

# Political trust in The Netherlands

A study on the relationship between political trust and geographical proximity.

## Summary

This is a quantitative research on political trust in the Netherlands. Data comes from CBS and Kiesraad. This research focusses on the relation between geographical proximity towards the political capital and political trust. With this research a new angle to the already existing body of literature on political trust will be added. Results can be used by governments to improve their overall trustworthiness. To generate results, thematic GIS maps are composed and used. The variables; political trust, distance and yearly income have been used to generate statistical results. Sub-questions about populism and urbanity are included to generate a broad overall outlook on the topic. Results show that there is no significant relation between distance from the political capital and populist voting behaviour. Neither is that the case with political trust and distance from The Hague. Significance was found when urban regions were compared to rural areas in political trust.

**Key words:** Political trust, Geographical proximity, Populism, Urbanity

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## **1. Introduction**

### ***a. Background***

Lately a rise in populist votes is visible in the United States, as well as in Europe. In the Netherlands parties such as the PVV (Freedom Party) and FvD (Democrats) have gained and gain popularity (Kiesraad, 2017; Kiesraad, 2019). This rise of populism is a clear sign of political distrust (Citrin & Stoker, 2018). This relation can be found in the following; democracy is based on the outsourcing of power. The people give their decisive power to public representatives that represents their will. The people must therefore have trust in the representatives to serve their interests (Citrin & Stoker, 2018). When the people get a feeling that their chosen representative does not serve their interests anymore, they lose trust in politics. This results in two consequences, non-voting and populist voting (Stoker, 2016). Populism is popular among these people because populist parties speak the people's language and question the current political system (Stoker, 2016). In line with these assumptions that an increased popularity of populism goes together with a lower political trust, is the feeling of the Dutch people. This feeling is confirmed by Fukuyama (2010) who states in his research that the Dutch have gone from a high-trust society towards a low-trust society. However, a contradicting observation regarding this statement, or moreover a feeling, is visible within the Netherlands. Even though populist parties do gain popularity in the Netherlands, political trust also shows growth over the period 2012-2017 (CBS, 2018).

Political trust is already 2.500 years recognized as a key aspect to rule a country successfully (Newton et al., 2018). In those years a lot of literature has been made on the subject. Also in the Netherlands there has been done research on the subject. One outcome here is the significant difference in political trust between people with an emigration background and the native Dutch. Those who are natively Dutch show higher trust rates than those with an emigration background (Vroome et al., 2013). This difference in political trust can be led back to a difference in economic and social resources (Vroome et al., 2013), where more economic and social resources lead to a higher political trust. Also in other countries there has been research in the field of political trust, these papers often focus on the relation between education level and political trust (Hooghe et al., 2012; Schoon & Cheng, 2011). Showing that higher educated people have more political trust than those who had less education. Furthermore researchers have explored the relation between family background and political trust (Schoon & Cheng, 2011). All these researches have been significant, confirming that there are many reasons and factors for differences in political trust between people. Another theme within this research, the influence of urbanity on political trust, has also been looked into in previous research. As well in Norway as in China a relation between urban and more populous areas and a higher political trust has been found (Saglie & Vabo, 2009; Saich, 2007). Nevertheless, none of these researches have ever issued the probability that geographical factors could play a role in political trust. This research will look into that possibility. If it turns out to be a significant variable, governments could use this outcome in improving their involvement in the regions further away from the political capital. Which then could lead to higher political trust, and therefore more effective governance.

### ***b. Research problem***

The aim of this research will be to look into the possibility that geographical factors influence political trust. The main question of this research will therefore be: "To what extent does geographical proximity towards the political capital influences political trust in the Netherlands?" This question will be supported by the following sub-questions:

- In which geographical areas does populism occur (relatively) more?
- To what extent does urbanity influences political trust?

The first sub-question helps understanding the geographical distribution of populist votes, which could be related to the geographical distribution of political trust. Populism has long been regarded as a rarely occurring form of democracy (Wirth et al., 2016) but since Mudde (2004) labelled it as ‘‘mainstream in the politics of Western democracies’’ its relevance became clear and more research on this form of politics has been done. These researches found then the link between populism and a feeling of political inefficiency (Spruyt et al., 2016). The second sub-question looks into the possibility that urbanity could be of an influence in political trust. A research by Saglie & Vabo (2009) in Norway showed that more populous areas are more politically active and trusting. Another research performed in China also shows that people from rural areas have less trust in the government than those living in urban spaces (Saich, 2007). Therefore this research will also look into the possibility that these differences might occur in the Netherlands as well. The overall outlook generated with the results from these sub-questions then helps answering the main research question.

### *c. Structure*

This research consist out of a theoretical framework where the main concepts of the research, political trust, geographical proximity and populism will be explained. The theoretical framework will also explain how political trust will be measured. Then the way of data-collection and usage will be described in the methodology. This is followed by the results to the sub-questions, as mentioned in the research problem. These questions will be addressed separately and will be answered using GIS maps and statistics. After these results have been explained and interpreted, the final conclusion on the main research question will be answered. Which is then followed by a discussion where the results will be discussed in relation to the hypotheses, and where the added value of the research will be reviewed.

## **2. Theoretical framework**

Within this research about the relation between political trust and geographical proximity towards the political capitol, there are three main concepts. These concepts are political trust, geographical proximity and populism. The use and interpretation of these concepts will be written down in the following section.

### *a. Political trust*

For the concept of political trust in this research, data provided by the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) will be used. They have conducted a large quantity of data on political trust within the 40 different COROP-regions and the 23 biggest cities of the Netherlands. The CBS collects its data by sending out surveys to all kinds of peoples throughout all of the Netherlands. Within the research by CBS that is used here, they asked questions about trust in different institutional organisations. Only one of these questions will be used, the question that addresses whether or not people have trust in the national government (yes/no) (CBS, 2018). Only this question will be taken into account since it is the only question in the research that has a geographical component and is therefore crucial to this research. Within this research, trust in politics can thus be seen as trust that the chosen representative effectively serves the interests of the voter (Spruyt, 2016). When the people have a feeling that this is indeed the case, they trust politicians and have therefore trust in politics (and will answer yes to the CBS question). However if the people have a feeling that politicians do not serve their interests anymore, they lose trust (and will answer no to the CBS question).

### ***b. Geographical proximity***

The second concept, geographical proximity, is a variable never really explored before within the theme of political trust. Therefore it is not possible to make use of an already existing body of literature. However, another similar concept has been used in previous research; geographical discontent. This concept has been used to address the negative effects rural and geographical isolated places experience. These negative experiences regard to job loss, declining labour force participation or a declining income for people in these areas (Martin et al., 2018). This geographical discontent has, on a European scale, already been proved to generate anti-establishment and populist voting behaviour (Dijkstra et al., 2018). Although this geographical discontent proves the relevance of geographical influence in political issues, it does not provide a clear definition for geographical proximity. Nevertheless, when this concept is divided into two different concepts, namely; geographical and proximity both these definitions can be found and combined with help from the Cambridge Dictionary. Geographical is, according to this Cambridge Dictionary (2019), about a particular area or space. Proximity refers to the state of being near in space or time (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019). When these two are combined, the following definition arises; spatially near a particular area. For this research the concept of geographical proximity will thus be regarded as: ‘spatially close to the political capital of the Netherlands, The Hague’.

### ***c. Populism***

Thirdly there is the concept of populism. This concept is not easy to clearly define. This is because political parties never call themselves populist, they are called this by others (Mudde et al., 2017). Still there are factors everyone agrees on characterize populism. The characteristic most defining for populist parties is their focus on differences between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ (Akkerman, 2017; De Cleen, 2017; Mudde et al., 2017). Another aspect many agree on is the presence of a strong and charismatic leader (Akkerman, 2017; Mudde et al., 2017). Lastly, parties that are extremely fond on media attention (or creating media by themselves) are also often seen as populist (Mudde et al., 2017). Populism is then seen as an indicator for political trust, or better, distrust. Populism displays political distrust since its voters vote populist because of a feeling of political inefficiency (Spruyt et al., 2016). Which then corresponds to the research by Stoker (2016) where is stated that people who do not believe politicians can represent their interests anymore, do thus not trust politics.

### ***d. Previous research***

With these three concepts a new approach to the already existing literature on political trust will be added. Quite some research has already been done on this subject. As said before, there is a visible rise in the popularity of populism in the Netherlands (Kiesraad, 2017) (Kiesraad, 2019). Pose (2018) links this to places that feel like they do not matter. These places are often more remote and therefore geographically distant from the economic and political centre of a country (Pose, 2018). Nonetheless, within the Netherlands we can also see a rise in political trust in the period 2012-2017 (CBS, 2018), the same period of time where populist parties saw an increase in votes during national government elections. Do these two trends contradict, or can they occur simultaneously within a country? In previous research the effect of economic means have been proved to be of great influence on political trust (Hooghe et al., 2012; Schoon & Cheng, 2011; Vroome et al., 2013). Therefore this research will, when looking at the geographical factor of political trust, take into the account the effect of the personal yearly income. Furthermore a deeper understanding of urbanity in relation to political trust in the Netherlands will be developed.

Within this research, political trust will be measured in different ways. When this research looks

into the relation between populism and political trust, the latter will be interpreted as the share in non-populistic votes. Which means that the share of populist votes depicts the level of distrust in national politics. For the second part of this research, where is looked into the effect of cities on political trust. Political trust is measured in the share of people declaring that they have trust in the national government.

*e. Conceptual model*

Figure 1 shows the conceptual model which is used for this research. Within this conceptual model you can see one completely independent variable: geographical proximity. There are two variables which are dependent as well as independent, namely urbanity and populism. These variables both influence political trust (Citrin & Stoker, 2018; Zmerli & Newton, 2008), but can both be influenced by geographical proximity. Finally there is one variable completely dependent, which is political trust.




Figure 1: Conceptual model

These influences do not need to be direct. The link between urbanity and geographical proximity lays within the fact that cities attract labour and people (Durkheim, 2018). Both need space, so surrounding places also grow and become cities. This phenomena is also clearly visible in the Netherlands, where we have the so-called Randstad, a highly urbanized area where most of the big cities are located. The Hague was one of the first cities here, thus attracting people and labour. Which has led to the fact that The Hague is surrounded by a lot of other big cities. The influence between populism and geographical proximity is as follows; Pose (2018) states that places further away from the economic and political centre feel like they do not matter. People in these areas are thus dissatisfied with the government. Dissatisfaction can then be linked to voting populist (Voogd & Dassonneville, 2018). Both these variables could possibly influence political trust. This research will look into the possibility that these variables do indeed influence political trust significantly.

*f. Hypothesis*

The hypothesis for this research is as follows; there is a positive relation between geographical proximity and political trust. Which should lead to more political trust in the areas close to the political capital, and less political trust in the areas further away from the political capital. Another expectation is that there will be a relation between the share of populist votes and the trust in the national government. This means that those places that show less trust in the national government, will show higher rates of populist votes.

### 3. Methodology

The data for this research is provided by Kiesraad and CBS and has then been converted into tables and maps to use all its potential. The data from Kiesraad is used to calculate the share of populist votes for each municipality in the Netherlands (Appendix C). Kiesraad provides all the election results from all layers of governmental elections throughout time. For this research, data from the 2017 governmental elections is used. This is the most recent election where all regions had the same voting options. This data is used to calculate the share of populist votes for all the 388 municipalities of the Netherlands. After calculating this share in votes, the results are projected in a GIS map including all 388 municipalities of the Netherlands. This map is then used to calculate the distance from the centre of each of these municipalities to the centre of the municipality of The Hague. This will result in two variables, distance (in meters) as the independent variable and share of populist votes as the dependent variable. The average year spendable income per person per municipality will be used as control variable (independent). Then with this data a multiple linear regression will be executed.

From CBS a research on political trust in the Netherlands is used (Appendix A). This data provided insight into the political trust all COROP-regions and the 23 biggest cities in the Netherlands expressed in 2018. Political trust was here measured by asking whether or not participants had trust in ten different institutions (yes/no), for this research only the question about trust on the national government will be used. To research whether there is a relation between political trust and urbanity or rurality, this CBS data will be used. The only disadvantage about this dataset is the fact that cities are also included within the COROP-regions. To really split the urban from the rural, the score of the COROP-regions has to be corrected for the city that is also within this region. To do this, all cities in this dataset have to be linked to their COROP-region. Then the average score of political trust of that region has to be corrected for the score of political trust in the city within that region. This can be done with the following formula:

$$(C / 2) + (X / 2) = R$$

Which, when X is extricated, gives the following formula:

$$X = 2R - C_1$$

Within this formula C stands for city and R for region, both representing the score a city or region display for political trust. X is the score for political trust a region has after it is corrected for the presence of the city within that region. An example:

$$C = Zwolle = 40,7$$

$$R = Noord-Overijssel = 35,3$$

$$X = 2R - C_1$$

$$X = 2 * 35,3 - 40,7$$

$$X = 70,6 - 40,7$$

$$X = 29,9$$

This shows that the COROP-region Noord-Overijssel has political trust score of 35,3. But within this region, the city of Zwolle is located with a political trust score of 40,7. After correcting for this presence, the region only shows a political trust score of 29,9. With these new scores in political trust, the differences between urban and rural can be fairly compared. In



Now that the relation between populism and political (dis)trust is confirmed, it is possible to look into the geographical distribution of populism. Political parties can be regarded as populist when they focus on the differences between “the people” and “the elite”. When the presence of a strong and charismatic leader is crucial for the party. And when the party is extremely fond on media attention (or creating media by themselves) (Akkerman, 2017; De Cleen, 2017; Mudde et al., 2017). Dutch political parties that match at least two of these characteristics are: PVV, FvD, SP, DENK and 50PLUS. The share in votes that these parties had in the governmental elections of 2017 are shown in the map of figure 3. This figure shows the share of populist votes per municipality in the Netherlands during the national governmental elections of 2017.




Figure 3: Map on share of populist votes per municipality in 2017

Looking at the figure, one characteristic is clearly visible. The most north-eastern and south-eastern parts of the country show a higher share in populist votes than the rest of the country. Another feature visible in the map is the so-called ‘‘Bible-belt’’. A belt which lays diagonally through the centre of the country. In this part of the country Christian political parties always gather many votes, which leads to less people voting populist. Nevertheless this map does not show whether or not these differences are significant. To calculate if that is the case, a multiple linear regression is executed (Fig. 4).

Variables	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	B <sup>b</sup>	Std. Error <sup>b</sup>	Sig.
Model 1	0,372 <sup>a</sup>	0,138	0,134	7,17095			,000
(Constant)					46,239	3,731	,000
Distance (m)					1,153E-5	,000	,138
Personal yearly income					-,773	,134	,000

- a. Predictors: (Constant), Distance (m), Personal yearly income
- b. Unstandardized coefficients, dependent variable: Political trust score

Figure 4: Output Multiple linear regression

Figure 4 shows partly the output of a multiple linear regression, the whole generated output from this tests can be found in the appendix (E). This figure shows the output for the different variables and the model as a whole. Model 1 displays the relation between political trust (dependent) and distance and income (independent). The first column shows R; the explained correlation between the dependent and the independent variables. R can vary between -1 and 1. For model 1 the R is 0,372, this means that there is a positive relation between the dependent and independent variables, when one rises, the other will rise too. But, a score of 0,372 is not high, so the explanatory value of the regression is therefore not that high. R Square indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent, or explanatory, variables. In this research that score is 0,138, which tells us that 13,8% of the outcome of the regression can be explained by the independent variables. The Adjusted R Square keeps in mind the number of variables that are being used to explain the percentage of the variance and thus shows a score that is a bit lower than R Square. The last component in this figure only relating to the complete model is the Standard Error of the Estimate. This measures the accuracy of the estimated figures. The lower this value, the better it explains the accuracy of the predictions the regression made. A score of 7.17 here is quite low, which means that the independent variables are quite close to the dependent variables in a regression line and thus accurately predict the regression line.

The statistical hypothesis associated with the multiple linear regression in figure 4 is as follows: ‘‘there is no linear relation between political trust score (dependent), and average yearly income and distance (both independent).’’ The outcome of this test is lower than 0.0005 (model), which means that this hypothesis can be rejected. It therefore can be said that there indeed is a relation between the dependent and independent variables. However, this does not show which of the independent variables is or are significant. Therefore we need to look to all the variables separately. These variables are also shown in figure 4. Within this research, that was significant overall, only one independent variable, average personal yearly income, is significant. Nevertheless it is interesting to look into the unstandardized coefficients in this output table. The column B shows how political trust rates differ when one unit from the independent variable is added. This means for the significant variable, that for every thousand euros a person yearly earns, the chance that that person will vote for a populist party decreases with 0,773

percent. The independent variable distance does not show significance (Sig. 0,138), it does however show that for each kilometre that a person lives further away from the political capital, the chance that he or she will vote for a populist party increases with 0,01153 percent. But with a chance of 86,2 percent that this result is true for the whole population, we cannot assume that there is a relation between geographical proximity and populist voting behaviour.

**b. Differences in political trust between urban and rural areas**

CBS provided data on political trust for all the COROP-regions in the Netherlands as well as the biggest cities. This made it possible to research whether there is a significant difference between urban and rural areas regarding political trust. With the formula  $X = 2R - C_1$  or when there were two cities;  $X = ((2R - C_1) + (2R - C_2)) / 2$  regions could be corrected for the city within. Figure 5 shows the differences between political trust in the city and the COROP-region where it is located.




Figure 5: Bar graph comparing cities and region political trust

The blue bars show the political trust of the cities, where the red bars show the trust of the COROP-region where the city is located. The score reflected on the y-axis is the share of people declaring to trust the national government. Directly visible is the difference between the both, but these differences work both ways. A t-test for paired samples is executed to test whether this difference is significant and which way that then could be. Figure 6 shows a part of the output of the executed test. The whole output can be found in the appendix (F).

	Paired Differences 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Upper	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1: Political trust city – Political trust COROP	5,986915198698728	3,027	22	,006

Figure 6: T-test for Paired Samples

The figure shows a significant difference (0,006) between the political trust score of the city and the political trust score of the COROP-region. Cities show a significant higher political trust score than the more rural areas surrounding it do. This is in line with research done in Norway by Saglie & Vabo (2009). This research showed that more populous areas are more politically active and trusting. Since cities are more populous than rural areas, these findings correspond with that research. Another research on the subject was done in China, here Saich (2007) found a significant difference in political trust between cities and rural areas. This test thus showed a significant difference between the biggest cities and the regions they are located in the Netherlands, but it did do nothing with the distance to the political capital. To investigate this, other statistical tests and GIS maps have been made.

*c. The effect of cities on political trust*

Figure 7 shows the score of political trust in all 40 COROP-regions of the Netherlands. This score is based on the percentage of people in each of these regions who declared (a yes/no question) during a CBS research that they had faith in the national government (CBS, 2018). Figure 7 shows two maps, the left map depicts the political trust a COROP-region shows towards the national government. In the right map, again political trust for the COROP-regions is depicted. Only the political trust score for every region with a green dot, is corrected for the big city/cities that lay within that COROP-region (as shown in the previous chapter). This is done in response to the results from the t-test for paired samples where was found that there is a significant difference between political trust in cities and the region they are located in. Therefore in this research a distinction was made between the COROP-regions and the 23 biggest cities in the Netherlands.




Figure 7: Map on political trust in COROP-regions

When comparing the nineteen marked regions (right) in both maps, nine regions stay in the same category of political trust when the city/cities within that region is/are extracted. This does not necessarily mean that their political trust score does not differ, the possible differentiation just does not show on the map. One region shows a rise in political trust and climbs one category. Another nine regions show lower political trust. Eight of these regions fall one category, one region even shows a fall in political trust of two categories. These different political trust scores in both maps generate a different outcome when we statistically look at the relation between distance and political trust (Fig. 8).

Variables	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	B <sup>b</sup>	Std. Error <sup>b</sup>	Sig.
Model 1	,628 <sup>a</sup>	,394	,361	3,66881			,000 <sup>a</sup>
(Constant)					21,214	8,530	,018
Distance (m)					-2,343E-5	,000	,095
Personal yearly income					,657	,312	,042
Model 2	,610 <sup>a</sup>	,372	,338	4,05064			,000 <sup>a</sup>
(Constant)					24,122	9,418	,015
Distance (m)					-3,133E-5	,000	,045
Personal yearly income					,248	1,566	,126

a. Predictors: (Constant), Distance (m), Personal yearly income

b. Unstandardized coefficients, dependent variable: Political trust score

Figure 8: Output multiple linear regression (both excluding and including cities)

Two multi linear regressions are combined in figure 8. Model 1 shows the results of a multi linear regression where the political trust score of the COROP-regions (dependent) is used when this was not corrected for the city within. Model 2, logically, shows the results of a multi linear regression where the political trust score of COROP-regions (dependent) is used when this is corrected for the city or cities within. For both models the independent variables used are again distance and personal yearly income. Figure 8 shows the main findings from the multiple linear regression, the whole output can be found in the appendix (G & H).

The model summary shows R; the explained correlation between the dependent and the independent variables. For model 1, R is 0,628, model 2 shows an R of 0,610. Even though model 1's R explains the correlation a bit more, both models score high. R Square indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent, or explanatory, variables. For model 1 and 2 this is respectively 0,394 and 0,372, which tells us that for the former 39,4% and for the latter 37,2% of the outcome of the regression can be explained by the independent variables. The Adjusted R Square keeps in mind the number of variables that are being used to explain the percentage of the variance and thus shows a score that is a bit lower than R Square.

As said, about forty percent of the outcome of the regression can be explained by the independent variables. Within these regression there are two, the average yearly income per person and distance to the political capital. When taking a significance level of 0,05, both models are significant as a whole (0,000) (Model, Sig.), but both models are significant because of different variables. Where model 1 shows its significance comes from the control variable income (0,042), the second model shows that indeed the variable distance makes it significant (0,045). Within the Netherlands, if we exclude the biggest cities, the unstandardized coefficient

B shows that for each kilometre you distance yourself from The Hague, your political trust decreases with 0,03133 percent. But since we cannot actually erase cities, this outcome is purely theoretic and does not represent the reality. The actual relation between distance and political trust in the Netherlands is shown in model one. Here the unstandardized coefficient B shows that for each kilometre you distance yourself from The Hague, your political trust decreases with 0,02343 percent. With a 90,5% chance that this result is representative for the whole country, some interesting calculations can be done. When looking at the most distanced part of the Netherlands from The Hague, a linear distance of about 230 kilometres arises. This means that people in this area would trust the national government on average  $230 * 0,02343 = 5,4$  percent less than those close to the political capital. Still these calculations and assumptions are based on a research that does not show significance. Therefore, even when these differences exist, we cannot assume that these differences are significant and it is distance that causes these differences in political trust.

## **5. Conclusions**

This research has focused on the geographical components of political trust. After a lot of research has been done on both political trust and populism, the factor of geographical proximity was never really touched in both fields. To make sure this component would also be investigated, this research had its focus primarily on the geographical distribution of political trust in the Netherlands. A t-test for paired samples confirmed the relation between populism and political trust. Then, with data from Kiesraad, the distribution of populist voting behaviour was established. A multiple linear regression showed that for each kilometre that a person lives further away from the political capital, the chance that he or she will vote for a populist party increases with 0,01153 percent. But this relation between populism and geographical proximity to the political capital was not found to be significant. With data from CBS on trust in the national government and again a multiple linear regression, the relation between distance and trust showed that for each kilometre you distance yourself from The Hague, your political trust decreases with 0,02343 percent. Yet again this relation between geographical location and political trust was not found to be significant. This data did however show, after running a t-test for paired samples, the significant difference in political trust between urban and rural areas in the Netherlands. Displaying urban areas show a significant higher score in political trust than rural areas. All in all can be concluded that the answer to the main research question; “to what extent does geographical proximity towards the political capital influences political trust in the Netherlands?” can hence get the following answer: “Within the Netherlands your geographical location towards the political capital does not influence your political trust.”

## **6. Discussion**

This research was based on data from Kiesraad and CBS. The Kiesraad data originated on data from 2017, the national government elections results. After these elections, the populist party of Thierry Baudet (FvD) saw a big increase in support, even becoming the country’s biggest party during the provincial elections in 2019. Immediately followed by the European elections where his party lost this position and became the fourth party of the Netherlands for that election. This shows the fluctuations in populist voting, and reminds that the data on populism used for this research is just a snapshot and can differ greatly in short periods of time. And could therefore show different results and thus relations.

Both the populist votes and trust in the national government were not significantly influenced by geographical factors. Still, both showed a reliability percentage of respectively 87 and 90 percent. Which should not easily be overlooked. Having the Netherlands as research area in a research about geographical proximity might then also not be the optimal choice. Maybe in countries that cover more ground, and thus the distance between the political capital and remote places is greater, these relations show to be significant. That is an interesting possibility for future research, and something worthy of investigating.

## 7. References:

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## 8. Appendix:

### A: Trust by COROP-region and cities in The Netherlands (CBS, 2018)

B.2 Vertrouwen in coropgebieden en grotere steden, voor en na correctie voor geslacht, leeftijd en opleiding, 2012/2017																							
	Medemens		Rechters		Politie		Leger		Banken		Grote bedrijven		Ambtenaren		Pers		Kerken		Tweede Kamer		EU		
	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na									
	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie											
<b>% van personen van 15 jaar en ouder</b>																							
<b>Coropgebieden</b>																							
Oost-Groningen/Delfzijl en omgeving	46,4	51,7	58,7	65,4	58,7	60,6	61,1	63,5	40,6	39,9	34,3	35,9	36,0	38,5	26,4	27,5	28,8	28,1	22,3	25,7	28,2	31,6	
Overig Groningen	65,6	63,3	75,5	72,8	69,5	68,5	62,2	60,7	35,9	35,8	39,5	38,3	47,5	46,3	31,9	31,6	35,8	36,1	38,0	36,4	43,4	41,6	
Noord-Friesland	65,4	66,6	70,2	71,5	72,1	72,5	68,2	68,7	35,9	35,6	40,2	40,5	46,5	47,2	35,7	36,0	43,2	43,0	33,4	34,2	37,0	37,7	
Zuidwest-Friesland	65,5	66,9	75,7	77,4	71,6	72,5	67,9	68,6	38,9	38,8	40,6	41,0	42,3	43,1	32,9	33,2	40,9	40,7	31,7	32,8	34,8	36,0	
Zuidoost-Drenthe	61,7	63,8	66,7	68,7	70,0	70,8	57,9	58,9	37,5	37,3	39,7	40,2	40,3	41,3	28,1	28,5	35,1	34,9	35,8	37,1	37,7	39,1	
Noord-Drenthe	66,4	65,6	73,0	73,8	73,2	75,2	62,6	63,7	38,5	40,0	40,8	42,0	45,8	46,0	31,4	31,0	32,5	32,5	38,0	38,3	39,9	41,0	
Zuidoost-Drenthe	55,6	57,6	61,6	63,8	65,2	66,2	63,7	64,8	37,7	37,7	41,3	41,8	34,1	35,3	28,7	29,1	28,2	28,0	27,6	29,0	31,9	33,5	
Noord-Drenthe	59,9	62,4	67,7	70,6	71,0	72,1	65,2	66,3	35,6	35,4	36,1	36,9	38,1	39,5	31,3	31,8	37,3	37,0	29,2	30,9	32,2	34,1	
Noord-Overijssel	66,0	66,9	69,3	69,4	71,1	71,5	69,8	69,5	40,9	40,2	40,7	40,0	42,7	42,8	28,7	29,0	48,0	48,0	35,3	35,6	37,0	36,9	
Zuidwest-Overijssel	58,7	59,2	68,8	70,0	70,0	70,1	62,5	65,8	40,1	41,0	40,6	42,0	47,9	48,5	28,8	28,7	31,3	31,1	38,1	38,7	42,7	45,9	
Twente	59,6	61,0	68,9	70,0	70,4	71,1	61,8	62,3	37,1	36,9	36,9	42,5	42,4	42,0	42,5	28,8	30,8	30,8	33,9	34,7	34,8	35,6	
Veluwe	65,2	63,9	69,2	69,7	69,8	70,0	62,1	62,3	38,1	37,9	39,3	39,2	42,0	42,2	30,4	30,6	46,4	46,3	35,1	35,5	34,7	35,0	
Achterhoek	63,1	64,5	71,4	73,2	70,2	70,7	61,8	62,8	38,1	38,3	39,8	40,8	40,9	41,9	27,7	27,9	28,5	28,2	33,0	34,2	38,1	39,5	
Arnhem/Nijmegen	62,7	61,1	72,9	71,8	72,4	71,7	63,7	63,4	34,7	35,2	38,0	38,2	46,3	45,7	31,3	30,9	24,7	24,7	38,8	37,9	38,8	38,1	
Zuidwest-Gelderland	57,5	59,6	68,6	69,9	70,0	70,8	66,1	66,4	39,6	38,6	43,7	43,5	41,4	42,1	29,4	29,9	34,2	34,0	33,6	34,7	33,9	34,6	
Utrecht	64,9	61,9	73,9	71,6	71,5	70,5	64,5	63,7	35,7	36,5	38,8	38,6	44,9	43,7	33,5	32,8	32,9	33,2	40,5	38,9	41,1	39,8	
Kop van Noord-Holland	41,8	43,6	64,9	67,1	67,3	68,0	63,4	64,4	33,4	33,4	39,5	40,2	37,2	38,1	33,4	33,8	23,4	23,2	30,8	32,0	29,2	30,6	
Alkmaar en omgeving	66,3	66,1	74,8	74,4	71,1	71,0	65,8	65,5	34,9	34,8	38,5	38,1	45,4	45,2	31,0	31,0	22,0	22,0	37,2	36,7	39,9	39,5	
IJmond	62,3	62,5	70,2	70,9	70,6	70,8	63,7	64,3	37,3	37,6	42,1	42,6	41,8	42,1	33,2	33,3	23,0	23,0	34,9	35,3	35,4	36,0	
Agglomeratie Haarlem	64,1	62,3	74,6	73,0	69,1	68,4	57,4	57,0	30,9	31,9	40,7	40,9	42,2	41,6	36,1	35,6	23,4	23,6	35,5	34,5	35,0	34,2	
Zuidwest-Holland	57,5	59,0	68,6	69,6	68,4	69,1	53,1	53,5	38,2	37,9	37,1	37,1	43,5	44,0	31,6	31,8	25,8	25,8	33,5	34,3	35,2	36,0	
Groot-Amsterdam	62,0	58,3	75,2	71,8	70,4	68,9	60,2	58,7	36,8	37,3	39,1	38,3	48,6	47,0	38,4	37,7	26,5	26,9	42,1	39,8	45,3	43,0	
Het Gooi en Vechtstreek	68,4	66,5	76,9	76,0	72,2	71,4	64,6	64,7	37,5	38,6	45,2	46,0	51,9	51,4	36,1	35,6	27,9	28,0	42,6	41,8	44,8	44,5	
Agglomeratie Leiden en Bollenstreek	64,2	62,8	72,9	71,2	72,4	71,7	65,4	64,4	38,4	38,3	41,5	40,8	46,9	46,1	32,7	32,5	32,1	32,3	40,2	39,2	43,8	42,5	
Agglomeratie s-Gravenhage	56,0	54,5	69,7	68,4	68,0	67,4	65,0	64,5	38,2	38,6	41,9	41,9	47,3	46,7	34,4	34,1	30,9	31,0	39,1	38,3	41,1	40,4	
Delft en Westland	59,5	58,3	70,9	69,9	71,7	71,3	67,4	67,0	34,8	35,0	44,3	44,0	40,9	40,4	32,7	32,5	36,3	36,5	37,2	36,6	40,3	39,5	
Oost-Zuid-Holland	58,8	59,1	69,5	69,6	71,7	71,6	63,0	63,0	37,1	36,9	40,3	40,2	41,9	41,9	27,7	27,7	38,6	38,5	37,9	37,9	37,8	37,9	
Groot-Rijnmond	53,0	53,9	66,7	67,1	66,1	66,4	63,2	63,0	38,0	37,2	41,6	41,1	42,6	42,7	31,3	31,6	32,3	32,3	34,1	34,4	35,2	35,1	
Zuidoost-Zuid-Holland	54,7	56,0	68,4	69,1	69,8	70,4	62,3	62,3	36,9	36,1	38,9	38,9	42,1	42,5	27,2	27,6	43,8	43,8	35,3	34,7	30,3	30,6	
Zeeland	60,7	62,9	67,8	70,2	74,0	74,9	63,0	64,3	36,2	36,2	39,0	39,7	40,4	41,5	28,3	28,7	35,8	35,5	34,0	35,3	34,4	36,0	
West-Noord-Brabant	53,7	55,1	67,8	68,8	66,2	66,8	63,9	64,3	40,0	39,8	38,1	38,3	38,3	38,9	28,0	28,3	20,6	20,5	31,0	31,8	34,4	35,2	
Midden-Noord-Brabant	58,0	58,9	69,8	70,1	69,2	69,4	63,9	63,8	41,0	40,5	42,8	42,7	41,0	41,3	29,0	29,2	23,6	23,5	36,4	36,8	36,3	36,5	
Noordoost-Noord-Brabant	58,9	59,6	71,9	72,3	73,9	74,2	66,4	66,4	41,2	40,7	45,9	45,8	45,1	45,3	30,6	30,8	20,5	20,4	38,9	39,2	40,8	40,9	

B.2 Vertrouwen in coropgebieden en grotere steden, voor en na correctie voor geslacht, leeftijd en opleiding, 2012/2017																							
	Medemens		Rechters		Politie		Leger		Banken		Grote bedrijven		Ambtenaren		Pers		Kerken		Tweede Kamer		EU		
	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na	voor	na									
	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie	correctie											
<b>Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant</b>																							
Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant	61,6	61,8	70,6	71,1	71,3	71,4	61,1	61,4	39,6	39,8	45,4	45,6	40,2	40,4	29,1	29,0	22,1	22,0	36,3	36,5	36,8	37,1	
Noord-Limburg	53,2	56,1	65,2	67,0	69,1	70,4	60,2	62,3	34,1	34,8	40,4	42,1	36,9	38,6	27,3	27,7	21,2	20,8	31,6	33,8	34,4	37,0	
Midden-Limburg	54,0	55,4	65,2	66,9	66,5	67,2	60,6	61,5	36,7	37,0	41,0	41,6	37,8	38,6	24,4	24,6	20,9	20,8	29,0	30,0	30,1	31,4	
Zuid-Limburg	53,3	55,0	63,8	65,8	64,5	65,1	58,0	59,2	36,3	36,6	38,9	40,0	37,1	38,1	28,6	28,8	21,0	20,7	28,0	29,2	34,3	35,8	
Flevoland	52,8	54,2	67,4	67,4	65,2	65,4	62,9	62,1	37,3	35,3	36,9	35,5	44,3	44,3	30,2	30,8	34,4	34,3	34,4	34,6	35,6	35,0	
<b>Grotere steden</b>																							
Amsterdam	63,6	58,0	79,0	73,6	70,9	68,8	60,4	57,5	36,0	36,3	37,1	35,2	51,8	49,2	40,4	39,3	27,1	27,7	46,2	42,6	49,7	46,0	
Rotterdam	53,7	67,7	66,6	66,5	66,4	65,5	62,1	38,9	37,7	41,3	39,6	45,8	45,2	33,4	33,6	30,3	30,5	35,4	34,9	40,5	39,3		
Den Haag	53,2	51,9	70,8	69,3	67,7	67,1	65,6	64,7	38,8	38,7	41,4	40,9	47,6	46,9	34,9	34,7	33,3	33,5	40,6	39,7	43,0	42,1	
Utrecht	69,5	62,3	82,8	75,3	74,5	71,8	64,9	60,5	35,0	34,8	38,6	35,6	53,2	49,5	36,5	35,3	25,2	26,0	50,1	45,5	51,9	46,7	
Eindhoven	61,6	59,9	74,5	72,8	75,3	74,9	59,8	59,0	39,7	39,8	45,3	44,6	47,4	46,8	29,8	29,4	23,8	24,0	40,4	39,3	39,9	38,9	
Groningen	69,0	63,4	81,7	74,9	73,7	71,6	65,0	60,8	34,0	35,0	41,7	38,2	49,2	46,0	35,5	32,8	32,3	32,9	42,4	38,5	49,3	44,5	
Tilburg	61,2	61,7	73,6	73,2	67,5	67,5	63,0	62,5	39,6	38,9	39,7	39,3	43,6	43,5	28,6	28,7	18,6	18,6	34,2	34,2	36,7	36,6	
Almere	51,1	51,9	68,5	67,7	62,3	62,4	63,8	62,0	39,0	36,3	37,3	35,0	46,9	46,5	30,8	31,5	25,6	25,6	34,4	34,2	38,3	36,8	
Breda	59,6	58,3	70,3	68,9	69,3	68,8	62,4	61,8	41,0	41,2	39,5	39,0	41,6	41,1	31,9	31,7	18,9	19,0	35,9	35,1	37,1	36,2	
Nijmegen	67,9	62,1	77,2	72,0	74,1	72,0	58,8	56,4	32,5	33,7	33,0	31,9	53,2	50,7	33,4	32,2	22,6	23,1	45,3	41,8	45,2	41,8	
Apeldoorn	60,5	60,2	67,6	68,1	67,7	67,5	59,6	60,0	37,9	38,5	38,5	39,3	41,7	41,8	28,8	28,6	29,8	29,7	31				

B: Trust in COROP-regions corrected for trust in cities in The Netherlands.

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
COROP-region	percentage of people with trust in the government	City	percentage of people with trust in the government		COROP-region corrected	City	percentage of people with trust in the government		
1	22,30	Amsterdam	46,20		Oost-Groninger / Delfzijl e.o.	Groningen	33,6		
2	38,00	Rotterdam	35,40		Overig Groninger				
3	33,40	Den Haag	40,60		Noord-Friesland				
4	31,70	Utrecht	50,10		Zuidwest-Friesland				
5	35,80	Enthoven	40,40		Zuidoost-Friesland				
6	38,00	Groninger	42,40		Noord-Drenthe				
7	27,60	Tilburg	34,20		Zuidoost-Drenthe				
8	29,20	Almere	34,40		Zuidwest-Drenthe	Zwolle	29,9		
9	35,90	Breda	35,90		Noord-Overijssel				
10	38,10	Nijmegen	45,30		Zuidwest-Overijssel				
11	39,90	Apeldoorn	31,80		Veluwe	Enschede	33,5		
12	35,10	Haarlem	36,60		Achterhoek	Apeldoorn	38,6		
13	33,00	Enschede	34,30		Arnhem/Nijmegen	Arnhem / Nijmegen	32,9		
14	38,80	Amerfoort	42,00		Zuidwest-Gelderland				
15	33,60	's-Hertogenbosch	42,00		Utrecht	Utrecht / Amerfoort	39,4		
16	40,50	Zaandam	33,10		Kop van Noord-Holland				
17	30,80	Arnhem	44,10		Almaar e.o.				
18	37,20	Haarlemmermeer	31,80		IJmond	Haarlem	34,4		
19	34,90	Dordrecht	32,00		Agel/Onestatie Haarlem				
20	35,50	Zwolle	40,70		Zaanstreek	Zaandam	33,9		
21	33,50	Leiden	49,30		Groot-Amsterdam	Amsterdam / Haarlemmermeer	45,2		
22	42,10	Zoetermeer	33,50		Het Gooi en Vechtstreek	Leiden	36,9		
23	42,60	Maaricht	32,80		Agel / Leiden en Bol'instreek	Den Haag / Zoetermeer	41,15		
24	40,20				Agel / S-Gravenhage				
25	39,10				Deiften en Westland				
26	37,20				Oost-Zuid-Holland	Rotterdam	32,8		
27	34,10				Groot-IJmond	Dordrecht	34		
28	33,00				Zuidoost-Zuid-Holland				
29	31,00				Zeeoland				
30	36,40				West-Noord-Brabant	Breda	26,1		
31	38,90				Midden-Noord-Brabant	Tilburg	38,6		
32	36,30				Noord-Noord-Brabant	's-Hertogenbosch	35,8		
33	31,60				Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant	Enthoven	32,2		
34	29,00				Noord-Limburg				
35	28,00				Midden-Limburg				
36	34,40				Zuid-Limburg	Maaricht	23,2		
37					Flevoland	Almere	34,4		

C: Share of populist votes per municipality & Yearly personal income per municipality

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Political trust Score</b>	<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Yearly personal income (X 1.000)</b>
Aa en Hunze	26,02	Appingedam	20,80
Assen	26,70	Bedum	21,90
Borger-Odoorn	34,81	Bellingwedde	20,60
Coevorden	30,98	Ten Boer	21,60
De Wolden	22,34	Delfzijl	21,00
Emmen	41,30	Groningen	21,40
Hoogeveen	34,04	Grootegast	19,60
Meppel	26,85	Haren	30,00
Midden-Drenthe	27,53	Hoogezand-Sappemeer	20,10
Noordenveld	25,18	Leek	21,80
Tynaarlo	20,07	Loppersum	21,30
Westerveld	24,26	Marum	21,60
Almere	33,99	Almere	23,50
Dronten	25,23	Stadskanaal	19,40
Lelystad	36,84	Slochteren	23,00
Noordoostpolder	24,86	Veendam	20,60
Urk	13,94	Vlagtwedde	19,80
Zeewolde	24,48	Zeewolde	24,10
Achtkarspelen	33,19	Winsum	21,70
Ameland	21,56	Zuidhorn	22,40
Dantumadiel	30,35	Dongeradeel	19,20
De Fryske Marren	24,97	Achtkarspelen	18,50
Dongeradeel	26,28	Ameland	20,50
Ferwerderadiel	26,43	het Bildt	19,60
Franekeradeel	27,06	Franekeradeel	20,60
Harlingen	33,07	Harlingen	20,60
Heerenveen	26,91	Heerenveen	22,20
Het Bildt	29,75	Kollumerland en Nieuwkruisland	19,10
Kollumerland en Nieuwkruisland	29,10	Leeuwarden	21,30
Leeuwarden	27,98	Leeuwarderadeel	21,50
Leeuwarderadeel	25,87	Ooststellingwerf	20,50
Littenseradiel	19,50	Opsterland	21,30
Menameradiel	24,99	Schiermonnikoog	23,80
Ooststellingwerf	30,91	Smallingerland	21,00
Opsterland	25,37	Terschelling	23,70
Schiermonnikoog	15,15	Vlieland	25,00
Smallingerland	28,36	Weststellingwerf	20,30
Súdwest-Fryslân	25,12	Assen	22,60
Terschelling	20,71	Coevorden	21,80

Tytsjerksteradiel	25,45	Emmen	20,60
Vlieland	19,70	Hoogeveen	20,10
Weststellingwerf	32,14	Meppel	22,60
Aalten	26,97	Littenseradiel	21,60
Apeldoorn	26,51	Almelo	20,40
Arnhem	29,31	Borne	23,60
Barneveld	17,45	Dalfsen	22,20
Berg en Dal	34,58	Deventer	22,80
Berkelland	27,14	Enschede	20,30
Beuningen	33,02	Haaksbergen	22,20
Bronckhorst	22,84	Hardenberg	20,30
Brummen	29,96	Kampen	20,40
Buren	29,52	Losser	21,70
Culemborg	28,90	Noordoostpolder	21,30
Doesburg	37,03	Oldenzaal	22,70
Doetinchem	30,65	Ommen	21,70
Druten	34,32	Raalte	22,20
Duiven	29,56	Staphorst	18,80
Ede	21,05	Tubbergen	21,30
Elburg	18,52	Urk	17,90
Epe	26,29	Wierden	22,60
Ermelo	19,08	Zwolle	23,50
Geldermalsen	27,67	Rijnwaarden	21,10
Harderwijk	24,70	Aalten	20,80
Hatterij	18,72	Apeldoorn	24,10
Heerde	24,06	Arnhem	22,90
Heumen	24,05	Barneveld	21,50
Lingewaal	26,69	Beuningen	24,80
Lingewaard	28,90	Brummen	23,70
Lochem	19,21	Buren	24,60
Maasdriel	34,82	Culemborg	24,20
Montferland	34,91	Doesburg	21,50
Neder-Betuwe	23,53	Doetinchem	22,50
Neerijnen	27,71	Druten	23,20
Nijkerk	22,49	Duiven	23,80
Nijmegen	25,71	Ede	22,90
Nunspeet	17,35	Elburg	21,00
Oldebroek	20,64	Epe	23,30
Oost Gelre	25,27	Ermelo	24,60
Oude IJsselstreek	32,29	Geldermalsen	24,80
Overbetuwe	25,92	Harderwijk	23,00
Putten	18,93	Hatterij	24,00
Renkum	20,23	Heerde	22,60
Rheden	28,56	Heumen	26,90
Rijnwaarden	40,34	Lochem	25,30

Rozendaal	10,40	Maasdriel	23,60
Scherpenzeel	18,67	Nijkerk	23,50
Tiel	36,21	Nijmegen	22,90
Voorst	22,80	Oldebroek	20,60
Wageningen	16,23	Putten	22,40
West Maas en Waal	34,25	Renkum	27,80
Westervoort	34,83	Rheden	23,90
Wijchen	31,81	Rozendaal	38,30
Winterswijk	26,85	Scherpenzeel	22,10
Zaltbommel	23,17	Tiel	22,30
Zevenaar	31,34	Voorst	23,80
Zutphen	28,26	Wageningen	22,60
Appingedam	40,64	Westervoort	22,60
Bedum	23,09	Winterswijk	20,90
Bellingwedde	43,73	Wijchen	23,70
De Marne	30,88	Zaltbommel	23,40
Delfzijl	40,59	Zevenaar	22,50
Eemmond	31,15	Zutphen	22,50
Groningen	21,32	Nunspeet	21,80
Grootevast	26,19	Dronten	22,50
Haren	14,68	Neerijnen	24,10
Hoogezand-Sappemeer	42,34	Amersfoort	25,90
Leek	27,64	Baarn	28,80
Loppersum	26,50	De Bilt	31,30
Marum	30,76	Bunnik	28,80
Menterwolde	44,67	Bunschoten	22,40
Oldambt	44,29	Eemnes	26,60
Pekela	53,48	Houten	28,20
Slochteren	29,70	Leusden	27,70
Stadskanaal	38,40	Lopik	22,80
Ten Boer	25,29	Montfoort	25,10
Veendam	43,36	Renswoude	22,80
Vlagentwede	41,20	Rhenen	23,30
Winsum	21,74	Soest	27,20
Zuidhorn	19,09	Utrecht	25,70
Beek	38,84	Veenendaal	22,40
Beesel	41,97	Woudenberg	23,70
Bergen	44,72	Wijk bij Duurstede	25,90
Brunssum	52,77	IJsselstein	26,00
Echt-Susteren	42,38	Zeist	29,30
Eijsden-Margraten	30,73	Nieuwegein	24,90
Gennep	39,02	Aalsmeer	27,00
Gulpen-Wittem	36,95	Alkmaar	24,30
Heerlen	51,55	Amstelveen	30,80
Horst aan de Maas	32,45	Amsterdam	26,90

Kerkrade	55,52	Beemster	26,90
Landgraaf	48,36	Bergen (NH.)	27,90
Leudal	33,90	Beverwijk	23,50
Maasgouw	39,13	Blaricum	39,70
Maastricht	36,94	Bloemendaal	40,90
Meerssen	36,10	Castricum	27,90
Mook en Middelaar	24,53	Diemen	24,80
Nederweert	34,50	Edam-Volendam	25,10
Nuth	38,38	Enkhuizen	22,80
Onderbanken	47,45	Haarlem	26,80
Peel en Maas	33,67	Haarlemmerliede en Spaarnwoude	27,40
Roerdalen	43,02	Haarlemmermeer	26,90
Roermond	41,13	Heemskerk	24,90
Schinnen	36,53	Heemstede	36,40
Simpelveld	43,68	Heerhugowaard	23,10
Sittard-Geleen	41,62	Heiloo	28,50
Stein	45,73	Den Helder	22,60
Vaals	42,63	Hilversum	28,00
Valkenburg aan de Geul	35,74	Hoorn	23,50
Venlo	42,49	Huizen	27,10
Venray	35,44	Landsmeer	28,40
Voerendaal	36,26	Langedijk	24,10
Weert	38,89	Laren	39,20
Aalburg	23,12	Medemblik	22,90
Alphen-Chaam	25,93	Oostzaan	26,60
Asten	29,79	Opmeer	22,80
Baarle-Nassau	31,98	Ouder-Amstel	31,40
Bergeijk	30,23	Purmerend	24,00
Bergen op Zoom	37,91	Schagen	23,60
Bernheze	31,69	Texel	22,10
Best	31,70	Uitgeest	26,20
Bladel	32,97	Uithoorn	26,40
Boekel	32,41	Velsen	25,20
Boxmeer	40,84	Weesp	26,60
Boxtel	32,22	Zandvoort	26,30
Breda	27,11	Zaanstad	23,20
Cranendonck	36,52	Alblasserdam	22,30
Cuijk	38,89	Barendrecht	27,40
Deurne	33,62	Drechterland	23,40
Dongen	32,24	Brielle	28,50
Drimmelen	33,72	Capelle aan den IJssel	24,50
Eersel	27,59	Delft	23,40
Eindhoven	32,38	Dordrecht	23,40
Etten-Leur	34,12	Gorinchem	23,90

Geertruidenberg	38,88	's-Gravenhage	24,40
Geldrop-Mierlo	34,41	Hardinxveld-Giessendam	21,90
Gemert-Bakel	35,83	Hellevoetsluis	26,40
Gilze en Rijen	35,65	Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht	25,20
Goirle	31,70	Stede Broec	22,20
Grave	35,08	Hillegom	25,20
Haaren	25,22	Katwijk	22,90
Halderberge	38,91	Krimpen aan den IJssel	24,40
Heeze-Leende	26,06	Leerdam	21,90
Helmond	43,14	Leiden	25,70
Heusden	33,66	Leiderdorp	27,80
Hilvarenbeek	24,97	Lisse	25,40
Laarbeek	35,26	Maassluis	23,80
Landerd	33,46	Nieuwkoop	25,40
Loon op Zand	34,17	Noordwijk	28,40
Meerijstad	32,69	Noordwijkerhout	24,60
Mill en Sint Hubert	37,77	Oegstgeest	34,20
Moerdijk	35,48	Oud-Beijerland	25,70
Nuenen, Gerwen en Nederwetten	24,34	Binnenmaas	26,60
Oirschot	29,53	Korendijk	24,80
Oisterwijk	26,46	Oudewater	25,10
Oosterhout	35,10	Papendrecht	24,90
Oss	41,63	Ridderkerk	23,90
Reusel-De Mierden	33,47	Rotterdam	22,30
Roosendaal	37,33	Rijswijk	26,60
Rucphem	54,78	Schiedam	22,40
s-Hertogenbosch	31,99	Sliedrecht	22,30
Sint Anthonis	31,69	Cromstrijen	26,60
Sint-Michielsgestel	29,55	Albrandswaard	29,10
Someren	33,22	Westvoorne	31,60
Son en Beugel	24,11	Strijen	25,40
Steenbergen	40,02	Vianen	24,20
Tilburg	33,18	Vlaardingenv	23,10
Uden	33,12	Voorschoten	30,50
Valkenswaard	35,22	Waddinxveen	24,30
Veldhoven	32,94	Wassenaar	43,10
Vught	23,76	Woerden	26,40
Waalre	24,60	Zoetermeer	25,30
Waalwijk	34,96	Zoeterwoude	26,40
Werkendam	26,78	Zwijndrecht	23,70
Woensdrecht	39,24	Borsele	23,00
Woudrichem	23,99	Goes	24,20
Zundert	32,65	West Maas en Waal	23,60

Aalsmeer	23,21	Hulst	24,20
Alkmaar	26,48	Kapelle	24,00
Amstelveen	20,20	Middelburg	23,40
Amsterdam	23,29	Giessenlanden	24,60
Beemster	20,47	Reimerswaal	21,10
Bergen	21,66	Zederik	23,30
Beverwijk	36,23	Terneuzen	23,60
Blaricum	19,74	Tholen	21,90
Bloemendaal	11,95	Veere	23,80
Castricum	20,00	Vlissingen	22,60
Den Helder	36,12	Lingewaal	23,90
Diemen	26,97	Tytsjerksteradiel	21,40
Drechterland	25,01	Aalburg	22,40
Edam-Volendam	34,56	Asten	22,90
Enkhuizen	30,69	Baarle-Nassau	23,50
Gooise Meren	17,36	Bergen op Zoom	24,80
Haarlem	24,03	Best	26,10
Haarlemmerliede en Spaarnwoude	23,86	Boekel	21,50
Haarlemmermeer	26,98	Boxmeer	23,70
Heemskerk	31,24	Boxtel	23,90
Heemstede	13,81	Breda	25,60
Heerhugowaard	28,65	Deurne	22,30
Heiloo	17,29	Pekela	18,90
Hilversum	24,56	Dongen	23,60
Hollands Kroon	29,74	Eersel	25,70
Hoorn	29,53	Eindhoven	24,60
Huizen	22,70	Etten-Leur	24,20
Koggenland	23,43	Geertruidenberg	24,10
Landsmeer	28,38	Gilze en Rijen	23,40
Langedijk	24,30	Goirle	25,20
Laren	15,87	Grave	23,60
Medemblik	26,81	Haaren	26,00
Oostzaan	31,43	Helmond	21,90
Opmeer	23,65	's-Hertogenbosch	25,70
Ouder-Amstel	19,26	Heusden	24,10
Purmerend	36,32	Hilvarenbeek	24,80
Schagen	24,60	Loon op Zand	23,80
Stede Broec	32,25	Mill en Sint Hubert	21,90
Texel	22,26	Nuenen, Gerwen en Nederwetten	28,50
Uitgeest	22,85	Oirschot	24,80
Uithoorn	25,90	Oisterwijk	26,80
Velsen	32,56	Oosterhout	24,20
Waterland	23,59	Oss	23,10
Weesp	25,46	Rucphen	22,40

Wijdemeren	21,06	Sint-Michielsgestel	25,80
Wormerland	28,50	Someren	22,20
Zaanstad	36,05	Son en Breugel	27,60
Zandvoort	30,21	Steenbergen	24,50
Almelo	37,84	Waterland	27,90
Borne	25,24	Tilburg	22,20
Dalfsen	18,22	Uden	23,30
Deventer	28,77	Valkenswaard	24,40
Dinkelland	20,65	Veldhoven	26,50
Enschede	34,21	Vught	28,80
Haaksbergen	27,10	Waalre	29,80
Hardenberg	24,62	Waalwijk	23,20
Hellendoorn	23,63	Werkendam	23,30
Hengelo	31,10	Woensdrecht	24,90
Hof van Twente	23,08	Woudrichem	24,40
Kampen	23,93	Zundert	23,20
Losser	31,65	Wormerland	25,10
Oldenzaal	28,52	Onderbanken	22,80
Olst-Wijhe	23,46	Landgraaf	22,60
Ommen	18,03	Beek	24,80
Raalte	20,39	Beesel	21,70
Rijssen-Holten	17,48	Bergen (L.)	21,70
Staphorst	13,50	Brunssum	21,30
Steenwijkerland	26,61	Gennep	22,70
Tubbergen	20,45	Heerlen	21,40
Twenterand	29,09	Kerkrade	20,90
Wierden	20,09	Maastricht	22,90
Zwartewaterland	18,25	Meerssen	26,50
Zwolle	21,58	Mook en Middelaar	28,10
Amersfoort	23,08	Nederweert	22,70
Baarn	21,57	Nuth	25,00
Bunnik	15,74	Roermond	22,70
Bunschoten	19,60	Schinnen	25,00
De Bilt	18,27	Simpelveld	23,10
De Ronde Venen	21,41	Stein	23,90
Eemnes	21,87	Vaals	22,00
Houten	20,28	Venlo	21,90
IJsselstein	26,78	Venray	22,60
Leusden	17,98	Voerendaal	25,80
Lopik	25,36	Weert	23,60
Montfoort	21,42	Valkenburg aan de Geul	24,60
Nieuwegein	33,41	Lelystad	22,10
Oudewater	20,11	Horst aan de Maas	23,00
Renswoude	18,63	Oude IJsselstreek	20,90

Rhemen	23,36	Teylingen	28,40
Soest	24,82	Utrechtse Heuvelrug	28,90
Stichtse Vecht	24,26	Oost Gelre	22,40
Utrecht	20,20	Koggenland	23,50
Utrechtse Heuvelrug	19,25	Lansingerland	28,20
Veenendaal	24,97	Leudal	24,10
Vianen	29,76	Maasgouw	24,60
Wijk bij Duurstede	26,16	Eemsmond	19,70
Woerden	20,34	Gemert-Bakel	22,00
Woudenberg	17,13	Halderberge	24,10
Zeist	21,53	Heeze-Leende	26,90
Borsele	24,36	Laarbeek	22,80
Goes	26,34	De Marne	20,70
Hulst	37,30	Reusel-De Mierden	22,80
Kapelle	22,03	Roerdalen	23,70
Middelburg	24,68	Roosendaal	23,60
Noord-Beveland	29,42	Schouwen-Duiveland	24,20
Riemerswaal	23,19	Aa en Hunze	24,50
Schouwen-Duiveland	25,70	Borger-Odoorn	21,90
Sluis	33,19	Cuijk	22,50
Terneuzen	36,05	Landerd	22,50
Tholen	28,04	De Wolden	22,90
Veere	17,99	Noord-Beveland	23,40
Vlissingen	36,18	Wijdmeren	28,90
Alblasserdam	27,66	Noordenveld	23,60
Albrandswaard	31,23	Twenterand	19,50
Alphen aan den Rijn	24,86	Westerveld	23,10
Barendrecht	29,68	Sint Anthonis	23,20
Binnenmaas	27,39	Lingewaard	23,80
Bodegraven-Reeuwijk	20,86	Cranendonck	23,60
Brielle	33,43	Steenwijkerland	21,20
Capelle aan den IJssel	32,38	Moerdijk	24,80
Cromstrijen	28,19	Echt-Susteren	23,70
Delft	24,36	Sluis	23,40
Dordrecht	34,36	Drimmelen	25,00
Giessenlanden	21,21	Bernheze	23,40
Goeree-Overflakkee	26,86	Ferwerderadiel	19,20
Gorinchem	32,14	Alphen-Chaam	25,00
Gouda	28,02	Bergeijk	23,80
Hardinxveld-Giessendam	20,19	Bladel	23,60
Hellevoetsluis	40,07	Gulpen-Witterm	24,20
Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht	25,12	Tynaarlo	26,00
Hillegom	27,78	Midden-Drenthe	22,30
Kaag en Braassem	24,39	Overbetuwe	24,20
Katwijk	24,79	Hof van Twente	23,00

Korendijk	25,63	Neder-Betuwe	20,50
Krimpen aan den IJssel	26,62	Rijssen-Holten	20,30
Krimpenerwaard	24,03	Geldrop-Mierlo	24,40
Lansingerland	23,04	Olst-Wijhe	22,70
Leerdam	32,42	Dinkelland	22,10
Leiden	23,07	Westland	24,40
Leiderdorp	23,70	Midden-Delfland	27,30
Leidschendam-Voorburg	23,93	Berkelland	21,70
Lisse	23,34	Bronckhorst	22,90
Maassluis	35,16	Sittard-Geleen	23,40
Midden-Delftland	18,04	Kaag en Braassem	25,60
Molenwaard	17,88	Dantumadiel	18,80
Nieuwkoop	24,42	Zuidplas	26,30
Nissewaard	43,19	Peel en Maas	23,20
Noordwijk	25,31	Oldambt	20,20
Noordwijkerhout	26,56	Zwartewaterland	20,60
Oegstgeest	15,06	Súdwest-Fryslân	21,00
Oud-Beijerland	25,95	Bodegraven-Reeuwijk	26,10
Papendrecht	29,50	Eijsden-Margraten	25,50
Pijnacker-Nootdorp	23,85	Stichtse Vecht	28,30
Ridderkerk	33,78	Menameradiel	21,50
Rijswijk	32,24	Hollands Kroon	22,70
Rotterdam	36,97	Leidschendam-Voorburg	29,30
Schiedam	43,91	Goeree-Overflakkee	24,20
s-Gravenhage	29,67	Pijnacker-Nootdorp	27,30
Sliedrecht	26,75	Molenwaard	22,50
Strijen	29,29	Nissewaard	24,80
Teylingen	21,20	Krimpenerwaard	24,30
Vlaardingen	39,70	De Fryske Marren	21,60
Voorschoten	19,52	Gooise Meren	33,80
Waddinxveen	24,63	Berg en Dal	23,50
Wassenaar	20,74	Meierijstad	23,20
Westland	28,51	Montferland	21,60
Westvoorne	28,18	Menterwolde	21,10
Zederik	17,90		
Zoetermeer	31,62		
Zoeterwoude	22,97		
Zuidplas	24,77		
Zwijndrecht	34,40		

D: Output t-test paired samples: populism and trust

**T-Test**

**Notes**

Output Created		10-JUN-2019 14:18:29
Comments		
Input	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	40
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each analysis are based on the cases with no missing or out-of-range data for any variable in the analysis.
Syntax	T-TEST PAIRS=Nonpopulisticvotes WITH Politicaltrust (PAIRED) /CRITERIA=CI(.9500) /MISSING=ANALYSIS.	
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,00
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01

**Paired Samples Statistics**

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	Non-populistic votes	71,2867177500 00000	40	5,85534998288 7431	,925812122167 611
	Political trust	34,4575000000 00010	40	4,59017275246 1055	,725770037571 060

**Paired Samples Correlations**

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	Non-populistic votes & Political trust	40	,682	,000

### Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences			95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	Lower
Pair 1	Non-populistic votes - Political trust	36,8292177499 99984	4,32453479671 4819	,683768988913 604	35,4461644247 21914

### Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences			
		95% Confidence Interval of the Difference			
		Upper	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1	Non-populistic votes - Political trust	38,212271075278 050	53,862	39	,000

E: Output multiple linear regression: populism

## Regression

### Notes

Output Created	23-MAY-2019 11:59:09	
Comments		
Input	Data	X:\My Documents\BachelorGemeen teSPSS.csv
	Active Dataset	DataSet2
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	383
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for any variable used.

Syntax		REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT Score /METHOD=ENTER bart.csv.DISTANCE Gemiddeldpersoonlijkinkome nperinwonerx1000.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,00
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,02
	Memory Required	3056 bytes
	Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots	0 bytes

### Variables Entered/Removed<sup>a</sup>

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Gemiddeldperso onlijkinkomenper inwonerx1000, bart.csv.DISTAN CE <sup>b</sup>	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Score

b. All requested variables entered.

### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,372 <sup>a</sup>	,138	,134	7,17095

a. Predictors: (Constant),

Gemiddeldpersoonlijkinkomenperinwonerx1000, bart.csv.DISTANCE

### ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3134,542	2	1567,271	30,478	,000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	19540,548	380	51,422		

Total	22675,090	382			
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a. Dependent Variable: Score

b. Predictors: (Constant), Gemiddeldpersoonlijkinkomenperinwonerx1000, bart.csv.DISTANCE

### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients Beta	
1	(Constant)	46,239	3,731		12,394
	bart.csv.DISTANCE	1,153E-5	,000	,083	1,486
	Gemiddeldpersoonlijkinkome nperinwonerx1000	-,773	,134	-,321	-5,750

### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Sig.
1	(Constant)	,000
	bart.csv.DISTANCE	,138
	Gemiddeldpersoonlijkinkomenperinwonerx1000	,000

a. Dependent Variable: Score

F: Output T-test for paired samples: COROP and city

## T-Test

### Notes

Output Created	30-MAY-2019 11:08:17	
Comments		
Input	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	23
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics for each analysis are based on the cases with no missing or out-of-range data for any variable in the analysis.

Syntax		T-TEST PAIRS=Politicaltrustcity WITH PoliticaltrustCOROP (PAIRED) /CRITERIA=CI(.9500) /MISSING=ANALYSIS.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,02
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01

### Paired Samples Statistics

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	Political trust city	38,0000000000	23	5,45435605731	1,13731185735
		00000		7858	0290
	Political trust COROP	34,4473684208	23	4,43778900939	,925342975001
		69560		0377	961

### Paired Samples Correlations

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	Political trust city & Political trust COROP	23	,367	,085

### Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences			95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	Lower
Pair 1	Political trust city - Political trust COROP	3,55263157913	5,62928093338	1,17378621538	1,11834795956
		0441	3671	7159	2154

### Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences			
		95% Confidence Interval of the Difference			
		Upper	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1	Political trust city - Political trust COROP	5,9869151986987	3,027	22	,006
		28			

G: Output multi linear regression: COROP-regions incl. city political trust

## Regression

Notes		
Output Created		27-MAY-2019 16:53:36
Comments		
Input	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	40
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for any variable used.
Syntax		REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT TweedeKamervoor /METHOD=ENTER Inkomen Afstand.
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,06
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,07
	Memory Required	3088 bytes
	Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots	0 bytes

### Variables Entered/Removed<sup>a</sup>

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Afstand, Inkomen <sup>b</sup>	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Tweede Kamer voor

b. All requested variables entered.

### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,628 <sup>a</sup>	,394	,361	3,66881391669 9580

a. Predictors: (Constant), Afstand, Inkomen

### ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	323,691	2	161,845	12,024	,000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	498,027	37	13,460		
	Total	821,718	39			

a. Dependent Variable: Tweede Kamer voor

b. Predictors: (Constant), Afstand, Inkomen

### Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	21,214	8,530		2,487	,018
	Inkomen	,657	,312	,376	2,108	,042
	Afstand	-2,343E-5	,000	-,305	-1,713	,095

a. Dependent Variable: Tweede Kamer voor

H: Output linear regression COROP: excl. city political trust

## Regression

### Notes

Output Created	27-MAY-2019 17:05:21	
Comments		
Input	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	40
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.

Cases Used		Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for any variable used.
Syntax	REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT TweedeKamerexcl /METHOD=ENTER Afstand Inkomen.	
Resources	Processor Time	00:00:00,02
	Elapsed Time	00:00:00,01
	Memory Required	3088 bytes
	Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots	0 bytes

### Variables Entered/Removed<sup>a</sup>

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	Inkomen, Afstand <sup>b</sup>	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: Tweede Kamer excl.

b. All requested variables entered.

### Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,610 <sup>a</sup>	,372	,338	4,05063801972 6430

a. Predictors: (Constant), Inkomen, Afstand

### ANOVA<sup>a</sup>

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	358,894	2	179,447	10,937	,000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	607,084	37	16,408		
	Total	965,978	39			

a. Dependent Variable: Tweede Kamer excl.

b. Predictors: (Constant), Inkomen, Afstand

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	24,122	9,418		2,561	,015
	Afstand	-3,133E-5	,000	-,377	-2,075	,045
	Inkomen	,539	,344	,284	1,566	,126

a. Dependent Variable: Tweede Kamer excl.