

# **Citizenship in a Post-Secular Society**

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## **Abstract**

Good planning is responsive to the needs and goals of citizens. Therefore, a society in which everyone is included is needed. I will argue that in the post-secular society that I sketch, this is not the case. I describe this post-secular society as a society with secularized institutional and social structures, but in which religion has not disappeared. The reason for this non-inclusivity is the lack of social cohesion, a lack of legitimation of political decisions, and a lack of a common civic culture. Both citizenship theory and post-secular theory have visions about the ideal role of citizens within society. From both theories I will reflect on the challenges of the post-secular society, trying to find an answer to the question: *What does a post-secular form of citizenship look like?* I will conclude by arguing that there is not just one best post-secular citizenship, but that the answer to this question is completely dependent on ones political views.

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## Introduction

All Western-European countries have plural societies. Men, women, younger people, older people, homosexual and heterosexual people, people with different cultural backgrounds, and – although this difference was expected to disappear for a long time – people with different religious convictions. In recent literature this society in which both religious and non-religious people are living is called a post-secular society.

All these different people are living together in a city or country, and although they are all different, the goal is to include everybody within the society. In the contemporary post-secular society, this does not seem to be the case. This creates difficulties for planning in such societies. Quadeer (1997) argued that planning is effective when it is responsive to the needs and goals of citizens, and that different people have different needs and goals. In order to make planning responsive to the needs and goals of citizens, every citizen should be included equally within society.

I will argue that to reach this equal inclusion, three problems have to be overcome. These three are a lack of social cohesion (Bedford-Strohm, 2007), a lack of legitimation of political decisions (Habermas, 2005), and a lack of a common civic culture (Habermas et al., 2008). Therefore the three challenges of the post-secular society are to reach social cohesion, to provide legitimation of political decisions, and to create a common civic culture.

There are two main theories from which it is possible to reflect on the challenges of the post-secular society, namely citizenship theory and post-secular theory. Citizenship is a complex concept, of which equality of status is the underlying principle (Lister, 2005). Furthermore, citizenship is a highly political concept. What exactly is involved in reaching equality of status is highly dependent on one's political views. From this principle of equality of status, it is possible to reflect on the problems of the post-secular society. There are already many citizenship theories written about other plural societies, for example urban citizenship and multicultural citizenship.

Habermas et al. (2008) have written about the ideal role of citizens in a post-secular society but they do not describe it from a citizenship perspective. This normative vision about the post-secular society is what I have defined as 'post-secular theory'. I will argue for the importance of making a distinction between post-secular theory and an empirical post-secular society. The empirical post-secular society then will be defined as an observable society with secularized social and institutional orders, but where religion has not disappeared from the lives of many of its inhabitants. Just like citizenship theory, it is also possible to reflect on the challenges of the post-secular society from post-secular theory.

Therefore, it would be interesting to combine the two theories and explore how citizenship theory together with post-secular theory can create a theory of post-secular citizenship that can overcome the problems of the post-secular society. Therefore my research question will be: *What does a post-secular form of citizenship look like?*

In the first two chapters the concepts citizenship and post-secular society are explained in more detail. Both concepts are not uncontested and open for different interpretations. Therefore it is

important to make clear what I exactly mean when using these two concepts. In the third chapter I will more deeply clarify why I want to combine the concepts post-secular and citizenship, and how I will do my research. Thirdly, different theories of citizenship are described together with a theory about the ideal role of citizens in a post-secular society. And at last an analysis of the different theories will be made, which will end in a description of a post-secular form citizenship.

I will conclude by arguing that there is not just one best post-secular citizenship, but that the answer to this question is completely dependent on ones political views.

## Chapter 1. Citizenship

The first and second chapters are written to introduce the two most important concepts of my thesis: citizenship and the post-secular society. *"The nature of citizenship"*, Aristotle declared, *"... is a question which is often disputed: there is no general agreement on a single definition"* (Heather, 2000, vii). Also the post-secular society is a concept about which many different opinions exist. To make clear the exact topic of my thesis, I should first explain these two concepts.

For both concepts the origins are described, followed by the different ways at which the concept is seen or researched. This is important because it makes you aware of the fact that there are also different ways to look at the concept. After that, I describe the way I use the concept myself in my thesis. Therefore an operational definition is given.

### 1.1 The history of the word citizenship

Originally, citizenship was mainly an urban issue. As Bauböck (2003) describes *"Athenian citizens were free, male and property owning members of a city-state who participated in the government of the polis"* (p. 139). This is not surprising, since, as Painter (2005) points out, the word 'citizen' is derived from the Latin word for city. Only in 1576 Jean Bodin questioned this idea. He states by definition that a citizen is *"the free subject under the sovereignty of somebody else"* (Bodin, 1576/1981, p. 158, in Bauböck, 2003). And, following Bodin, because only states are sovereign, and cities are not, since its inhabitants are under the sovereignty of a state, citizenship has to be related to the state. Although Bodin argued this already in 1576, this idea of citizenship as being a member of a state did not become dominant until the late 1700s (Painter, 2005).

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, citizenship was subject to political debate. Questions which were discussed included: 'who could be a citizen?' and 'what does it mean to be a citizen?'. The answers to these questions came with the introduction of the right to vote for all men and women, and with the introduction of the welfare state and the extension of social rights (Painter, 2005). After these changes, the term 'citizenship' got a more passive character. This means that there was a greater focus on social and political rights, and less focus on obligations (Painter, 2005). It already becomes clear that citizenship can be looked at in many different ways. In the rest of this chapter, all different perspectives from which citizenship is researched, will be described.

### 1.2 Towards a definition of citizenship?

The word citizenship is used in many contexts and is researched from many different perspectives. In short, citizenship is distinguished into different sorts, is researched at different levels of analysis, is seen as both a word with a formal (or empirical) character as well as a word with a normative character, and at last, citizenship can be seen as something actively brought into practice by people, but at the other side, can be seen as a passive concept as well. These different perspectives will be described in this chapter.

#### Different forms of citizenship

Marshall (1950) describes three different sorts of citizenship: civil-, social-, and political citizenship. In civil citizenship individual freedom is the central topic. This includes *"freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to*

*justice*" (Marshall, 1950, p. 30). Social citizenship is a more broad term, described by Marshall as: "... a whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall, 1950, p. 30). And political citizenship at last include: "the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body" (Marshall, 1950, p. 30). Next to the three forms of citizenship as described by Marshall, other authors have defined some other forms. In the researches of Boomkens (2009) and Vega (2010) cultural citizenship is the central topic. Isin & Wood (1999) expand the list of Marshall with for example technical-, urban-, ecological-, sexual-, and cosmopolitan citizenship.

### **The normative character of citizenship versus the empirical character of citizenship**

*"Citizenship is one of the convenient but slippery social concepts whose usage bridges the gap between the normative and the empirical, so that accounts of actualities slide into prescriptions for change"* (Taylor-Gooby, 1991, p. 94).

This citation of Taylor-Gooby (1991) shows, that the concept 'citizenship' has both a normative- and empirical character. Lister (2005) argues that, on the one hand, citizenship refers to a status: someone can be a citizen of a state and this involves rights and obligations as well. On the other hand, the concept of citizenship also contains arguments about the ideal situation, notions about how citizenship should be. Where Bodin (1576/1981, p. 158, in Bauböck, 2003) argues that citizenship has to be related to the state, he argues from a empirical perspective. Citizenship is in this context seen as a legal status.

The question that is central to this normative kind of discussion, is: what should citizenship be like? Different people can answer this question differently. Kemmis (1995), for example, describes the good citizen. In his (normative) view, the good citizens, is a democratic citizen. One who governs and thereby shapes the conditions of his own live. Because, the word itself, democracy, implies that the citizens govern the country. Thereby he suggest that citizenship involves being democratic. On the other hand, Lister (2005) debates the theory of Marshall. He states that Marshall (1950) also had a normative view on what citizenship should look like: "*a developed and effective conception of citizenship requires at least three elements; civil, political and social rights*" (Marshall, 1950, in Lister, 2005, p. 476). In this normative view on what citizenship should be, there is a great focus on the rights that are connected with the concept citizenship.

### **Active and passive citizenship**

There is a big difference between the two ideal types of citizenship of Kemmis (1995) and Marshall and Lister (1950&2005). Where Kemmis' sees citizenship as an active concept, Marshall and Lister refer to citizenship as a passive concept. The difference between active- and passive citizenship, can be found in the behavior of people. Citizenship as a passive concept, does not refer to actions or obligations of people, but only to the rights of people. Citizenship as an active concept on the contrary, refers to a certain behavior of people. Acts of people, make them citizens, or ideal citizens.

Painter (2005) describes that after the introduction of the welfare state and the extension of social rights the word citizenship got a more passive character.

### **Difference in level of analysis**

As described before, until the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, citizenship was mostly seen as an urban issue. Next to Bodin, who questioned this idea already a century earlier, there were no disputes on this idea (Bauböck, 2003). Nowadays, there is a different link between citizenship and geographical scale. Desforges et al. (2006) describe that there are different "*scales at which citizenship is constructed and performed*" (p. 440). Where Bodin argues that citizenship, as a legal status, had to be linked to the nation state, Desforges et al. their argument refers to a more active form of citizenship. Citizenship can be seen as something actively brought into play by citizens. This active character of the term citizenship where they refer to, can be recognized by the word performed. In this discussion held by Bodin, the scale citizenship is linked to, is excluding. Citizenship, as a legal status, has to be linked or to the city, or to the nation state. In the argument of Desforges et al. citizenship can be linked to more than one scale at the same time. Citizenship can be brought into play on the national scale and the local scale, as well as on the transnational scale.


Although citizenship can be played out on different levels of scale, Desforges et al. (2006) found out that recently citizenship is increasingly linked to the local and the transnational scale. This, however, does not mean that the relevance of the national scale has diminished. These geographical scales can best be seen as fluid. Which in this context means that forms of citizenship sometimes adhere to more than one level of scale.

### **Discussion**

With this description of all different forms of citizenship, it becomes clear that it is impossible to give a straightforward definition of the word citizenship. The word has a political meaning, a social meaning as well as a civic meaning, can be researched on different geographical scales, can be an active and passive concept and can at last be seen both as a formal status and as a normative concept. In many researches about citizenship, the word citizenship is not defined explicitly.

Although it seems impossible to give a straightforward definition of the word citizenship, a description of the field in which citizenship is researched, can be made. All researches about citizenship can be divided between the two categories 'normative' and 'formal'. And in addition, a distinction between active and passive citizenship can be made. This already makes four categories of researches. The first are researches with a normative character about active citizenship. In these researches questions about how citizenship should look like, are central. And specifically about how people should ideally act as a citizen. The second category involves researches with normative character about passive citizenship. In this kind of research attention is paid to the rights people ideally should have in a society. Third, there are researches with a formal character and a focus on active citizenship. The central topic here is on the obligations citizenship of a certain society brings. And the last category of researches has a formal character and focuses on the passive side of citizenship. Central are questions about the rights people have in a society.

Within these four categories, the form of citizenship researched can differ. To stay with the three forms of citizenship as given by Marshall (2005), researches about social-, political-, and civil citizenship can be done. And at last, these researches can differ in their geographical scale. This makes in principle possible to divide all researches into four basic categories, three topics, and three geographical scales. This gives in total 36 different kind of researches and this field would look like figure 1.



The situation as described above, can be criticized in many ways. In the first place, it sees all different categories as separate from each other, en don't show a direct link between the categories. Second, the scheme does not show a shared meaning of the word citizenship. And at last, it suggest that it is only possible to place a research in one category. The purpose of this figure is however not to give an in depth review of the whole citizenship debate, but to give an overview of the different fields and ways in which citizenship is researched. Researches can often be placed in more than one category. This can be the case when: researches are both normative and empirical, and a change to another kind of citizenship is promoted. Or when citizenship is seen as both an active and a passive concept. Or when the different sorts of citizenship are researched in relation to each other. It can however be argued that it is important to define on what form of citizenship is focused when doing research. Different researches on citizenship can have totally different topics.

### 1.3 Citizenship as a unified concept

Next to this overview it is therefore useful to discuss a more unified system as well. One researcher that could have given the noted critique on the figure, is Michael Lister (2005). He

argues that too many researches see the different sorts of citizenship rights (social, political and civil) in isolation from each other. He states that that is a misinterpretation of Marshall's theory. In his opinion, there is an underlying principle of citizenship: *equality of status*" (p. 474). These three forms of citizenship rights can only together reach this equality of status and are therefore inextricably bound up with each other. Lister (2005) illustrates this with an example. He states that political rights are worthless if someone is not educated (a social rights), because then you have nothing worthwhile to say. The same counts for political rights and civil rights. Political rights are only worth something if someone also has freedom of speech, which are seen as civil rights.

I would like to stress this claim even further. Since equality of status can be seen as the underlying principle of citizenship, a general theory of citizenship must entail everything that possibly lead to the equality of status. There are many theories that see equality of status not only as 'having the same rights'. Kymlicka & Norman (1994) for example argue that: *"The New Right believes that the model of passive citizenship underestimated the extent to which fulfilling certain obligations is a precondition for being accepted as a full member of society"* (p. 355). When everyone is a full member of society, this can be seen as equality of status, since everyone has the same status as full member. Therefore, a unified model of citizenship, should also include the role of obligations.

Lister (2005) also makes clear that obligations cannot be seen separately from rights. He argues that certain socio-economic standings are necessary for political participation. Also in discussions about the importance of practicing responsibilities, the conclusion always is that rights are a necessary condition for practicing responsibilities (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994).




Figure 2 Unified model of citizenship

At last, questions about the formal status of a citizen cannot be seen separately from questions about rights and responsibilities. Although Kymlicka & Norman (1994) argue that *"we should expect a theory of the good citizen to be relatively independent of the legal question of what it is to be a citizen"* (p. 353). I will argue that this is not the case. The good citizen is supposed to act in a certain way, depending on the given context (Pycket et al. 2010). I just argued that practicing responsibilities will only happen if people have certain rights which will enable them to practice the

responsibilities. This can in the same way be argued for other acts that are seen as 'good'. These rights are only available for people who have the legal status of a citizen, and therefore acting as a good citizen can only happen if people have the legal status of a citizen. Therefore in my thesis I will

use a more unified model of citizenship. In this model, rights, obligations and equality of status are dependent on each other. The model is showed in figure 2.

What exactly equality of status is, and which rights and responsibilities are necessary for reaching this status, is closely connected with theories of social justice. Therefore there are different citizenship theories, which all have other visions on what the ideal system would look like. In chapter 4 different citizenship theories will be described.

### **Definition**

In this thesis, citizenship is seen as a unified system of rights, responsibilities and (equality of) status. These rights, responsibilities and status are closely connected with each other, and can only together reach an equality of status.

## Chapter 2. The post-secular society

### 2.1 Origins of the term post-secular

The concept 'post-secular' consists of two words, 'post' and 'secular'. The two words together make clear that the post-secular is something 'after the secular'. Discussions about the post-secular all have their origins in theories about the secular. Therefore I will first consider the concept 'secular' before introducing the 'post-secular'.

#### The secular society

The secularization of society is described by many different researchers. Discussions about secularization find its origins in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, together with the beginning of sociology. Max Weber, Auguste Comte and Émile Durkheim were the first ones referring to the term secularization (van de Donk & Plum, 2006). Habermas et al. (2008) define secularization as: *"The decline of the influence of the church, and the decline of the importance of faith in society"* (p. 17) and Van de Donk & Plum (2006) describe the modernized society as *"a society in which religion take no, let alone an important, place anymore"* (p. 27, translated from Dutch). These two citations make clear that the most important element of the word secularization is the implication of the decline of religion in society.

The secularization of society is often seen as the logical result of the modernization of society. The more modern a state was, the less religious its population would be (Casanova, 2003, in Ziebertz & Riegel, 2008). The reason for Max Weber to predict the secularization of society in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, was based on two assumptions. The first was that modernization would lead to increasing rationalization of the population. The second was that this increased rationalization has as a result an increased secularization. Therefore, he predicted that the modernization of society would indirectly lead to secularization of society (Demerath, 2000: 2483, in Van de Donk en Plum, 2006).

Where Max Weber points to modernization in general, Habermas et al (2008) explain the reasons for the secularization thesis in more detail. They make a distinction between technical- and social modernization and explain why both forms of modernization would lead to secularization. Technical modernization would lead to secularization because phenomena could be explained through science. An understanding of the world in which humans are central is promoted: *"a scientifically enlightened mind cannot be easily reconciled with theocentric and metaphysical worldviews"* (p. 17). Social modernization would lead to a higher average level of welfare and social security. Because of this increased level of security in life, there is less need for a faith that fills the gap of insecurity (Habermas et. al., 2008).

In practice this secularization of society can be recognized on different levels. Habermas et al. (2008) and Ziebertz & Riegel (2008) refer to the decline of influence of religion on the societal-, institutional- and individual level.

A decline of influence of religion on the institutional level is in practice characterized by a limitation of religious organizations to control over “*law, politics, public welfare, education and science*” (Habermas et al., 2008, p. 17). Ferrara (2009) refers to this same phenomenon as ‘political secularization’, which includes the separation of church and state.

Secularization on the societal level is characterized by a changing function of religion. Religion has always been an important source of social cohesion (Ziebertz & Riegel, 2008). But with the modernization of society, it became the norm to keep religion in the private sphere (Van de Donk & Plum, 2006). Therefore it was expected that religion would lose its function as source of social cohesion. Related to this, it was also expected that religion would have less influence on people's social networks (Ferrara, 2009).

On the individual level, secularization could be seen in the decline of religious practices and beliefs. Ferrara (2009) for example points to the loosening impact of religious motivations when making decisions. Furthermore he researched secularization from a phenomenological approach. This phenomenological approach takes the experience of believing into account. Is there a difference in how faith is experienced between now and a few years ago? Ferrara's (2009) conclusion is that the experience is totally different today: “*the unquestioned framework shared by everybody in a natural, unreflective way, to the experience of being one among many options available, none of which can be seen as having a privileged status within society*” (Ferrara, 2009, p. 80). Where the unquestioned framework refers to the experience of religion in the past, and the many options available characterize religion how it is experienced today.

In short, the secularization of society was already predicted in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, because it was thought that the modernization of society decreased the need for religion. In practice, secularization took place on the institutional level, the societal level and the individual level. But in the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there came critique on the secularization thesis as well.

### **Critique on the secularization thesis**

In both science and the public domain there has been a renewed attention to religion (Van de Donk & Plum, 2006). This was remarkable, since ‘a coming back’ of religion is incompatible with the secularization thesis. Following Van de Donk & Plum (2006) it looks like there are only two solutions to solve this contradiction of opposing theses. The first is to reject the secularization thesis. The second is to defend the secularization thesis, and thus to defend the accompanying organization of the state, which precludes religion from coming back in society.

Although it may look in the first place that these are the only options, Van de Donk & Plum (2006) state that the situation is too complex, to make such a simplified sketch of it. There is more complexity behind it, and that will be outlined in the next section.

On the one side, there came two types of critique on the secularization theories: theoretical critique and empirical critique (Van de Donk & Plum, 2006). Empirically it is argued that religion in Western countries is not diminishing. Many migrants still identify themselves with people with the same religious background and is therefore a source of social cohesion. And many individuals are still involved with projects organized by churches, and many churches are growing (Berger, 1999 in

Ziebertz & Riegel, 2008). Berger questioned the theoretical assumptions of the theory. This theoretical critique referred to the vagueness of the theory, and a Christian bias.

Although there came a lot of critique on the secularization thesis, this does not mean that it is uncontested that the secularization of society never happened. As Ziebertz & Riegel (2008) state: *"Only a minority of scholars would contest that secularization happens, but the agreement is growing that secularization does not explain societal developments exhaustively. This does not mean that the opposite position is taken for granted that we undergo a strong vitalization of religion"* (p. 11). In other words, the secularization theory has its limits, because it leaves a gap in the explanation of developments in society.

This can also be seen in descriptions given by Habermas et al. (2008) and Beaumont (2010). Where Beaumont (2010) describes that *'somehow the religious re-emerges in the secular and the public'* (p. 4), and later he refers to the presence of religion in *'the secularized structures of late modern capitalism'* (p. 5). Both these descriptions imply that there has been a process of secularization of society.

## 2.2 Discussing the post-secular

As is shown, the secularization thesis was not sufficient in explaining societal developments exhaustively. More specifically the thesis failed to explain the presence of religion in contemporary society. Therefore the concept post-secular was introduced. This concept is used by many different researchers, but everyone uses the concept in a different way. Therefore, I will give an overview of the different uses in the next section.

First, the post-secular is used as a critique. The concept of the post-secular finds its origins in the critiques on the secularization thesis. The secularization thesis turned out to be not sufficient in explaining the presence of religion in contemporary society (Ziebertz & Riegel, 2008). Beaumont (2010) describes it as: *"the postsecular refers to the limits of the secularization thesis and the ever-growing realization of radically plural societies in terms of religion, faith and belief within and between diverse urban societies"* (p. 6). In this description, the essence of the post-secular is presented: the presence of religion, faith and belief in contemporary society. Contrary to secularization thesis, where religion played no role at all, in the post-secular society religion does play a role. So in short, the post-secular can be seen as a critique towards the secularization thesis.

Second, the post-secular society is both seen as both a normative concept (Rosati & Stoeckl, 2012), and an empirical concept (Cooke, 2007). Often these two characters of the post-secular are seen as interconnected. I will argue for a disconnection of the two characters.

Cooke (2007) described what the empirical post-secular society, regarding to the societal- and institutional structure looks like:

*'In its empirical sense it refers to social orders that have undergone processes of secularization over the course of the past two or three hundred years, but in which religious worldviews continue to shape the identities of inhabitants; it is usually connected with the further empirical claim that this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future'* (p. 227).

So this observable post-secular society, is a society with secularized social orders, but where religion did not disappear from the lives of many of its inhabitants.

Cooke (2007) furthermore refers to the fact that this empirical notion of the post-secular, is often used as an argument for specific normative ideas of the post-secular. Cooke also argues that, although: *"The empirical claims do not, of course, justify the normative use of the term "postsecular"*" (2007, p. 227), this is exactly what is done very often. There are many authors who use the post-secular as a normative concept. This normative component says something about the role religion should have in contemporary society. The post-secular society then reflects a society in which religion has a specific, ideal, role.

The first authors that focus on the normative side of the concept 'post-secular', are Habermas et al. (2008). They describe that we have come to live in a *'modus vivendi'* (p. 22). In this situation different cultures and religions live next to each other, but *'remained foreign'* (p. 22). They interpret this as a problem for which a solution is necessary. Following their post-secular perspective, the voice of the religious is not good enough articulated in the public debate (Ziebertz & Riegel, 2008). Cooke (2007) shows how Habermas does not use the post-secular as an empirical concept, but that he *"makes a plea for a model of law and politics in which religious arguments are not excluded from political debate"* (p. 227). The post-secular is thus used as an normative concept.

Also Ziebertz & Riegel (2008) pay attention to the normative character of the post-secular. They describe that the answer to the question which role religion should have in society, can be found in three different concepts of religion: secularity, non-secularity and post-secularity. All three concepts denote a certain vision towards this question. From a secular perspective, religion should be a private matter. The state has no normative relation to any religious doctrine. Following a non-secular perspective, there is just one truth and that truth is coming from the one leading religion. Religion has a lot of influence on the public sphere. And at last from the post-secular perspective, plurality of convictions should be taken seriously. Agreement is reached through dialogue in an interreligious way. Religion can best be seen as *"a source of orientation when public issues are discussed"* (Ziebertz & Riegel, 2008, p.36). Ziebertz & Riegel (2008) do not refer to a factual situation, but to a normative idea about the role religion should have in society.

Cooke (2007) argues that, since the empirical post-secular society can be an argument for both a secular state and a post-secular state, it is necessary to extent the definition of the post-secular with a normative component before using it as a normative concept. Only an empirical conception of the post-secular can never be an argument for a specific ideal role of religion in society.

In this thesis the empirical definition of the post-secular, given by Cooke (2007), will be used and I will explain why. Both the post-secular as an empirical concept and the post-secular as a normative concept are discussed.

Cooke (2007) argued that if the post-secular is used as a normative argument, an extended definition of the post-secular is necessary. Since there is not one straightforward normative description of what a post-secular society exactly should look like, it is not yet possible to make a definition of 'the normative post-secular society'. This is in opposition with the empirical post-secular society, which can be defined.

It is therefore better to split the two conceptions of the post-secular. The empirical post-secular society, can be defined as *the* post-secular society. And the normative notions *about* the post-secular society can better be seen as theories on how this society should be organized. These theories can be compared with theories of for example liberalism, republicanism and many other theories that make arguments about the structuring of the state. Since the normative post-secular theory does not restrict itself to state-structuring, but makes claims about citizen behavior too, it can also be compared to for example liberal citizenship theory or republican citizenship theory.

By disconnecting the normative and empirical conceptions of the post-secular, it is possible to define a society without immediately referring to normative arguments too. The separation of the two conceptions makes it easier to specify which post-secular society (normative or empirical) is exactly researched.

For this research it is especially important to separate the empirical and the normative, because I want to research what a post-secular citizenship could look like. As I already argued, citizenship is a very political concept. If I describe the post-secular with a normative character, I displace many possible citizenship theories beforehand.

## **2.3 Definition**

In this research I will make a distinction between the post-secular society, and post-secular theory. With the post-secular society, I refer to a society with secularized social and institutional orders, but where religion did not disappear from the lives of many of its inhabitants. With post-secular theory I refer to theories that say something about the ideal role religion should have in the post-secular society described above.

## **Chapter 3. Connecting citizenship, the post-secular and planning.**

In the first two chapters I only paid attention to two concepts that do not directly seem to be tied to one another. Furthermore, in the introduction I shortly argued that both concepts can be related to planning debates. In this chapter I will make clear why and how the concepts citizenship and the post-secular can be linked to one another. Also the importance for planning will be explored. This will be done by first showing how planning is influenced by cultural diverse societies, and how planning influences cultural diverse societies the other way around as well. Secondly, I will focus more specifically on planning in the post-secular society. There are some challenges for planning in the post-secular society, and these will be described. At last I pay attention to how citizenship theory comes in the debate.

In the second part of the chapter I will explain why I choose to do a literature study, and what the answer of my research will look like.

### **3.1. The reason of my research**

#### **3.1.1 Planning in culturally diverse societies**

Leonie Sandercock wrote the book 'Towards Cosmopolis: planning for multicultural cities' (1997). In this book she reflects on how we can build an urban Utopia with our culturally diverse society. In the first place she describes that our cities and regions are culturally diverse. This is perceived more than a threat than as an opportunity by many people. She argues that this threat is many layered:

*"It is perceived as economic, as cultural, as religious, as psychological. It is a complicated experiencing of fear for the Other, alongside fear of losing one's job, fear of a whole way of life being eroded, fear of change itself. These fears are producing a new world disorder – rising levels of violence against those who are different, who don't belong, rising levels of racism, and increasingly repressive responses to the claims of insurgent citizenship"* (Sandercock, 1997, p. 164).

It is clear that cultural diversity in general is understood by many people as something negative. But Sandercock (1997) describes that there is no way back to a homogeneous society.

Sandercock (1997) pays attention to planning specific challenges of cultural diverse societies too. She describes how planning decisions can influence different groups, differently. She gives a few examples of this.

The first example Sandercock (1997) gives is New York. Robert Moses restructured New York by building many infrastructure projects. This caused an enormous suburbanization, but only for those people who had enough money to buy a car. As a result, there was segregation of rich people and those who had less money. This example illustrates how planning can influence rich and poor people differently.

Second, Sandercock (1997) mentions Paris' spatial restructuring after the Second World War. The industry was relocated to the outskirts of the city, which required the relocation of its largely unskilled and immigrant workforce as well. Additionally the highly educated sectors, such as universities, corporate headquarters and governmental buildings, were placed within the city limits. The relocation of the industry was not a decision made by the industry itself. Sandercock (1997) argues that the industry was encouraged to relocate by the government. Also this example shows that planning decisions can cause segregation of higher- and lower educated people, and can cause segregation of minority groups as well.

Mohammad Quadeer (1997) researched '*how multiculturalism has affected planning policies and strategies in Canada*' (p. 481). He argues that urban planning is effective when it is responsive to the needs and goals of citizens. He supposes that these needs and goals "*differ by social class, race, gender, and cultural background*" (p. 482). Therefore, urban planning can be seen as effective when it is able to accommodate the needs of all citizens in the cultural diverse society. All citizens should be treated equal in this process. In the examples given by Sandercock this is not the case. Not all citizens are treated equally in the process of accommodating to their needs.

It can be argued that in plural societies, where poor people, rich people, higher educated people, lower educated people, and people from different cultural backgrounds are living, there is a big challenge for urban planning. How can planning take place without excluding specific groups of people?

Quadeer (1997) describes three necessary conditions for planning in culturally diverse societies. First, because of the cultural diversity, planning outcomes are less predictable. Therefore the rational-technical planning has become more difficult, because planning affects different groups, differently. Second, sensitivity to the needs of individuals has become more important. There is a necessity for a careful understanding of how every different group gets influenced by regulations. Planners must lock out systematic biases in planning procedures. At last, there is a greater need for citizen involvement in the planning process. Since citizen-involvement "*has shown the greatest responsiveness to the diversity of citizens*" (p. 485).

A lot of attention is paid already to urban planning in multicultural societies. Both Sandercock (1997) and Quadeer (1997) are examples of that. On the other hand, nearly no attention has been paid to religious diversity in planning. Sometimes religious diversity is seen as a part of cultural diversity. This is the case when Quadeer states that the right to practice your religion is one characteristic of a multiculturalism. But no one specifically focuses on religious diversity. I think it is important to focus on religious diversity specifically and I will explain why.

### **3.1.2 Planning in religious diverse societies**

Next to Paris and New York City, Sandercock (1997) also pays attention to a few other cities, including Jerusalem. Within Jerusalem, she describes two different cases where cultural differences influence planning. On the one hand there are citizens from Israel and from Palestina. On the other hand, there are two kinds of Jews living in Israel. There are secular Jews and haredi, the ultra-orthodox Jews. I will discuss this second example given by Sandercock (1997).

Sandercock (1997) described that the haredi and the secular Jews have “*a battle in the public domain (...) about whose city Jerusalem will become*” (p. 179). It seems that the two groups are not able to negotiate with each other. The haredi perceive the secular character of the city as a danger for their way of life, and their sacred spaces. The haredi have strict rules on behavior and manners of dressing. The secular Jews are willing to respect the haredi way of living, the haredi are not willing to respect the way of living of the secular Jews. Therefore, there is a conflict over “*the rules of behaviour in the public domain of the city*” (p. 180). And since the haredi population is growing way faster than the secular Jews population, the balance in different neighborhoods is shifting all the time. Sandercock (1997) describes that:

*“The haredi community prefers to live in a completely segregated environment. It cannot tolerate ‘the godless lifestyle’ of secular Jews in its neighbourhoods. Similarly, the secular population cannot accept the demands and dictates of newly arrived haredi families”* (p. 181).

These complete opposite positions resulted in the refusal to have a dialogue with each other. Sandercock (1996) describes what the possible outcomes would be if the haredi become the majority, and there is still no dialogue between people. She argues that it would be likely that the secular Jews will back out of the inner city towards the suburbs. Another possibility is that the city will be separated completely.

This example shows that it is not only the planning that influences different cultural groups differently; it is also the different cultural groups (or in this case religious groups) that influence planning. Furthermore it shows how religion specifically can influence planning. It seems that the lack of dialogue and negotiation are caused by their complete different convictions and motivations for their actions and behavior. Sandercock (1997) describes this as the absence of a common civic culture. Quadeer (1997) described that citizen involvement is one of the necessary conditions for planning in culturally diverse societies. But citizens are unlikely to involve in the planning process, if they are not able to communicate with each other.

### **3.1.3 Planning in a post-secular society**

In chapter 2, I described the post-secular society as a society with secularized social and institutional orders, but where religion did not disappear from the lives of many of its inhabitants. This is by definition a society where people with different religions and no religion at all are living. Besides that, it is a society with secularized social and institutional orders. So secularism can be seen as the dominant culture. As is shown, it can be expected that this society experiences difficulties in the planning process as well.

These challenges are described by different authors. Mostly they do not directly refer to the planning process, but this link can be found if the general problems of the post-secular society are compared to the difficulties of planning in a culturally diverse society.

### ***Challenge 1. Social cohesion***

Bedford-Strohm (2007) state, that every democratic society needs the involvement of citizens. This can be compared to Quadeer's (1997) statement that citizen involvement in the planning process needed in culturally diverse societies. Bedford-Strohms (2007) supposition is that this involvement will only happen if there is a great amount of social cohesion in society. In other words, social cohesion is needed in every democratic state.

In his article *Nurturing reason: The public role of religion in the liberal state*, Bedford Strohm (2007) describes that social cohesion in a liberal state cannot be taken for granted. In the *theocratic state* and the *atheist state* (p. 27) there is a forced social cohesion. The role of religion in society is clear, and, if necessary, people are forced to act accordingly. In the liberal state this role of religion is unclear. Following the Böckenforde dilemma, there are two options that describe how the state can deal with religion in society. The first is: promoting religion, accepting the risk of losing neutrality. The second is to ignore religion, accepting the possible loss of cohesive forces.

### ***Challenge 2. Legitimation of political decisions***

In order to create a stable political community, generated by social solidarity of its inhabitants, it is necessary that the political authority is understood as justified by the citizens (Habermas in Cooke, 2004). Therefore, the legitimacy of political decisions is very important. Without this legitimacy for all inhabitants, social solidarity will not exist, and people feel not represented.

In a post-secular society, this secular political law is not yet legitimated for all citizens. For the non-secular citizens, the secular legitimation will not be a legitimation per se. And therefore the social solidarity is at stake (Habermas, 2005).

### ***Challenge 3. Modus vivendi***

Habermas et al. (2008) describe a situation within the post-secular society in which people "*remain foreign*" (p. 22) to each other. This is a problem because people "*do not mutually recognize one another in civil society as members of one and the same political community*" (p. 22-23). And also people do not "*meet as equals*" (p. 23). This will cause a society that is not inclusive, because if people do not meet as equals, they will surely not feel equal members of the society. This problem described by Habermas et al. (2008) can be seen as the absence of a common civic culture as described by Sandercock (1997). Following Sandercock, this common civic culture is necessary for planning in a culturally diverse society.

#### **3.1.4. From a post-secular society to an inclusive society**

The challenges described above, together with the example given by Sandercock, point towards the non-inclusivity of the post-secular society. The word inclusive society is used by many researchers, but not defined clearly. Habermas et al. (2008) refer to the concept 'inclusive *community*' (p. 23) while directly linking it to equal rights for all citizens. So in the first place an inclusive society or inclusive community, is one where everybody has equal rights. Also Osler (1999) refers to inclusiveness as all humans being equal and having the same rights. Walzer (1983, in Garcia, 2006) argues that a citizen not only has the formal status of a citizen, "*but also holds a conception of self as part of the society*" (p. 749). Therefore, a society is only completely inclusive, if all citizens see themselves as equally part of the society they live in.

Being an inclusive society has many benefits. Many people feel they belong to a larger community (Osler & Starker, 2005, in Kiwan, 2008). This sense of belonging – identifying yourself with a group – makes you more willing to participate in the context this group is dominant in. And, the other way around, participating in a certain context, creates a sense of belonging (Kiwan, 2008). In other words, groups that do not identify themselves with the dominant group, are unlikely to participate. So, if a society is not inclusive, people are less willing to participate within that society. This is even more so when not all social groups have equal access to the necessary resources, such as information and certain skills, to participate (Garcia, 2006). If only a certain social group participates in politics, only their claims are heard in the public and political debate. And therefore, not all citizens are represented in this debate (Garcia, 2006), and if citizens are not represented, this may cause that they feel not part of the society they live in.

In other words, an inclusive society creates a sense of belonging because people identify themselves with that society. This sense of belonging makes that people are more willing to participate, people that participate are better represented. And if people are represented, they may feel more included




Figure 3 Inclusive society

in the society they live. This is visually reflected in figure 3.

This figure may seem a bit simple. I will not suggest that these are the only factors that influence the creation of an inclusive society, identification of people with this society, citizen participation or full representation of every citizen. But these are factors that influence each other, and can theoretically create a positive circle. Although I think that none of these can be realized in its ideal form (all citizens participate, all citizens identify themselves with the community, all citizens feel included or all citizens are represented). But the figure is meant to represent the relations between the factors that are described within the literature.

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Being an inclusive society is important for the planning process. Quadeer (1997) described that the effectiveness of the planning process is defined by its responsiveness to the needs and goals of citizens. In the figure this can be recognized in the factor 'representation'. For this representation an inclusive society is needed. This is a society where people can identify themselves with. This is not the case in a post-secular society, because there is a lack of legitimation, social cohesion, and a common civic culture. This causes that people *"do not mutually recognize one another in civil society as members of one and the same political community"* (Habermas, et al. 2008, p. 22-23), and people do not *"meet as equals"* (Habermas et al. 2008, p. 23).

The most important causes of this non-inclusivity, seems to be the secular character of the state, by which non-secular people by definition are excluded. And secondly, the difficulty of having a conversation between secular and non-secular people, causes the lack of a common civic culture.

### **3.1.5 Normativity of the problem statement**

Where I described the post-secular society as an empirical society in chapter 2, I now added a normative side to it as well. I am aware of the fact that the problem statement is normative in a certain way. But without any notion of an ideal situation, it is not possible to define a problem at all.

I choose to see the inclusive society as an ideal society, because only in such a Utopian society, planning in its ideal form can be done. Planning in its ideal form, as described by Quadeer (1997) is planning where everyone in society is represented.

## **3.2. The how of my research**

### **3.2.1 Citizenship and the post-secular society**

I stated that the underlying principle of citizenship is equality of status. This equality of status also refers to full citizenship, because when everyone is a full citizen, everyone has an equal status. Therefore the concepts equality of status and full citizenship are used interchangeably. Osler (2001) argues that citizenship is an inclusive concept by definition. Since the goal is creating an inclusive society, which means that all citizens feel equal citizens, citizenship theory can give insights in creating inclusive societies.

The model can better be seen as an open system, where each of the independent variables can be influenced from factors outside the system, both positively and negatively. This leads to figure 4. As is represented there, the inclusive society can also be influenced from outside the figure. Examples of these are insights from citizenship theory. By creating a more inclusive society, other factors will be positively influenced as well.

So the choice for researching what a post-secular citizenship would look like, is based on the assumption that citizenship theory can contribute to making societies more inclusive. Since having an inclusive society is a necessary condition for having a 'good planning process', as described by Quadeer (1997). Since the post-secular society can be seen as a non-inclusive society, citizenship theory can contribute to making the post-secular society, more inclusive.




Figure 4 extended model

### 3.2.2 Doing a literature study

I described citizenship theory as being a unified concept. The concept consists of many different components. I described that rights, obligations and status are part of the definition. There are different citizenship theories and post-secular theories. The citizenship theories are mostly political theories that describe what equality of status, the underlying principle of citizenship theory, exactly is. And they also describe which rights and obligations are necessary for reaching that status. The post-secular theories are theories that describe an ideal organization of a post-secular society. Post-secular theory specifically pays attention to the role of religion in that society.

Habermas et al. (2008) ask themselves the question:

*“How should we see ourselves as members of a post-secular society and what must we reciprocally expect from one another in order to ensure that in firmly entrenched nation states, social relations remain civil despite the growth of a plurality of cultures and religious worldviews? (p. 21)”*

This question indirectly relates to questions about citizenship. The question, ‘How should we see ourselves?’ specifically focuses on an active understanding of the citizen. On the other hand, Habermas et al. (2008) do not specifically focus on status and rights. Also Cooke (2010) pays attention to the question what the ideal post-secular society would look like, and what the role of citizens preferable involves. On the other hand, citizenship theory pays attention to many aspects of my conception of citizenship. But most citizenship theories does not specifically pay attention to culturally diverse societies, or to the post-secular society.

Since there are two kind of theories that both do not give a complete understanding of the specifics of citizenship theory in a post-secular society, it is interesting to confront those theories with each other. The theories are complementary to each other. And together give a total overview of the theory that exist of post-secular citizenship.

This confrontation will be done by doing a literature study. This may look strange since I described the post-secular society as an empirical society. But I think doing a literature study is important before doing an empirical study. A lot of literature is written about both post-secular and citizenship theory. But both theories have never been combined before. Therefore, it is difficult to get an overview of possible post-secular citizenships. And having an overview of different possibilities, is necessary before doing an empirical study. Without such an overview, a theoretical grounding is missing.

By doing this literature study, I will give a theoretical grounding for further empirical research. I am aware of the fact that there are infinite different post-secular citizenship theories. Therefore I choose to select the most well-known post-secular theory, written by Habermas, and reflect from this theory on a few different citizenship theories. How this is done is described in the next section.

### **3.3 Working towards an answer**

To give an answer on my research question, I decided to research different citizenship theories and post-secular theories. In the last chapter I explained why I choose these theories.

I already described that citizenship theory is based on notions of justice. This notions of justice are strongly political. Therefore I choose to analyze the three models that represent different political visions. Liberal citizenship, neo-republican citizenship and communitarian citizenship. I could also choose for models writing about other kinds of plural societies. The reason I did not do that, is because also these models are based on political convictions, and therefore it is much clearer to describe these basic models themselves. Besides that I analyze a model of differentiated citizenship. Differentiated citizenship is a concept of Young, and does not write about specific differences, but differences in general. Because the other models are not specifically sensitive to difference, I added this model.

For the post-secular theory, I choose to analyze the theory of Habermas et al. (2008). Habermas specifically focus on citizen behavior in post-secular societies, and does pay attention to the dialogue between people. This is one of the main problems of the post-secular society that I stated.

It is important that I am aware of the fact that both theories are normative to a great extend. Therefore I think it is not possible to pose 'the best post-secular citizenship theory'. By making the normative aspects of the theories visible in the answer, it is easier to stay aware of the fact that most of the theories used in this thesis are normatively grounded.

Therefore my answer will be an overview of different post-secular citizenship theories, based on liberal-, neo-republican-, communitarian- and differentiated citizenship theory and based on Habermas post-secular theory.

## Chapter 4. Citizenship theory & post-secular theory

### 4.1 Citizenship theory

#### 4.1.2 Liberal-, communitarian- and republican citizenship theory.

When looking at theories of citizenship, it is important to understand that all theories have a normative basis. Theories of citizenship hold a certain view on justice. Where all theories have the goal to treat all citizens equally, what this equality exactly involves, differs between the theories. Therefore it is important to first discuss the three theories on which nearly all other citizenship conceptions are based. These are the liberal-, republican-, and communitarian theories.

These three citizenship theories have a certain vision on different aspects of citizenship. In the first place, it discusses when someone officially is a citizen. Secondly, the theories have a vision on what it involves to be a citizen: is there a focus on the importance of rights or obligations? And at last, I will shortly discuss how is dealt with diversity within each of the theories.

#### Liberal theory

Liberal theories of citizenship have a strong focus on citizenship as a set of universal rights that automatically applies to everyone with the formal status of a citizen (Gaventa, 2002). Following liberal theories, there is no common-good (Mouffe, 1992). Each individual acts rationally, and strives for their own interest. Citizens have thus a self-interested and independent character (van Gunsteren, 1998). Having rights makes you as much a citizen as all your fellow-citizens who have the same rights (Gaventa, 2002). Van Gunsteren (1998) point to the limits of the practice of rights, this have to stay: *"within the limits of their respect for the rights of others"* (p. 17). Diversity is not an issue within liberal theories, since everyone formally has the same rights, and therefore the same opportunities. An equal status of all citizens is thus reached through giving all citizens the same rights. This theory is strongly based on Marshall's theory, which has the same basis focused on rights.

#### Communitarian theory

Central to the idea of the communitarian approach to citizenship, is the type of community they emphasize. Following the communitarian approach, a community has to be based on shared values and an idea of the common good (Mouffe, 1992, p. 29). Following this idea, the communitarian approach puts strong emphasis on the community, and the responsibilities citizens have towards this community. Citizens have responsibilities *"towards each other and towards the community at large"* (Etzioni, 2009, p. 359). Smith (2004) states that because of this belonging to the community, *"Communitarianism is [therefore] suspicious of the very idea of individual rights"* (p. 121).

This community based on shared values is created by its citizens, and a sense of identity of the citizens themselves is again created through relations within the community. The citizen is embedded within this community and therefore derives his or her identity from this community (Smith, 1998, in: Gaventa, 2002). Van Gunsteren (1998) describes this as 'natural belonging' (p. 20) to the community.

It may be clear that following the communitarian theory, diversity within a society is undesirable. Communitarianism wants to reach an equal status of all citizens by directing them towards the same convictions.

### **Republican theory**

Citizens are mostly citizens through political participation. Political participation is what makes them citizens instead of inhabitants. "*Citizens are political beings*" (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 362). In this way, republican theory very much looks like communitarian theory, since in both theories the community comes before the individual (van Gunsteren, 1998).

What distinguishes the republican point of view from the communitarian point of view, is that people do not participate in order to contribute to the common good and the shared values, the values and the common good are created by participating in the political arena. Therefore, political participation is not only valuable for the community, but also for the participants themselves (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). An equal citizenship status can in this way only be reached by participating within the community.

#### **4.1.3 Differentiated citizenship/politics of difference**

Differentiated citizenship is a concept that is based on the ideas of Iris Marion Young. In her book *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990), she builds from notions of justice, towards the description of 'a politics of difference' (p. 156).

This theory of differentiated citizenship is different from other theories because it is based on other ideas of justice. Young (1990) describes that most theories of justice follow from a distributive paradigm. This distributive paradigm prescribes that everyone should have the same access to material goods. In other words, everyone should have the same opportunity to get an even income, to stay healthy or to get a specific job. But, as Young (1990) argues, this distributive perspective often ignores the social structure and institutional context in which this even distribution of goods is supposed to take place. While at the same time, this social structure and institutional context are very important in determining how this distribution really occurs. Therefore, Young (1990) argues, "decisionmaking power and procedures, division of labor, and culture" (p. 15) are necessary to analyze.

Therefore Young (1990) sees justice as a broader concept than only distribution. Justice involves "*institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation*" (p. 39), as well. But what are these institutional conditions, that really distinction this approach from other citizenship theories? Instead of looking to individuals, like the liberal theory, or looking at the community as a whole, like the communitarian theory, Young (1990) argues that it is better to look at the level of a group, because: "*While groups do not exist apart from individuals, they are socially prior to individuals because people's identities are partly constituted by their group affinities. Social groups reflect ways that people identify themselves and others, which lead them to associate with some people more than with others, and to treat others as different*" (p. 9)

In Young's analysis, this group diversity is not seen as a problem. Unlike the communitarian theory of citizenship, differentiated citizenship does not try to reduce the differences between groups. Instead, Young (1990) argues for the acknowledgement of difference within the institutional context. To ensure that every group's desires are articulated within the public debate. This can only be substantiated if not all groups are equally treated. Some groups need particular rights in order to promote their participation within society (Young, 1990). Specific group rights are therefore the essential part of Young's vision of justice, and therefore essential to the citizenship theory based on that vision: differentiated citizenship.

Next to the focus on group-specific rights, Young also points to the obligations related to differentiated citizenship. In the first place there is local participation. But on the other hand there is also an obligation within this participation. People should recognize "*obligations of justice to more distant others to whom one is tied by institutional relations of interdependence*" (2007, p. 249). This means that when participating, citizens should not only think about their own interests, but must also be aware of the impact on others. It is the responsibility of the institutions that organize participation to realize this ideal (Young, 2007).

## 4.2 Post-secular theory

Also Habermas et al. (2008) give their vision on the role of citizens in a post-secular society. When Habermas et al. (2008) talks about citizens within a post-secular society, he sees citizens as participants in that society. The question that he poses is about the role citizens have in a post-secular society:

*"How should we see ourselves as members of a post-secular society and what must we reciprocally expect from one another in order to ensure that in firmly entrenched nation states, social relations remain civil despite the growth of a plurality of cultures and religious worldviews?"* (p. 21).

Habermas et al. (2008) describe that, in order to overcome the 'modus vivendi' as described in the last chapter, citizens of a post-secular society should: "*meet as equals*" (p. 23) , "*mutually recognize each other as members of one and the same political community*" (p. 22-23) and practice tolerance. Next to the citizens themselves, the state has a responsibility as well. The state should guarantee that everyone is provided with certain material conditions.

First, if people are only living within their own religious communities, people from different communities do not share a common civil society. And in that case, the constitutional state can not guarantee equal freedom of religion to all citizens (Habermas et al., 2008). Therefore, people should come together within civil society as democratic citizens, and recognizing each other "*as members of one and the same political community*" (p. 22-23). In the democratic process, everyone meet and can grant themselves rights to "*preserve their identity*" (Habermas et al., 2008, p. 23) as private citizens.

Besides that, Habermas et al. (2008), argue that in our liberal state everyone already have basic right like religious freedom. But how this religious freedom is actually applied, always differs

per case. Since affected people have the possibility to be involved in the decision-making process, they can always defend their interest when trying to reach an agreement. But, Habermas et al. (2008) state, this will only work if people *"meet as equals"* (p. 23) and no condescension is blocking the discussion.

The third conduct Habermas et al. (2008) describe, is practicing tolerance. This tolerance should not be seen as an obligation to become religious or secular yourself. But this tolerance means that citizens *"concede (...) one another the right to those convictions, practices and ways of living that they themselves reject"* (p. 23). This can only happen when the first to conducts are fulfilled.

And at last, Habermas et al. (2008) state, that, all this can only be realized if *"certain material conditions are met"* (p. 24).

## Chapter 5. Analysis

In this chapter I analyze the different citizenship theories, and the vision of Habermas et al. (2008) on the role of citizens in a post-secular society. I do this by first comparing the different citizenship theories with Habermas et al. (2008) their vision on the role of citizens in a post-secular society.

### 5.1 Comparing Habermas et al. (2008) and citizenship theories

For every theory I made a schedule in which the vision on (equality of) status is described, the role of rights, obligations and the vision on difference in society. Habermas et al. (2008) their vision forms the starting point. All the other schedules are colored with the colors green, orange and red. The color green means that the vision of the theory is mostly corresponding with the vision of Habermas et al. (2008), the color orange means that there are many differences between the visions, but that they are not complete opposites, and the color red refers to a complete opposite position.

#### Habermas

Habermas vision on the role of citizens in a post-secular society is already described in the last chapter. The scheme showed here is a summary of defining characteristics of a citizenship theory plus the vision on difference within society.

Habermas	
(Equality of) Status	Every citizen has by law an equal status: religious or not religious, everyone can be a citizen.
Rights	Not many emphasis on rights. Everyone should have " <i>certain material conditions</i> " (p. 24), and everyone has the right to participate.
Obligations	Participating in the democratic process, and: " <i>meet as equals</i> " (p. 23) , " <i>mutually recognize each other as members of one and the same political community</i> " (p. 22-23) and practice tolerance.
Difference	Difference is not a problem, unless people remain foreign from each other.

#### Liberal theory

Liberal theory	
(Equality of) Status	Every citizen has by law an equal status: religious or not religious, everyone can be a citizen.
Rights	Equality is reached because all citizens have the same social, political and civil rights.
Obligations	The only obligation is that you should not disrupt others' rights.
Difference	Difference is no issue, because everyone is treated equally. It does not matter if someone is religious or not.

The problem that not everyone has an equal status as a citizen, is not recognized by liberal theory. Since everyone has the same rights, they argue, everyone has an equal status.

Kiwan (2008) states that social inclusion is not an important part of Marshall’s theory of citizenship. Although Marshall acknowledged that diversity is within the nature of citizenship, Kiwan (2008) argues that this awareness only applied to difference of gender and age. And that: *“there is no substantive consideration of ethnic and religious diversity in the context of ‘broadening’ citizenship”* (Kiwan, p. 41).

Since the only obligation of citizens, following liberal citizenship, is not interrupting others’ rights, there is no reason for citizens to act as public citizens. Their rights are guaranteed and there is no obligation to act just towards each other, or to see yourself as equal to other citizens, as is demanded by differentiated citizenship and by Habermas et al. (2008). Therefore Phillips (1991b, in Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) argues that *“Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens”* (p. 366). And also Habermas et al. (2008) to this same principle. They state that: *“In a constitutional state, all norms that can be legally implemented must be formulated and publicly justified in a language that all the citizens understand”* (Habermas, et al. 2008, p. 28). If citizens are purely private citizens, people will become foreign to each other. And being foreign to each other, is defined as one of the problems of the post-secular society.

So although the intention of liberal citizenship is an equality of status for everybody, the question stays what this equality of status exactly involves. It can although be said that the equality of status as described by liberal citizenship theory, is not enough to overcome the challenges of the post-secular society. But having rights is the very basis of every theory of citizenship, because without rights people will not even participate as citizens.

### Neo-republican theory

Neo-Republican theory	
(Equality of) Status	Both religious and non-religious people, everyone who participates can be seen as a full citizen.
Rights	Everyone has the rights to participate, to grant themselves other rights.
Obligations	To be a full citizen, you should participate.
Difference	Difference is ‘solved’ through participation. Trough participation shared goals are formulated.

The neo-republican theory has one overlapping vision with Habermas et al (2008). Both the neo-republican theory and Habermas et al. (2008) do not pay great attention to the basic rights people (should) have. By participating within the democratic process, people can grant themselves rights. In this sense there is a distinction between the public citizen and the private citizen. The public citizen participates in the democratic process, to grant rights for the private citizen. This private citizen has, through these rights, the possibility to preserve his or her identity.

But there are also differences between the two perspectives. Habermas et al. (2008) clearly state that the goal is the equal inclusion of all citizens, and therefore the responsibility of this inclusion is not only with the citizens themselves, but also with the other citizens and the state. Equality of rights is for that reason granted by being a citizen formally. The neo-republicans on the other hand see this inclusion mostly as a responsibility of the citizens themselves. And therefore the neo-republicans will not directly recognize the post-secular society as a problematic society.

Difference is by the neo-republicans not directly recognized. Difference is solved through participation. But not attention is paid to the role difference plays in the participation process. Where Habermas et al. (2008) strongly focus on the obligations attached to participation, the neo-republican theory seems to be not sensitive for those differences that can play a role in influencing participation itself.

### Communitarian theory

Communitarian theory	
(Equality of) Status	Everyone who shares the common vision, is seen as a full member of society. Since the common vision is secular, only secular citizens are full citizens.
Rights	Everyone who has the equal status of a citizen, has social-, political- and civil-rights.
Obligations	Working together towards the shared ideal society.
Difference	Difference is undesired.

As described before, central to the idea of the theory of communitarian citizenship, is the type of community they emphasize. From the perspective of communitarian theory, the post-secular society is thus seen as a problematic society. But not because of the fact that people are excluded from society as citizens, but because of the fact that the shared common good is in danger. Difference is something undesired for communitarian citizens, while difference is one of the defining characteristics of the post-secular.

As I described when discussing the post-secular, the renewed attention to religion contradicted with the secularization thesis, and this could be solved in two ways. The first was rejecting the secularization thesis, the second was defending the secularization thesis and thus defending the accompanying organization of the state. Which would preclude religion from coming back in society. The communitarian perspective represents the second option. A forced social cohesion is applied to the society. The post-secular than stays a society with secular social and institutional structures, but religion is excluded from the public domain.

### Differentiated theory

Differentiated theory	
(Equality of) Status	Every citizen has by law an equal status: religious or not religious, everyone can be a citizen.

Rights	Should be group-differentiated, it is outcome that counts.
Obligations	Everyone should act just towards others.
Difference	Difference is celebrated. It is seen as an opportunity. Difference exists in groups.

From a differentiated citizenship theory perspective, the post-secular society is only a problematic society if not all citizens are equally included. If they are equally included is measured by the outcome, and not by the rights people have. So if the post-secular society is actually a problem, can only be said after measuring if everyone is represented. In fact Habermas et al. (2008) see this in nearly the same way. For them, the post-secular society is also not problematic in itself, but only the challenges I described are problematic consequences.

An important difference is that Habermas et al. (2008) do not mention group differentiated rights. Habermas et al. (2008) place their emphasis much more on obligations through which the participatory processes can become more accessible for everybody. So both Habermas et al. (2008) and Young (1990) have the same goal: reaching a representative participatory process. But their approaches are completely different.

Furthermore, Habermas et al. (2008), put a stronger focus on the negative sides of difference than Young (1990) does. Habermas et al. (2008) see it as a problem that people remain foreign from each other, while Young does describe that as a problem. The only problem Young sees, is inequality in distribution of sources and outcome. Each of them tries to solve their own defined problem with the theory they describe. You can also state that maybe Habermas et al. (2008) define the cause of the problem Young (1990) describe. And therefore, that Young (1990) does symptomatic treatment, and Habermas et al. (2008) try to solve the core problem that causes the symptoms. It is however not to say that one of the two approaches is better by definition. It is possible that symptomatic treatment is much more effective than trying to solve the core problem.

### Overall

Overall can be seen that that citizenship theory strongly focuses on rights and obligations. This is also the case because I defined citizenship that way myself. Habermas et al. (2008) put much more emphasis on what they expect from people. Not merely as an obligation, but as an expectation and a necessary condition for success. In that way, he does more describe the normative 'good citizen', instead of the formal rights and obligations. Where Habermas et al. (2008) pose the question "*How should we see ourselves as members of a post-secular society and what must we reciprocally expect from one another in order to ensure that in firmly entrenched nation states, social relations remain civil despite the growth of a plurality of cultures and religious worldviews?*" (p. 21) and tries to find an answer to this question, this normative question is not answered within citizenship theory.

On the other side, Habermas strongly focus on the normative aspects, and does not pay much attention to the rights people have as citizens. Therefore, both theories can make up each other.

## 5.2 A post-secular citizenship

A best post-secular citizenship theory cannot be defined when no normative statement is made beforehand. Both citizenship theory and post-secular theory are normatively grounded. Therefore, an infinite amount of post-secular theories can be made, all slightly different from one another. I will and cannot describe an infinite amount of post-secular theories, therefore I choose to describe 4 kinds of post-secular citizenship theories, all derived from the citizenship theories described in the last chapter: post-secular communitarian citizenship theory, post-secular liberal citizenship theory, post-secular neo-republican citizenship theory, and at last post-secular differentiated citizenship theory. For each of the theories will be described what rights, obligations and citizenship status they have. Also how the challenges of the post-secular society are treated is added.

The first theory is a post-secular communitarian citizenship theory. This theory may seem to contradict with the definition of the post-secular itself. The problems of the post-secular society following a communitarian theory can be found in the lack of social cohesion, and the differences that exist within society causing that lack of social cohesion.

The post-secular communitarian citizenship theory will be one where religion is abandoned from society. The Böckenforde dilemma will be solved by ignoring religion and creating a secular state. Social cohesion will be forced by this common secularism. People will have the obligation to participate within planning, but participation has to contribute to the common (secular) good. Equality of status is therefore reached by the obligation to work towards the common good. Everyone will be treated equally. Since the basic assumptions of the theory are completely contradicting with Habermas' opinions about the understanding of citizens in a post-secular society, these two theories can hardly contribute to each other.

Following the liberal theory, every citizen has an equal status by law. Therefore, differences between people are not a problem. A liberal theory of citizenship in a post-secular society, will therefore see all citizens as being equal. Liberal theory does not directly see the post-secular society as a problematic society. Since everyone has the same rights, everyone has the same opportunities. And therefore, everyone has the same equality of status. Therefore, no specific theory of post-secular liberal theory can be defined.

A post-secular neo-republican citizenship theory, people have to participate to be seen as a full citizen. This means that the difficulty of having a dialogue between people with different religious background is a problem that is specifically important for this theory. The assumption that difference is solved through participation means that a lot is expected from the citizens, from a neo-republican vision.

Citizens are expected to find a common language through which they can communicate with each other. No attention has been paid to how this common language can be made. Therefore specifically to this theory, Habermas' insights can contribute to this theory a lot. Social cohesion can be created through the defined shared goals.

A post-secular differentiated citizenship theory will be one where both secular and non-secular people have an equality of status as citizens. The main problem following this differentiated vision, is that the outcomes of planning decisions will not be the same for everyone. Therefore, a different institutional structure is required. One that can give different rights to people who need different rights.

On all different theories described, comments can be made. Most citizenship theories are not specifically designed for plural societies, or even post-secular societies. This is strange, since every society is to a greater or lesser extent plural. The post-secular society has some specific characteristics that should be taken into account when designing a post-secular citizenship.

First, Ziebertz & Riegel (2008) described that the voice of the religious was not good enough articulated within the public debate. This can also be understood from the challenges of the post-secular society. Habermas (2005) described that the secular society cannot be legitimated from secular reasoning only. But, on the other side, presenting religious arguments and posing them upon society, will not be legitimizing for non-religious people. Therefore, the debate between religious and non-religious people is very important.

Another challenge of the post-secular is that people are to not recognize each other as members of the same political community, and do not meet as equals (Habermas et al. 2008). Meeting as equals requires having the same citizen status, and also requires understanding of each other's position. So therefore, a post-secular citizenship must guarantee the same rights for everyone in society, because only then you can meet as equals. This status must thus be linked to the status of a citizen, since every citizen should have the same rights as a basic condition.

Young described the group-differentiated rights. On the one side I understand that it is a good way to ensure a same status for everybody. On the other side, these group-differentiated rights underline the differences between people. The wish of Habermas et al. (2008) that people meet as equals, does then not stand a change from the very start. But where citizens from Habermas et al. (2008) their perspective are dependent on their fellow citizens, Young gives more security about reaching an equal citizenship status.

## Conclusion

Both citizenship and the post-secular society are not uncontested concepts. Therefore I started with giving a background and an operational definition of both concepts. By making a distinction between the post-secular society and post-secular theory, I disconnected the normative and empirical side of the concept.

This post-secular society can be seen as a problematic society, since it is not an inclusive society. And an inclusive society is necessary for creating a good planning process. A good planning process is a planning process where every citizen is represented. This non-inclusivity of the post-secular society is created by a lack of social cohesion, a lack of legitimation of political decisions, and a lack of a common civic culture.

I argued that both citizenship theory and post-secular theory can contribute to making a more inclusive society. Since citizenship theory is not specifically designed for post-secular societies, it is interesting to research post-secular theory as well. The post-secular theory can give citizenship theory an insight in the specifics of the post-secular society, and the citizenship theory can add aspects of the unified model of citizenship theory to post-secular theory.

Therefore I summarized the post-secular theory of Habermas et al. (2008), and liberal-, communitarian-, neo-republican and differentiated citizenship. By doing this, I could afterwards reflect from the post-secular theory on the different citizenship theories. I did this by comparing the different components of citizenship theory that I described in the first chapter: the role of rights, obligations, status and difference, in reaching equality of status.

In the end, it is not possible to define one single form of post-secular citizenship. Therefore the question: *What does a post-secular form of citizenship look like*, cannot be answered in only one single way. It is completely depending on political views, or descriptions of specific ideal situations. Therefore, I described four possible post-secular citizenship theories. By doing that, I made clear that all possible post-secular citizenship theories are normatively grounded. I described a post-secular communitarian citizenship theory, post-secular liberal citizenship theory, post-secular neo-republican citizenship theory, and at last post-secular differentiated citizenship theory.

This categorization can be used as a theoretical grounding for further research on citizenship in post-secular societies. Different positions of for example different countries can be placed in a category. Therefore the different possible positions that can be taken by for example governments can better be understood when placing it in a specific perspective.

Also for planning this research can be a contribution. This research can make planners aware of the fact that all choices they make about making the planning process more inclusive, are politically grounded. It can also make planners aware of the fact that the institutional framework in which planning takes place is not a neutral framework. It is more open for non-religious people, than for religious people.

There is much further research that can be done. One example is how different countries, or planning agencies, deal with the presence of religion in society. Are these countries taken this presence of religion into account by giving people specific rights, obligations or status? And how can this stance be seen in relation to the different post-secular citizenship models I described?

I think it is also interesting to research how individual religious motivations play a role in the experience of the physical environment. In other words, what influence has religion on specific preferences for planning the physical environment? Does religion really play such a big role in developing specific preferences?

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