<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . . "The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action"^^ . "In this research a qualitative comparative case study is conducted between three cases. The\r\nresearch analyses the influence of institutional rules from the IAD framework on collective\r\naction. The IAD framework consists of different rules, which can have different rule states and\r\nthese states can have a negative or positive influence on collective action. The central question\r\nthat is answered in this study is how these rule states influence collective action regarding\r\nsubsurface infrastructure projects in the municipality of Groningen and Het Hogeland. The rule\r\nstates have been identified for each of the cases on the basis of interviews and document\r\nanalysis. Important rule states that influence collective action for these projects were found.\r\nChoice rules, aggregation rules, pay-off rules and scope rules had a different rule state when\r\nthe project that succeeded in collective action was compared with the projects that did not\r\nsucceed in collective action. Risk sharing pay-off rules, flexible choice rules and homophily\r\nscope rules seem to have a positive influence on collective action. For future similar projects it is\r\nadvised to apply these rule states during the project to incentivise collective action. A noticeable\r\ndifference between the conceptual model and the results of the research was the difference\r\nbetween the scope rules. In the theoretical framework, homophily was expected to negatively\r\ninfluence collective action and heterophily was expected to positively influence collective action.\r\nHowever, in the analysis of the three cases this turned out to be the other way around. A factor\r\noutside of the IAD framework was found that additionally influences the seizing of collective\r\naction. The knowledge about the built environment of the project and upcoming tasks of other\r\nsectors seems to be important when the information rule state is unshared, and the boundary\r\nrule state is closed. The study is an exploration of the influence of the IAD framework rules on\r\ncollective action. To fully grasp the influence of these rules on collective action a larger dataset\r\nof cases is needed."^^ . "2021" . . . . . . . "Gerrit"^^ . "Joustra"^^ . "Gerrit Joustra"^^ . . . . . . "The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action (Text)"^^ . . . "Bachelor Thesis Gerrit Joustra s4591127.pdf"^^ . . . "The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "small.jpg"^^ . . . "The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "medium.jpg"^^ . . . "The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "preview.jpg"^^ . . . "The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "lightbox.jpg"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #3627 \n\nThe Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action\n\n" . "text/html" . .