

Encouraging Building Initiatives in Inner-City Development:

Perceptions of Public Authorities and Developers in the Dutch Real
Estate Market

MSc. Real Estate Studies
University of Groningen

Diego van Kampen
S3494446

June 28, 2023



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Title	Encouraging Building Initiatives in Inner-City Development: Perceptions of Public Authorities and Developers in the Dutch Real Estate Market
Version	Final version
Author	Diego van Kampen
Supervisor	Dr. S. (Sander) van Lanen
Assessor	Dr. M. (Mark) van Duijn
Internship company	Sweco Nederland B.V.
E-mail	<u>d.m.van.kampen@student.rug.nl</u>
Date	June 28, 2023

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Abstract

Although the Netherlands is experiencing a severe housing crisis, there is a stall in housing development, attributed to a “rationale bubble” wherein landowners and property developers are incentivized to withhold land from the market. Option theory explains that retaining land for future development holds more advantages than developing now. The complexities of the land market, including spatial planning, regulations, and municipal land policies, further exacerbate the housing production shortfall.

This thesis addresses solutions to stimulate housing construction by examining the perceptions of public authorities and developers. To provide an answer to this research question, a contextual framework is established through a literature review. Dutch spatial planning and municipal land policy are investigated, together with an analysis of the evolution of land policy in the Netherlands. Semi-structured interviews are conducted to gain insights into initiatives that can foster development.

The findings highlight the shift from a development-led to a plan-led system with more government intervention and a resurgence of active land policy. Two initiatives, the 30-40-30 rule and the use of option contracts, can foster housing developments. This thesis offers insights into potential strategies for accelerating housing production and bridges the gap between authorities and developers.

Keywords: Housing construction, Urban redevelopment, land banking, government, developers

Preface

I proudly present to you my master's thesis, 'Encouraging Building Initiatives in Inner-City Development: Perceptions of Public Authorities and Developers in the Dutch Real Estate Market'. This research is the culmination of my Master's in Real Estate Studies and also my internship at Sweco consultancy. My ambition to actively contribute to urban development has driven me to conduct in-depth research on how housing construction can be expedited and what policies are necessary to achieve this. Through my research, I have gained a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics of the real estate market and the pivotal role that active land policy and creating market initiatives can play in effecting positive change.

I would like to thank my supervisor for this research, Dr Sander van Lanen, for his help and knowledge. I would also like to thank my entire team at Sweco for their help and support during my internship. In particular, I want to thank Jeroen Coers and Marc Braaksma for their advice on this study.

I hope that this thesis will make a valuable contribution to the knowledge and discourse surrounding the acceleration of housing construction and the development of effective land policy. May this work inspire others to explore new avenues and discover innovative solutions to the complex challenges faced by the real estate sector.

Best regards,
Diego van Kampen

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1. Introduction

1.1 Motivation

One of the biggest problems on the Dutch housing market is currently the supply of sufficient housing (Boelhouwer (2020)). The current housing shortage will rise to 355,000 by 2023 (Capital Value, 2023). According to a report by the Dutch National Bank, the rapid increase in house prices has made housing affordability a major concern in the Netherlands (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2022). Rouwendal and Koomen (2022) note that rising house prices give landowners and property developers an incentive to delay selling their land. This 'rationale bubble' has contributed to the lagging production of large-scale housing projects since 2013 (Rouwendal and Koomen, 2022). The number of permits granted for new owner-occupied houses has dropped by 31% in 2022 compared to 2021 (CBS 2023).

The shortfall in housing production that has persisted for years is influenced by the functioning of the land market, the shortage of land available for housing sites, the delay in which the supply of building land responds to demand, and land prices. In turn, the land market is influenced by laws and regulations, spatial planning, municipal land policies, and government subsidies. Spatial changes include supply restrictions of land, changes in the role of municipalities (from 'active' to a more 'facilitating' land policy), an increase in organic area development, and a shift from building in suburban areas to inner-city construction. At this moment housing development is even less attractive due to exploding construction costs for housing.

The delayed response of housing construction is often pointed to spatial planning policies in the Netherlands. The European Commission (1997) defines spatial planning as methods used by public agencies to influence the future distribution of spatial activities, such as the location of housing, agricultural land, industry, and recreational areas. In the Netherlands, spatial planning is carried out by the national government, provincial authorities, and municipal governments. The land market in the Netherlands is a complex and highly regulated system that has undergone substantial transformations throughout the years. In various Dutch national spatial policy documents a prominent position is taken by strategies to achieve compact urban developments (Nabielek, 2013). The complexity of spatial planning has increased significantly in recent years, further increasing the research challenges. The decision to build mainly within cities certainly plays a role in this, but suburban locations are also facing increasing challenges. The lack of concrete policy and choices therein make the challenge growing. It was already common practice to divide the planning process into steps. But area development has become broader, especially in inner-city areas. This justifies paying more attention to the preliminary phase of a plan. This is where plans are still being thought about, but at the same time, land positions are already being taken. For the government, it is important to set the boundary posts (*in Dutch: piketpaaltjes*) as early as possible and prevent further land speculation.

An active government does not rule out the need for market parties to play an important role in accelerating housing production in urban areas. Due to the tightness in the Dutch housing market, the current government states in the 2018-2021 Housing Agenda that it will work with relevant partners to encourage the development of new housing to reduce pressure on the housing market (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2022). In this regard, the National Environmental Vision (NOVI) of the national government states that inner-city construction is preferable from a sustainability and economic perspective (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2020). However, urban densification is reaching its limits in several Dutch cities, because of increasing costs, complex constellations of ownership, and complicated legal procedures (Nabielek, 2013). Fragmented land ownership within existing urban areas means that cooperation is needed in many areas and the municipality needs to lead the distribution of tasks and risks. In this respect, a municipality could also consider to re-establish an active land policy, to get a better grip on land and also benefit from land value development. From a facilitating policy, insufficient acceleration can currently be enforced, while the urgency for housing increases.

1.2 Academic relevance

In the past, government agencies played a prominent role in spatial development. It is for this reason that the role of the government is often brought to the assumption in the academic literature on spatial developments in the Netherlands. The land policies pursued by Dutch municipalities in the past were often described as unique. Faludi (2005) even called it the 'Planners Paradise'. Many municipalities used an active land policy and bought land strategically. This meant that municipalities purchased (agricultural) land on the land market, then made a zoning change, and then prepared the land for building. After all, the Dutch have an international reputation as successful comprehensive planners (Van Dijk, Van Kann and Woltjer, 2019). The developed land was then resold to a project developer. By issuing land in this way, conditions could be imposed on its future use.

However, the role of government agencies began to change. There is a clear shift from government to governance that is frequently described in the literature (Driessen *et al.*, 2012). The government takes a more facilitative role in land policy, directing mainly through urban containment policies and growth controls, as described by (Evans, 1999). The change in the way land policy is conducted is reinforced by the financial crisis in 2008, as a result of which many municipalities suffered huge losses on their land. Property development requires land, and in response, private parties began buying land. Through the use of urban containment policies, urban sprawl can be addressed (Halleux, Marcinczak and van der Krabben, 2012). In general, the Netherlands is characterised by relatively stringent spatial planning, strongly fitting within the highly institutionalised planning culture (Faludi, 2005). For this, Roodbol-Mekkes, van der Valk and Korthals Altes (2012) refer to the physical evidence in the manmade landscape, such as the preservation of farmland and the results of land and water development as expressed in the orderly parcelling of city plans.

To ensure that supply and demand are balanced, it is important to better identify the interplay between Dutch land market actors. Developers are needed to realise the desired amount of housing. However, the literature suggests that developers and other landowners benefit from delaying development. It is up to the Dutch government, especially municipalities, to regulate this (Needham, 2014). It is often said that the government should make more building land available. In Germany and Austria, however, it appears that this does not work. Davy (1996) called it the building land paradox (*Baulandsicherung*). Because of high housing needs, the government made more and more housing developments possible and parcelled out areas. However, landowners did not proceed with construction. In response, even more sites were designated and parcelled out. Davy (1996) uses the 'building land paradox' to argue that the more sites are designated for housing, the less is built. After all, a designation as building land does not translate into an obligation to build. This also reflects in a study by Buitelaar and Van Schie (2018) which shows that between 2010-2015 a total of 22,500 properties were notified as licensed but not yet reported as completed within a normal lead time. Governments respond to stagnation in building by lifting supply constraints, which in turn results in even lower production (Korthals Altes, 2019).

More and more, it follows from non-academic sources that municipalities' facilitative land policies have not led to the desired structural provision of housing and resonates the call to reinstall an active land policy (Deloitte, 2021; APPM, 2022; De Jonge, 2023a). In doing so, it is also very important to create an initiative for developers to engage in this. Existing literature tends to talk mostly about the problems affiliated with the housing market and about the pros and cons of different land policies. However, the trend now seems to be that active land policy will return, so concrete measures need to be developed appropriate to the Dutch context. A modernisation of Dutch land policy is underexposed in the current literature, also because the discussion is now very much on the rise since the reopening of the Ministry of Housing and Spatial Planning, which closed in 2010. This research will therefore focus on finding solutions that can create more initiative among developers to start building, to ensure a structural construction of (affordable) housing.

1.3 Research problem statement

The above literature has shown that expanding housing locations can be counterproductive for housing production. Government agencies will therefore have to come up with other solutions. There are new issues that require collective answers that go beyond housing development and realisation. These issues need to be thought through before the start of an area development. A new, innovative and less risky development model could provide a solution. This should still include a role for both government and developers.

This study aims to identify perspectives that are acceptable for both public authorities and developers that can be implemented in new spatial planning policies by the government to encourage housing development. Currently, few households can afford the high house prices for a new-build home, and

therefore there needs to be an acceleration in the housing task. Therefore, this research provides the following research question:

“What are perceptions of public authorities and developers to encourage building initiatives in inner-city development?”

To provide a structured answer to the question the following (sub)questions are formulated:

1. What does the spatial planning policy of the Netherlands look like and what does it entail in terms of municipal land policy?
2. What are the characteristics of the interplay between actors within the property development process?
3. What are perceptions to solve imposed problems on the land- and housing market?

For this empirical study, the contextual framework is formed with a literature review. It is important to understand land policy in the Netherlands over the years. It is also important here to study the cooperation between the various actors involved, and how each wants to contribute to housing development. For this, it is important to examine the property development process, to find out the benefits and burdens of the actors involved. To give a deeper meaning to this, semi-structured interviews are used. These interviews are also used to explore certain initiatives that can contribute to more active area development. This answers the third sub-question.

1.4 Reading guide

Chapter 2 provides the contextual framework for this study. First, it describes how land is developed in the Netherlands and which policies are in place. This section also focuses on the interests and roles of landowners, developers and governments. All actors have a strong interest in the land price and adjust their tactics or policies accordingly. The chapter also discusses the historical development of Dutch land policy, including the current state of the housing market. Finally, it discusses the shift from government to governance and the possible return of government intervention. Chapter 3 then describes the methodology for the study. Chapter 4 then deals with the results from the literature review and empirical research, after which the results and recommendations are discussed in Chapter 5.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Land development in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, many actors have an interest in area development. The spatial frameworks are set by the Dutch government. These spatial policies influence the amount of building land and available sites. The interest of the actors involved lies mainly in the potential value of the land. This section describes how this land value works and when a government can intervene. An analysis of spatial policy examines whether Dutch policy is facilitative or steering and which is better for housing development. Area development itself is characterised by the municipal land policy that is pursued. Indeed, housing development can be done privately or publicly.

Buying and reselling or holding land early can make a landowner a lot of money. If suspicions arise that land will become suitable for housing development in the future, developers, investors or investment funds try to acquire the land as an asset. The difference between the potential value and the current value is called the residual, and the interests of actors are seen as the 'fight for the residual' (De Greef, 1997). This can occur in the case of a landowner who resells his undeveloped land to another investor over time. Or a new owner who has speculatively purchased building land at a value higher than its residual value (Buitelaar and Witte, 2011). To determine the size of this surplus, it is necessary to calculate backwards from the expected housing price. Figure 2.1 shows that construction costs are subtracted from the final product, the expected value of new property. From the perspective of neoclassical economic theory, the concept of economic rent plays a role in land use change. The economist Ricardo (1821) states that the supply of the factor of production does not depend on the price. “The price of corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because the price of corn is high” (Ricardo, 1821). After all, the supply is fixed in the short term. The method widely applies in many countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands as a theory to estimate land values (Buitelaar and Witte, 2011; Purcell and Ward, 2022). The landowner will proceed to change the use of land if a surplus is created when the destination is changed.




Figure 2.1: The calculation of the residual value.

The value of land is primarily determined by what is possible, less by its actual use. This is determined in the zoning plan. According to Van Schie, Breedijk and Buitelaar (2018), land positions are often taken well in advance of zoning changes, anticipating potentially profitable uses. With expansion sites, there is often a large surplus because the value of the new function (usually housing) is much higher than the agricultural use that was previously on it. According to Buitelaar, Segeren and Kronberger (2008), the situation is different in inner-city locations. The surplus here is often smaller or even negative because the current use value is often higher. Because of the increasing pressure on available space and the potential jump in value that the land price can make when changing uses, land is being purchased strategically and early. This is also known as land banking in the international literature. Mills (1967) argues that land banking leads to market concentration, which in the long run causes lower construction volume and greater price volatility. According to Adams & Tiesdell (2012), developers, try to acquire land early at a price based on the expectation that in the future the land will be zoned for housing. Adams and Tiesdell (2012) demonstrate an important problem, which is that housing production is deliberately delayed by developers in the hope that housing prices will continue to increase, to cover their costs for the investment made, since they have overpaid for the land. Research by the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2021) and previously described in the study of Segeren (2007) found that a pure market for raw building land in inner-city locations does not exist. According to them, this market is a derivative market and prices in the commercial property market determine the minimum land acquisition prices for housing sites. High acquisition costs could therefore be explained by the high economic value of existing property.

From the above, it can be concluded that it is beneficial to be involved as an actor as early as possible in the development process. However, it also appears that these actors like to hold land rather than develop it, which also follows from Davy's building land paradox (1996). However, Dutch land law stipulates that the government has responsibility for sufficient housing, so a government can intervene if the market fails to deliver. In general, a government can intervene for 3 reasons (Van der Krabben, 2021).

First of all, is the welfare economics argument (Needham, Van der Krabben and Ploegmakers, 2015). According to welfare economics theory, government intervention would be impermissible if there is an ideal market. However, the land and housing market generally do not meet these criteria that stand for a perfectly functioning market (full competition, market access, no information asymmetry, no barriers to entry and exit, no transaction costs and the product traded is homogeneous). There is consequently the expression "market failure", which justifies a government's intervention in the market. According to Segeren (2007), negative externalities are strongly related to the location-specificity of land. Therefore, spatial policy is a strongly deployed tool to get rid of these externalities.

Secondly, a government can intervene from an institutional economics argument (Van der Krabben, 2021). Institutional economics assumes that the market is structured by governments. The right to property is shaped by governments and also they facilitate market transactions. Markets are institutionally and socially constructed, meaning that actors create the institutions and the market institutions in turn influence the actors. From this perspective, government intervention (in the Netherlands) is known as a public development of a housing site, where an active municipal land policy is pursued. As mentioned earlier, there are two reasons why, according to this theory, a government may intervene, namely if the transaction costs of producing a housing site are too high and if property rights are not conducive to the private development of a housing site. With fragmented land ownership, which you often find in inner-city locations, it may be too complex and risky for a private actor to develop. A municipality can get this done more easily through the Preferential Rights Act or Expropriation. But, a private landowner can always invoke self-realisation, and this in turn makes the procedure complex.

Third, paternalistic considerations may play a role in the government's intervening in the land and housing market (Besseling *et al.*, 2008). From the government's perspective, certain societal goals may prompt intervention. Examples include more public housing or better access to the housing market for first-time buyers.

The entire development process can take place according to different models. The four types are public comprehensive top-down models, public planning-led quasi-market models, private market models and land readjustment models (Van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). Using one model does not exclude the other, but it reflects which actors are responsible for development, and how value capture and cost recovery are handled. According to Van der Krabben and Jacobs (2013), land development models serve three main objectives. First, land must be made available for development in the case of a desired development. This often requires some form of land assembly, as the new development does not match up with the existing ownership structure. A differentiation should be made between active landowners, those who are willing to develop their land, and passive landowners, who take no steps to the market or develop their land (Louw, 2008). The second objective is to make sure that costs for public works in the new development are recovered. The last objective is part of the political debate and concerns the capturing of a part of the unearned increment in the land value that occurs as a consequence of a zoning change. To some extent, all models occur in the Netherlands, except the public comprehensive top-down model, because the Dutch government does not develop itself but issues (developable) land. The models vary by the main purpose of the strategy, its relation to planning, land assembly strategy, cost recovery and value capturing strategy (Van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). Table 2.1 shows the land development models and the main differences.

Land development models	Definition	Main purpose and relation to planning	Land assembly	Cost recovery and value capturing
<i>Land assembly models</i> Public comprehensive top-down model	Public purchase and development of land, in order to guarantee building developments according to public policies, to realize full cost recovery of all public works via the sale of building plots and to capture part of the surplus value of the land	To implement a local-authority-driven development program for a whole city, in close relation to city-wide comprehensive public planning goals	Public body acquires all land within a city that is needed for (future) development, services that land and re parcels it into building plots that suit the planned development	Cost recovery and value capturing via the sale of building plots
Public planning-led quasi market model	Public purchase of land (and vacant properties) in a specific area and subsequent sale of that land to the private sector, in order to enable a (re)development program for that specific area	To achieve a (re)development program for a specific area, sometimes in relation to a city's smart growth or brownfield agenda	Public body acquires the land that is needed for the (future) development of a certain area	Cost recovery via developer contributions (when building permit is issued); no value capturing by public authorities
Private market model	Private purchase of land (and vacant properties) in a specific area, in order to enable a (re)development program for that specific area	To achieve a (re)development program for a specific area, in accordance with zoning regulation for that area	Private sector company acquires land to achieve their own development plans	Cost recovery via developer contributions (when building permit is issued); no value capturing by public authorities
<i>Land readjustment models</i> Urban land readjustment model	Owners of land and property in a designated area transfer voluntarily their property rights over land and property temporarily to a self-governing body. After re parceling the land into suitable building plots, the original owners are again assigned property rights over land and property in the development area, proportional to their original share	To achieve a (re)development program for a specific area, sometimes in relation to a city's smart growth or brownfield agenda	Temporary transfer of land rights to a self-governing body for redevelopment	Cost recovery via a contribution by the self-governing body for redevelopment (when building permit is issued); no value capturing by public authorities

Table 2.1: Different land development models. Source: Van der Krabben and Jacobs (2013).

Important for housing development is who has the land and wants to develop it according to one of the development models, as well as whether the zoning of the land has been changed and is ready for development. Changing a zoning plan is the responsibility of the municipality. If it has not been adopted, a developer cannot start building at all. For housing development, all actors need to have certainty, and this can be provided with binding zoning plans. Gielen and Tasan-Kok (2010) identify two different systems and acknowledge a tension between certainty and flexibility. On the hand, there are “plan-led” systems, where zoning plans are approved at early stages and are supposed to be legally binding before interested developers find out whether their intentions are in accordance with the terms (see Figure 2.2). On the other hand, there is the “development-led” system, where, although there may be some indicative zoning plans, legally binding zoning rules are supposed to be implemented after the negotiations ended successfully (Gielen and Tasan-Kok, 2010). Buitelaar and Sorel (2010) conclude that the quest for control and the rule of law seems to be antagonists and that one could only exist at the expense of the other.




Figure 2.2: The place of legally binding land-use plans in development processes in Western European countries. Source: (Gielen and Tasan-Kok, 2010).

The findings of Gielen and Tasan-Kok (2010) indicate that many Western European countries show characteristics similar to development-led planning. In the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, formerly followers of the plan-led system, binding legal land-use rules are only accepted when negotiations with developers are ended positively, so only shortly before development. Spain, Italy, France and Belgium are examples of plan-led systems. Since the Planning Act of 2008, the Netherlands aimed for a plan-led system and a stronger role of the land-use plan in providing the necessary building permit through a framework, instead of granting permits as exceptions on the land-use plan, trying to guide development (Buitelaar and Sorel, 2010). However, Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel (2011) found that land-use plans are primarily to facilitate development instead of guiding it. A change in the zoning plan is still inevitably driven by development proposals. Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel (2011) conclude that there is a lack of sufficient incentives to change the behaviour of local actors.

Moroni (2007) suggests that flexible planning systems (such as the development-led planning model) are unpredictable as every case is judged independently and therefore cannot be predicted. At the same time, Moroni (2007) also acknowledges that more flexible rules are needed to deal with complexity. Local governments, using public-private instruments, may prefer to be able to examine plans and if necessary change those plans informally, because with strict certainty there is no room left for negotiation. In practical terms, Dutch municipalities tend to wait until negotiations with developers or landowners have concluded before making any modifications to binding regulations, particularly in cases where comprehensive urban regeneration is being carried out on privately owned land (Moroni, 2007). Typically, this means that they will only approve a new land-use plan to replace the existing one or permit a departure from the previous plan after the development agreement has been signed (VROM, VNG and VVG, 2008).

So the interests surrounding area development are ultimately money-driven, and there are reasons for landowners to wait to develop. Government intervention is possible and could lead to a different land development model. A shift to a plan-led system could provide more certainty in housing development and more initiative for developers to proceed to development faster (Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel, 2011).

The municipality is one of the main actors in new spatial developments, as it draws up the zoning plan. A zoning plan states which functions are allowed in a certain area, such as living, working, recreation or a combination thereof. It can be argued that the municipality has both a public role and a private role to develop (Buitelaar and Sorel, 2010). From its public role, the municipality sets spatial policy through zoning plans and municipal housing visions. At the same time, in its private role, the municipality is active in the land market, where it can fulfil different roles. These are discussed in more detail below.

The Netherlands distinguishes between two forms of land policy: active land policy and facilitative land policy (Wigmans, 1995). In active land policy, the government purchases land, rezones the land for development, services the land and subsequently sells it to developers to earn a profit (Groetelaers, 2004; van Straalen, van den Brink and van Tatenhove, 2016). The government takes the initiative and is responsible for implementing the project. By pursuing an active land policy, the government has more control over spatial development and policy can be steered in a more targeted way (Needham, 2014). In the past, Dutch land policy was mostly described in the international literature as unique because most municipalities pursued an active land policy. This was unique because in most countries, transforming land into building plots and building on them was done by one actor. For property developers, this active municipal land policy was also desirable, as it meant they did not have to take major risks themselves in acquiring land and preparing it for construction. Employing a reactive policy, developers responded to sites offered to them by municipalities. Facilitative land policy, on the other hand, focuses on creating conditions for private parties to develop the land. Here, the government

provides the necessary infrastructure and sets requirements for land development. Developers are responsible for implementing the project and bear the financial risks.

Partly because of the uniqueness of Dutch municipalities' active land policy, it also came crashing down. The global economic crisis of 2008 showed the financial risks of the Dutch active land policy (Holtslag-Broekhof, 2018). Developments stagnated and Dutch municipalities felt the financial burden of land ownership (Holtslag-Broekhof, 2018). After this, municipalities mainly pursued a facilitative land policy (Buitelaar and Bregman, 2016).

Both forms of land policy have advantages and disadvantages. Arguments for and against both policy methods vary, so municipalities are not obliged to pursue one specific policy type (Hartmann and Spit, 2015). Active land policy gives the government more control and can lead to better spatial planning, but also involves financial risks. Facilitative land policy places responsibility on private parties and is often cheaper for the government, but can lead to fragmentation of space and a lack of direction (Needham, 2014). In the Netherlands, there is no clear difference between a real 'active' or 'facilitative' land policy, as is visible for instance in the German context (Hartmann and Spit, 2015).

According to Segeren (2007), a facilitative land policy, in which the municipality does not engage in land trading itself but only influences the actions of other actors through, for instance, zoning plans, is more appropriate. In addition, private sector-led urban development would create more opportunities for developers, as they can commit to projects for the long term, which is less risky and ensures more successful projects (Heurkens and Hobma, 2014). However, a report by Deloitte (2021) uses regression analysis to show that housing production in municipalities with active land policies is on average 15% higher than in municipalities with facilitative policies. Besides, the Dutch Housing and Spatial Planning Minister Hugo de Jonge argues that bottom-up spatial planning has not worked (De Jonge, 2023b).

From this paragraph, the general view could be formed that private parties have had the upper hand in recent years, and were able to take full advantage of the increase in land value. They were able to take full advantage of the residual. If government intervention has been justified, the literature suggests that the government's role should be increased again. The government could move to a plan-led system, providing more certainty for developers. The government could also adopt an active land policy to provide more pace and direction in housing development.

2.2 The Dutch housing market

The limited land available has led to many dilemmas in the Netherlands. The scarcity of land means that various stakeholders compete for uses (e.g. agriculture, industry, recreation, housing) of the available land and choices have to be made continuously (Van Dijk, Van Kann and Woltjer, 2019). One such stakeholder is the government, setting the institutional context. The institutional context relates to interventions in land policy in the form of different regulations and also cultural norms and values (van

der Heijden, Dol and Oxley, 2011). the municipality has several options to fulfil its directorial role when developing an area. The reason for wanting to direct (or not direct) the development of a particular site is mostly aimed at controlling various aspects. Examples are the quality of the area to be developed, the urgency of the development and the cooperativeness of market parties, the financial dimension and related feasibility, the equalisation between profitable and unprofitable projects, and the time dimension (De Graaf and Verkerk, 2006). In the past, land policies arose mainly to create a better living environment for the working class. Realising affordable and healthy housing was not possible in the nineteenth century because of private ownership and land speculation in city centres. As a result, land prices became so high that it was no longer possible to realise proper working-class housing (De Graaf and Verkerk, 2006). The government intervened to meet the set targets.

Land policy is part of the Spatial planning Act (*Wet ruimtelijke ordening*) of the government (Rijksoverheid, no date). To better understand the concept of land policy, this subchapter researches land policy from a historical perspective. Land policy should not be seen as an independent subject of policy, but considered as part of a broader policy, which is sometimes referred to as spatial planning (Wigmans, 1995). Social attitudes and political views on land are often subject to changes. Central in this discussion is often the government (Wigmans, 1995). To put Dutch spatial planning in a historic perspective, the nine-cell model of De Roo (2018) is used. In this way, this paragraph investigates whether government intervention in the past has proved successful in battling housing crises.

According to De Roo (2018), the nine-cell model can generate a comprehensive understanding of each situation a planner can encounter (see Figure 2.3). The first cell stands for the material world, representing both the physical and the social. It is a situation in which the built environment and the social community likely changes or change is needed. The second cell represents the organizational world, which plans, prepares and executes the decisions made in the institutional cell in the material cell. The third cell, the institutional world, contains laws and rules. “Institutions are the rules of the game in society” (North, 1990). Often planning issues are not isolated at one particular level of observation. Hence a macro, meso and micro level can be distinguished, completing the nine-cells model. Planning issues are also complex, meaning they might show a path dependency. The discipline of planning is also not an exact science. It is the planner’s job to acknowledge certainty that is around, but also identify uncertainties (De Roo, 2018). Without uncertainties, there would only be one truth and the planner can go home.




Figure 2.3: The nine-cell model (De Roo, 2018).

Planning theory strongly relates to the institutional cell, which represents a contingency between two rationales. The technical rationale strongly relates to a world that can be understood through direct causal relationships. In this view, the result of planning interventions is highly predictable, and therefore this rationale accompanies a top-down approach and command-and-control governance (De Roo, 2018). The communicative rationale goes hand in hand with uncertainty and reasoning that strongly relates to meanings and values that people share to understand situations (De Roo, 2018). In this view, through intersubjective reasoning, agreements are made and consensus is reached among groups of people. Instead of a factual reality, the aim is to come to an agreed reality (De Roo, 2018). This institutional cell is the base for the 'holy spectrum of planning' (Figure 2.4). It motivates a decision on how to intervene and is used in this research to understand the paradigm shifts in history concerning Dutch planning systems and the way the Dutch state and local governments coped with land policy.




Figure 2.4: The 'holy spectrum of planning' differentiated into categories of planning issues. Source: De Roo (2018).

In the history of Dutch land policy, multiple periods can be distinguished. This research combines the work of Wigmans (1995), De Graaf and Verkerk (2006) and Van Dijk, Van Kann and Woltjer (2019). in combination with the 'holy spectrum of planning' of De Roo (2018), to get a better understanding of different governmental attitudes during planning periods in the Netherlands.

Post-war period

The municipality became a monopolist in housing construction after the war. With the Policy Document on Development of the West (1958), the focus was on restoring war damage to housing and infrastructure. The great shortage of housing made it the government's turn and so it pursued a centrally active land policy. The national government fully assumed responsibility for land prices. This attitude of the government was partly due to their status as monopolists, as well as the insufficient empowerment of private landowners, with the result that the government had little trouble acquiring land. The high housing demand meant that municipalities did not bear large financial risks for land ownership. The institutional setting in this post-war period represented a technical rationale within planning. The government executes full control over housing development, intending to rebuild areas as fast as possible.

1960 – 1980

Municipal land policy was focused on converting agricultural land into developable land with associated steering processes until well into the 1960s. The market shows mainly a supply-oriented market, where large deficits almost always allow the municipality to fully recover financing in pricing. The Dutch state experienced hyperbolic expansion, which was reflected not only in generous benefit and subsidy systems, and easy access to education but also in housing (Musterd, 2014). That is why municipalities maintain their active land policy. The legal and institutional basis of the Dutch system is laid down in the spatial planning Act of 1965. Since that time the idea existed that planning is above all a coordinative activity (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000). By the end of the '60s, over 35% of all housing was public housing (Musterd, 2014). State involvement was expressed by direct municipal ownership of public housing, as almost 12% of the total housing stock was council housing (Musterd, 2014). Regarding land, there was an important discussion about goals to be pursued. Well-known themes include expropriation at use value, letting surpluses accrue to the community and the Right of Preference for municipalities.

In 1977 the Dutch Cabinet fell as it failed to agree on the politically sensitive subject of compensation in the event of expropriation. The proposal was to introduce use value with compensation for inequities (De Vries, 1989). Due to the capital investment required for this and the delay in making the necessary legislative changes, this functional land policy never came to fruition. It were the progressive parties that were in favour, but conservatives eventually blocked the bill. Due to the economic recession, municipalities found themselves with large amounts of unsold building land later in the 1970s. This resulted in large interest losses. The 1974 Third Policy Document on Spatial Planning tried to cushion these blows, but it could not prevent the demand for land from falling due to higher land allocation prices.

Changes in both the societal context and the institutional context of planning have reduced the power of the Dutch system of planning (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000). The study of Hajer and Zonneveld (2000) also states that a 'network society' is emerging, that will form the new socio-spatial context in Dutch planning. The planner's focus will be on communicative activity: making concepts, plans, and visions. The aim was to unite relevant actors, both within the horizontal axis of government (different sectors) as well as the vertical axis (other levels of government) (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000). The so-called comprehensive integrated approach suggests that "...spatial planning is conducted through a very systemic and formal hierarchy of plans from national to local level, which coordinates public sector activity across different sectors..." (European Commission, 1997b, p. 36). This approach in governmental policy poses problems, as each level of government has now the authority to lay down a strategic plan, resulting in a 'matryoshka' of interrelated plans (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000). This period clearly shows a transition from the technical to the communicative rational.

1980 – 2000

A shift from government regulation to a more market-oriented sector began to take place. Municipalities faced the risks of their active land policies. The market sector is emerging in these times of economic growth, mainly due to the tech bubble-bust. Private parties with long-term investments in land are gaining decision-making influence. The government intervened on a large scale with the Fourth Policy Document on Spatial Planning Extra (named: VINEX), to provide more control over development. The original goal of municipalities was to use revenue generated from the sale of building land to create affordable housing plots for social rent and cover the costs of necessary infrastructure for VINEX locations (van der Krabben, 2021). While they attempted to negotiate with property developers to contribute to infrastructure costs and reserve land for social housing, they were unable to enforce these regulations under the current legislation at that time. It also became evident that the expropriation of developers brought long procedures due to the right of self-realisation. To resolve this issue, municipalities and property developers with land positions came to a mutually satisfactory solution, which involved implementing either the building claim model, Public Private Partnership (PPP), or a combination of both models. During this period, the transition from government to governance and the associated communicative rationale means that a veritable power grab can take place by landowners.

2000 – now

Decentralisation of tasks and independence from the state of municipalities and provinces will be further promoted (Raad van State, 2009). These agreements are enshrined in the Municipalities Act and the Provinces Act. In 2008, the new spatial planning Act entered into service, with its focus on decentralisation, deregulation and focus on implementation. 'Decentralise what can be done, centralise if necessary' (Van Dijk, Van Kann and Woltjer, 2019). More and more focus is put on an integrated approach in a highly complex planning system, demanding tailor-made solutions to the planning issue, thereby fitting a communicative rationale in the institutional setting.

According to Van der Krabben (2021), three developments have caused a shift from an active to a facilitative municipal land policy from 2008 onwards. First, legislation allowed municipalities to recover costs for public space on private land development and also allowed for the designation of public housing. Without major risks, this allowed indirect influence to be exercised on housing development, at least this was the thought behind it. Secondly, the world economic crisis caused an extreme drop in demand for new construction, leaving municipalities and developers who participated in a public-private partnership facing a financial noose. A building claim model also revealed that developers were often not obliged to buy the plots, thus waiving their rights. Thirdly, the gradual development after the VINEX period from expansion locations to inner-city locations, with higher transformation costs and complex ownership structures caused problems on the balance sheet of projects. The (social) pressure to accelerate new housing construction has created a debate if municipalities should resume an active land policy, based on the idea that this can contribute to the

desired acceleration of housing production (Ollongren, 2021). During this period, it is notable that market-based land development flourished, before collapsing at its peak. A similar period is visible from 2015-2023, with the market now making a retreat.

The history of Dutch land policy thus shows several distinct periods. Evans (1999) argues that Dutch government intervention is the solution to the housing shortage. With the help of the nine-cell model, the link between the technical- and communicative rationale and periods of government intervention in a failing market with an inadequate supply of housing is made visible. From this, it can be concluded that a new period is emerging in which government intervention is not only justified, as demonstrated in Section 2.1 but also successful. The last paragraphs reflect more on the current situation, taking into account the problems experienced with a market-based housing development.

The current housing market

Despite fragmented land ownership and higher development costs, the government nevertheless chooses to focus on (re)developments in infill locations and avoid unnecessary urban extensions (Bruinsma and Koomen, 2018). The foundation for this was laid in the Third National Policy Document on Spatial Planning in 1976, and the Randstad is the perfect example. After the VINEX period, the Fifth National Policy Document on Spatial Planning encouraged urban infill again. The red and green contours were introduced to prevent further urban expansion. The NOVI states that there are still plenty of opportunities for infill development for at least the next 10 years (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2020). That there is still plenty of room for housing development within the existing urban area is also confirmed by research by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Van Duinen, Rijken and Buitelaar, 2016). According to Van Duinen, Rijken and Buitelaar (2016), it is mainly up to municipalities to restructure residential urban areas or to build in higher densities.

Inner-city development is a reason for developers to hold off on development in the current era. The cost of development is simply too high. De Zeeuw (2012) wrote earlier that the business case is red in advance if nothing changes in the planning, development and construction process. Buitelaar and Van Schie (2018) cite several causes for delays: policy and regulations, feasibility problems, location problems, landowners who do not want to cooperate, and strategic land policy of developers. The latter is also known as land banking (Van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013; Sasu, Squires and Javed, 2022). There is also land banking in the Netherlands. As with the building land paradox, land-banking can be explained with the theory of land as an option. Option theory assumes that property developers, in their investment strategy, take into account that during the planning process, a decision can be made to postpone building. Titman (1985) also shows that an increase in price uncertainty leads to a higher value of unused land positions and thus a further decline in housing development. A commonly posited solution in the public debate is to expand land supply by the government. Davy (1996) uses the building

land paradox to show that the more housing sites are offered, the less is built. The result of land-banking are stalled sites, locations where the spatial plan has been approved but no development is taking place (Buitelaar and Van Schie, 2018). Several causes are cited for delays, among which are policy and regulations, feasibility problems, location problems, and landowners who do not cooperate Buitelaar and Van Schie (2018).

Fragmented landownership plays less of a role for developers, but makes government tasks more complex. With more landowners, inner-city development becomes more complex as everyone wants value optimisation for their land (Turk and Korthals Altes, 2010).

2.3 From governance to government?

The level of control exercised by government agencies has undergone a significant transformation in recent decades, commonly referred to as the "shift from government to governance" in academic literature (Driessen *et al.*, 2012). For a long time, governing a country by a democratically elected government was sufficient. The desire for decentralisation in the Netherlands was fuelled by a lack of trust in the central government in the '90s (Van de Walle, 2010). Trust in the state was also declining in other countries, such as America, Germany, England, Spain and the Nordic countries. A paradigm shift towards neoliberalism is visible in this period (Kotz, 2003). Leading became the idea that if the market was left free, supply and demand would naturally balance out. A government would only hinder this. Whereas the Netherlands maintained strong government control of both the land and housing markets until the late 1990s, the principles of decentralisation, deregulation and market forces have been at the centre since then (De Rijk, 2017). Providing sufficient (affordable) housing became a shared responsibility of municipalities, market parties and housing corporations. Control was therefore no longer centralised, but at the same time, the above parties benefited from shortages. As mentioned earlier in this study, a higher sales price (scarcity drives up sales prices) leads to higher yields and this gives builders an interest in postponement and delay. The central government, typically the primary entity to step in when market parties, housing corporations, and municipalities are unable to come to a resolution, has become increasingly limited in its ability to intervene. This is due to the decline in land positions, development and construction subsidy programs, and the corporatization of housing corporations (De Rijk, 2017). As a result, the central government relinquished control, leading to a situation where everyone was accountable, but no one felt responsible.

With the Strengthening Public Housing Control Act (*Wet versterking regie op de volkshuisvesting*), the central government can now take back control. Developers pinpoint the renewed central government reign as the cause of the construction dip (Wolzack, 2023). De Kam and Wind (2023) argue that in reality the housing crisis is deepened by a lack of regulation. The blame falls mainly on the liberal housing policies of recent years, which allowed developers complete freedom in what they wanted to build (De Kam and Wind, 2023).

2.4 Initiatives for government intervention

The previous sections have already elaborated on the spatial policy to be pursued and the municipal land policy. Here, the focus should be on a plan-led system with an active land policy by municipalities. Thereby, it has been shown that government intervention is necessary and justifiable. This last section briefly explains two initiatives that could potentially lead to more housing development. For both initiatives, the municipality of Amsterdam is being studied, a municipality that still pursues an active land policy. The first initiative is based on the 40-40-20 system that the municipality maintains. 40-40-20 is the starting point for projects with more than 10 dwellings that require a change in the zoning plan. In the Housing Agenda 2025, the municipality has included the following planning for new construction: 40% regulated rent, 40% middle segment (rent and buy) and 20% expensive rent and buy (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017b). The idea behind this construction is that the local government controls the quantity, timing, quality, and finances. The land is disposed of in a ground lease system, where developers pay monthly rent rather than the whole amount at once, in which one of the conditions is that the land must be used according to its designated use (Ploeger and Bounjough, 2017). However, the national government seeks that all municipalities include 30% social renting in their housing plans, so this study will assume a 30-40-30 ratio (Rijksoverheid, 2022).

UK lower House of Commons member Oliver Letwin says developers are guided by market absorption (MacFarlane, 2018). Market absorption is about how much housing can be sold at a market price. Below this price, developers cannot afford to build. Yet other reasons are often given by this group, such as the shortage of staff, not enough building materials or difficulties in obtaining land (Korthals Altes, 2019). Because market values were so high in the past period, market absorption was low and so construction is not taking place. The 30-40-30 rule could ensure that only a small part is subject to market absorption at the highest possible value, while the rest is accessible to other target groups. Reasoning according to the residual land value methodology should lead to lower land values.

The second initiative is the possibility of working with options contracts. In the agreement, the developer will be given an option right: "The developer's entitlement towards the municipality to the formation of a leasehold agreement in respect of the parcel, subject to the terms and conditions set out in the agreement" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017a, p. 7). This requires the developer to pay an option price: "The one-off fee payable by the developer to the municipality to have x months of the option right" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017a, p. 7). The developer must then develop in the contracted period, or the contract will be terminated. Unclear is the attitude of developers on this. The advantage is that contracts should be dissolved without complicated legal procedures. In addition, this is an active means for the local authorities to direct developers (Korthals Altes, 2019). Both perspectives need to be reviewed and will be part of the data collection in this thesis.

3. Methods

3.1 Methods of data collection

This research is about finding perspectives on encouraging developers to build, to keep building production going. To provide an answer to this research question, it is important to engage with the actors involved. For this reason, a qualitative study was chosen. This qualitative research design is shaped by a literature study and conducting semi-structured interviews with relevant actors. The relevant actors in this study are both municipalities and developers, together with the extra information about the market functioning provided by appraisers. This research is mainly looking at the interrelationships between municipalities and developers, for example how they view government intervention in the land market, but also how they cooperate in the property development process. With a qualitative approach, underlying complex processes can be identified (Clifford *et al.*, 2016). During the empirical research, I try to discover what perspectives the government and the landowner themselves see as a solution since at present it mainly consists of trying to antagonise each other.

Semi-structured interviews were used to establish how both municipalities and developers view the housing issue and what proposals they initiate to find a solution, but also to assess what roles the actors have and should have in area development. Interviews were also conducted with appraisers to get a better understanding of the current problems in the land and housing market. Semi-structured interviews contain pre-established questions in a certain order, and the interviewer has the option to deviate from this if deemed necessary (Hay and Cope, 2021). Structured interviews have no flexibility and may cause important information to be omitted, and unstructured interviews give the participants complete freedom, which may also cause the interviewer not to have all the information he would like to gather as an interviewer (Clifford *et al.*, 2016; Hay and Cope, 2021).

An interview guide was prepared for conducting the interviews, slightly adapted for each participant to get the right information from everyone. The interview guide provided sufficient structure to the interview. See Appendix 1-3 for the different interview guides. The questions are based on the theory described in the theoretical framework. Some basic questions were asked to all participants so that the answers could be better compared. It is important to properly understand and respect the position of the interviewee. Developers in particular do not want to reveal too much about acquisition strategies, and a response must be given if information should not be shared.

Important for this study are internal and external reliability. Bryman (2016) argues that the degree of internal reliability is determined by the extent to which the opinions of different researchers in one research team are aligned. This study is conducted by one researcher, so it can be said that internal reliability is ensured. External reliability determines the extent to which the results of this study are reproducible for larger samples. Because only the Dutch context will be researched, external reliability

is ensured, as the information was collected from multiple respondents and consulted literature. Additional reliability and verifiability will be ensured by making audio recordings and transcripts of the interviews, that will be coded with a coding scheme.

3.2 Selected participants

The selected participants of this research experience the consequences of the outlined Dutch land policy daily. At the municipalities, the participants are project managers and employees at the land affairs department. In their daily work, they deal with housing construction in their municipality. Participating municipalities are all situated in the north of the Netherlands. Participants working for a developer are mainly employed as project developers or regional managers, also mainly working in the northern provinces of the Netherlands. Although the interviewees all work in the north of the Netherlands, these results are also applicable to other regions in the Netherlands, as they are also covered by national regulations. However, land acquisition does get more expensive the closer you get to the Randstad. The interviewed appraisers are operating nationwide and are knowledgeable about land policy and the tools available to municipalities. A total of nine interviews were conducted for this study. Due to the length of the interviews and the amount of information obtained, the saturation is high. Internal consultation within Sweco also helped to guide the research and validate the data obtained. Due to the sensitivity of the information provided, the participants have been fully anonymised and no information is provided that refers back to their work or organisation. Table 3.1 shows how participants are referred to.

Table 3.1: Participants of this thesis.

Name	Function
M-1	Municipality
M-2	Municipality
M-3	Municipality
M-4	Municipality
M-5	Municipality
D-1	Developer
D-2	Developer
A-1	Appraiser
A-2	Appraiser

3.3 Data analysis

With participants' consent, all interviews were audio recorded, transcribed using Trint and imported to Atlas.TI for analysis. The interviews were analysed using thematic analysis. This is a systematic tool for analysing qualitative data (Verhoeven, 2020). Six clear steps explain how to summarise qualitative data into codes and themes, how to make connections and how to interpret themes and structures. The analysis begins with exploration, which was convenient for this study because of its exploratory nature. This is followed by coding and thematising the codes. Step 5 is revision and this is done until there is satisfaction with the codes. Since it was not certain at the beginning which codes were going to apply,

this thematic analysis is incredibly useful. The final step is refining, establishing and structuring and this is presented in the codebook. In particular, the part where the developer expresses its views on the government agencies and vice versa, and how both parties view the pros and cons of changing land policy are important topics that would not have emerged as well without this analysis.

The codes and subcodes used were shaped in a codebook (see Appendix 6), which was used to compare the data with the theory on the land and housing market in the theoretical framework. Both inductive and deductive coding was used to code the interviews. According to Verhoeven (2020), several rounds of coding will be needed to get the correct final result. Some of the codes were derived from the literature (deductive), while other codes emerged from analysing the interviews and reinterpreting the existing codes from previous coding rounds (inductive).

3.4 Ethical considerations

To obtain potential participants, it is not only essential to provide them with information about the research but also to ensure that they have the freedom to decide whether to give their consent to participate or not (Miller *et al.*, 2012).

Participants were approached via a working email accessible only to the researcher. In this email, an interview request was made, naming all information about the purpose of the research. It also named all rights the interviewee has before, during, and after conducting the interview. The privacy of the interviewees was well protected at all times. The interview was conducted on location or by phone if desired by the interviewee. Before conducting the interview, a consent form was signed and discussed. This consent form can be found in Appendix 5. It is important that the interviewee voluntarily agrees to be interviewed, that he/she can withdraw or refuse to answer a question at any time, that the interviewee acknowledges that the purpose of the study has been explained to him/her, that the interview is part of the data collection of this research and for this reason, it will be recorded with a clear start and end signal for the recording, that the interviewee's name will be replaced by a pseudonym (e.g. M-1), that the information given will be kept confidential, that fragments of the interview may be quoted in this study and related presentations, and that the consent form, transcript, and audio recording will be kept throughout the study, in a folder accessible only to the researcher.

The positionality of the interviewer is also important in this study. Positionality refers to the position that the researcher has within the research study (Savin-Baden and Howell Major, 2023). This research took place in collaboration with Sweco. Sweco has an interest in bringing in major projects and mostly works with municipalities. In addition, I am also a future first-time home seeker and am involved in housing developments. Nevertheless, this research will be conducted objectively.

4. Results

Based on the interviews and the literature review, this chapter presents the research findings to answer the sub-questions. First, the interests of the actors involved are examined within land acquisition. Then it looks at how the interviewees view government involvement and how that changes their role. Then, at the municipal level, it considers how interviewees think about active municipal land policy and what implications that has. Finally, the two perspectives that emerged from the theoretical framework are evaluated.

4.1 Spatial policy

This section reviews how developers and municipalities are involved in land acquisition, the interests behind land-banking strategies and whether the effects of the building land paradox are also visible in the Netherlands. It then examines whether motivations for government intervention correspond with the literature. This section concludes with the results of a change in policy towards plan-led systems.

In the 'Fight for the residual' (De Greef, 1997), it is argued that actors like to be involved in the construction column as early as possible, to get the most profit on area development. This means that as soon as the land is potentially designated for housing development, speculative actors immediately buy land to attract the residual to themselves. This requires an amendment to the zoning plan, with the responsibility resting with the relevant municipality.

"Market players have bought land in our city centre, at very different values. But they have certainly paid millions for it. At the same time, there are parties with historical property, who have paid almost nothing. That makes it complicated to work together" (M01).

When developers are asked how they view this, the most striking thing is that they do not recognise themselves in this, but instead, their competitors would.

"There are several parties in the Netherlands, which are listed companies. Such a company should just be filled with land positions because then the shareholders can resell it and that makes money" (D02).

Since the real answer lies in between, advice was sought from appraisers for the subject of land positions. The appraiser states that:

"What developers are particularly concerned about is buying a position in relation to the relevant government. To realise building volume in such a way. If they have the land in the plan area, or perhaps future plan area, it may cost money for such a developer. It is an investment aimed at being able to build housing in the future" (A02).

It can be concluded from this that the developer indeed wants to be involved early in the property development process. However, the interview with A02 shows that the land itself is not part of the

profit, but mainly to enforce a guarantee to build. This can therefore refute the notion that early land acquisition is money-driven.

The study then looked at how actors view land-banking strategies and if development is deliberately delayed. By the municipality, developers who strategically own land are being watched:

I think land is strategically held back by market players. Firstly, that has to do with creating scarcity in the market and secondly, that has to do with the fact that you don't have the capacity to build (M02).

The developer thinks otherwise:

"Generally, a developer is very happy when someone says to him that something is allowed. But yes, if the market is very bad and you do have all kinds of requirements that you have to meet, then you may not have a feasible plan at that point, and if you wait then I understand that"(D02).

Zooming in on the motivations behind non-development, reasons similar to those mentioned in section 2.4 are often cited:

"That has nothing to do with realistic normal land prices or balanced land price politics, Say there are cowboys in the field" (D02).

"Municipalities often don't have the knowledge and expertise anymore"(D01).

When questioned further on these problems, it appears that market absorption is poor in these times. Often, the low-cost segment is netted with revenues from the high-cost segment. On this, D02 says the following:

"That is kind of the trend now. The expensive owner-occupied segment is falling back quite a bit, and it is precisely the homes between, say, three and four tons that are currently doing well (question: should they be financed by more expensive homes). So that all intertwine" (D02).

"There is always a demand. Only the pace goes down, because if instead of sixty homes we put thirty homes on the market then we are at 70% sooner, we can start building sooner and then again we can do something faster" (D02).

It is known from the literature that land banking has price-driving effects on land prices. These high land prices should lead to market concentration, which in turn affects higher land prices. Limited competition in the land and housing market is likely to contribute to market failure (Van der Krabben, 2021). How is this perceived by the municipality:

The few developers out there have such a large amount of land in their portfolio, with the possibility of building, because these are strategic lands that they are allowed to build on, That this should be better regulated" (M02).

The developer does not seem to have a problem with this: "It is not for everyone to act in that market" (D01).

Land-banking could be explained with Option theory, where it pays to wait longer to build (Titman, 1985). And if a government allows it to build on more land, according to the building land paradox, it only pays more to postpone building real estate (Davy, 1996). Is there a visible tension here between the municipality and the developer? And do they also experience this building-land paradox in everyday life?

"The moment you start asking real commitment from them (read: landowners), then, of course, there must be something in return. That's just the way it works" (M04).

"We have to wait patiently because if we start building now, it won't work. The contracting prices are too high now. Interest rates have gone up, so the freehold prices can't go up any further" (D02).

Focusing specifically on delaying construction because it would pay off, D01 replied:

"I don't know to what extent it pays to wait. Whether it yields more than it costs, I think that also depends per location" (D01).

From these interviews, a tentative conclusion can be drawn that the current outlook is causing at least developers not to want to develop because they fear loss-making projects if the homes are not sold. It should be added here that they often want to sell the expensive segment because in previous years they bought the land far too expensively and thus have to compensate. Government intervention, the literature suggests, could provide a solution. Based on the three stated characteristics (welfare economics arguments, institutional arguments and/or paternalistic considerations), we examine whether the interviews also show that government intervention is necessary.

From a welfare economics argument, it can be argued that the land market is not a perfect market. The perfect market has seven requirements, namely full competition, market accessibility, no information asymmetry, no entry and exit barriers, no transaction costs and the product traded is homogeneous. The literature suggests that the Dutch land market is characterised by market concentration (no full competition).

"The same developers keep coming forward and these parties have a lot of leverage to buy land strategically" (M04).

The great financial power of developers makes it impossible for small private actors to buy up land (no market accessibility).

"I can well imagine large parties having great financial clout" (D01).

The high land price that has to be paid to acquire land (high transaction costs) is beyond the reach of small municipalities and local developers (entry barriers). The land market is also thin because few (public) transactions take place in it (Buitelaar, 2021). This ensures that complete information is not available to everyone (information asymmetry). Finally, land is a very location-specific commodity, which makes the product very heterogeneous (Segeren, 2007).

From a welfare economics argument, it can be argued that the land market is not a perfect market. The perfect market has seven requirements, namely full competition, market accessibility, no information asymmetry, no entry and exit barriers, no transaction costs and the product traded is homogeneous. Based on these requirements, it can be argued that the land market in the Netherlands is not a perfect market, and thus government intervention is justified. The literature suggests that the Dutch land market is characterised by market concentration (no full competition). Municipalities recognise that the same developers keep coming forward and that these parties have a lot of leverage to buy land strategically (M04). In reality, it is also noted that the great financial power of developers makes it impossible for small private actors to buy up land (no market accessibility). The high land price that has to be paid to acquire land (high transaction costs) is beyond the reach of small municipalities and local developers (entry barriers). The land market is also thin because few (public) transactions take place in it (Buitelaar, 2021). This ensures that complete information is not available to everyone (information asymmetry). Finally, land is a very location-specific commodity, which makes the product very heterogeneous (Segeren, 2007).

From an institutional economics argument, a government may intervene if transaction costs are too high and if property rights are so dispersed that it is too risky for a private actor to realise a private development. Fragmented land ownership contributes, among others, to an increased land price for inner-city locations. It also follows from the interviews that land price and other costs are major problems for (re)development in urban areas:

“I think that (read: inner-city development) for a city is very good for livability. But if you want to make miles, you have to look beyond that, because the inner city is just very complicated. They are very long trajectories because there is an awful lot involved” (D01).

“This also has to do not only with the price but also with the long-term nature of an inner-city project with everything that comes with it. Then you're not going to get the quick numbers in the short term” (D02).

“It is much more expensive to build within urban areas yes, that is true” (A01).

Third, paternalistic considerations may be seized upon by the government to intervene in the land market. The ongoing housing shortage is a reason for the government to intervene:

“Access to the market for first-time home seekers is completely locked” (M01).

"The urgency to build affordably is greater than ever" (M01).

Thus, the necessity of government intervention is also evident from the interviews. The question is, whether there is a difference here between municipality and developer. From the interviews, this does not appear to be the case:

"Active policy is certainly preferable. But I don't care whether that land then belongs to a developer or us" (M01).

"For some areas that would be good" (M04).

*"I think the market is willing though. If I look from ****, we are really willing to think along and we also think we should have a societal role in the sense that we should also realize affordable housing" (D01).*

"I think that if you want to come to development and you want to have some say as a municipality, then you need the land" (A01).

"You eliminate competition between developers with that" (A02).

The transition to a plan-led system is a first step by the government to remove market uncertainty. Developers like it when there is more clarity about the plan in advance.

"In such a trajectory, you're constantly being overtaken right and left by new policies. That's so hard to answer that of how should it go right" (D02).

So from this first paragraph of results, it may be concluded that there is a struggle to own land and that the reason for this is mainly the assurance of building quantity. At the same time, it is recognized that conditions for development are not good at present, and therefore there is a stalling from developers. Government intervention is therefore not only justified but also desired by the parties involved, as they feel that in times of market failure, a government should take financial responsibility. The next section elaborates on the land policy to be pursued by municipalities, which with these developments should focus on an active land policy.

4.2 Municipal land policy

Almost all interviewees agree that an active land policy can help accelerate housing construction. Because inner-city locations are complex and not immediate, it can be argued that the government is needed to facilitate these developments. The pros and cons of active land policy are found in Figure 4.1.

Arguments in favor of active land policy			Arguments against an active land policy	
<p>More direction and control</p> <p>On inner-city sites, a government can have much more control over the development if it owns the land on the development (M01, M02, M03, M04, D1, D2, A1, A2).</p>	<p>Signal to the market</p> <p>Whoever has the land, builds. So that's how you get developments off the ground (M03, A1).</p>	<p>Directing Pace</p> <p>An active policy makes it possible to break up developments into time frames, with agreements made in advance (M01, A1).</p>	<p>Expertise</p> <p>The government does not have enough knowledge and expertise to responsibly pursue an active land policy. The market does have this capability. (D01).</p>	<p>Risks</p> <p>Active land policy leads to potentially unacceptable financial risks in worse economic times. Ultimately, the financial consequences are for citizens who pay taxes. (M05).</p>
<p>Continuity in development activity</p> <p>Most developers in the Netherlands, want to guarantee continuity in the basis of business, i.e. construction guarantees (M01).</p>	<p>Continuity among people</p> <p>Successful projects start with working with the same people everyday, both from the developers side as well as the government (M01).</p>		<p>Unique</p> <p>Active land policy by municipalities is less common abroad than in the Netherlands. We will be an odd duck in Europe (M02).</p>	

Figure 4.1 Arguments in favour and against active land policy.

"We are willing to contribute, but with the current set of regulations of the government it is simply not possible. We also need to keep our chimney smoking" (D01).

"I believe that if the market cannot solve it, I am talking for a moment about the demands from the government that a large part must be realized affordably, that the government must step in. I consider that to be a social task." (D01).

"We always liked it when the control was just with a municipality" (D02).

So the developer is satisfied with an active government.

"On the one hand it's good that you leave a lot to the market, but on the other hand I think it's also good that there is steering, that you have a finger in the pie for quality" (D01).

At municipalities, they seem a bit more cautious, particularly because of the large losses incurred during the financial crisis. Still, the advantages of an active land policy are recognized:

"The advantage of active land policy is, of course, that you do have a lot of things under your control. You do notice that the negotiations you have to conduct to arrive at development are quite difficult.

Because of the housing crisis, though, there is a lot of political tailwind for reinstalling an active land policy:

"We currently have a facilitative land policy, but my understanding is that the discussion to reinstate an active land policy is ongoing by some council members" (D03).

So the municipality and developer both seem to be hinting at an active land policy. This issue has also been put to the appraisers, who also appear to be in favour:

"I do think the advantage of an active government is that it can steer much more and have a grip on all sorts of things. Among other things, the time frame in which certain things are realized. A purely facilitative role can entail that nothing happens, so to speak" (A01).

The above results send a clear message regarding the pursuit of active land policy by municipalities. The Ministry of Housing and Spatial Planning is explicitly concerned with spatial developments in the Netherlands. In recent years, government influence has been reduced and more and more has been left to lower authorities and citizens. With the national housing shortage, this ministry has been revived and the overall tendency is for more control. A shift from governance back to government is thus clearly visible and follows the theory.

"If you say, spatial planning and public housing is by definition a task of government, I think that's a political consideration as well. If you think that, I would also opt for an active government that also uses the land policy instruments we have for that. Then I am thinking of the municipal right of first refusal, on the one hand, to keep out project developers and thus price increases. On the other hand, and this aspect is sometimes underexposed in practice, by establishing the right of first refusal you also create a status quo in the property situation and that can prevent you from frustrating expropriation proceedings against the landowner at a later stage" (A01).

Returning to Section 2.2, here De Roo's (2018) nine-cell model was used to examine government intervention in land and housing markets. It could be argued that since the '90s there has been a communicative rationale, in line with the deregulation and decentralization appropriate to this era. A reinforcement of less government involvement occurred during the economic crisis in 2008. With the changed circumstances outlined above, a transition must occur to a more technical rationale approach, with the government leading housing development. The evidence is that more government involvement in the past has always resulted in increased housing production.

4.3 Perspective 1: segmenting the housing market

The housing market is dynamic, several mechanisms affect its functioning and structure. As a result, the housing market cannot be considered as one uniform whole (Heylen, 2017). There are several submarkets, each with its characteristics and dynamics. When talking about submarkets in the housing market, one immediately thinks of the distinction based on ownership status. Thus, the property sector forms the ownership sector, and the private rental sector and the social rental sector each form a separate part of the total market. Years of liberal policies have led to the fact that land prices have skyrocketed (De Kam and Wind, 2023). However, high land prices are now preventing landowners from rounding out their projects for cheaper segments of the housing market, such as public rentals. Normally,

proceeds from the sale of the expensive segment are used to finance cheaper segments. But, because the expensive segment is now selling worse, there are fewer opportunities for social rental and middle segment projects (Van den Eerenbeemt, 2023).

"If we as a developer haven't sold 70%, we can't start building here. Because the buyers of such a project can't get completion insurance. In fact, if we haven't sold 70%, no bank will give them a mortgage. So we have to sell 70% before we can start building. Yes, and in this period that is so difficult that in a lot of cases, projects come to a standstill because that 70% is not achieved. So the first buyers walk away again after a few months because they can't get the financing." (D02).

For a mandatory segmentation of the housing market in a 30-40-30 ratio, the developer is still sceptical:

"By definition, affordable housing is almost non-existent in existing urban areas due to the long processes and land costs much higher. 30-40-30 is now a trend, then the municipality wants 30% public housing. We would rather choose public housing for sale" (D02).

As suggested by (Van den Eerenbeemt, 2023), a solution would be to provide guarantees as the national government, a fund for a build-through warranty (*in Dutch: 'doorbouw garantie'*). Then that fund takes over the risk for the unsold properties.

"Economist, do your job and go introduce this model on a nationwide scale. Provide some certainty that the market can do its job. Go remove that uncertainty by providing a certain guarantee" (M01).

In addition to better market absorption, the 30-40-30 rule also reduces land prices over time:

"That's one of the points you make to indicate to the landowner that he might have too high expectations about the price because you also have to build public housing. And there's very little land value under that" (D02).

This can be explained by the residual land value method, which dictates that land is worth what can be built on it (Buitelaar, 2021). It can be concluded that with a segmentation of the housing market in the ratio 30-40-30, the market absorption is reduced for developers from 70% to, say, 30%. A further specification of the exact percentage needs to be investigated. The government is establishing a "build-through guarantee," which allows housing projects to be completed that would otherwise come to a halt. At least the developers are in favour of this.

4.4 Perspective 2: Option contracts

A common problem heard from the interviews is that uncertainty plays a major role in area development. In particular, uncertainty about the outcomes of the project, for example, the housing program. But developers also perceive the tender process as tedious:

"Everything is tendered. That has become a price driving thing though, because those, often the municipality or whoever puts out a tender, generally in nine out of 10 cases the one with the highest land bid gets the project " (D02).

And specifically about the accumulation of requirements during the development process:

"The city council that piles up all the requirements and you ask we roll. Covenants are made about sustainability, biobased, about this, about that. And that is an accumulation of requirements. And that's all neatly written down. And then they look for a victim. Well, that's possible, but if at the same time, the housing market has completely collapsed, it slows things down" (D02).

Option theory, outlined in the theoretical framework, describes the benefits that can be gained by delaying developments. Developers want to retain the value of the option to build later. This option is worth money to them, which is why the idea arose to work with option contracts, with an option price in them. The idea was generated by listening to the perceived problems of the interviewees and therefore has not yet been tested with the interviewees themselves. However, the municipality of Amsterdam is showing positive results when it comes to option contracts. In this case, projects are prepared by the municipality and offered to the market through a tender for a fixed land price. This requires an active land policy, whereby land is purchased by the municipality.

The advantage of this approach is that a clear agreement is made. If there is no development within the agreed period, then the contract does not have to be complicatedly dissolved, but the developer loses the right to build by an included condition in the agreement. Important for this is that the municipality does its homework, and the building title must be there at the time the option is offered.

This requires a transition from a development-led system to a plan-led system, as suggested earlier where zoning plans are approved at the preliminary stage of projects.

"Then you also handle your land policy very differently as a developer. You don't just buy land speculatively anymore. You start talking to a government at the front, saying: 'We would like to develop here, is it possible, and what are the risks for me as a developer? Then the government becomes much more directing" (A02).

5. Conclusion

This chapter puts the empirical research findings in perspective of the theoretical framework. First, spatial policy in the Netherlands and the forms of land policy that occur in this context will be discussed to answer sub-question 1. Subsequently, sub-questions 2 and 3 will be elaborated and the roles and interests of municipalities and developers will be identified. Finally, the possibilities of improving the land and housing market to accelerate the property development process are discussed. By answering the sub-questions, the answer to the central research question is formulated at the end:

“What are perceptions of public authorities and developers to encourage building initiatives in inner-city development?”

5.1 New Dutch spatial planning

The Dutch land market is a complex and highly regulated system that is often subject to. Spatial developments have been highly regulated by government agencies for decades. This study concludes that a new era must dawn that will end the current housing construction impasse. It has become clear from the literature and interviews that housing development is not just money-driven, but that involved parties want certainty. More certainty for future developments brings stability to the land market, with in particular private actors not acquiring land speculatively. It has also become clear that deregulation and decentralization since the 1990s have not led to a structural supply of new housing.

By applying Davy's (1996) Baulandsicherung and explaining it using Titman's (1985) option theory, it has been shown that the current system of real estate development provides opportunities for developers to deliberately delay their development, to potentially increase revenues from future development on this land (Adams and Tiesdell, 2012). This study, therefore, proposes to reinstall active land policy. With an active land policy, governments have more influence on spatial development (Needham, 2014). An active land policy can provide market steering. The advantages of this land policy for the government are more direction and control, it sends a signal to the market, it speeds up development, and it provides continuity in development. From the data, it was found that the land market is an imperfect market with high costs and poor market access, justifying government intervention. Both the municipality and the developer see opportunities in this strategy, as they ultimately share the same goal of being able to develop.

To enable this step, a transition will have to take place from a development-led development system to a plan-led development system, which can provide more certainty to developing actors (Moroni, 2007). In doing so, it makes zoning plans guiding and not adaptive to development proposals (Buitelaar, Galle and Sorel, 2011). This transition also involves changing the development model towards a public planning-led quasi-market model, where land is acquired by the local government, prepared for construction and then offered to the market. Because the adage remains: he who has the land, builds

(and thus decides). Although tension is initially expected concerning the municipality and developer, this does not emerge in this study. It can therefore be concluded that provided the right frameworks are in place, there are possibilities for an active land policy in which land ownership lies mainly with local authorities.

Using the nine-cell model of De Roo (2018), the developments of Dutch land policy have been mapped over the past decades. Here, there is a continuous transition of more or less government intervention and thus a transition from a technical rationale approach to land policy and a communicative rationale approach. From the current circumstances in the land and housing market, it must be concluded that a transition from the current communicative rationale to the technical rationale must be made. This transition is already underway and is further stimulated by this research. A good example is the Strengthening the Control of Public Housing Act, by the revived Ministry of Spatial Planning and Housing.

A cause for concern, however, is capacity problems at municipalities, and, according to developers, also a lack of knowledge and expertise. The severe shortage of manpower is causing projects to take longer, and so this needs to be addressed. The survey has no further contribution to this.

5.2 The perspectives to encourage building initiatives

A variety of news sources and literature have shown that current laws and regulations will not lead to a sudden increase in the number of new housing developments. On the grounds of developers and investors in particular, municipalities have little say, and the current economic climate does not allow the former to proceed with development. From the literature and interviews, two initiatives have been identified that can accelerate inner-city developments, and thus form the answer to the stated main question of this study.

In the short term, a bill may provide for a national requirement of a 30-40-30 housing program. A 30-40-30 program with public housing, mid-rent or mid-buy, and free sector or high-end buy, will lead to higher market absorption and lower land prices. The former allows developers to move faster to develop. The government provides a "build-through guarantee," which allows the developer and buyer to get their loans financed at the bank. The second, a lower land price, will cause acquisition costs to be lower and thus the operating balance becomes more positive.

Second, it can be concluded that option contracts lead to faster development of vacant land. However, this requires an active land policy with a land acquisition by municipalities, which will take more time while there is an existing housing crisis already. The premium paid for the option to develop could be used by a relevant municipality for other social objectives. The current land policy tools that municipalities can employ for land acquisition are considered sufficient by this study, and thus no further contributions are made here.

However, land acquisition will require a large financial capacity, which will likely require looking to the state. However, the financial implications have not been sufficiently explored in this study and thus require more research in the future.

An active government again emphasizes the importance of planners in history. The above measures are two ways in which the government and developers can actively start developing in time, to solve the current housing crisis. It must be acknowledged that the market conditions for both an active and a facilitative land policy are not optimal at the moment. But, especially with inner-city development, a facilitative land policy is not favourable for municipalities. This research contributes to the current academic field that there are certainly opportunities, even in the short term, to solve the Dutch housing crisis, with both developers and municipalities. No sooner have Dutch developers and municipalities been studied to see where opportunities exist for both of them. Various policy interventions will have to take place, but the current political climate has made this a high priority. Article 22(2) of the Dutch Constitution states that the government must provide housing, and therefore this study socially contributes by providing perspectives to encourage housing development within the Dutch context.

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Appendix 1: Interview guide municipality

Thema	Vragen
De grondmarkt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wat verstaat u onder de grondmarkt en hoe ziet deze er volgens u uit? • Hoe kijkt u aan tegen de huidige woningbouwmarkt? • Hoe zouden deze twee markten eruit moeten zien volgens u? • Denkt u dat de huidige grondverwervingsmethode toe is aan modernisering? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Wat zou het doel hiervan moeten zijn? • Hogere grondprijzen zetten de betaalbaarheid van nieuwe woningen nog verder onder druk. Wat is uw visie op de gestegen grondprijzen, wie is er 'schuldig' en wie heeft er baat bij? • Kan een private actor verplicht worden tot het bouwen van deze betaalbare woningen en zo ja, op welke manier(en)?
De rol van overheden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • De rol van de overheid lijkt te veranderen van een actieve rol naar een meer faciliterende rol omtrent gebiedsontwikkeling. Hoe kijkt u aan tegen deze veranderende rol? • Hoe zou de overheid ontwikkelaars in staat kunnen stellen meer betaalbare woning in een plangebied te realiseren? • Een mogelijk nieuw ontwikkelmodel (bijvoorbeeld een actief privaat ontwikkelmodel of juist een vernieuwd actief gemeentelijk ontwikkelmodel). Hoe zou volgens u een ideaal ontwikkelmodel eruit zien? • Hoe kan het Rijk of gemeente volgens u bijdragen aan een snellere / betere gebiedsontwikkeling? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Geld? Vertrouwen?
Betrokken actoren	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worden ontwikkelaars vroeg genoeg betrokken in het proces van ontwikkeling? • Hoe verlopen deze gesprekken? Begrijpen jullie elkaar? • Ontwikkelaars zijn vaak in het bezit van strategische grond. Hoe wordt hiermee omgegaan en hoe verloopt de samenwerking met de ontwikkelaar over deze grond? • Hoe ervaart u als gemeente de onderhandelingen over bijvoorbeeld het programma met de ontwikkelaar? • Private partijen lijken de actieve rol van voorheen de gemeente steeds meer over te nemen. Zij nemen vroegtijdig grondposities in en zorgen zelf voor het bouwrijp maken van deze grond. Wat vindt u van deze ontwikkeling?
Beleid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voert Het Hogeland vooral een passief of actief grondbeleid? • Strategische grond wordt vooral ingekocht op uitleglocaties en aan de randen van de stad. Daarentegen is overheidsbeleid gefocust op stedelijke inbreiding. Denkt u dat er sprake is van een mismatch? • Klopt het dat ontwikkelaars liever geen grond aankopen in de binnenstad? Zo ja, waarom niet en wat zijn de gevolgen van de continue wil om binnenstedelijk te bouwen? • Moet de ontwikkelaar meer ruimte krijgen om te bouwen op zijn locaties? Of moet een gemeente meer zelf initiatief nemen?
Instrumenten	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is het instrumentarium rondom grondverwerving en ontwikkeling voldoende? • Met het zelfrealisatierecht geldt in principe, wie de grond heeft, die bouwt. Ook als een grondeigenaar momenteel niet in staat wordt bevonden de gewenste bouw te realiseren. Hoe denkt u over het recht op zelfrealisatie? • Waar betalen ontwikkelaars momenteel voor? Openbare ruimte of betaalbare woningen?
Marktmacht	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is er volgens u sprake van marktconcentratie op de grondmarkt in Nederland? • Hoe zouden we een volledige markt kunnen bewerkstelligen? Brengt dit voordelen? • Hoe kunnen wegleffecten naar grondeigenaren beperkt worden? • Hoe kunnen wegleffecten van risico's beperkt worden zodat er meer subsidie beschikbaar komt voor bijvoorbeeld betaalbare woningbouw?
Afsluiten	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Welke rol gaat de Omgevingswet spelen op de nieuwe grondmarkt? • Waar liggen wat u betreft de kansen rondom gebiedsontwikkeling met meer betaalbare woningbouw? Welke rol zou het Rijk moeten hebben?

Appendix 2: Interview guide developer

Thema	Vragen
De grondmarkt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wat verstaat u onder de grondmarkt en hoe ziet deze er volgens uit? • Hoe kijkt u aan tegen de huidige woningbouwmarkt? • Hoe zouden deze twee markten eruit moeten zien volgens u? • Denkt u dat de huidige grondverwervingsmethode toe is aan modernisering? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Wat zou het doel hiervan moeten zijn? • Hogere grondprijzen zetten de betaalbaarheid van nieuwe woningen nog verder onder druk. Wat is uw visie op de gestegen grondprijzen, wie is er 'schuldig' en wie heeft er baat bij? • Kan een private actor verplicht worden tot het bouwen van deze betaalbare woningen en zo ja, op welke manier(en)?
De rol van overheden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • De rol van de overheid lijkt te veranderen van een actieve rol naar een meer faciliterende rol omtrent gebiedsontwikkeling. Hoe kijkt u aan tegen deze veranderende rol? • Hoe zou de overheid ontwikkelaars in staat kunnen stellen meer betaalbare woning in een plangebied te realiseren? • Een mogelijk nieuw ontwikkelmodel (bijvoorbeeld een actief privaat ontwikkelmodel of juist een vernieuwd actief gemeentelijk ontwikkelmodel). Hoe zou volgens u een ideaal ontwikkelmodel eruit zien? • Hoe kan het Rijk of gemeente volgens u bijdragen aan een snellere / betere gebiedsontwikkeling?
Betrokken actoren	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ontwikkelaars zijn vaak in het bezit van strategische grond. Hoe wordt hiermee omgegaan en hoe verloopt de samenwerking met de gemeente over deze grond? • Hoe ervaart u als ontwikkelaar de onderhandelingen over bijvoorbeeld het programma met de gemeente? • Private partijen lijken de actieve rol van voorheen de gemeente steeds meer over te nemen. Zij nemen vroegtijdig grondposities in en zorgen zelf voor het bouwrijp maken van deze grond. Wat vindt u van deze ontwikkeling?
Beleid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategische grond wordt vooral ingekocht op uitleglocaties en aan de randen van de stad. Daarentegen is overheidsbeleid gefocust op stedelijke inbreiding. Denkt u dat er sprake is van een mismatch? • Klopt het dat ontwikkelaars liever geen grond aankopen in de binnenstad? Zo ja, waarom niet en wat zijn de gevolgen van de continue wil om binnenstedelijk te bouwen? • Moet de ontwikkelaar meer ruimte krijgen om te bouwen op zijn locaties?
Marktmacht	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is er volgens u sprake van marktconcentratie op de grondmarkt in Nederland? • Zojuist bespraken we de land banking strategie van grote bouwondernemingen. Hierdoor is het moeilijker voor kleine ondernemingen om toe te treden tot de markt. Vormt dit volgens u een probleem? • Hoe zouden we volgens u als ontwikkelaar om moeten gaan met bijvoorbeeld het Kostenverhaal? Moeten ontwikkelaars verplicht meebetalen aan bijvoorbeeld de openbare ruimte? • Zou eenzelfde constructie ook gebruikt kunnen worden om meer betaalbare woningbouw in een plangebied te realiseren?
Afsluiten	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Welke rol gaat de Omgevingswet spelen op de nieuwe grondmarkt? • Waar liggen wat u betreft de kansen rondom gebiedsontwikkeling met meer betaalbare woningbouw? Welke rol zou het Rijk moeten hebben?

Appendix 3: Interview guide appraiser

Thema	Vragen
De grondmarkt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wat verstaat u onder de grondmarkt en hoe ziet deze er volgens u uit? • Hoe zou de ideale grondmarkt eruit moeten zien volgens u? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Denkt u dat er momenteel een probleem is op de grondmarkt in Nederland? • Denkt u dat de huidige grondverwervingsmethode toe is aan modernisering? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Wat zou het doel hiervan moeten zijn? • Hogere grondprijzen zetten de betaalbaarheid van nieuwe woningen nog verder onder druk. Wat is uw visie op de gestegen grondprijzen, wie is er ‘schuldig’ en wie heeft er baat bij?
De rol van overheden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • De rol van de overheid lijkt te veranderen van een actieve rol naar een meer faciliterende rol omtrent gebiedsontwikkeling. Hoe kijkt u aan tegen deze veranderende rol? • Een mogelijk nieuw ontwikkelmodel (bijvoorbeeld een actief privaat ontwikkelmodel of juist een vernieuwd actief gemeentelijk ontwikkelmodel). Hoe zou volgens u een ideaal ontwikkelmodel eruit zien?
Betrokken actoren	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grote bouwondernemingen zijn in staat grote grondportefeuilles aan te houden (ook wel land banking genoemd). Hoe kijkt u hier tegenaan. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Hoe zouden private actoren eerder kunnen overgaan tot de bouw van woningen? • Private partijen lijken de actieve rol van voorheen de gemeente steeds meer over te nemen. Zij nemen vroegtijdig grondposities in en zorgen zelf voor het bouwrijp maken van deze grond. Wat vindt u van deze ontwikkeling?
Beleid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Door de grotere grondwaardesprong aan de rand van steden nemen ontwikkelaars vooral hier grondposities in. Daarentegen is het huidige beleid gefocust op stedelijke inbreiding. Denkt u dat er sprake is van een mismatch? • Dan bouwers en ontwikkelaars: waarom verwerven zij onbebouwde grond aan de rand van de stad waarop (vooral nog) niet gebouwd mag worden? Waarom verwerven zij geen binnenstedelijke gronden? • Binnenstedelijk bouwen zorgt vaak voor grote tekorten op de grondexploitatie, vanwege de dure aankoop van de grond. Moeten we wel binnenstedelijk blijven bouwen met het huidige woningtekort?
Onteigening	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kunt u mij in uw eigen woorden uitleggen wat onteigening is, hierbij lettend op wie mag onteigenen en tegen welke waarde? • Is het Ontheigeningsrecht op dit moment voldoende om als instrument te functioneren? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Zo niet, wat moet er gewijzigd worden? • Bij minnelijke verwerving worden grondprijzen gerekend die gelijkstaan aan de marktwaarde + schadeloosstelling van de huidige eigenaar (schaduwwerking van het Ontheigeningsrecht). Hoe kijkt u hier tegenaan en denkt u dat de verwervingsprijzen hierdoor te hoog worden ingeschat? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Wat is het gevolg van deze te hoge verwervingsprijzen? • Met het zelfrealisatierecht geldt in principe, wie de grond heeft, die bouwt. Ook als een grondeigenaar momenteel niet in staat wordt bevonden de gewenste bouw te realiseren. Hoe denkt u over het recht op zelfrealisatie?
Marktmacht	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is er volgens u sprake van marktconcentratie op de grondmarkt in Nederland? • Zojuist bespraken we de land banking strategie van grote bouwondernemingen. Hierdoor is het moeilijker voor kleine ondernemingen om toe te treden tot de markt. Vormt dit volgens u een probleem? • Momenteel heeft de gemeente het instrument Kostenverhaal. Dit is iets anders dan winstafroming (of de behaalde winst door de grondwaardesprong). Hoe kunnen deze wegleffecten beperkt worden?
Afsluiten	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Welke rol gaat de Omgevingswet spelen op de nieuwe grondmarkt? • Waar liggen wat u betreft de kansen rondom gebiedsontwikkeling met meer betaalbare woningbouw? Welke rol zou het Rijk moeten hebben?

Appendix 5: Consent form

Master Thesis Diego van Kampen

Toestemming om deel te nemen aan het onderzoek

- Ik stem vrijwillig in met deelname aan dit onderzoek.
- Ik begrijp dat ondanks mijn instemming om deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek, ik mij op elk moment kan terugtrekken of weigeren een vraag te beantwoorden.
- Het doel en de aard van het onderzoek zijn mij uitgelegd en ik heb de gelegenheid tot het stellen van vragen over het onderzoek.
- Het interview is onderdeel van de dataverzameling van Diego zijn Thesis. Hierom zal het interview opgenomen worden. Diego zal duidelijk aangeven wanneer de audio opname gestart en beëindigd wordt.
- De audio opname wordt alleen gebruikt om het interview te transcriberen. In de transcripten wordt u geanonimiseerd. Uw naam wordt vervangen door een pseudoniem (bijvoorbeeld 'Participant 01').
- Ik begrijp dat alle informatie die ik voor dit onderzoek verstrek, vertrouwelijk zal worden behandeld.
- Ik begrijp dat fragmenten uit mijn interview kunnen worden geciteerd in de Thesis en bijbehorende presentaties.
- Ik begrijp dat ondertekende toestemmingsformulieren en audio-opnamen worden bewaard gedurende het onderzoek. Alleen Diego heeft toegang tot de map waarin deze data wordt opgeslagen.

Diego gaat er met onderstaande handtekening van uit dat geïnterviewde toestemming geeft voor het afnemen en verwerken van het interview.

Handtekening geïnterviewde:

Handtekening interviewer:

Datum:

Datum:

Appendix 6: Codebook

The land market

- Land ownership
- Problems in the land market
 - Functioning
 - Land price
 - Land value jump
 - Pricing
 - Cooperation
 - Speculation
 - Transparency

The housing market

- Problems on the housing market
 - Complexity
 - Lack of locations
 - Influence of interest
 - Costs
 - Procedures
 - Housing stock
- Future
 - Ambitions
 - Visions

Power relations

- Policy
 - Spatial policy
 - Land policy
 - Laws and regulations
- Conflict
 - Municipality's thinking on developer
 - Developer's thinking on the municipality
 - Critics
 - Poor communication between involved actors
- Influence
 - Influence on the housing programme
 - Influence on the construction pace
 - Market concentration
- Cooperation within existing power relations

Problem statements

- Capacity
- Economy
- Lack of efficiency
- Uncertainty
- Risks
- Time
- Increasing demand for affordable housing

Suggested solutions

- Continuity
- Leasehold
- New development model
- Strategy
- New housing concepts