eprintid: 3627
rev_number: 5
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1
dir: disk0/00/00/36/27
datestamp: 2021-08-03 13:56:25
lastmod: 2021-08-03 13:56:25
status_changed: 2021-08-03 13:56:25
type: thesis
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 1
creators_name: Joustra, Gerrit
creators_id: S4591127
creators_email: g-joustra@hotmail.com
title: The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action
ispublished: unpub
full_text_status: public
abstract: In this research a qualitative comparative case study is conducted between three cases. The
research analyses the influence of institutional rules from the IAD framework on collective
action. The IAD framework consists of different rules, which can have different rule states and
these states can have a negative or positive influence on collective action. The central question
that is answered in this study is how these rule states influence collective action regarding
subsurface infrastructure projects in the municipality of Groningen and Het Hogeland. The rule
states have been identified for each of the cases on the basis of interviews and document
analysis. Important rule states that influence collective action for these projects were found.
Choice rules, aggregation rules, pay-off rules and scope rules had a different rule state when
the project that succeeded in collective action was compared with the projects that did not
succeed in collective action. Risk sharing pay-off rules, flexible choice rules and homophily
scope rules seem to have a positive influence on collective action. For future similar projects it is
advised to apply these rule states during the project to incentivise collective action. A noticeable
difference between the conceptual model and the results of the research was the difference
between the scope rules. In the theoretical framework, homophily was expected to negatively
influence collective action and heterophily was expected to positively influence collective action.
However, in the analysis of the three cases this turned out to be the other way around. A factor
outside of the IAD framework was found that additionally influences the seizing of collective
action. The knowledge about the built environment of the project and upcoming tasks of other
sectors seems to be important when the information rule state is unshared, and the boundary
rule state is closed. The study is an exploration of the influence of the IAD framework rules on
collective action. To fully grasp the influence of these rules on collective action a larger dataset
of cases is needed.
date: 2021
pages: 27
thesis_type: bachelor
degree_programme: EIP
tutors_name: Busscher, T.
tutors_name: Neef, M.R.
tutors_organization: Fac. Ruimtelijke wetenschappen, Basiseenheid Planologie
tutors_organization: Fac. Ruimtelijke wetenschappen, Basiseenheid Planologie
tutors_email: T.Busscher@rug.nl
tutors_email: Robin.Neef@rug.nl
security: validuser
keywords_local: Collective action
keywords_local: IAD framework
keywords_local: Rule states
language_iso: en
agreed_repository: yes
date_issued: 2021-08-03
citation:   Joustra, Gerrit  (2021) The Effect of Institutional Rules on Collective Action.  Bachelor thesis.   
document_url: https://frw.studenttheses.ub.rug.nl/3627/1/Bachelor%20Thesis%20Gerrit%20Joustra%20s4591127.pdf