5.516
1	1	.076[b]	.006	.002	5.522
2	1	.061[c]	.004	.000	5.528
3	1	.079[d]	.006	.002	5.521

a. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent

b. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent

c. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

d. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

Table A3: ANOVA regression results

ANOVA[a]

Imputation Number	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	79.516	4	19.879	.653	.625[b]
		Residual	20842.891	685	30.428		
		Total	20922.407	689			
1	1	Regression	177.670	4	44.418	1.456	.213[c]
		Residual	30741.258	1008	30.497		
		Total	30918.928	1012			
2	1	Regression	114.984	4	28.746	.941	.440[d]
		Residual	30803.944	1008	30.559		
		Total	30918.928	1012			
3	1	Regression	191.363	4	47.841	1.569	.180[e]
		Residual	30727.565	1008	30.484		
		Total	30918.928	1012			

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

b. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent

c. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent

d. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

e. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

Table A4: Coefficient table

Coefficients[a]

Imputation Number	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Fraction Missing Info.	Relative Increase Variance	Relative Efficiency
			B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Original data	1	(Constant)	-207.881	295.792		-.703	.482	-788.648	372.887			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.246	.423	.022	.583	.560	-.584	1.076			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.136	.169	-.031	-.806	.421	-.469	.196			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.082	.102	.031	.804	.422	-.118	.282			
		Normally money left for savings	-.441	.483	-.035	-.913	.362	-1.390	.508			
1	1	(Constant)	278.803	247.869		1.125	.261	-207.595	765.201			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.067	.349	.006	.193	.847	-.617	.751			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.022	.033	-.021	-.675	.500	-.086	.042			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.086	.085	-.032	-1.003	.316	-.253	.082			
		Normally money left for savings	-.799	.392	-.064	-2.039	.042	-1.568	-.030			
2	1	(Constant)	271.562	247.257		1.098	.272	-213.636	756.759			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.082	.349	.007	.236	.813	-.603	.767			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.025	.033	-.024	-.756	.450	-.089	.039			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.083	.085	-.031	-.977	.329	-.250	.084			
		Normally money left for savings	-.580	.395	-.046	-1.469	.142	-1.355	.195			
3	1	(Constant)	257.826	245.084		1.052	.293	-223.107	738.758			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.145	.349	.013	.415	.678	-.539	.829			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.025	.033	-.024	-.761	.447	-.089	.039			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.078	.084	-.029	-.929	.353	-.244	.087			
		Normally money left for savings	-.846	.393	-.068	-2.152	.032	-1.618	-.075			
Pooled	1	(Constant)	269.397	247.046		1.090	.276	-214.806	753.600	.002	.002	.999
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.098	.352		.279	.780	-.592	.788	.019	.019	.994
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.024	.033		-.730	.466	-.088	.040	.003	.003	.999
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.082	.085		-.969	.333	-.249	.084	.002	.002	.999
		Normally money left for savings	-.742	.426		-1.741	.085	-1.589	.105	.166	.174	.948

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

8.2 Appendix B: SPSS output from research question addressing moderation of sex

Women:

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics[a]

Imputation Number		Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Original data	Age at first childbearing	28.68	5.172	349
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.49	.501	349
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.64	1.269	349
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.82	1.995	349
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.443	349
1	Age at first childbearing	28.67	5.129	507
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.50	.500	507
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.95	6.115	507
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.82	2.013	507
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.447	507
2	Age at first childbearing	28.67	5.129	507
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.50	.500	507
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.95	6.115	507
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.82	2.014	507
	Normally money left for savings	.71	.452	507
3	Age at first childbearing	28.67	5.129	507
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.50	.500	507
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.95	6.115	507
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.82	2.029	507
	Normally money left for savings	.76	.430	507
Pooled	Age at first childbearing	28.67		507
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.50		507
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.95		507
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.82		507
	Normally money left for savings	.73		507

a. Selecting only cases for which Sex Respondent = female

Table B2: Model Summary

Model Summary

Imputation Number	Model	R Sex Respondent = female (Selected)	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.098[a]	.010	-.002	5.177
1	1	.127[b]	.016	.008	5.107
2	1	.117[b]	.014	.006	5.114
3	1	.122[a]	.015	.007	5.110

a. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent

b. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent

Table B3: ANOVA regression results

ANOVA[a,b]

Imputation Number	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	89.323	4	22.331	.833	.505[c]
		Residual	9218.734	344	26.799		
		Total	9308.057	348			
1	1	Regression	215.094	4	53.773	2.062	.085[d]
		Residual	13093.573	502	26.083		
		Total	13308.667	506			
2	1	Regression	180.909	4	45.227	1.729	.142[d]
		Residual	13127.758	502	26.151		
		Total	13308.667	506			
3	1	Regression	199.523	4	49.881	1.910	.107[c]
		Residual	13109.144	502	26.114		
		Total	13308.667	506			

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

b. Selecting only cases for which Sex Respondent = female

c. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent

d. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent

Table B4: Coefficient table

Coefficients[a,b]

Imputation Number	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Fraction Missing Info.	Relative Increase Variance	Relative Efficiency
			B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Original data	1	(Constant)	4.548	404.290		.011	.991	-790.644	799.740			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.578	.556	.056	1.040	.299	-.515	1.672			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.291	.220	-.071	-1.322	.187	-.724	.142			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.008	.139	.003	.061	.951	-.265	.282			
		Normally money left for savings	-.437	.631	-.037	-.692	.489	-1.678	.804			
1	1	(Constant)	584.330	328.093		1.781	.076	-60.275	1228.934			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.608	.455	.059	1.337	.182	-.285	1.501			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.028	.037	-.033	-.754	.451	-.101	.045			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.191	.113	-.075	-1.694	.091	-.413	.031			
		Normally money left for savings	-.795	.510	-.069	-1.559	.120	-1.796	.207			
2	1	(Constant)	586.272	328.233		1.786	.075	-58.608	1231.152			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.632	.455	.062	1.389	.165	-.262	1.527			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.029	.037	-.035	-.779	.436	-.102	.044			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.192	.113	-.075	-1.700	.090	-.414	.030			
		Normally money left for savings	-.556	.504	-.049	-1.104	.270	-1.546	.433			
3	1	(Constant)	552.892	325.609		1.698	.090	-86.831	1192.616			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.650	.455	.063	1.428	.154	-.244	1.545			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.029	.037	-.034	-.766	.444	-.102	.045			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.181	.112	-.071	-1.611	.108	-.401	.040			
		Normally money left for savings	-.777	.530	-.065	-1.465	.143	-1.818	.265			
Pooled	1	(Constant)	574.498	328.028		1.751	.080	-68.432	1217.428	.004	.004	.999
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.630	.456		1.383	.167	-.263	1.523	.003	.003	.999
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.029	.037		-.766	.443	-.102	.044	.000	.000	1.000
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.188	.113		-1.665	.096	-.410	.033	.004	.004	.999
		Normally money left for savings	-.709	.537		-1.321	.188	-1.766	.348	.088	.089	.972

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

b. Selecting only cases for which Sex Respondent = female

Men:

Table B5: Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics[a]

Imputation Number		Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Original data	Age at first childbearing	30.36	5.720	341
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.61	.488	341
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.71	1.223	341
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.98	2.136	341
	Normally money left for savings	.75	.432	341
1	Age at first childbearing	30.43	5.772	506
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.58	.493	506
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.76	4.417	506
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.85	2.059	506
	Normally money left for savings	.74	.441	506
2	Age at first childbearing	30.43	5.772	506
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.58	.493	506
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.76	4.417	506
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.84	2.073	506
	Normally money left for savings	.76	.427	506
3	Age at first childbearing	30.43	5.772	506
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.58	.494	506
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.76	4.417	506
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.088	506
	Normally money left for savings	.71	.453	506
Pooled	Age at first childbearing	30.43		506
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.58		506
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.76		506
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.84		506
	Normally money left for savings	.74		506

a. Selecting only cases for which Sex Respondent = male

Table B6: Model Summary

Model Summary

Imputation Number	Model	R Sex Respondent = male (Selected)	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.074[a]	.005	-.006	5.739
1	1	.095[b]	.009	.001	5.768
2	1	.093[c]	.009	.001	5.769
3	1	.083[c]	.007	-.001	5.774

a. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent

b. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)

c. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

Table B7: ANOVA regression results

ANOVA[a,b]

Imputation Number	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	60.102	4	15.026	.456	.768[c]
		Residual	11064.807	336	32.931		
		Total	11124.909	340			
1	1	Regression	151.691	4	37.923	1.140	.337[d]
		Residual	16670.388	501	33.274		
		Total	16822.079	505			
2	1	Regression	146.072	4	36.518	1.097	.357[e]
		Residual	16676.007	501	33.285		
		Total	16822.079	505			
3	1	Regression	117.064	4	29.266	.878	.477[e]
		Residual	16705.015	501	33.343		
		Total	16822.079	505			

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

b. Selecting only cases for which Sex Respondent = male

c. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent

d. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)

e. Predictors: (Constant), Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

Table B8: Coefficient table

Coefficients[a,b]

Imputation Number	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Fraction Missing Info.	Relative Increase Variance	Relative Efficiency
			B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Original data	1	(Constant)	-311.201	424.519		-.733	.464	-1146.252	523.849			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	-.495	.638	-.042	-.776	.439	-1.750	.760			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.019	.255	-.004	-.073	.942	-.521	.484			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.118	.146	.044	.808	.420	-.170	.406			
		Normally money left for savings	-.506	.725	-.038	-.698	.486	-1.933	.921			
1	1	(Constant)	-32.248	362.952		-.089	.929	-745.344	680.847			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	-.839	.522	-.072	-1.609	.108	-1.864	.186			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	.011	.058	.008	.182	.855	-.104	.125			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.022	.125	.008	.178	.859	-.223	.268			
		Normally money left for savings	-.798	.583	-.061	-1.368	.172	-1.945	.348			
2	1	(Constant)	-44.962	360.624		-.125	.901	-753.483	663.559			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	-.833	.522	-.071	-1.595	.111	-1.858	.193			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	.004	.058	.003	.070	.944	-.110	.119			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.027	.124	.010	.214	.830	-.217	.271			
		Normally money left for savings	-.783	.602	-.058	-1.300	.194	-1.967	.400			
3	1	(Constant)	-42.992	357.964		-.120	.904	-746.287	660.303			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	-.717	.522	-.061	-1.372	.171	-1.743	.310			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	.003	.058	.002	.055	.956	-.111	.118			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.026	.123	.009	.210	.834	-.216	.268			
		Normally money left for savings	-.681	.569	-.053	-1.195	.233	-1.799	.438			
Pooled	1	(Constant)	-40.067	360.605		-.111	.912	-746.841	666.706	.000	.000	1.000
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	-.796	.528		-1.508	.132	-1.831	.239	.023	.023	.992
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	.006	.058		.102	.919	-.109	.121	.006	.006	.998
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.025	.124		.200	.841	-.219	.268	.000	.000	1.000
		Normally money left for savings	-.754	.590		-1.278	.201	-1.910	.402	.016	.016	.995

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

b. Selecting only cases for which Sex Respondent = male

8.3 Appendix C: SPSS output with effect of grandparental care

Table C1: Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics

Imputation Number		Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Original data	Age at first childbearing	29.25	5.112	545
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.53	.500	545
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.66	1.229	545
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.90	2.069	545
	Normally money left for savings	.74	.440	545
	Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	11.78	175.522	545
	Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	43.86	349.059	545
1	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.035	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.443	1013
	Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	18.21	211.897	1013
	Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	34.02	341.831	1013
2	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.042	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.74	.440	1013
	Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	13.73	213.446	1013
	Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	37.43	337.912	1013
3	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.058	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.442	1013
	Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	18.43	212.673	1013
	Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	54.29	338.296	1013
Pooled	Age at first childbearing	29.55		1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54		1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85		1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83		1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73		1013
	Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	16.79		1013
	Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	41.91		1013

Table C2: Model Summary

Model Summary

Imputation Number	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.159[a]	.025	.014	5.075
1	1	.142[b]	.020	.014	5.488
2	1	.111[b]	.012	.006	5.510
3	1	.144[c]	.021	.015	5.486

a. Predictors: (Constant), Time distance (hrs) to father's residence, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence

b. Predictors: (Constant), Time distance (hrs) to father's residence, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence

c. Predictors: (Constant), Time distance (hrs) to father's residence, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence

Table C3: ANOVA regression results

ANOVA[a]

Imputation Number	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	359.908	6	59.985	2.329	.031[b]
		Residual	13857.145	538	25.757		
		Total	14217.053	544			
1	1	Regression	624.890	6	104.148	3.459	.002[c]
		Residual	30294.038	1006	30.113		
		Total	30918.928	1012			
2	1	Regression	380.292	6	63.382	2.088	.052[c]
		Residual	30538.636	1006	30.356		
		Total	30918.928	1012			
3	1	Regression	642.127	6	107.021	3.556	.002[d]
		Residual	30276.801	1006	30.096		
		Total	30918.928	1012			

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

b. Predictors: (Constant), Time distance (hrs) to father's residence, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence

c. Predictors: (Constant), Time distance (hrs) to father's residence, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence

d. Predictors: (Constant), Time distance (hrs) to father's residence, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Normally money left for savings, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence

Table C4: Coefficient table

Coefficients[a]

Imputation Number	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Fraction Missing Info.	Relative Increase Variance	Relative Efficiency
			B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Original data	1	(Constant)	-180.646	306.471		-.589	.556	-782.673	421.380			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.240	.438	.023	.548	.584	-.620	1.101			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.077	.178	-.018	-.431	.667	-.427	.274			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.072	.106	.029	.687	.493	-.135	.280			
		Normally money left for savings	-.881	.498	-.076	-1.769	.078	-1.860	.098			
		Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	.003	.001	.113	2.288	.023	.000	.006			
		Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	-.002	.001	-.155	-3.141	.002	-.004	-.001			
1	1	(Constant)	343.236	246.943		1.390	.165	-141.346	827.819			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.184	.348	.017	.530	.597	-.498	.866			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.021	.032	-.020	-.643	.520	-.084	.043			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.108	.085	-.040	-1.269	.205	-.275	.059			
		Normally money left for savings	-.805	.390	-.065	-2.067	.039	-1.570	-.041			
		Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	.003	.001	.107	3.017	.003	.001	.005			
		Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	-.002	.001	-.126	-3.538	<.001	-.003	-.001			
2	1	(Constant)	336.316	247.476		1.359	.174	-149.313	821.945			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.164	.349	.015	.469	.639	-.521	.849			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.024	.032	-.023	-.730	.465	-.087	.040			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.106	.085	-.039	-1.238	.216	-.273	.062			
		Normally money left for savings	-.615	.394	-.049	-1.561	.119	-1.388	.158			
		Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	.003	.001	.100	2.805	.005	.001	.004			
		Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	-.001	.001	-.077	-2.156	.031	-.002	.000			
3	1	(Constant)	338.370	244.567		1.384	.167	-141.550	818.290			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.243	.348	.022	.700	.484	-.439	.926			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.025	.032	-.024	-.758	.449	-.088	.039			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.106	.084	-.040	-1.261	.208	-.271	.059			
		Normally money left for savings	-.922	.391	-.074	-2.355	.019	-1.690	-.154			
		Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	.003	.001	.134	3.778	<.001	.002	.005			
		Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	-.001	.001	-.090	-2.531	.012	-.003	.000			
Pooled	1	(Constant)	339.308	246.366		1.377	.168	-143.561	822.176	.000	.000	1.000
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.197	.351		.561	.575	-.492	.886	.019	.019	.994
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.023	.032		-.709	.478	-.087	.041	.005	.005	.998
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.107	.085		-1.256	.209	-.273	.060	.000	.000	1.000
		Normally money left for savings	-.781	.431		-1.813	.074	-1.640	.079	.196	.208	.939
		Time distance (hrs) to mother's residence	.003	.001		2.761	.010	.001	.005	.299	.343	.909
		Time distance (hrs) to father's residence	-.002	.001		-2.143	.051	-.003	8.379E-6	.462	.631	.867

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

8.4 Appendix D: SPSS output with comparison to formal care

Table D1: Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics

Imputation Number		Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Original data	Age at first childbearing	29.51	5.511	690
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.67	1.246	690
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.90	2.066	690
	Normally money left for savings	.74	.437	690
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.55	.498	690
	Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	1.18	.388	690
1	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.035	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.443	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	1.18	.382	1013
2	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.042	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.74	.440	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	1.18	.382	1013
3	Age at first childbearing	29.55	5.527	1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85	5.333	1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83	2.058	1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73	.442	1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54	.499	1013
	Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	1.18	.382	1013
Pooled	Age at first childbearing	29.55		1013
	Highest Education Level of Respondent	3.85		1013
	Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	2903.83		1013
	Normally money left for savings	.73		1013
	Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	1.54		1013
	Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	1.18		1013

Table D2: Model Summary

Model Summary

Imputation Number	Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Original data	1	.062[a]	.004	-.003	5.520
1	1	.079[b]	.006	.001	5.524
2	1	.065[c]	.004	-.001	5.529
3	1	.081[b]	.007	.002	5.523

a. Predictors: (Constant), Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Normally money left for savings

b. Predictors: (Constant), Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

c. Predictors: (Constant), Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Normally money left for savings, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

Table D3: ANOVA regression results

ANOVA[a]

Imputation Number	Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Original data	1	Regression	79.535	5	15.907	.522	.760[b]
		Residual	20842.873	684	30.472		
		Total	20922.407	689			
1	1	Regression	191.074	5	38.215	1.252	.282[c]
		Residual	30727.854	1007	30.514		
		Total	30918.928	1012			
2	1	Regression	130.307	5	26.061	.852	.513[d]
		Residual	30788.621	1007	30.575		
		Total	30918.928	1012			
3	1	Regression	204.285	5	40.857	1.340	.245[c]
		Residual	30714.643	1007	30.501		
		Total	30918.928	1012			

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing

b. Predictors: (Constant), Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job), Normally money left for savings

c. Predictors: (Constant), Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Highest Education Level of Respondent, Normally money left for savings, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

d. Predictors: (Constant), Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement), Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.), Normally money left for savings, Highest Education Level of Respondent, Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)

Table D4: Coefficient table

Coefficients[a]

Imputation Number	Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Fraction Missing Info.	Relative Increase Variance	Relative Efficiency
			B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Original data	1	(Constant)	-207.746	296.058		-.702	.483	-789.039	373.546			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.137	.170	-.031	-.805	.421	-.469	.196			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	.082	.102	.031	.803	.422	-.118	.282			
		Normally money left for savings	-.441	.484	-.035	-.910	.363	-1.392	.511			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.247	.424	.022	.582	.560	-.586	1.081			
		Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	-.013	.545	-.001	-.025	.980	-1.084	1.057			
1	1	(Constant)	277.029	247.952		1.117	.264	-209.534	763.591			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.023	.033	-.022	-.690	.490	-.087	.041			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.085	.085	-.031	-.994	.320	-.252	.083			
		Normally money left for savings	-.790	.392	-.063	-2.013	.044	-1.560	-.020			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.085	.350	.008	.244	.807	-.601	.771			
		Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	-.303	.457	-.021	-.663	.508	-1.199	.594			
2	1	(Constant)	270.159	247.326		1.092	.275	-215.175	755.493			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.025	.033	-.024	-.771	.441	-.089	.039			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.083	.085	-.031	-.970	.332	-.250	.085			
		Normally money left for savings	-.574	.395	-.046	-1.454	.146	-1.350	.201			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.102	.350	.009	.290	.772	-.586	.789			
		Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	-.324	.457	-.022	-.708	.479	-1.221	.573			
3	1	(Constant)	256.944	245.157		1.048	.295	-224.134	738.022			
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.025	.033	-.024	-.776	.438	-.089	.039			
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.078	.084	-.029	-.924	.356	-.244	.088			
		Normally money left for savings	-.834	.394	-.067	-2.119	.034	-1.607	-.062			
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.161	.350	.015	.461	.645	-.525	.847			
		Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	-.297	.457	-.021	-.651	.515	-1.194	.599			
Pooled	1	(Constant)	268.044	247.096		1.085	.278	-216.257	752.345	.002	.002	.999
		Highest Education Level of Respondent	-.024	.033		-.745	.457	-.088	.040	.003	.003	.999
		Region or administrative unit of residence (country spec.)	-.082	.085		-.962	.336	-.249	.085	.002	.002	.999
		Normally money left for savings	-.733	.425		-1.723	.088	-1.577	.111	.159	.166	.950
		Regular help with child care (for whom caring for children is not a job)	.116	.353		.329	.742	-.576	.808	.017	.017	.994
		Regular help with child care (institutional/paid arrangement)	-.308	.457		-.673	.501	-1.204	.588	.001	.001	1.000

a. Dependent Variable: Age at first childbearing