

Master's Thesis

Political integration in the Netherlands
Citizens with an immigrant and a Dutch background compared.

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ABSTRACT: Dutch society embraces a rising proportion of foreign residents, from Europe and rest of the World. With underrepresentation of migrants in the legislature, the rise of migrant political parties, and policies aimed at bridging cultural differences, the political integration of residents with an immigrant background becomes relevant. This study on political integration in the Netherlands has the objective to establish the level of political integration of citizens with a migration background, by comparing them with citizens of Dutch background on political activity, trust and preferences for values and democracy. The study wants to establish the effect of background on activity, trust and preferences. Mechanisms that can explain effects are found in the Evolutionary Theory of Emancipation and the Updated Assimilation Theory. The research is quantitative, using datasets from the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey.

Results show shared preferences for a liberal democracy, but differences in political activity. Most migrant categories trust Dutch government less than the Dutch. Non-Western migrant categories have less preference for emancipative values. The background has an effect on integration, but values and education are also significant predictors. Policies for more political integration should focus on these variables. Modifications in the surveys can enhance their usefulness for this kind of research.

KEYWORDS: emancipative values, political integration, trust in government, political activity, liberal democracy, representation, integration, migration, ESS, WVS.



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Glossary

CBS	Netherlands Statistics
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
G1	First generation migrants, born in a country outside continental Netherlands
G2	Second generation migrants, born in continental Netherlands but with at least one parent born outside this area
H	Hypothesis
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares (Regression)
PvdA	Dutch Labour Party
PVV	Dutch Freedom Party
SCP	Social-Cultural Planning Institute
WVS	World Values Survey

Readers interested in the Appendix and in the used Stata do-files, please contact the author via email: gerrit.kreffer@gmail.com.

1. The Netherlands: from immigration to political integration?

1.1 Introduction

As a trading nation, the Netherlands traditionally houses people from the Western world working and staying there. Since the middle of the last century, the Netherlands has seen several large migrant groups settling in the country; firstly from former colonies, e.g. Indonesia and Surinam, followed by “guest workers” from Northern Mediterranean countries, and later also from Turkey and Morocco. New this century, was the arrival of migrants especially coming from Eastern Europe, and refugees from across Europe, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, there is continuous in and out flow from the Dutch Antilles – part of the Netherlands.

Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the Dutch population increased since 2000 from approximately one million reaching 17 million people in 2016. Individuals with a foreign background almost entirely account for this growth and now form 22% of the population. In the three biggest Dutch cities residents with an immigrant background recently became the majority, leaving the Dutch as the largest minority category. Main countries of origin are Turkey, Morocco, Surinam, and Germany. Projections for the future depend on assumptions made, but growth to 42% of the population in 2060 is not unlikely (cordial scenario, demo-demo.nl, 2017).

In the eighties of last century, when it became apparent that migration to the Netherlands was not a temporary phenomenon, policies were developed to improve the situation for ethnic minorities (Amersfoort, 1993). Separate language and (origin) culture education was organised for children of immigrants, to prepare them for later return to the parent’s country of origin. Kogan (2006) makes clear that the Dutch government emphasised cultural differences. Ethnic organisations were encouraged. Koopmans (2010) describes the integration policies that were developed since then as multicultural, mainly directed at social-economic integration – education, labour and income (CBS, 2016). Immigrants got easy access to equal rights and welfare, without providing strong incentives for host-country language acquisition and interethnic contacts.

Pim Fortuyn, a candidate prime minister, assassinated in 2002, started a political discussion on values in the Dutch society, to be shared among residents (Fortuyn, 1997). Shared values are now thought to support a viable democracy (Tweede Kamer, 2017). The political aspects of integration have attracted more attention. The government promotes a “participation declaration” for new migrants in which the importance of liberal values is stressed and whereby migrants declare their engagement with Dutch society and their readiness to contribute actively to it. Balkenhol, Mepschen and Duyvendak (2016) observe nativism, separation of good and bad citizens on cultural grounds. Dekker and Den Ridder (2016) establish what is known on shared values and a vital democracy in the Netherlands using existing surveys.

In 1986 immigrants got voting power. Migrants then voted for a variety of parties. As a protest against the Christian led cabinet since 2006, the Dutch labour party (PvdA) was the most popular migrant party (Tillie 2006). However, it lost most of its seats in the national elections of 2017. A new Turkish party (DENK) acquired four seats. The dual nationality of many migrants became apparent in 2017 through massive demonstrations in Rotterdam in favour of the Turkish president Erdogan. Moreover, through a substantial number of Dutch migrant voters in Turkish national elections.

Alba and Foner (2016) report in “Strangers no more” on the challenges of integration in the Netherlands. They see a transition to greater ethnic-racial diversity in the country which they call the diversity transition. Coleman (2006) sees a comparable transition. It is accelerating, due to the ageing of the baby boom generation and the entry into adulthood of the second and third generations of migrants. The authors urge to put more effort in labour market integration of residents with an immigrant background. They also look at the state of political integration, specifically the low statistical political representation of migrants. Table 1 compiles data on the representation of non-western migrants. The Netherlands had 12% Non-Western inhabitants in 2016 (CBS, 2017).

Table 1 Political representation of non-western migrants in Dutch legislature

political function	percentage of migrants occupying that function	number of functions (proximate)
Burgomasters (2017)	2%	387
Councils municipalities (2010)	3%	9,500
Councils Provinces (2011)	4%	570
Second Chamber (2017)	9%	150
First Chamber (2017)	0%	75
Ministers (2017)	0%	13

Source: Compiled by the author. Registration partly based on picture and name, when official sources are lacking. Moreover, on Staat van Bestuur (2016), Alba and Foner (2016), Van Heelsum, Michon and Tillie (2016), CBS (2016). Bloemraad (2010) reviews the problems measuring representation.

For Alba and Foner gaining elective office and taking part in political decision-making, is a paramount indicator of the overall inclusion of migrants (Alba & Foner, 2016, pp. 143-144).

There is valuable research on the migrant turn-out at elections, running for office and party choice in the Netherlands and drivers of migrant political action (Rath, 1988; Tillie, 2004; Michon, 2011; Van Heelsum, Michon and Tillie, 2016). This study aims to broaden the scope towards *political integration*, which could gain a place next to more familiar integration topics as socioeconomic integration. There is not a standard set of items to measure it (Bilodeau, 2016, p. 4). Significant for political integration is trust in institutions such as the police, the courts and the parliament that form the government (Almond and Verba, 1963). Being part of a civic culture comprises for them not only acceptance of the authority of the state, but also participation in civic duties. Thus, citizens with a migrant background should be allowed to take part and then also participate in political life, to influence policies and laws and to assure that special migrant needs and issues are considered. Political activity per se is not enough. Integration must also bring support for the Dutch system in place. Beckman argues democracies have a right to exclude and to set conditions for inclusion (2014).

1.2 Objective and research questions

Integration research, in general, focuses on what happens with migrants in society after migration. Diminishing variation among people with Dutch background and migrants on relevant indicators (like unemployment) is often considered a sign of integration. Ascertaining variables that explain variation leads to possible actions to further integration. This study is about political integration. It differs from current Dutch research as it focuses on a wider range of indicators for political integration, for a broad spectrum of migrants, taking into account their countries of origin (Zapata-Barrero, Gabrielli, Sánchez-Montijano and Jaulin;2013). Political integration is defined as participation, being part of mainstream political debates, practices and decision making, including emotional attachments to the Netherlands, trust in its political system, and support for its core political values (Bilodeau, 2016, p. 5).

The objective of this study is to establish the level of political integration of migrants in the Netherlands by comparing their political activity, trust and preferences with those of citizens of Dutch background. Thus, the subtitle of the study: “Citizens with an immigrant and a Dutch background compared”. Background stands here for the country of birth of the citizen and his parents.

Specifically, the three research questions to be answered are:

1. What is the effect of background on the level of political activity?
2. What is the effect of background on the level of trust in the Dutch government?
3. What is the effect of background on preferences for values and democracy?

No effect of background on these items could stand for successful integration. Comparison of residents helps to assess political marginalisation.

1.3 Structure of the study

In this chapter, the background, objective and research questions of this study have been presented. The study is organised in four additional chapters: theoretical framework, data and methods, results, discussion and conclusions, and an Appendix.

In the theoretical framework (2), the main concepts and insights on political integration and how they are measured are presented, derived from existing literature. Significant variables explaining integration are values, education, age and religion. The current knowledge on the association of these factors with political activity, trust and democratic preferences is reviewed to inform this work.

The data and methods chapter (3), provides information on the availability and quality of the data used in the analysis. The methods applied are specified as well.

For the results chapter (4), the effect of background on five operationalisations of integration and preferences is tested: being politically active, trusting the government, preference for liberal democracy, preference for a welfare democracy, and having emancipative values. Results from the analysis are presented.

Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the results and what insights this brings for policies and further research. Also considered, is what the outcomes could mean for policies on democracy in the Netherlands.

The Appendix contains additional definitions, data and results.

2 Theoretical Framework

This chapter includes a summary of the literature and theories that help to specify the study's research questions and make it possible to draw a conceptual model that guides the research. Moreover, it gives insight into research methods suited to answer the questions (Hennink, Hutter, & Bailey, 2010). After an overview of the literature (2.1), theories are clarified (2.2) that help to build a conceptual model for this study (2.3).

2.1 Literature

Political activity

In the Netherlands people that acquired Dutch citizenship can vote at all levels. Non-nationals that live five years in the country can vote lawfully at the local level. Many immigrants have a double nationality, so their political activity can be directed at two nations. The organisation of ethnic minorities as groups and the pillarized culture of the Netherlands influences activity (De Wit and Koopmans, 2005; Tillie, 2004). Most political science research in the Netherlands focuses on the largest non-Western immigrant groups (Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean) and their participation in the biggest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). Results from these studies show a rise in political participation of migrants, but not to native levels. Immigrants from Turkey and Morocco, mobilised through ethnic networks, vote more and elect more representatives from their communities (Van Heelsum, Michon and Tillie, 2016, p. 44).

Bilodeau (2016, p. 12) reviews all studies with the political behaviours or attitudes of immigrants as dependent variables, published in academic journals between 1955 and 2011. Many studies rely on general surveys which have drawbacks (Anderson, 2010). Immigrant respondents in surveys are most likely naturalised citizens, and critical variables to understand integration, like language-proficiency, transnational considerations, contact with co-ethnics and pre-migration experiences are missing. The studies show with many variations that the propensity to vote and to be politically active is lower for immigrants than for the local population. A less favourable position in society can lead to being more politically active. Partisan preference is for centre-left parties. These seem to defend an agenda in which immigrants recognise themselves. Representation in political institutions of immigrants and ethnic minorities is low. Achieving descriptive representation (equal proportions of migrants in office as in society) proves to be a challenge.

Mügge (2016) examines the recruitment and selection of ethnic minority candidates in political parties and stresses the importance of intersectionality. Ethnicity and gender are connected in the selection. Gest (2010 and 2016), studying alienated Muslims and white working class members, makes an important distinction in political activity. Being active can be pro-system (engagement) and anti-system (rebellion). Staying passive can also be pro-system (sitting-out) or anti-system (withdrawal). Being political active as a member of a group is thus not by itself supportive of a certain political system.

Trust in government

Literature finds differing background effects on trust in government. Boelhauer, Kraaykamp and Stoop (2016), comparing 15 European countries, conclude that political trust (in politicians, political parties and parliament) in the Netherlands is not particularly high, but still higher than in most countries. The authors notice that trust fluctuates with the quality of government, but also with events such as economic developments or measures that were taken.

Helbling et al. (2016), using data from the first four European Social Survey (ESS) waves, discover first and second generation migrants in the Netherlands have a higher political trust than natives and a lower electoral participation. The authors link this to the developed integration policies of this country. Maxwell (2010) finds that immigrants from non-democratic countries exhibit greater trust and are more satisfied with the destination government than immigrants from democratic countries. The explanation could be that democracy offers them the chance of a better life.

Schmeets and Te Riele (2014) define three levels of trust: social, institutional and political. Among ethnic minorities, they find lower social trust than among natives, but fewer differences in institutional and political trust. Huijnk and Dagevos (2012) find lower trust in the Dutch government, judges and police among four migrant groups than among natives. Based on data from 2011 they notice especially low scores for the national government, which was supported at that time by the anti-Muslim party PVV. They find higher scores for the second generation, but this appears to be less of a generation effect, and more of an effect of higher education in this generation. The level of trust of migrants is strongly associated with their orientation towards the country and views on the opportunities offered to them.

Belonging to an ethnic minority group and experiencing discrimination could lower trust in government (Röder and Mühlau, 2011)

Preferences for political system and values

Another integration issue is how well immigrants *fit into liberal democracies*. Fitting goes beyond political participation. Answering the question requires a more normative discussion and is a sensitive topic. Immigrant values, their relationship with political authorities and the strength of attachment, loyalty and sense of civic duty that immigrants express for the host country are significant. White, Bilodeau and Nevitte (2015) find that a strong attachment of immigrants to Canada depends on the level of economic prosperity achieved (in comparison to expectations) and the feeling to be accepted and treated well. Personal experiences “with the system”, being employed, having a good education and feeling part of mainstream society could lead to more support.

There are different definitions of democracy and different ideas on what establishes preferences for democracy. A pro-democratic attitude is often operationalised as agreement with the statement: “Having a democratic political system is a good way of governing this country” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p. 264).

Alejandro Moreno (in Camp, 2001, p. 31) uses a democratic-attitudes index ranging from anti-democratic attitudes to pro-democratic attitudes. He looks at income, gender, education and class and finds that class predicts the score on this index best. Preferences for democracy also varies significantly at the individual level depending on the individual’s value orientations.

Schubert (2015) shows that most political cultures in the world differ from secular liberal democracies like the Dutch. These cultures have normative orientations that can be described as more religious than secular in politics, more authoritarian than democratic in political regime, and more

exclusive than inclusive when it comes to people who are part of the community. See Appendix Figure A.1 for Schubert's map showing political cultures of countries.

Kuhn (2014) states it is unclear what political culture explains the stability of democratic political systems. Public trust in government as well as satisfaction with democracy – both deemed necessary for stability in the classic approach of Almond and Verba (1965) – have declined markedly since then. However, this did not lead to the collapse of democracies or revolutions. Kuhn proposes research, in which culture is approached through values. Values are transmitted through socialisation, and are relatively stable and ideational. When values form a shared and patterned system in society, they can be qualified as cultural elements (Kuhn, 2014, p. 6). A political culture is focused on the political realm and could exist among the members of a political community. The core of a democratic political culture must consist of basic democratic values. He constructs an index based on twelve items of the World Values Survey (WVS), which operationalise basic cultural orientations like autonomy, equality, self-government and freedom. High scores on this index are strongly related to effective democracies.

Using four WVS waves, Steenkamp and Du Toit (2017) find many countries supporting democracy, but support for authoritarian regimes grows and threatens democratic values.

Adaptation

Bilodeau (2014) notes that most immigrants settling nowadays in Canada have little to no experience with democracy. He finds many immigrants believe democracy is a good form of government and understand government in broadly the same terms as the rest of the population. However, immigrants from partly democratic and non-democratic countries are more likely to support other political systems (e.g. experts, the army, a strong leader). For them, democracy is “not the only game in town” (Bilodeau, 2014, p. 359). These observations seem to hold over time and place. There is no age at migration effect. The reason could be that an authoritarian political socialisation very early in life endures throughout life and influences further political learning. There could also be a strong democratic socialisation for Canadians and immigrants born in Canada explaining the difference. Bilodeau, McAllister and Kanji (2010) find that adaptation to democracy in Australia is harder for immigrants coming from authoritarian countries.

Röder and Mühlau (2011) find first generation migrants have a level of trust in public institutions, comparable to natives. They base this on a favourable comparison to the institutions in their country of origin. The optimistic outlook fades over time, as expectations rise and evaluations become more in line with those of natives. They suspected the second generation to have lower levels of trust, due to the feeling of discrimination and social exclusion as a member of an ethnic group. However, this factor was not significant in explaining trust.

2.2 Theories

From the literature we derive, that next to activity and trust, the values of citizens are vital variables in a conceptual model for this study. The Evolutionary Theory of Emancipation (Welzel, 2013) puts values in the centre of attention. It explains how a democracy comes into existence and stays vital by the behaviour of its citizens. Based on a study of the people and political systems worldwide, it takes into account characteristics of different countries of origin when explaining background effects.

Literature also shows different effects for first and second generation migrants (Bilodeau, 2014). Almost all literature on political integration has hypotheses on assimilation (Bilodeau, 2016, p.22). The Updated Assimilation Theory is used to explain variation in the integration of migrants.

2.2.1 The Evolutionary Theory of Emancipation

For explaining how citizens support democracy and operationalising political integration, this study uses the Evolutionary Theory of Emancipation. It is developed by Christian Welzel in his book *Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation* (2013). He builds on

earlier work by Lipset (Theory of modernization, 1959) and Inglehart and Welzel (Revised theory of modernization, 2007), using results of the earlier mentioned WVS.

He develops the idea that over most of history ordinary people's life was a source of threats and a struggle to survive. External pressures forced people to act in certain ways. Poverty and oppression prevailed. Then, since the industrial revolution, a growing number of people attained higher living standards, longer lives and improved conditions of life. People became aware of the possibility to do what inner desires encourage them to do. Emancipative values are emphasising freedom of choice coupled with an emphasis on equality of opportunities becoming important.

Emancipation theory considers democracy as the institutional manifestation of people power. Democracy means "government by the people". The ideal democracy gives entitlements to ordinary citizens to self-govern their private lives and co-govern their public lives. The shell model of *Human Empowerment* (Figure 1.) shows how empowerment arises. Needed is an empowering political regime, within an empowering socio-cultural context and an empowering socioeconomic context. All three shells are considered to contribute to the concept of power.

Figure 1 The shell model of Human Empowerment




Source: Welzel (2013, p. 268)

Welzel's definition of democracy is people power through citizen's rights. Human empowerment is a process whereby people free themselves from external restrictions to pursue their own and mutually shared values. He builds here explicitly on the work of Sen (1999) who uses the term human development. Having regular competitive elections does not make a political system a democracy. Elections are just one of the tools that can empower people. Needed are autonomy rights, freedoms to follow personal preferences in private life and participatory rights, freedoms to make political preferences count in public life (Welzel, 2015, pp. 252-255). Autonomy rights can include the freedom to choose how to earn and spend one's money, which sources of information to access and what to learn, which religion, if any, to practice and where to live with whom and how. Participatory rights could include the freedom to express political preferences in public, to mobilise support for them, to sue authorities for violations of rights, to run for public office and to have a free vote. Democracy thus varies by degree. Having more citizen rights makes a country more democratic, having fewer rights a country more autocratic.

Comparing data in time and between countries on values compiled by the WVS and on democracies, compiled by organisations measuring citizen's rights, Welzel establishes that in most cases a substantive proportion of people in a country with emancipative values force more autocratic regimes in a democratic direction. His theory is essentially a theory on the macro level. Coleman's micro-macro scheme with a central role of rational action theory (Udehn, 2002, pp. 209-306) is useful to show how his theory is connected to this study.

Figure 2 Coleman diagram for economic development and democracy



Source: Spaiser and Sumpter (2016, p. 2)

At the macro level, economic development leads to democracy. At the micro level, the mechanism behind this is shown: people with more resources develop emancipative values, and these then support the macro-democracy.

2.2.2 Important concepts for conceptualising and testing political integration

The evolutionary theory of emancipation brings important concepts that help to operationalise political integration in the Netherlands and test background differences for this research. This paragraph also shows WVS findings from the literature.

Dependent variable: Political activity

Political activity is a broad term which includes voting in a representative democracy, where citizens are represented in a government. Moreover, that includes petitioning, demonstrating and boycotting. Membership of organisations can stimulate this; membership in old style hierarchical organisations like churches, and labour unions, but these days also in more loosely knit environmental group or civil rights initiatives challenging elites (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007, p. 118).

There must be civic entitlements to perform these actions. In less democratic countries, voting could be possible, but anti-elitist demonstrations forbidden. Migrants might not know what exactly the entitlements are in the destination country. Migrants can be influenced by origin state's actions addressed to citizens abroad. Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) describes transnational political practices of Turkey in the Netherlands. Large scale demonstrations can force regimes from autocracy towards democracy. Moreover, collective action is used in a democracy to reach action goals. For people with emancipative values, participation in a joined action becomes a value itself.

Dependent variable: Trust

Emancipative values are essential for democracy and are linked to trust. Trust is seen as critical to democracy in most political culture research (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007, p. 260). Trust can be horizontal - confidence in other people - and vertical - trust in institutionalised hierarchies through which authorities exert power over the public. Societies which emphasise liberty tend to be more critical toward authorities which tie them to command hierarchies. However, they put more emphasis on horizontal civic interactions.

Dependent variable: Liberal democracy and welfare democracy


Democracies safeguard citizen's rights, which imply personal autonomy rights as well as political participation rights. More effective democracies grant more of both types of rights. When a political system amply provides these rights, it can be called a *liberal* democracy. Migrants start of entering a country with less of both rights. After attaining citizenship, those rights also apply to them. Political integration is about not only having these rights but also using them.

Many democracies are called welfare states, when they adapt caretaking responsibilities of its citizens, reducing the risks of ageing, sickness and unemployment. They thereby open economic and public roles to women (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007, p. 278). However, the level of redistribution differs. The label *welfare* democracy is used for democracy with stronger redistribution characteristics that lead to welfare equalisation for its citizens. If it is a liberal democracy, the combination stands for a social-liberal definition. Especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, a market-liberal democracy is found.

Dependent variable: Values

Values are conceptions of desirable things that every individual and society possesses. Values guide not only action but also judgment, choice, attitude, evaluation, argument and rationalisation (Rokeach, 1979). Values are already learned in early childhood. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) discern different *cultural zones*, families of nations that share economic, cultural and institutional characteristics. Figure 3 shows these zones.

Figure 3 Cultural Map of the World




Source: WVS (2017); based on the WVS wave 6 (2010-2014).

The map shows scores of societies in two dimensions. Traditional values emphasise the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Secular-rational values have the opposite preferences to the traditional values.

Survival values emphasise economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of immigrants, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life (World Values survey, n.d.).

Strong Secular values go together with strong Self-expression values. However, they are different. Communism and Confucianism made people less traditional but not necessarily more emancipative. In general, we can expect less democratic political regimes when going down on the diagonal from the top right of Figure 4 to the bottom left.

Figure 4 The relation between values and effective democracies



Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005)

Welzel's *emancipative values* are a subset of these self-expression values. They are defined as the combination of orientations emphasising a liberating orientation, namely freedom of choice, and an egalitarian qualification of this liberating orientation as equal freedom of choice and equality of opportunities (Welzel, 2013, p. 67; see Table A.2.1., Appendix).

The cultural zones in Figure 3 are formed measuring country population averages in values. Within a country, emancipative values are not homogeneous. Personal action resources like a higher education make higher emancipative values within a society more likely. However, emancipative values are developed and gain strength in interaction with others. The availability of action resources (Figure 1) in a country determines how useful emancipative values are. Between society differences by far outweigh within-societal differences. So a higher educated migrant moving to another culture zone may well differ in values from a higher educated person with a Dutch background when settling.

Independent variable: Education

People with higher education and with higher income, have larger action resources and thus emphasise emancipative values more. The material resource income has less influence than more intellectual and connective resources. Expanding education could be a force behind more freedom (Welzel, 2013, p. 106). People with more resources have more opportunities to participate in political action. Their values could stimulate them. However, they might have less motivation for action as they might have fewer grievances and dissatisfaction.

Independent variable: Religion

Religion is part of a country's cultural heritage and continues to shape basic values and behaviour in different ways. People who are very religious tend to favour traditional (non-secular) values. In Figure 3 most cultural zones carry the name of religion. Then there are also countries where religion is not influential, and highly secularised countries like the Netherlands, where people with Dutch background might still have values inspired by their earlier Protestant or Catholic belief.

Education systems, media and the government may amplify the importance of religion. Protestant tradition with decentralised churches and layman's role in it may have made countries more liberal. Where Islam, built on nomadic tribes, has patriarchic tendencies, which hinder gender equality (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007, p. 282). Religion appears to be the base for certain values which then shape democratic preferences.

Independent variable: Age

What to expect when it comes to the effect of age on democracy? There was a trend towards more emancipative values the last decennia (Welzel, 2013). Younger people have fewer action resources and thus might favour emancipative values less than older people (life cycle effect). As people's values take shape during their childhood and early adolescence, the action resources available at that time could also shape the values of a cohort in a country (cohort effect).

Independent variable: Minority

Ethnic diversity can be used to create hostilities between ethnic groups, undermining the democratic idea of a community of equals (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007, p. 205).

2.2.3 The Updated Assimilation Theory

Surprisingly the subject of migration is almost absent in the comprehensive work based on the WVS. The evolutionary theory of emancipation does not cover what happens when an individual or group socialised in a traditional culture settles in an advanced democracy. Paragraph 2.2.4 discusses one article that does cover migration based on WVS data.

Migration is central to assimilation theory. Central concepts are put forward by Gordon (1964). He looks at group life within a large industrialised urban nation with a heterogeneous population. He expects migrants to eventually assimilate in American life, going through seven sub-processes of assimilation. His cultural, identificational and civic assimilation are related to political integration. American society has many sub-societies. People identify with a certain social class within an ethnic group. There primary group life happens. There are many secondary contacts, e.g. in civic participation and political life. Assimilation takes form when an ethnic group is not confined to certain classes, and ethnic group differences become smaller through intermarriage. A process of Americanisation took shape last century to get immigrants to appreciate the American institutions and forget the obligations and connections with countries of origin (Gordon, 1964, p. 100-101).

Should migrants enter the country with different attitudes, it is not necessary they stick with them. Classical assimilation theory (Alba and Nee, 1997) expects migrants to integrate into their country of destination. It is a linear process unfolding in a sequence of generational steps. Acculturation to the middle class/mainstream society is enhanced as it is considered a prerequisite for social and economic integration. Expected is more acculturation with longer residence. Alba and Nee (2003) distinguish in the Updated Revised Assimilation Theory different trajectories of adaptation of migrants and their descendants to the American mainstream society. The outcome of adaptation is not always assimilation. The majority changes too. When assimilation occurs, it may take generations, and the extent of it differs substantially between and within ethnic-racial groups. Political action, collective action to fight barriers and gain entrance in mainstream institutions is necessary to break boundaries.

Zhou (1997) sees two alternatives for assimilation in the middle class: a downward path of permanent poverty and assimilation in the underclass; and the building of an ethnic enclave where immigrant values reign.


Crul (2016) proposes to improve the updated theory and the segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou, 1993) by taking into account super-diversity. Within ethnic groups, there are gender, class, generation and age differences. Moreover, the integration context and institutional arrangements matter. Amsterdam has become a majority-minority city because there is no longer a dominant ethnic or racial majority group in statistical terms. Labour migrants live already over three generations in the city, where people with Dutch background tend to stay more temporarily for study or work. As a consequence children of migrants in many districts can no longer assimilate to white people of Dutch descent; as these could be a minority in the neighbourhood or schools.

Another factor important for adaptation is transnationalism. Fifty years ago, the means for travelling and communication were different. A migrant left the country of origin starting a future in a new destination with limited contact with the origin. The possibilities for contact and communication with the country of origin have increased, and thus also the opportunities for further attachment to origin culture, values and institutions.

Berry (2005) defines acculturation as a dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place because of contact between two or more cultural groups and their members. These changes come about through a long-term process, sometimes taking years, sometimes generations, sometimes centuries. To explain political actions, the incentives and motives for doing so must be considered. However, actions out of self-interest are shaped by cultural beliefs and rule of thumb heuristics. Moreover, by the institutional context. People could refrain from actions because one *should not* act against authorities.

Berry (2011, p. 2.2) recognises *cultural plural societies* in which various ethnic or cultural groups live, negotiate and accommodate to each other, within a common social and political frame. Moreover, the melting pot model, with one dominant mainstream society, into which minority groups can be indistinguishable incorporated or stay on the margins. Figure 5 captures these models.


Figure 5 Two implicit models of plural societies



Source: Berry, 2011, p. 2.4.

In cultural plural societies, persons and groups vary in the way they want to relate to other ethnocultural groups. They have strategies, attitudes and behaviours, whereby they have a relative preference for maintaining their own origin culture (issue 1) and for engaging with other groups and larger society (issue 2). Figure 6 shows in the left circle that a strategy of a group that wants to have relationships with other groups, while maintaining its own identity is labelled an integration strategy.

Figure 6 Intercultural strategies of ethnocultural groups and the larger society



Source: Berry, 2011, p. 2.5

Groups can only attain integration, when the larger society does not exclude them and the ideology and policy of the dominant group give room for cultural diversity (circle on the right). In the introduction (paragraph 1.1.) the intercultural strategy of Dutch government was mentioned. It has elements of the multiculturalism and melting pot strategy. The research presented here can be called acculturation research, as preferences and behaviour of origin groups in relation to the Dutch political system are explored. Phalet and Swyngedouw (2003) find substantial differences in preferred strategies of Belgian hosts and immigrants. Separation in the public domain is preferred by 3% of Belgians and 31% of Moroccans, assimilation by 44% of Belgians and 11% of the Turks.


Where the concept assimilation stresses a process, integration is as well a process as a particular state. Vermeulen, Michon and Tillie (2014) capture the process by looking at the turn-out of voters, city councillors and (deputy) majors of immigrant background in Amsterdam in the period 1990-2010. Surinamese – despite a better economic position – have a lower participation rate than Turks and Moroccans. Group based resources can partly explain higher participation and representation of Turks. A clearer perception of group interests, a perceived hostile Dutch environment and links with the country of origin lead to organisation among ethnic lines. Moroccans have less group based resources, but could still get representative positions as they are put forward as role models by main political parties.

2.2.4 Adaptation to emancipative values?

Figure 4 in paragraph 2.2.2 showed self-expression values of people are associated with effective democracies. The percentage of people in the Netherlands having these values is relatively high. People from non-Western countries have in general more traditional and survival values. Do migrants represent their countries values? If so, what happens to these values when immigrating in the Netherlands? Assimilation theory expects change, but the result and time frame of change (in one generation) is unclear.

Through the WVS much data is available on values in countries, but as stated these data are seldom used for research on the values of migrants moving from one country to another. An exception is research by Norris and Inglehart (2012) on Muslim integration into Western cultures, based on the first five waves of the WVS. They differentiate between four cultural value scales, and compare the mean scores in Muslim countries of origin, in Christian countries of destination and of Muslim migrants in these destination countries (Figure 5.). They expect that gender roles, ethnic identities and religious values are established very early in life and then change less easily. Economic and political values are formed later in life.

Figure 7 Mean scores on cultural values in Islamic countries of origin, in Christian countries of destination and of Muslims in these countries of destination



Notes: Figure from Norris and Inglehart (2012, p. 240), using source pooled World Values survey 1981-2007. Each value scale standardised to 100 points. Scales used: religiosity (being religious, the importance of God, attending services); sexual liberalisation (abortion, divorce, homosexuality justifiable); gender equality (men better leaders, more right to a job, need education more); democratic values (rule by the army, experts, strong leader, democratic system).

Figure 7 shows Muslim migrants score in between the society of origin and destination, which the authors see as an adaptation. The smallest difference between the societies is on democratic values. The migrant adaptation is strongest when it comes to gender equality.

The countries within the societies differ in their scores. In comparison to the other Western countries, the Netherlands scores higher on gender equality and sexual liberalisation, lower on religiosity and lower on the democratic values scale. Within the Islamic societies, Asian and African countries score closer to other Western nations than Arab states. These are all descriptive data.

The authors fit models predicting cultural values in the compared societies. The type of society has the strongest effect on all value scales. More education has a positive effect on all values and religiosity is associated with traditional values. The older generation has less support for sexual liberalisation and gender equality but more for democratic and religious values. The difference between young and old is bigger in Western than in Islamic societies; for instance, the religiosity of the young goes down quicker with Western Christians than Western Muslims. Second-generation immigrants have significantly higher scores than the first generation on all scales except democratic values (Norris & Inglehart, 2012, p. 245).

Their conclusion is, that adaptation takes place. Cultural differences between immigrants and natives exist. Not so much on democracy as a desirable political system. However, especially on gender equality and sexual liberalisation. Tolerance for these values is crucial in a democratic political culture. Over the years the gap between Western and Islamic societies on equality and liberalisation issues has widened in recent years, as Western societies changed quicker into an emancipatory direction.


Breidahl and Larsen (2016) notice a faster adaptation on gender issues. Careja and Emmenegger (2009, 2012) find that Eastern European emigrants only change their political attitudes when these were not fixed before migration. Wimmer and Soehl (2014) expect that among children of disadvantaged immigrants value differences emerge because acculturation processes are blocked. Not values but social disadvantages could cause of social boundaries with mainstream society for the second generation. Cross-sectional research limits them in drawing definite conclusions.

2.3 Conceptual model

This study wants to compare citizens with different backgrounds on political integration items. Considered the way this integration is examined in literature, five items are chosen that stand for the various aspects of inclusion in the Dutch political system. *Political activity*, as the active participation of citizens, is a democratic ideal. *Trust in government*, as it is one of the main factors supporting democracy in the traditional literature (Almond & Verba, 1965). *Emancipative values*, considered necessary for support in recent literature (Welzel, 2013; Kuhn, 2014). *Preference for a liberal democracy*, as found in the Netherlands (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007). Moreover, the *preference for a welfare democracy*, as redistribution of income and resources is the main issue in politics. These five items are complementary and were chosen as dependent variables in the conceptual model after a check if they could be operationalised with available datasets. One important item, pro- or anti-system activity (Gest, 2016) was left out, being unavailable in the surveys. The chosen items are shown in the conceptual model (Figure 8.).

Controls are chosen that explain variation in integration in literature and that are available in the datasets. Minority status stands for the feeling to belong to a minority group, where background tells if a respondent belongs to a minority as registered statistically. Having a religion and having certain values are expected to be mediators between background and political integration. Education, minority status and age probably moderate. Their effect could, of course, differ for different background categories. Emancipative values is one of the dependent variables, but emancipative and secular values are also expected to be a mediator.

Figure 8 Conceptual model of political integration



Compiled by the author from theory and literature in paragraph 2.2.

2.4 Hypotheses

Based on theory and literature review nine hypotheses are formulated. They are possible answers to research questions 1, 2 and 3. Most hypotheses assume that immigrants are representative of the origin population and that little assimilation to values occurs over time. As less liberal countries limit or restrict political activity (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007), people from those countries have less experience with activity or may fear to be active. Thus, hypothesis H1.1: The political activity of non-Western migrants is less than that of people with a Dutch background (the Dutch). Assimilation theory expects adaptation over time and generations (Alba & Foner, 2015). In line with this is H1.2: Comparing to the first generation (G1), the political activity of the second generation (G2) of non-Western migrants will be closer to the political activity of the Dutch.

Helbling et al. (2016) and Maxwell (2010) find that immigrants from non-democratic countries have higher trust in government than natives. The reason could be the comparison of the countries of origin and destination. Thus H2.1: The trust in the government of G1 non-Western migrants is higher than that of the Dutch.

Feeling a part of an ethnic minority group in the Netherlands, and maybe experiencing discrimination could lower trust in government. However, Röder and Mühlau (2011) found that factor to be less important. Following their research H2.2 is: Self-description as belonging to an ethnic minority group does not lower the level of trust in the government of persons with a migrant background.

Emancipative values are important to get and sustain a liberal democracy. As these values are established in one's primary socialisation (Norris & Inglehart, 2012) and non-Western societies are less emancipative (Figure 3.), hypothesis H3.1 is: The preference for emancipative values of non-Western migrants is lower than that of the Dutch.

As tolerance and equality are important in a liberal democracy (Norris and Inglehart, 2012; Welzel, 2013) and non-Western countries are less liberal, the expectation is H3.2: The preference for a liberal democracy of non-Western migrants is lower than that of the Dutch.

Relatively more migrants than Dutch are supported by welfare (CBS, 2016, p. 13). Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009) show disadvantaged groups support the welfare state. Most migrants locate in the working class and benefit more than average from the welfare state. That is why H3.3 is expected: The preference for a welfare democracy of migrants is higher than that of the Dutch.

In line with assimilation theory (Alba & Foner, 2015) and Norris and Inglehart (2012) is H3.4: In comparison to G1, the preference for emancipative values and a liberal democracy of G2 of non-Western migrants will be closer to that of the Dutch.

As emancipative values are so essential for an effective democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007), expected is H3.5: Emancipative values are a significant predictor of political activity, trust and preference for a liberal democracy.

3 Research design

This chapter clarifies the two surveys and data that will be used to answer the questions (3.1.), the methods employed and the operationalisation of the variables (3.2.) and summarises the data (3.3.). The Appendix to the thesis extends on 3.2 and 3.3.

3.1 Sources and data

A problem with quantitative research on migrants is the availability of sufficient data. The World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS) are held every few years in the Netherlands. Pooling the data from six WVS and seven ESS waves would bring a sufficient number of migrants to discern sub categories. A limitation of survey data is that the migrants that responded might not reflect the migrant population. People that are not registered and who do not speak the Dutch language are underrepresented. Also, migrants might understand questions differently and could be more inclined to give answers that they think are socially acceptable. The international context and the long history of these surveys, however, heighten their quality.

Essential for this research is the availability of the variables in our conceptual model. The ESS lacks data on secular values and liberal democracy. The WVS has only one wave in which it is possible to discern migrants and make a further classification. For this study, both surveys are used and comparable concepts operationalised with the available data. The research uses

1. WVS wave 6 (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>) from 2012 for the Netherlands: the data include several dependent variables as a proxy for political integration, as information on the migrant generation and an ethnocultural categorisation comparable with the visible minority criterion used in e.g. Canada. The Dutch questionnaire was administered to the LISS panel (computer questionnaire). The response was 77%. Excluding respondents with missing values on relevant variables, 1553 of the 1902 cases were used.

2. ESS wave 2-7 (www.europeansocialsurvey.org) from 2004 to 2016 for the Netherlands: the data include relevant dependent variables, but not support for a liberal democracy. Personal interviews gathered the data. GfK Panelservices Benelux was hired to collect data for most waves. Plus there is information on the country of origin of migrants, which makes it possible to differentiate between the different background categories found in the Netherlands.

Both surveys are cross-sectional data sets and interview around 1900 respondents per wave. In this study, data from about 1,553 respondents in the WVS and 10,456 respondents in the ESS are used for building models. The waves of the ESS are pooled. The WVS wave is analysed separately. Excluded are respondents for whom data on their background and that of their parents were missing.

3.2 Methods

The objective of the research by Norris and Inglehart (2012) as described in paragraph 2.1.4 is like this study. The aim was in their case comparing the scores of Muslim migrants on democratic values with the scores of Islamic societies of origin and Western societies of destination. This study has only one country of destination, the Netherlands, and a variety of migrants. Norris and Inglehart choose a multilevel design with Islamic countries and Western countries at country level and Muslim immigrants at the individual level. As most WVS waves do not have questions on migrant status, they might have considered all Muslims in Western states to be migrants. In their study design, the countries of origin are not included. In this study, the migrants are clustered considering the values in their countries of origin (as shown on the cultural map, Figure 3.), as values are expected to be a main predictor of integration. The values of the Dutch destination society are directly considered by clustering migrants and natives in one background categories, using natives as a reference. Hierarchical OLS linear regression models are used to test the influence of migrant background on political integration, controlling for other explanators like education and age.

A problem with this approach is that the population parameters are assumed to be equal across the background groups (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). The samples are not large enough to estimate the models separately for all groups. Interactions will be used to tackle this problem.

There is a check for possible strong correlation between the covariates to avoid collinearity. Results come from two Surveys.

3.2.1 Operationalising the five dependent variables

Using two pooled datasets, and liberal democracy only operationalised with the ESS data, there are nine operationalisations of the dependent variables. The information in this paragraph is backed up by detailed information on the items that are used and descriptive result by background in the Appendix to the thesis (A.2 - A.4.). The dependent variables are all standardised from 0 to 1, a higher score meaning more, to make comparisons easier.

Political activity

For this concept, Helbling et al. (2016, p. 137) distinguish between electoral and non-electoral immigrant participation. Using ESS waves 1-4 for the first, they include party membership, working for a party, contacting politicians and working in an organisation. For the second they use wearing a badge, signing a petition, demonstrating and boycotting. For the study, some of these and comparable items were chosen, dependent on availability in all ESS waves 2-7 and WVS wave 6, and with sufficient response. As the WVS data and ESS data are analysed separately, differences between the surveys are acceptable, if both represent political activity. In A.3 the items used and the method to get a total score on these additive scales are shown, as well as the mean score of the different background groups on the items. The surveys lack information on the country the political activities are directed to, the kind of issue the activity is about, and on the aim: supporting or undermining the country (Gest, 2015 and 2016). This information would it make easier to evaluate a given level of activity.

Trust in the government

Helbling et al. (2016) also measure political trust. They use seven ESS questions on trust in politicians, parties, the national parliament, the legal system, the police, the United Nations and the European Parliament. Most of these are also apt for this research, except trust in the last two institutions. The focus is on trust in the Dutch government, so satisfaction with the national government is added. The WVS misses an item on politicians but makes it possible to include trust in the civil service and the army. The items from the ESS and the WVS are quite comparable, but the answer categories are not. The WVS has four very straightforward answering categories (a great deal, quite a lot, not very much and not at all, while the ESS offers an eleven-point scale from 0 “No trust at all” to 10 “Complete trust”. After standardising both scores from 0 to 1 adding the “Don’t know” category in the middle, we see in the WVS much more variation in the mean scores per item than in the ESS. The goal is to compare residents with immigrant backgrounds and Dutch, and these differences should not prevent comparison. Further information on these additive scales is in A.3.

Liberal democracy and Welfare Democracy

Liberal democracy and welfare democracy are operationalised from items in WVS wave six according to instructions from Moreno and Welzel (2011). Respondents are shown ten items, like “Governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor” Then they are asked on a scale from 1 to 10 if that is an essential characteristic of democracy. Some of these items count as a preference for a liberal democracy, some count as non-democratic, and some count as a preference for a welfare democracy like this item. The ESS has no variables to construct a liberal democracy preference and one redistributive item which is used for operationalising Welfare Democracy.

Emancipative Values

Emancipative and secular values (a control variable) are calculated using items from Inglehart (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007). The end scores for every respondent are part of the WVS dataset. A.2 shows how they are constructed from single items.

The European Social Survey (ESS) measures human values as developed by Schwartz in his theory of basic values (Schwartz, 2012). Dobewall and Rudnev (2013) and Schubert (2014) demonstrate these values are comparable with the Inglehart values. Application of the system of computing scores for the Human Values scale (Schwartz, 2002) creates an emancipative values scale for the ESS.

3.2.2 Definitions of background

De Zwart (2012) describes how the Netherlands provides since 1980 official statistics on migrants. The data in A.1 are from the CBS. Every person in the Dutch population register can be labelled as native, first (G1), second (G2) and third generation (G3) migrant, combined with the country of origin. This registration is “top-down” – an inhabitant cannot change his registration. In this study ‘natives’ are also called ‘Dutch’ and ‘migrants’ also ‘resident with an immigrant background’ or ‘foreigners’. It is a classification by background of the respondents. In official statistics, G3 are usually labelled natives.

In the surveys used, the definition is bottom-up. The respondent himself gives the information as he wants. In both the ESS and the WVS results a G1 migrant is born outside the country (of destination), here the Netherlands part of continental Europe. A G2 migrant is born in the Netherlands, but at least one of his parents was born outside. Migrants are compared with people with Dutch background, people who themselves and whose parents were born in the Netherlands.

The ESS also has information on country of origin, the country the migrant is also related because of his/her birth or the birth of his/her parent(s). They are clustered in five background categories: Dutch, Western, Non-western from the Dutch colonies, Non-western from Muslim countries and other Non-western countries.

The WVS data has an ethnocultural categorisation, comparable with the visible minority categorisation used in the USA and Canada. The respondents were asked, “Which of the following groups would you say describes your skin colour best? You may skip this question if you prefer not to answer it. 1 Caucasian white 2 Negro Black 3 South Asian Indian, Pakistani, etc. 4 East Asian Chinese, Japanese, etc. 5 Arabic, Central Asian 6 Other, namely...”

Mixing migration data with ethnocultural background gives a category White migrant in the WVS. They will be considered to be similar to Western migrants in the ESS. Moreover, the non-White WVS category similar to non-Western ESS. People with a Dutch background that are non-White are labelled Ethnic native. Simon (2017) sees an ethno-racial categorisation for research on discrimination and integration, superior to the G1 and G2 classification.

3.2.3 Control variables


The WVS and ESS both have regular variables on religion, education level and age. *Religion* in the study is a dummy variable for a respondent having a religion, yes or no. The Netherlands and many Western countries had a Protestant majority but are now mainly secular. *Education* has three categories, the middle one (secondary level) being the dummy. *Age* with also three categories has 50-74 years as a dummy.

Minority status is a dummy about the respondent stating he yes or no feels he belongs to an ethnic minority group. This variable is only available in the ESS. *Values* were described in 3.2.1.

3.3 Descriptive data

In this paragraph, remarkable summary statistics from the samples are shown in figures. Appendix A.4 lists the variables, frequencies and mean scores for the dependent variables. The revised theory of modernisation – with a relationship between emancipative values and *effective* democracies at the macro level - is one of the underpinnings of this study. Figure 9 shows a comparable linear relation between emancipative values and the *preference* for a liberal democracy at the micro level in the Netherlands. The sample data are thus in line with theory.


Figure 9 Scatterplot Emancipative Values and preference for a liberal democracy



Source: Compiled from the Dutch WVS data set by the author (N=1540); observations clustered for transparency

Expectations are that migrants still carry the values of their country of origin when in the Netherlands. Figure 3 placed countries with their mean scores on the cultural World map. Figure 10 shows the scores of the respondents in the Dutch WVS survey on a Dutch cultural map. The placement of Arabic (and central) Asian Migrants down left, Dutch and White Migrants up right and other categories somewhere in between, is by expectations. Interestingly the Ethnic Native (=Dutch) category, which could contain migrants of G3, scores close to the Dutch (White Natives) which hints at adaptation.


Figure 10 Background categories on the cultural map



Source: Compiled from the Dutch WVS data set by the author (N=1533); averages for each group

Figure 11 shows the dispersion of the values scores. Not White Dutch but White migrants have the highest median scores. The Arabic and central Asian category, however, the lowest on both sets of values. The boxes bordered at the 25th and 75th percentiles all overlap with the Dutch boxes. There is overlap in the sample, and the tests in chapter 4 will show if differences in values are probable in the population.


Figure 11 Boxplot scores of background categories on emancipative and secular values



Source: Compiled from the Dutch WVS data set by the author (N=1533)

Figure 12 uses the same axes as Figure 10, but plots now the mean of the background groups. The specific non-Western groups all combine lower emancipative values with a lower preference for a liberal democracy, as hypothesised. Ethnic and White Natives score differently on preference for a liberal democracy.


Figure 12 Emancipative values and preference for a liberal democracy by background



Source: Compiled from the Dutch WVS data set by the author (N=1533); averages for each group

Figure 13 shows, as hypothesised, people of foreign background prefer a welfare democracy more than the Dutch; but Western migrants and individuals from the Dutch colonies in the mean do not differ that much. The X-axis scores show that in the ESS data persons from Muslim majority countries have less emancipative values than the other categories.


Figure 13 Emancipative values and preference for a welfare democracy by background



Source: Compiled from the Dutch ESS datasets by the author (N=10.440); averages for each group

Figure 14 demonstrates with WVS data lower trust and lower activity for most non-Western migrants. East Asians are the exception with a high trust in government score.


Figure 14 Trust and political activity by background



Source: Compiled from the Dutch WVS data set by the author (N=1533); averages for each group

Figure 15 shows trust and activity using the ESS data. Here trust of the Dutch is higher than the trust of migrants. However, the political activity of three of the four groups is comparable or greater than that of the Dutch. Here the different definition of political activity using the ESS and the WVS could play a role. Voting had to be left out of the ESS definition of activity because of a high number of missing data.

Figure 15 Trust and political activity by background



Source: Compiled from the Dutch ESS data set by the author (N=10,440); averages for each group

4 Results

In this chapter, OLS regression models are fitted to test the hypotheses and answer the research questions. An effect is expected of country of origin, and migrant generation. A mix of these is used for categorization of background, keeping enough respondents per category for testing. Tables 2 (WVS) and 3 (ESS) use background based on countries of origin as a predictor for the integration items controlling for other variables. Tables 4 (WVS) and 5 (ESS) enable to test adaptation in generations of Western and non-Western migrants.

4.1 Political Activity

Political activity is operationalised as performing certain actions that civil rights make possible, like being a member of a political party or demonstrate. It is an additive scale. The more different actions performed, the higher the score. Appendix 3 shows how activity is operationalised plus the scores on separate items. Model 1 (p. 29) in Tables 2 and 3 gives the results of the OLS regression modelling to explain political activity scores. The political activity of the White Dutch (WVS) respectively the Dutch (ESS) is the reference to which the activity of other background categories is compared.

The WVS model explains 21 percent of the variation in activity. The ESS model only 7 percent, as the secular values variable is not available. In both models, the non-Western rest and in Table 2 the East Asian Migrant category have a negative and significant coefficient (column b), meaning they are significantly less active than the Dutch, controlling for other predictors. Western migrants have a significant positive coefficient (.011) signifying higher activity than the Dutch. Not looking at the significance, and controlling for other variables, all Non-Western categories are less active, except the Non-Western Muslim category. There is not enough support for H1.1.: The political activity of non-Western migrants is less than that of the Dutch. The political activity of non-Western migrants is not significantly less than that of persons with a Dutch background.

How can this be explained? Van Heelsum et al. (2015) found lower participation in the Netherlands and Helbling et al. (2016) too but then only in G2. Compared to many other countries Dutch migrants get citizenship rather quick, which makes it possible for them to be more active. Moreover, maybe the number of respondents in certain categories plays a role – the “else” categories are filled well.

A closer look at the scores on the separate activity items in Appendix A.3 shows especially more activity of Western migrants than the Dutch on non-traditional activities like demonstrating

and boycotting. This kind of activity indicates they are further on the road of human empowerment (Welzel, 2013). It must be noted that the activities could be supportive of the Dutch system, but also anti-system. Because many migrants have a double nationality, their activities can also be directed at the country of origin. The questions in the surveys leave these possibilities open.

Political activity of the second-generation closer to the Dutch?

The assimilation hypothesis H1.2 expects compared to G1, the political activity of Non-Western G2, to be closer to the political activity of the Dutch. Models 1 of Table 4 and 5 show that the coefficients of the Western/Caucasian White G1 and G2 are both not significantly different from zero, so their political activity is not significantly distinct from the activity of the Dutch. The Non-Western/Visible Minority G1 are significantly less active than the Dutch, where the activity of the Non-Western/Visible Minority G2 is comparable to the Dutch. This change signals a change in the expected direction. The figures for activity in Appendix A.5.1 and A.5.2 presenting the coefficients with their confidence interval show that the intervals of G1 and G2 overlap. So, there is not enough support for H1.2.

The scores for separate activity items in A.3 show that G2 is more active in many respects than G1. The numerals show however a considerable variation in activity for the Non-Western/Visible Minority G2 giving more room for an overlap with G1.

In this study, as in the established literature, political activity has differing definitions, and literature is not specific in the timing of adaptation. The changes are in the expected direction, so the findings are in line with literature. Bigger samples could have brought significance. Paragraph 4.3.4 discusses adaptation further.

4.2 Trust in government

The score on trust in government derived from the surveys shows the mean scores on trust in different institutions in the Dutch political system like the courts, politicians and the police. See A.3.3 and A.3.4 in the Appendix.

The Models 2 in Tables 2 and 3 show the trust of migrants in compare to the Dutch. All Models show a negative coefficient for trust for immigrants. For five of eight Non-Western and one of two Western categories, the coefficient is significantly different from zero. Table 4 and 5 show significantly negative coefficients for G1 and G2 with two exceptions. The Caucasian White generations have lower trust but not significantly. H2.1 expects the trust in the government of G1 non-Western migrants to be higher than that of people with a Dutch background. This hypothesis is not supported. Trust is lower, not higher. Helbling et al. (2016) and Maxwell (2010) do find in general higher trust for G1. The suggested reasons are a positive comparison with the country of origin and a positive evaluation of their profit from the destination government. What can explain the different outcome here?

Trust in this research is operationalised in a standard way. The control variables used are also comparable to those used in literature (age, education, religion); emancipative values is a new explanator, but does not explain the difference. A possible explanation is a high score on trust in the Netherlands in comparison to other countries (Boelhouwer et al., 2016). This could make it comparatively harder for immigrants to score higher than natives.

A.3 shows the scores on separate trust items. In compare to the Dutch the confidence in the police is low. However, there is very low trust of non-Western G1 in political parties and the parliament in both surveys. Boelhouwer et al. (2016) mention the fluctuation of trust with political events, and Huijnk and Dagevos (2012) relate a lower score for trust in the Dutch government with the PVV supporting the government. During the whole period that the surveys used took place, there was much turmoil on migration and migrants in Dutch politics. A negative evaluation of politics could be an explanation for the lower than expected score on trust.

Adaptation to the Dutch trust level can be seen in Tables 3 and 4 Models 2 in the three figures the mean score of G2 is closer to the Dutch than G1. However, the confidence intervals overlap.

Röder and Mühlau (2011) hypothesised, that feeling to be part of an ethnic minority group and experiencing discrimination could lower trust in government. Then in their study, it was not a significant predictor. In both the Models 2 in Table 3 and 5 “minority” is not statistically significant when predicting trust. This seems to support H.2.2 expecting self-description as belonging to an ethnic minority group does not lower the level of trust. However, fitting another model replacing Table 5 Model 2, by adding interactions of minority status with background (not shown here), minority and most of the interactions become significant. As hypothesised by Röder and Mühlau, the non-Western G2 feeling a minority has significantly lower trust than natives. The trust of the non-Western G2 not feeling a minority in the new Model is comparable to that of natives. Therefore H.2.2 is rejected for non-Western G2.

4.3 Preferences for democracy and values

This paragraph, related to research question 3, turns attention to preferences for the Dutch political system. Literature shows the association of values with an effective democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). Paragraph 4.3.1 shows variation in emancipative values among persons with different backgrounds. Preference for a liberal democracy is subject of 4.3.2. Paragraph 4.3.3 looks at the preference for a welfare democracy, which is understood here as an addition to the liberal democracy with fiscal transfers from the rich to the poor. Distance in preference scores of G1 and G2 with the Dutch is analysed in 4.3.4. The importance of values and education for background effect on preferences is subject of 4.3.5.

4.3.1 Emancipative values

The fitted models predicting the preference for emancipative values are shown in Models 3 of the WVS Tables show a significantly lower preference for emancipative values for all non-Western migrants – except Other Ethnic Migrants (negative coefficient but not significant). The coefficients of the Western migrants are not significantly different from the Dutch. The ESS Models show lower preferences now also for the Western migrants, many significant. However, the Non-Western people from the Dutch colonies, score in Table 3 significantly higher than the Dutch. This seems related to the positive score for the Non-Western G2 in Table 5. They have a significantly higher preference for emancipative values, for which there is no clear explanation. Maybe the upbringing in two cultures leads to more preference for emancipative values.

Emancipative values are established in one’s primary socialisation (Norris & Inglehart, 2012). Moreover, values of Non-Western societies differ from the values of the Dutch on the cultural map (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007). H3.1 expects the preference for emancipative values of Non-Western Migrants to be lower than that of the Dutch. The results support H3.1, except for people from the former Dutch colonies.

The WVS and the ESS have different outcomes for Western migrants, which can be related to varying value definitions. Dobewall & Rudnev (2013) found the ESS emancipative scale adds elements of the WVS secular values scale to WVS emancipative values.

4.3.2 Preference for a welfare democracy

The welfare democracy is a democracy where the state redistributes money from the rich to the poor and takes care of those in need. This is not in contrast with a liberal democracy giving civil rights and protecting freedom rights. Model 4 in Tables 2 to 5 shows the results when testing for background effect on this preference. In the WVS Models, all migrant categories have more preference for a welfare democracy than the Dutch, except Black African Migrants. Western Migrants and the Arabic Asian Migrants significantly. The models explain only 2% of this preference. Other

factors are in play here. In the ESS Models, the coefficients are not significantly different from the Dutch. Some migrant categories prefer this democracy more, and some less than people with Dutch background, but the differences are not significant. The expectation in H3.3 is that the preference for a welfare democracy of migrants is higher than that of the Dutch. This hypothesis is supported for Western and Arabic and central Asian Migrant categories. Appendix Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 show the broad support for a welfare state among migrants before controlling.

4.3.3 Preference for a liberal democracy

A variable measuring preference for a liberal democracy can only be constructed with WVS data. Tables 2 and 4, Model 5 show the results. After controlling, the Ethnic Dutch and the East Asian Migrants have significantly less preference for this system. The importance of tolerance and equality in a liberal democracy (Norris & Inglehart, 2012; Welzel, 2013) led to expect a lower preference for a liberal democracy of non-Western migrants than of the Dutch (H3.2). This hypothesis must be rejected. The explanation can be that tolerance is not part of the operationalisation of liberal democracy in the WVS. It refers to free elections, referenda votes, civil rights and equal rights for women (Moreno & Welzel, 2011). Norris and Inglehart (2012) found a relatively easy adaptation to a democratic political system for Muslim immigrants.

4.3.4 Adaptation of generations of migrants

Adaptation refers to the relatively stable changes that take place in an individual or group in response to environmental demands. This does not imply becoming more like the average individual in the destination society. The updated assimilation theory expects variation in adaptation for migrants, so models were fitted allowing interaction of Western and non-Western background and first and second-generation migrants (G1 and G2). Cross-sectional data are used. The consequence is that the process of adaptation, e.g. the change of values of an individual over time, cannot be measured directly. Measured is the outcome at a certain point of time for different cohorts of migrants. The results are found in Tables 4 and 5 and Figures A.5.1 And A.5.2 in the Appendix. If G2 scores are closer than G1 to people of Dutch background, this could be an indication that an ethnocultural/migrant category integrates or assimilates. This may involve a differential between the parental generation and the second generation, i.e. children of immigrants develop different values as a result of socialisation in the NL (in which predominate different values than in the origin society, where the parental generation was socialised). Education, media, and neighbourhoods are likely to be key to this socialisation.

There are clear changes between G1 and G2 for visible minorities (WVS) in “welfare democracy” and in “political activity”, but no changes in the other dimensions. Their scores are also quite different from the non-visible Caucasian White minorities. Hou, Schellenberg and Berry (2017) find that non-visible migrants are more likely to assimilate, which is consistent with the scores in this study. Visible minorities keep a stronger sense of belonging to the origin country, which could explain the less political activity. Moreover, they could be in a lower class because of their visibility, explaining their preference for a welfare democracy.

For Non-Western G2 (ESS) there is a comparable change in political activity, but also in emancipative values (Table 5 Model 3). In 4.3.1 was found that especially people from the former colonies score higher.

Looking at the absolute difference in the mean scores of G1 and G2 to the Dutch mean ($\beta = x = \text{zero}$) in the nine figures, of A.5, the gap with the Dutch gets larger nine times and smaller also nine times. The 95% confidence intervals of G1 and G2 overlap in almost all cases, so the scores of the generations could be the same, like those of the Dutch population. No general trend of adaptation from G1 to G2 is found. However, the samples are relatively small, making it harder to get significant results. Also, it must be stressed that these results are after controlling. Education is an important moderator in most models. Especially the non-Western G1 might have a higher proportion of lower educated people and non-Western G2 a larger proportion of higher educated people.

The background effect on political integration thus might not change much over generations, but G2 scores “better” than G1 because of a higher education level.

Expected is (H3.4): In comparison to the non-Western G1, the preference for emancipative values and a liberal democracy of the non-Western G2 will be closer to that of the Dutch. ESS Model 3 shows an adaptation in emancipative values. The WVS Model shows no change, but Appendix Table A.4.1.2 does show an adaptation before controlling. The sample size of G2 (n=37) in the WVS could be too small to get reliable results. Norris and Inglehart (2012) expect emancipative values, established earlier in life, relatively resistant to change, which can explain the lack of adaptation in the WVS Model.

They also expect, that democratic values – established in early adulthood – change easier. Their democratic values come close to the preference for a liberal democracy. In Table 4, Model 5 already in G1 no differences are found between people of migrant and Dutch background, which supports their expectations. H3.4 is only partly supported

In line with assimilation theory, we see differences in adaptation between Western and non-Western migrants. The first category scores in most models already the same as Dutch, leaving no room for adaptation to the Dutch in G2. For emancipative values and trust, there is a difference between G1 and the Dutch. Only the first disappears for G2.

4.3.5 The importance of values and education for background effect in the models

The predictors emancipative values secular values and education prove crucial in the fitted models as shown by their significant coefficients. Not shown here, hierarchical regression models were fitted, where the second step was adding values and the third step adding education. This brought a significant rise in the R^2 of the models with each step for all independent variables except welfare democracy.

As emancipative values are essential for an effective democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2007), emancipative values are expected to be a significant predictor of political activity, trust and preference for a liberal democracy (H3.5). Only for trust in the ESS models, the b coefficient of emancipative values is not significantly different from zero. However, in the WVS models, it is. The secular values part of the ESS definition can explain this. The results support H3.5.

The models in Tables 2 to 5 can be considered main effects models. For the background categories, only the intercept is different from the reference category (Dutch), but the slope of the linear relation stays the same. In Tables A.6.1 and A.6.2 in the Appendix, the slopes can differ by background. This is achieved by adding an interaction between background and emancipative values.

Only in Model 2 of Table A.6.2, there is a significant different slope for the Black African category. The intercept for support of a liberal democracy is lower than for Dutch, but then the slope rises steeper. The effect of values is for most categories the same as for Dutch.

The Tables also show in which cases the education category has a different effect. In the main effects models, a lower education means less trust, activity and preference for liberal democracy and a higher education more. In A.6.1 (2) The Non-Western Else and Muslim categories have an upward slope for trust also in the lower education category. The slope for political activity goes down for the East Asian-higher education category (Table A.6.2 (1)). Moreover, the slope for preference for a liberal democracy goes significantly more down for the Other Ethnic and South Asian migrant categories (Table A.6.2 (2)). However, also for most education categories, the effect is not significantly different for people with different backgrounds.

Most coefficients of the interaction variables are not significant. Values and education are significant predictors for political integration of Dutch citizens of almost all backgrounds. This has policy implications which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Table 2 Full OLS regression Models testing influence background on political integration

	(1) Political Activity			(2) Trust in government			(3) Emancipative values			(4) Welfare Democracy			(5) Liberal Democracy		
	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta
Ethnic Dutch ¹	.02	(.03)	.01	-.01	(.03)	-.01	.01	(.03)	.01	.01	(.04)	.01	-.04*	(.02)	-.04
White Migrant	.00	(.01)	.00	-.01	(.01)	-.03	.01	(.01)	.01	.04***	(.01)	.07	.01	(.01)	.01
East Asian Migrant	-.08**	(.03)	-.06	-.01	(.03)	-.01	-.08***	(.03)	-.06	.02	(.04)	.02	-.06***	(.02)	-.06
South Asian Migrant	-.04	(.04)	-.02	-.07**	(.03)	-.05	-.10***	(.03)	-.06	.05	(.04)	.03	.01	(.03)	.01
Black African Migrant	-.03	(.04)	-.02	-.09***	(.03)	-.06	-.09***	(.03)	-.06	-.01	(.04)	-.01	-.02	(.03)	-.01
Other Ethnic Migrant	-.05*	(.03)	-.04	-.06***	(.02)	-.06	-.03	(.02)	-.02	.02	(.03)	.01	-.02	(.02)	-.02
Arabic Asian Migrant	-.03	(.04)	-.02	-.08**	(.03)	-.06	-.08**	(.03)	-.06	.12***	(.04)	.07	.02	(.03)	.02
Emancipative values	.27***	(.03)	.24	.07***	(.02)	.07				.07**	(.03)	.06	.38***	(.02)	.43
Secular values	-.12***	(.03)	-.10	-.39***	(.03)	-.39	.16***	(.03)	.15	-.03	(.04)	-.02	-.06**	(.02)	-.07
Education Lower ²	-.06***	(.01)	-.14	-.04***	(.01)	-.12	-.04***	(.01)	-.12	.01	(.01)	.03	-.04***	(.01)	-.12
Education Higher	.08***	(.01)	.20	.05***	(.01)	.17	.07***	(.01)	.20	-.02	(.01)	-.05	.03***	(.01)	.11
Religion	-.02	(.01)	-.04	-.02***	(.01)	-.08	-.08***	(.01)	-.22	.00	(.01)	.01	-.01	(.01)	-.04
14-49 years ³	-.09***	(.01)	-.23	.01	(.01)	.03	-.04***	(.01)	-.11	-.01	(.01)	-.02	-.05***	(.01)	-.16
75-96 years	.01	(.02)	.01	.03**	(.01)	.06	-.05***	(.01)	-.08	.00	(.02)	.00	-.01	(.01)	-.02
R2	.208			.190			.233			.017			.290		

Note ¹ White Dutch reference, ² Secondary school reference, ³ Age 50-74 years reference; (N = 1540; WVS, 2012)

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 3 Full OLS regression models testing influence background on political integration

	(1) Political Activity			(2) Trust in government			(3) Emancipative values			(4) Welfare Democracy		
	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta
Western ¹	.011*	(.006)	.02	-.019***	(.006)	-.03	-.010**	(.004)	-.02	.005	(.011)	.00
NonWesternCol	-.004	(.008)	-.01	-.021***	(.008)	-.03	.010**	(.005)	.02	-.006	(.014)	-.00
NonWesternElse	-.023*	(.012)	-.02	-.014	(.012)	-.01	-.003	(.008)	-.00	.017	(.021)	.01
NonWesternMuslim	.013	(.011)	.01	-.015	(.011)	-.02	-.022***	(.007)	-.04	-.007	(.020)	-.00
Emancipative Values	.184***	(.016)	.12	.001	(.015)	.00				-.112***	(.028)	-.04
Education Lower ²	-.034***	(.004)	-.10	-.045***	(.004)	-.14	-.023***	(.002)	-.11	.043***	(.007)	.08
Education Higher	.045***	(.004)	.13	.050***	(.004)	.15	.022***	(.002)	.10	-.041***	(.007)	-.07
Have a Religion	.002	(.003)	.01	.031***	(.003)	.10	-.049***	(.002)	-.23	-.017***	(.006)	-.03
Belong to a minority	.006	(.009)	.01	-.002	(.009)	-.00	-.018***	(.006)	-.04	.058***	(.016)	.05
14-49 years ³	-.022***	(.003)	-.07	.010***	(.003)	.03	.042***	(.002)	.20	-.060***	(.006)	-.11
75-96 years	-.024***	(.006)	-.04	.022***	(.005)	.04	-.048***	(.003)	-.13	-.012	(.010)	-.01
R2	.069			.073			.215			.041		

Note ¹ Dutch reference ² Upper secondary school reference ³ Age 50-74 years reference; (N=14440; ESS 2004-2014)

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 4 Full OLS regression Models adaptation towards political integration in the second generation

	(1) Political Activity			(2) Trust in government			(3) Emancipative values			(4) Welfare Democracy			(5) Liberal Democracy		
	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta
Caucasian WhiteG1 ¹	-.03	(.02)	-.03	-.02	(.02)	-.03	-.00	(.02)	-.01	.04**	(.02)	.05	.00	(.01)	.00
Caucasian WhiteG2	.02	(.02)	.03	-.01	(.01)	-.02	.01	(.01)	.02	.04**	(.02)	.05	.01	(.01)	.02
Visible MinorityG1	-.06***	(.02)	-.07	-.06***	(.02)	-.08	-.07***	(.02)	-.09	.01	(.02)	.02	-.01	(.01)	-.02
Visible MinorityG2	-.03	(.03)	-.03	-.06***	(.02)	-.06	-.07***	(.02)	-.06	.08**	(.03)	.07	-.03	(.02)	-.03
Emancipative values	.27***	(.03)	.24	.07***	(.02)	.07				.07**	(.03)	.06	.37***	(.02)	.43
Secular values	-.12***	(.03)	-.10	-.39***	(.03)	-.39	.16***	(.03)	.15	-.04	(.04)	-.03	-.06**	(.02)	-.07
Education Lower ²	-.06***	(.01)	-.14	-.04***	(.01)	-.12	-.04***	(.01)	-.12	.01	(.01)	.03	-.04***	(.01)	-.12
Education Higher	.08***	(.01)	.20	.06***	(.01)	.17	.07***	(.01)	.20	-.02*	(.01)	-.05	.03***	(.01)	.11
Religion	-.01	(.01)	-.04	-.03***	(.01)	-.08	-.08***	(.01)	-.23	.00	(.01)	.01	-.01	(.01)	-.03
14-49 years ³	-.09***	(.01)	-.23	.01	(.01)	.03	-.04***	(.01)	-.11	-.01	(.01)	-.01	-.04***	(.01)	-.15
75-96 years	.01	(.02)	.01	.03**	(.01)	.06	-.05***	(.01)	-.08	.00	(.02)	.00	-.01	(.01)	-.02
R2	.210			.188			.231			.015			.286		

Note ¹ Dutch reference ² Upper secondary school reference ³ Age 50-74 years reference; (N = 1540; WVS, 2012)

* p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01

Table 5 Full OLS regression Model adaptation towards political integration in the second generation

	(1) Political Activity			(2) Trust in government			(3) Emancipative values			(4) Welfare democracy		
	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta	b	se	beta
WesternG1 ¹	.014	(.009)	.01	-.017*	(.009)	-.02	-.013**	(.006)	-.02	.013	(.016)	.01
WesternG2	.007	(.008)	.01	-.020**	(.008)	-.02	-.008	(.005)	-.01	-.001	(.015)	-.00
NonWesternG1	-.018**	(.009)	-.03	-.019**	(.008)	-.03	-.024***	(.005)	-.05	.000	(.015)	.00
NonWesternG2	.008	(.009)	.01	-.018**	(.008)	-.02	.025***	(.005)	.04	-.002	(.015)	-.00
Emancipative Values	.181***	(.016)	.12	.001	(.015)	.00				-.111***	(.028)	-.04
Education Lower ²	-.034***	(.004)	-.10	-.045***	(.004)	-.14	-.023***	(.002)	-.11	.044***	(.007)	.08
Education Higher	.045***	(.004)	.13	.050***	(.004)	.15	.022***	(.002)	.10	-.041***	(.007)	-.07
Have a Religion	.002	(.003)	.01	.031***	(.003)	.10	-.049***	(.002)	-.23	-.017***	(.006)	-.03
Belong to a minority	.017*	(.009)	.02	-.000	(.009)	-.00	-.015***	(.005)	-.03	.055***	(.015)	.05
14-49 years ³	-.022***	(.003)	-.07	.011***	(.003)	.03	.040***	(.002)	.19	-.060***	(.006)	-.11
75-96 years	-.024***	(.006)	-.04	.022***	(.005)	.04	-.048***	(.003)	-.13	-.012	(.010)	-.01
R2	.069			.073			.217			.040		

Note ¹ Dutch reference ² Upper secondary school reference ³ Age 50-74 years reference; (N=14440; ESS, 2004-2016)

* p< .10, ** p< .05, *** p< .01

5 Discussion and Conclusion

This study looks at political integration in the Netherlands, comparing citizens with a Dutch and immigrant background. It differs from much research in this field, as it makes predictions based on data and focuses on a broad range of indicators, on all Dutch migrants, and on the effect of values from the countries of origin. Little or diminishing variation among people with a different background (origin), is considered a sign of integration. Political integration is defined as participation, including emotional attachments to the Netherlands, trust in its political system, and support for its core political values (Bilodeau, 2016). Moreover, operationalised in five items: political activity, trust in government, preference for emancipative values, for a liberal democracy and a welfare democracy.

The operationalisation was useful. The concepts were correlated but got different scores touching different aspects of integration. The research design used two different surveys, whereby many variables had to be defined differently. Still, most results were comparable, which signals the power of the analysis presented. Using surveys implies that the respondents are already somewhat integrated, being registered, having an address and speaking the language. Especially migrants could be inclined to give socially acceptable answers, fearing possible government actions when they would not. The conclusions drawn could thus be too positive.

In the Evolutionary Theory of Emancipation (Welzel, 2013) citizens' emancipative values are vital for democracy. Immigrants can share the values of the Dutch society, but could also have internalised basic values of their country of origin, and mix values. While categorising migrants using value distinctions in the countries of origin, the research showed different effects on the five integration items per background category. The Evolutionary Theory explains many findings. Having emancipative values is a strong predictor. Differences in origin values appear relevant. However, care is necessary as the country or region of origin can also be acting as a proxy for other explanators (Zapatero-Barrero et al., 2013). After controlling for values and other predictors, there still was a background effect in most fitted models.

The Updated Assimilation Theory (Alba & Nee, 2003) expects an adaptation of migrants to Dutch activity, trust and preferences. The theory does not predict specific outcomes. Adaptation can differ by background and may take generations. This study found substantial differences between Western migrants, with political integration scores comparable to the Dutch, and non-Western migrants scoring lower on most items.

The level of integration differs per item. Most migrants share the preference for a *liberal democracy* with the Dutch. Though a liberal democracy also implies equal rights for women, preferences of non-Western migrants were not generally lower. This can be explained by a decent high preference worldwide and quick adaptation (Norris and Inglehart, 2012). Not in line with assimilation theory, Dutch that are a visible minority, which could well be third or more generation migrants, prefer a liberal democracy significantly less than the Dutch.

Several migrant categories prefer a *welfare democracy* more than the Dutch. This is in line with Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009) showing especially disadvantaged groups support a welfare state. This can explain the level of trust in government among immigrants.

When it comes to *political activity*, Western migrants are more active than the Dutch, especially performing non-traditional activities like demonstrating and boycotting. This is in accordance with the relative ranking of some Western countries and the Netherlands in the cultural map (Figure 3, p. 11) and democracy hierarchy (Figure 4, p. 12). Expected was less activity for all non-Western migrants, but less activity is found only in the first generation. The second generation adapts toward the Dutch level. It is necessary to stress that political activity measured here is not 'participation, including emotional attachments to the Netherlands' from the integration definition. The survey questions do not differentiate between activities aimed at the Netherlands and the country of origin and do not measure if activities are about participating in the Netherlands. A pro-Erdogan demonstration also counts as political activity.

Trust in government is important in a civic culture supporting democracy (Almond and Verba, 1965). Where from literature higher trust of the first-generation non-Western migrants in compare to the Dutch was expected, this study shows lower trust for almost all migrants. In many cases significant. Especially the Parliament and politicians score low. The data used are from the years 2004–2014, a period of economic crises and political turmoil on migration. This could explain the lower trust found here.

Welzel (2013, p.268) considers citizens with *emancipative values* as vital for democracy. Western migrants have these to the same extent as the Dutch, but non-Western migrants significantly less. The exception are non-Western citizens from the former colonies; they score higher than the Dutch. Emancipative values is also used as a predictor in our models. It is expected to mediate between background and other integration items. Higher emancipative values predict higher trust in government, higher political activity and higher preference for a liberal democracy. Higher education has the same effect. Interaction of background with these variables showed values and education are significant predictors for the integration of almost all background categories.

Many of the differences between non-western migrants and natives were not significant, which could indicate that some adaptation takes place.

Implications for Dutch Policies

The Dutch democracy exerts power over the society and its citizens of which a growing proportion is of foreign background. For a long time Dutch integration policies were about redistribution to defined migrant groups, but today there is a trend towards more asking of migrants and less giving. Involvement of more citizens in the political process and a broader citizenship could help to handle possible conflicts of interest and contribute to social harmony.

A country with a diverse population – maybe even super diversity (WRR, 2017) - could expect competing claims of its constituency on how they want to be governed, and what the priorities should be. The diversity should be mirrored in the policies formed, but also in the government itself and the parliamentary and legislative institutions. Although the government has only limited influence on the filling of positions, some stimulation could be necessary to get a better representation.

A significant result of this study for policies is the lower trust in politics, politicians and Parliament among people of foreign background. The low trust, especially in Parliament and politicians, could be related to a statistical or substantive underrepresentation of people with a foreign background in the legislature. Also significant is the comparatively low preference for emancipative values. These basic values are learned in childhood. Democratic values are formed in adolescence. So, education is vitally important for improvement.

Comparatively the Netherlands displays relatively poor integration outcomes. Stronger incentives for host country language acquisition and interethnic contact, as well as social inclusion, seem also suited to ensure political inclusion (Koopmans, 2010). This research shows however a great deal of similarity with other countries in several dimensions. Adding political integration to the Dutch integration agenda would make it easier to follow developments, and to add political integration arguments in decision making on immigrants and migration.

Ersanilli and Koopmans (2011) warn public officials to be aware of the possible adverse effect of policies that emphasise ethnic differences. Even if well-intended, the policies may raise the salience of ethnic boundaries and lead to increased perceptions of diversity with adverse effects on trust and cooperation (integration paradox).

Follow-up research

With the rising proportion of migrants in countries, economic and cultural integration has become a pressing issue. In the larger Dutch cities, people with Dutch background are now a significant minority, but individuals with a Dutch background still have an overwhelming majority in government. Political integration could become more prominent too. The focus of research could be on the development of political integration as a separate theme in government.

Questions guiding further research include, but are not limited to:

1. How to operationalise political integration, what data exist for measuring it and what data are missing on the Dutch and the EU level?
2. How to ameliorate existing surveys to add to the research in this field? The objective could be to propose a module for the next waves. The WVS could collect more information on migrants. The ESS could delve deeper in political values. The goal of political activities needs clarification. How to measure subversive political activities of migrants and people with Dutch background quantitatively and qualitatively? These could go by unnoticed in current surveys. Moreover, with migrant activity both in the country of origin and destination, the focus should be made clear.
3. How to define migrants and migrant background? Only distinguishing first and second generation migrants, while in reality differences also exist in third and more generations, makes it less possible to create a reliable picture of adaptation and possible separation and marginalisation. Adding a visible minority criterium could prove useful.
4. What are the facts about the underrepresentation of migrants in Dutch and European government? What could help diminish underrepresentation? Berry's schemes (2011) describing different paths and end stages of adaptation are useful for differentiating between immigrant groups. Which wants to adapt in what way and does a destination country facilitate this?
5. International comparative research can provide a wider perspective on the findings and the result of policies. The differentials between natives and migrants to be larger in most other countries, especially liberal countries such as UK or US.
6. Oversampling migrants can be useful, in order to conduct research on the topic.

Ethical Considerations

This research uses information and datasets which are anonymised. The expectation is the respondents in the surveys used will not be harmed by opening up personal information. However, as the position of immigrants is an important topic in Dutch society, care must be taken of the way results are substantiated and published. I was at the time of completion of the study connected with the Directorate Democracy and citizenship of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations in the Netherlands. Two presentations at the ministry and contact with several colleagues inspired my work. However, the Ministry had no say in the way this research was carried out or on what is published. The research is not an impact-analysis of Dutch policies on democracy or integration. However, the results could prove useful for people working in this field.

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