

Understanding migration motives to alleviate societal ageing challenges in the Netherlands

Master Thesis

By Rick Heeren

Supervisor: Isabel Palomares Linares

University of Groningen
Master Population Studies
(S3859991)

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Introduction

As a result of ageing and dejuvenation of the population, the sustainability of the social security systems has been challenged. The Netherlands -the same as many other industrialized countries- is undergoing this significant demographic transition with low fertility rates combined with the extension of life expectancy (Alvarado & Creedy, 1998). Population ageing means that the share of elderly people in the total population is increasing. In the Netherlands, since the latter half of the previous century, the share of people who are over 65 years has doubled, while those over 80 years has almost quadrupled during this period. It is expected that in 2040 more than a quarter of the population will be made of elderly people (CBS, 2019). Over this same period the share of young people in the total population has also decreased, this is known as dejuvenation. Declining birth rates are the main influence of this phenomenon, which was the result of significant secularization, emancipation, and the high availability of contraceptives during this period (Zwiers, 2019). Partly because of these ageing and dejuvenation processes, the structure and sustainability of the Dutch pension system are under scrutiny: as there are more and more people who will utilise these provisions, while there are fewer and fewer contributors, or those in the working age groups (Garssen, 2011). There are additional contributing factors besides demographic ones. The most recent economic recession is an important one: because of poor investments and very low interest rates, pension funds will have insufficient reserves to meet future payments. This has consequences for both current and future pensioners, as retirement benefits may not be able to be adjusted to inflation or could even be shortened (Putters & Hoff, 2016). In addition to funding pensions, other social security's such as health services and aged care are also leading economic concerns. Concerns that have been partly demographically driven, with increasing longevity, but also because of escalating health care costs due to more expensive medical technologies and pharmaceuticals.

Besides raising the retirement age and labour productivity, migration can play an important role in elevating problems associated with societal ageing. However, migration and social security systems do not always comply, at least in common opinion. As some argue that migrants only strain the treasury and besides are a deterrent to the solidarity welfare states are entrusted on. Regular migration to the Netherlands has in the past, broadly speaking, been characterised by lower educated labour migrants, or 'guestworkers', in the 1960s and 1970s, but also afterwards. The 1980s particularly saw an increase in family migration, as migrants reunited with their families. Current migration patterns are the following: where from the 1980s onwards, family migration was the main reason to come to the Netherlands, labour migration has since 2016 become the foremost motive (CBS, 2020). And although asylum migration peaked in 2015, it is a far smaller, but significant, cohort than those who come for labour or family incentives. The free movement of workers is a fundamental principle of Schengen agreement, and it is mainly Eastern Europeans coming to Western Europe who give substance to this free movement (Kivisto & Fasit, 2009). And in the Netherlands, it is citizens from these Eastern European countries who have seen the largest influxes into the country in recent years. In addition, new migrants from Asia, and particularly India, have come to the Netherlands. The Netherlands has invested significantly into attracting highly skilled migrants from outside the EU, an example of this is the 'knowledge-worker scheme' dating from 2004 (Kremer, 2016). The only requirement for the regulation is having an above average salary of more than 50.000 euros. Often these individuals are employed in IT, business, and services industries.

Despite this policy approach of attracting highly skilled workers, migrants are on average still less educated than natives in the Netherlands (CBS, 2020). Compared to other developed countries' migrant populations; migrants in Canada and Australia have on average an even higher level of

education than the native population (OECD, 2019). How long people stay in the hosting country is another important factor in migrants' contribution to social welfare regimes. Of all labour migrants registered in the Netherlands in 2000, more than half (55 percent) were no longer present in the Netherlands in 2007 and the departure rate is even higher for EU migrants (CBS, 2019). These are all important policy implications.

Policy- and decision making in the field of migration is, and should be, done on the basis of understanding how and why migration takes place, who these migrants are, and what the impact of the policy will be. Population statistics offer an opportunity to gain knowledge and insight into who has entered the country, as well as who has departed it. Furthermore, representative statistics enable an understanding whether generalisations about characteristics or activities of particular migrant groups are accurate or are simply stereotypes. Also, it comprehends if perceived problems are indeed as compelling that a policy response is desired. Or how many people a policy change is likely to affect. Although migration statistics are of quality and of great quantity, the data on which most quantitative academic migration research is based is often less complex and generic, distinguishing few reasons for migration and legal channels through which people move (Sumption, 2018). Migrant motivations are often complex, however, and may not be easily captured by one category, for instance, when migrants from the same country have different reasons for migration (Zwysen, 2019). It is important to differentiate between migrant motivations in migration policy. For example, when there is to decide whom to grant or refuse admission into the country to, then all migrants cannot be treated as interchangeable or homogenous. People move under very different circumstances, from refugees and asylum seekers to students who move abroad, people who are reunited with their families, or employees and entrepreneurs. The same applies for the academic field, where acknowledging the heterogeneity of migration would lead to more insightful analysis and allow for stronger policy recommendations (Niedomysl, 2011).

Most quantitative research on migration concerns with the economic impact of migration in the host country, mainly concerning labour market integration and public finance expenses. Almost all research defines migrants based on country of origin (often split into groups, for example EU and non-EU migrants) and the year of arrival. Some studies are able to differentiate by categories of admission into the country, however, this will not always reflect the actual motivation as such a category is shaped by the legal framework of the host country (Zwysen, 2019). When combining all migrants into such undifferentiated groups, it could be particularly difficult for policymaking to adjust migration criteria, because many have very different backgrounds and have entered the country for different reasons.

This study will thus focus on different contemporary migration patterns in the Netherlands, examining their specific reasons for migration and what possible effect these migrants can have on population ageing. The main research question is: *'What impact do migrants have on the alleviation of challenges associated with societal ageing in the Netherlands?'*

Specifically, the research question has been open-endedly stated, as this study will have a more explorative approach to it. Different migrant groups will be explored and analysed, among other things on the basis of their nationality and reason for migration. By examining their migration patterns, this study will try to find greater understanding, new insights, and nuances between different migrant groups and captivate whether they can influence societal ageing. To do this, this research will rely on an existing framework to classify and divide contemporary migration patterns by Engbersen et al. (2011). The explorative approach of this study allows for a preliminary analysis of the larger data set whereupon sub questions and hypotheses can be drawn up as a result of the first analyses of the migration data beforehand.

The first part of this study will build up a theoretical framework by discussing patterns of migration and their motives, whether migration has perceived benefits for societal ageing, and how this translates into migration policy. The second part will then present the preliminary data analysis of migrants' main motives, classified by nationality, whereupon hypotheses on migrant groups' impact on ageing is provided. The third part will present more empirical findings which will try to answer the hypotheses deducted from the analysis. The final part discusses the consequences of the findings for the debate on migration and societal ageing.

Theoretical framework

Typology for contemporary migration motives

The development of a typology alongside the data analysis can be an effective means to create a theoretical structure to research. Engbersen et al. (2011) have created a model which tries to captivate the ideal-typical patterns of contemporary migration by mapping out today's diversity in migration patterns, shown in *figure 1*. Different migration patterns exist depending on the migrants' bond with its host and native country. Because of modern communication methods and the higher mobility of migrants, people are less tied to one place. Another important factor here is the specific functioning of European labour markets, which offers different possibilities to different groups of labour migrants. As a result, it is rational for some migrants to temporarily work in the Netherlands and then return to the country of origin. For those who manage to acquire a stable job or contract in the Netherlands, it might be more worthwhile to permanently settle here. A final factor lies with the bonds migrants retain with their native country and their resulting obligation to their personal relations and kin, which can encourage frequent return. It is obvious that the disappearance of borders in the enlarged EU and the free mobility of labour have facilitated a diversity in migration patterns. Engbersen et al. (2011) distinguishes four different ideal-types migration patterns which reflect these important bonds with migrants' host and native country: circular migration, transnational migration, settled migration, and footloose migration.

The first pattern is the circular, temporary, migration. The term circular migration is used to describe cyclical temporary migration, where migrants repeatedly leave and then return to their country of origin. A subset of circular migration patterns is seasonal migration, these are programs where migrants are employed for only part of a year, because the work they perform depends on season conditions (OECD, 1998). Seasonal migrants typically migrate to provide agricultural or hospitality labour services in the on-season and return to their country of origin in the off-season. Engbersen et al. (2011) identifies these people as having migrated more often at a higher age, therefore being more likely to have a partner and/or children in their country of origin.

The second pattern is transnational or bi-national migration. This concerns migrants who are relatively stronger rooted in the Netherlands but at the same time have strong ties with their home country. Transnational migration is defined as a process of movement and settlement across international borders in which individuals maintain or build multiple networks of connection to their country of origin while at the same time settling in a new country (Fouron & Glick-Schiller, 2001). In this pattern it is important to underline that those migrants and their families continue to have important relationships with their home countries, even though they migrated to another country. Transnational immigrants frequently travel to their home country and/or send remittances, while at the same time incorporating themselves in their host country's society (Upegui-Hernandez, 2014). Transnational perspectives have also been associated with diaspora literature. Where diasporas are formed as networks or organizations of a particular cultural group which expresses their identity as a transnational group, exhibiting some level of self-consciousness about belonging to a community spanning border (Levitt, 2000). Diasporic and transnational perspectives acknowledge that immigrants participate both in their home countries while also they are being incorporated into their host country. Engbersen et al. (2011) relates it to migrants who are rooted in their native country as well as in the host country. Within their migrant typology, they account transnational migrants being those who act fairly independently because they are for instance less bounded by family obligation and other commitment in either country. Transnational migrants therefore tend to be mostly young and highly skilled with unpredictably migratory habits.

A third pattern is settled or established migration, this covers those people with a migration background who have permanently established themselves in the host country, and most often speak the language. These individuals are relatively the most integrated of all other categories. Engbersen et al. (2011) notes that these settling migrants often have children in the Netherlands, with a partner that doesn't live in their native country or have migrated here for such family purposes. Also, established migrants more often are higher educated compared to the other migration patterns. Migrating at a younger age also increases the chances of settling in the country, strongly for underaged migrants but also so for young adults.


The final pattern is footloose migration, this relates to migrants who act fairly independently because they are less bound by obligations and commitments in either their country (Engbersen et al., 2013). This group has much weaker attachment to the host country and their country of origin, they are therefore less integrated in Dutch society and hardly speak the language or have regular contact with natives. It is also more difficult to follow this group as Engbersen et al. (2013) notes that many footloose migrants (but also some circular migrants) do not register in the Dutch population register and are therefore systematically overlooked in studies based on the official population statistics. Footloose migration is concentrated among migrants who started to migrate when they were still relatively young, and who have not been in the Netherlands for a long time. They also do not intend to stay in the Netherlands for a long period of time.

There is an underlying issue of determining different migration groups within the various patterns of migration. Which migrant group, with which characteristics will predominantly wind up in which typology, is a question to be asked. To summarize, Engbersen et al. (2013) assume in their study that lower skilled migrants seem to end up in circular quadrant, while better-education migrants are more presented in the transnational and established quadrant. This is because the latter is able to attain a stable position in the destination country, thanks to their assumably higher human capital, which would generally concern relatively successful migrants. The footloose quadrant seems more applicable to highly skilled migrants, because their high competences would allow them more easily

to choose their where they want to establish themselves, and to young migrants who have less tendency to already settle down.

Figure 1

Migration pattern model, “Migration split in four”.



Note: adapted from Engbersen et al. (2011).

Benefits or costs of migration

Different patterns and bonds of migrants exist, can occur beside each other and can change over time. No longer, the one-sided image of a migrant as a lower educated ‘guestworker’ holds true to itself. Higher educated single migrants come temporarily to the country, or people who often travel between the Netherlands and their country of origin and are not sure yet if they will settle. These new, diverse patterns of migration might make it even more challenging to think about the future and sustainability of social welfare systems. By some, migrants are only seen as a financial burden, or only immigrate to enjoy the hosting countries’ social benefits. In computational financial studies, all effects considered, ‘non-western’ migrants are indeed detrimental to the treasury. In 2003, Roodenburg et al. measured the individual costs on healthcare, education, pensions and social securities were about 43.000 euro per migrant. On the request of the xenophobic PVV party, the Nyfer-raport (2010) calculated the costs to be between 40.000 and 50.000 euros for every ‘non-western’ migrant. However, highly skilled and higher educated migrants do actually make a net positive contribution, often contributing even more than the native population.

In other European countries, migrants are also an expense, like in Denmark and Sweden, for the latter this was only true from the end of the ninetens when heavy industry disappeared (Gerdes & Wadensjö, 2012). In the United Kingdom, computational studies to the costs of migration, gave both positive and negative outcomes (MAC, 2012). According to Australia’s own Treasury Department, migrants were an important net contributor to its treasury (Commonwealth of Australia, 2019).

Lucassen & Lucassen (2011) note that often in such reports on the costs of migration, unlike in the public sector, private employers often benefit financially from labour migrants, especially in sectors where there are labour shortages. They also note that these calculations can be quite narrow in their measurement: often only the cost and profits are included which are directly linked to public finances,

while for example missing general taxes migrants expend while consuming (consumption tax/VAT). Moreover, what is often not considered are migrants' contributions to innovation and economic growth. Particularly the diversity of higher skilled migrants contributes to innovation, especially if they have so-called strategic important skills: possession of knowledge and skills that suit the sector specific economy (George et al., 2012). Besides, migration can also help improve trade relations and diffusion of knowledge. And migration helps with the before mentioned benefits of solving labour shortages in specific sectors.

The cost of migration is largely determined by the course of an individual's socio-economic integration and participation in the labour market (Kremer, 2016). Many western European countries, including the Netherlands, have in fact struggled to equalise migrants', and their children's, socio-economic levels to those of the native population, particularly when compared to other receiving countries such as Canada and Australia (OECD, 2012). Unemployment is also significantly higher among people with a migration background compared to natives. Partly this can be explained by the relatively lower levels of education of parents. However, studies to the socioeconomics of migrants, as well as the earlier described studies, are particularly focussed on the cost of the migrant type who historically came to the country. Dutch studies have mainly focused on the generation of migrants from the 'classic migration countries' (Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, Suriname & the Antilles), who came to the Netherlands from the 1960s onwards. It goes without saying, that it important to study more recent patterns of migration, particularly now migration from within the EU has come into the forefront.

Fertility

Declining birth rates have been a significant contributor to societal ageing in the Netherlands. It is notable that women migrants often have higher fertility levels than the indigenous population, potentially negating ageing effects. The same is true for the Netherlands, where in 2019 native Dutch women had a total fertility rate (TFR) of 1,57, while Dutch women with a migration background had a TFR of around 1,59. There is a difference in the TFR for women from different national backgrounds: western migrants have a lower-than-average TFR of around 1,34, while non-western migrant women have a TFR of around 1,76 (CBS, 2021a). Given the fertility differences between migrants' native country and host country, competing views on the impact of migration on fertility exist. On the one hand it is assumed that *socialisation* in the country of origin determines migrants' levels of fertility, while the *adaptation* hypothesis suggests that migrants will show similar levels of fertility as native women within some year of residency (Kulu, 2005). When examining TFR levels of first- and second-generation migrants in the Netherlands, a convergence can be observed to levels of the native population, both for western and non-western migrant women (CBS, 2021a), offering some evidence for the adaptation theory. In this theory the convergence of TFR levels can be triggered by two primary channels: cultural factors and/or socio-economic conditions (Milweski, 2007). This same author finds a similar convergence of TFR levels across migrant generations in West Germany. However, when women's socio-demographic factors are controlled, the fertility differential disappears, where the crucial variable is the educational attainment of the women. Van Nimwegen & Erf (2010) note that the convergence of fertility of migrant groups in the Netherlands to the national average can be regarded as a dimension of integration and therefore seemingly supporting the adaptation hypothesis. They identify the migrant's region of origin, their socio-economic characteristics, and the duration of stay as being significant factors in fertility levels. De Beer et al. (2020) argues that the relatively higher TFR among non-western migrants in the Netherlands is mainly the result of these women being on average much younger, and therefore more likely to have children than native women. Beside the importance of age, the absolute number of migrants in the

country or region is also significant, and the composition of the group of migrants. Are there, for example, mainly labour migrants who are more likely to leave after some time or mainly family or asylum migrants, who stay for longer periods.

Pressured welfare state?

However, an argument can be made whether migration and welfare securities are actually conflicting issues. Because migrants come to countries where they can make use of social provisions and benefits. As a result, they would not only strain the treasury, but also weaken the solidarity welfare state are entrusted upon, because of the appearances of ‘outsiders. Whether this truly occurs is a matter of scientific and social debate. The arrival of migration does not undermine it as a whole, but some consent that strangers are not always allowed to participate on the same basis. In the Netherlands, there is not a large group who wants to completely exclude migrants from social regimes, but the vast majority (82 percent) do believe that conditions should be attached to access welfare redistribution (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012). Different migration patterns also play an important role: whether employed, higher educated, and having the same social attitudes, increases approval. And it is not the absolute number of migrants in a country which correlates to a greater desire for exclusion, but the pace at which migration occurs (Hooghe et al., 2019 & Van der Waal et al., 2013).

An important term in the migration and welfare state debate is the welfare magnet theory, or ‘social benefits tourism’, where it is hypothesized, first by American economist Borjas (1999), that the welfare state functions as a strong pulling force for migrants. Although much research has been done on his hypothesis in both America and Europe, the results are very mixed, and with particularly scarce empirical evidence; Giulietti (2014), gives an overview and himself finds no evidence for the theory. In the Netherlands, a simple argument can be made against the magnet theory, as migrant workers cannot apply for such benefits without ever having worked in the country, else risking losing their residency permit. At least for labour migrants, the availability of work seems therefore to be more critical than the presence of welfare regimes. The demand for labour in different segments of the labour market is a crucial pull factor for migrants. In addition, other important economic, political, demographic, social networks and social push factors do exist (De Haas, 2010). But migrants particularly immigrate to countries where economic growth can be found. To be more resilient to competition from low-wage countries, the Netherlands, and Europe, are mostly committed to their developed knowledge economies. The attraction of highly skilled workers is an important part of this commitment. This could mean that many lower paid jobs would simply disappear, but the contrary seems to be true. Sassen (1991) already predicted that globalization would create more service jobs, especially in the global cities, and particularly at the bottom of the labour market. The growth of highly skilled work accords with the demand for lower skilled services. The dual labour market theory explains that the demand in advanced economies for such lower paid jobs exists, and why the applications are hardly filled by local workers, enhancing lower skilled migration (Piore, 1997 & Arango, 2019). This also corresponds in Dutch large cities, where an extensive service economy has indeed developed for lower skilled workers, and many migrants find employment (Van der Waal, 2009). However, notably is that in the Netherlands, the number of paid informal caregivers -a form of employment which is imminent to dramatically increase-, is comparably low; resulting in the fact that relatively few migrants work in the healthcare sector. This differs from other developed countries, where the increasing informalization and privatization of healthcare has led to an explosive growth of migrant domestic workers (van Hooren, 2012). Important to recognize is the sometimes-precarious environment lower-skilled migrants find themselves in, as their position in the labour market can be prone to exploitation. Many new migrants are temporarily appointed, often finding employment

through agencies and in specific sectors, particularly in the Netherlands in agriculture construction industries.

Translation modern migration policy

Given financial and social tension in the Netherlands, aiming for a mix of higher and lower educated migrant population seems more appropriate than retaining the current more unbalanced distribution. Changing migration policy however is difficult, because the Netherlands has committed itself to European Union and its rights of free movement of persons. As a result, admission policy of EU citizens is de facto determined by the situation on the labour market. The agreements, laws and institutions of the labour market can diminish or accelerate immigration and streamline the patterns of migration -high or lower educated, temporary, or permanent, settled, or footloose- coming to the Netherlands. Also, better control of employers and employment agencies, raising (minimum) wages or discouraging contract flexibility can influence the degree and form of migration. As without flexible contracts there are no flexible migrants.

Highly skilled labour migrants however mostly not cohere to such contracts, given that in recent years, an increasingly international competition for highly skilled professionals has become apparent. Papademetriou (2012) argues that governments should look to themselves first to ensure that such professional choose them instead of trying to compete to attract the *best and brightest*. To ensure good employment and career opportunities, it is essential that there is a flourishing economy, and the right knowledge infrastructure is in order, so these highly skilled migrants can actually have added value. The presence of other talented employees also helps, as talent attracts talent. Also, more general conditions, such as the assurance of a just and generous social model and a tolerant and safe society. Regarding the latter, the Netherlands might have some improvements to be made, one could argue. Many migrants, including expats, do not experience a warm welcome policy. There is for example, a strict legislation on citizenship that can only be obtained after successfully passing a strict language and culture exam. Moreover, the Netherlands is one of the few countries where dual nationality is in principle not allowed. The constant naming of migrants as 'the other', and negative attention given to Muslims and Poles, particularly by prominent politicians, also make the Netherlands less attractive.

The accompanying partners of migrants often also play an important role in the decision to migrate and to stay in the country. However, partners can find significant difficulties when entering the labour market. *Tied migration* refers to the fact that family migration is rarely beneficial for labour participation (Clark, 2006). Despite rising levels of qualification, and the increasing professional aspiration of women, it is mostly men who make career-related moves, adding to the gendered nature of family migration (Föbker, 2019). When accompanying partners are not able to participate in the labour market, will negatively influence the migratory move. How partners fare in the labour market is, therefore, an important policy question which should be incorporated.

Methodology

This research is based on the dataset about on migration information from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). On the request of the Ministry of Justice and Security the CBS has developed an information management tool that visually tracks, analyses, and displays key indicators to monitor the most important migration trends in the Netherlands. This latest dashboard on immigration has a specific focus on how many migrants come to the Netherlands, and importantly, what their exact motivations or reasons are for migrating. Consequently, the dashboard gives information on their

subsequent sources of income once settled and their duration of stay. Importantly, the dataset comes in the form of a dashboard, where the user uses the tool to request information on specific variables, which come in macro form, not person specific. This visual dashboard and its supporting database of migration information do allow for further quantitative analysis on exact reasons for migration. The database is found in the bibliography under CBS (2021b) and CBS (2021c).

Sample

The sample of database refers to all persons who are registered as immigrants in the Basic Registration of Persons (BRP) between 1999 and 2018, where the main distinction between immigrant groups is made on basis of nationality where two large groups are distinguished: migrants with EU or EFTA nationality and those who are non-EU nationals at the moment of immigration. For the latter group, their migration motivation is deducted from the holder's type residence permit, collected from the Immigration- and Naturalization Service (IND). Migrants from the EU and EFTA countries, however, have a different determination for their exact motive of migration, due to the redundancy of a visa or working permit. The Bureau of Statistics (CBS) have defined their reason for migration determined on their main activities shortly before or after migration to the Netherlands. The main motives for migration, recognized in this study are *Labour, Family, Study, Asylum* and *Other & Unknown*. Because information about migrants from outside the EU is more available from their residence permit, more information can be extracted, therefore migration motives for non-EU migrants also include whether labour migrants are *Highly skilled* or *Other*, whether family migrants come for *Unification* or *Formation* purposes and whether underaged study migrants went on to live at home or by themselves.

This study will at have an explorative character, the analysis of the quantitative descriptive statistics will be used to gain further insight and nuances into the data and the migration situation in the Netherlands. From the dataset, the migration motivations for each group can be withdrawn as to why they come to the Netherlands. First, the largest groups will be distinguished and analysed, they will consist of the five largest migrant groups from inside the EU and the five largest from outside the EU in the latest year of the dataset. These are, in descending order, Polish, German, Indian, Romanian, Italian, British, Chinese, American, Turkish, and Syrian migrants. The important migration motive for each group will be analysed and will be elaborated on. Based on these early findings the four most interesting national groups are to be singled out and their impact on the alleviation of problems associated with societal aging will be further elaborated on. The further examined national groups will be Polish, Indian, Romanian, and American migrants.

Variables and procedure

The main dependent variable this study will focus on is the nationality of the migrants with the independent variables being the migration motive, age category, sex, and departure rate. Of the most recent migration year, 2018, the probabilities, in the forms of odds and odds ratio's, will be given to measure the exact occurrence of the different variables. First the odds will be taken of the largest present migration *motive* within the national group as a reference. Furthermore, the odds ratio will be used by dividing the probability of the odds with those in the largest *age* group to give an overview of what the exact chances are that the exposed migrants are not part of the majority of their countrymen. Odds and odds ratios are used because the outcome does not necessarily indicate that the association is statistically significant. To determine significance, confidence intervals and p values are to be provided. Because this dataset only allows retrieving of piecemeal information by selecting certain variables from the dashboard tool, instead of providing a whole conclusive dataset, such statistical test

will not be performed. Also, literature and theory already show significant association between the used variables.

Description migration motives

Migrants are considered *labour* migrants if within 120 days of migration the main income source of the individuals comes from employment. When couples migrate often one is defined as a labour migrant and the other as a family migrant, the individual who finds employment first is considered to be in the category of labour motivation. For migrants outside the EU a further distinction is being made between highly skilled labour migrants and other or lower skilled labour migrants. Whether someone is classified as highly skilled is based on the 'knowledge worker' scheme which stipulates, that highly skilled migrants from outside the EU must earn a certain income, in accordance with the salary criteria used by the Immigration office. Those who fall below this income criteria are instead classified as other or lower skilled labour migrants.

EU/EFTA migrants are placed in the *family* motive category when a person migrates within 120 days after migration of the partner or parents. Migrants who have a partner who has already resided in the Netherlands for 120 days are also defined as family migrants. As noted earlier, when couples migrate often one is defined as a labour migrant and the other as a family migrant, the individual who finds employment first is considered to be in the category of labour motivation, the second as a family migrant. For migrants from outside the EU, a distinction is made in the family category for family unification and formation. Family unification migrants are those who settled in the Netherlands from families that already existed before migration, whereby one or more family members move to live with the family member who has previously come to the Netherlands. This may include married (partners), minor children, or parents who are going to live with their children. Family formation concerns the settlement in the Netherlands of individuals who migrate here to get married, or enter into a partnership, or to cohabit with a partner who already lives in the Netherlands, with whom the person concerned has never lived together before (Nicolaas & Sprangers, 2012).

The migration motivation *study* is for those who are studying within 366 days after migration. For study migrants from the EU and EFTA countries, an inaccuracy occurs. As there are in fact more international students than reflected here in the data. Some of the foreign students are in fact not immigrants, for example those from neighbouring countries who enjoy an education in the Netherlands, but do not reside in the country. Another part is because this dataset reflects those migrants who are in the Basic Registration of Persons (BRP) which all persons are after registering at the municipal level. Those students who have registered at their school but not registered yet at their municipality are therefore not reflected in this dataset.

For a small proportion of non-EU migrants, the reason for migration is not beforehand, however. These are thus characterized as *unknown*. As it was not possible to identify the exact reason for migration, statistical techniques have been employed to allocate individuals in motivation categories using estimated propensities based on distribution of the known migration motives. This estimate is based on the characteristics that are most closely related to the migration motive.

For EU migrants the group is larger of whom it's unknown what their exact reason for migration is. As of 2006, EU citizens, with the exception of Bulgarians and Romanians, were no longer required to have a residence permit when staying in the Netherlands for longer than three months. The same applies for migrants from EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). Officially, both groups must register with the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau (IND), but if

they constrain to do so it has no consequence on their right of residence in the Netherlands. Therefore, concerning EU/EFTA migrants, there is a relatively large group where the reason for migration is unidentified, as many migrants failed to register with the IND or at the municipal level (Nicolaas & Sprangers, 2012).

Migrant residents are also tracked over time. Every year, after arrival in the Netherlands, it is noted if they still reside here and to what socioeconomic group they belong to. This happens on the same date annually: February 12th. The data on the socioeconomic group is based on information from the System of Social-statistical Files (SSB).

Staying rate

The demographic and descriptive analysis of these groups will give a multifaceted picture of these migrant groups, the departure rate will be used as the most important proxy to measure the effect that migrant along their different motives have on Dutch society. If people don't tent to stay in the country, migration on itself has little effect in solving potential problems associated with ageing. The departure rate will be transformed into the *staying rate* by measuring the reverse, of what percentage of people still reside, instead of departed, the country. An average staying rate will be measured ten years after migration. The ten-year threshold is chosen because after this ten-year period migrants will have had enough time to work and settle in the hosting country. Migrants will have built extensive networks, should be able to show some language proficiency and have integrated in some sort of way in the Netherlands. The data set allows for migrant information from 1999 to 2018. The staying rate will therefore be measured for migrants who immigrated prior to 2009, allowing for ten-year residency.

Based on this staying rate, the quantities per migration motivation, migrants' influence on societal ageing will be assessed. Engbersen et al. (2011) has distinguished new migration patterns depending on the migrants' bond with the host and native country: circular, transnational, settled and footloose migration, as described earlier in the theoretic part. The model can be found in *figure 1*. Their model will be applied to be able to make an interpretation about the added value these newcomers can give to social ageing and social securities, where it is argued that the two patterns in which migrants have stronger bonds with the host country, will have the strongest effect on this. Due to the explorative nature of this study, the yet to be distinguished four largest and most important migrant nationality groups will be placed in this model, on the further characteristics of their motivation, age, sex, and socio-economic category. The bond or attachment these different categories have will be measured based on the duration of stay, or staying rate, in the Netherlands.


Data analysis

The number of migrants in the Netherlands have for almost all migration motivation categories been steadily increasing in the last years, this is shown in *figure 2*. An exception exists for those who come here for reasons of asylum, which saw an enormous increase during the 2015 refugee crisis, the number of asylum seekers has since then been declining. Besides differentiating between motivation categories, the other main category is of course the country of origin, where a distinction is being made between migrants from EU & EFTA countries and non-EU/EFTA countries. The EFTA countries enjoy similar rights of free movement for their citizens within the EU as proper Member States. The EFTA countries are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Still differentiating

between each country would give a rather large focus group, especially considering some nationalities are sparsely represented in the Netherlands. Therefore, this study focuses on the 10 largest national immigrant groups in the Netherlands in 2018. Including the five countries with the most nationals in the Netherlands from within the EU/EFTA and the five largest migrant national groups from outside the EU/EFTA. In 2018 these were, in ascending order: Polish, Germans, Indians, Romanians, Italians, British, Chinese, Americans, Turks and Syrians. The migration flows of these groups can be found in *figure 3*, in the period between 1999 and 2018.

Figure 2


Migration flows per migration motivation in the Netherlands between 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).

Figure 3

Migration flows of ten largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands in 2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b) & CBS (2021c).


These ten nationalities composed the largest migrant groups in 2018 in the Netherlands, other large migrant groups that would have made it into a similar list in previous years are Bulgarians, Spanish,

French, Eritreans, and Iraqi migrants. The latter two migrant groups, Eritreans, and Iraqis, saw large influxes during the refugee crisis but their numbers have since then been declining to the point that they now only account for 5% and less than 1% of the total non-EU migrant population in 2018 respectively. This significant influx is clearly shown in *figure 2*, with a sharp rise of asylum migrants during the 2015/2016 period. Poland, Germany, and India were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2018. Among the top 10 countries of origin, Indians registered the largest increase (+1.975) and Syrians the largest decrease (-10.075) in flows to the Netherlands compared to the previous year.

For EU migrants a notable group are Romanian migrants, who have surged into the larger migrant groups just in recent years. All earlier mentioned significant EU migrant populations have larger diasporas in the Netherlands than the Romanian migrant group. Romanians have only become a large significant group since its entry into the Schengen zone. They are however dwarfed by the by far largest recent migrant group, the Polish migrants in the Netherlands. Even though information on the number of Polish migrants in the Netherlands has only been available since 2004, their diaspora still forms the absolute largest group. This is clearly shown in *figure 4*, where the total number of migrants are displayed during the last 20 years. *Figure 5* shows the total number of migrants from non-EU countries in the Netherlands. Here, all nationalities which are considered in this study also reflect the 5 largest groups from outside the EU in the Netherlands for the past 20 years. ‘Other Nationalities’, forms the largest group over the past years. The decision to combine these people into one categorical group, is a major flaw of this dataset. ‘Unknown’ nationality is even the second largest group over the past 20 years. People who are registered with the nationality as ‘unknown’, do have, most of the time, a nationality, but are not able to prove this with proper documentation. Almost all migrants whose nationality is unknown are those who come to the Netherlands for asylum purposes. Particularly in the period between 1999-2003, the unknown group was significant, but has since steadily decreased.

Figure 4


Total EU/EFTA immigrant population during 1999-2018 period in the Netherlands.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).

Figure 5

Total non-EU/EFTA immigrant population during 1999-2018 period in the Netherlands.




Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Before further scrutinizing the socioeconomic characteristics and demographics of the largest diasporas in the Netherlands it is important to recognize how the motive for migration is labelled on each individual. Earlier, in *figure 2* the trend over the years of the different migration motives has been shown. *Figure 6* shows the latest distribution of migration motives in the Netherlands for EU and non-EU migrants.

Figure 6

Distribution of migration motives for both EU and non-EU migrants in 2018 in the Netherlands.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b) & CBS (2021c).

EU migrants


In 2018, the most recent year in this survey, a total of 191.060 foreigners immigrated to the Netherlands. Most migrants, almost 58% of them, came from within the EU/EFTA, with a total number of 109.815 people in the year 2018. As mentioned before, Polish migrants, by far, make up the largest migrant group in the Netherlands. With a further analysis of the ten largest migrant group, it is with this group this study will start with.

Polish

The number of migrants from Poland have significantly increased since it's entry to the European Union in 2004. It is from this year that Polish migrants appear in this set of data. As seen in *figure 2* Polish migrants are the largest immigrant group since 2007. For the largest part, Polish migrants are driven by labour market aspirations to move to the Netherlands, 43% of them have indicated labour as their main motivation for migration, as seen in *figure 7*. In the same figure, it clearly shows that this has differed in the past. When Poland recently joined the European Union, by far the largest reason for migrating was for family purposes. From this data set, it is unclear whether these family migrations were for formation of reunification purposes. However, as the motivation for EU migrants is often based on the information whether someone has found employment, it is also possible that their own indicated reason for migration had been for family purposes, while still being categorized as a labour migrant. About 30% of the Polish migrants, similar to those other countries who have recently joined the EU, had both family and labour as their derived reason for migration (CBS, 2018). A certain degree of variation between the migration motivation is therefore in order. However, labour migration has become the dominant reason for migration for Polish people, more so for males than for females. Women have a slightly larger share for family migratory reasons than men, although the difference is less than for labour reasons. In 2018, 14.560 Polish men and 11.010 Polish women migrated to the Netherlands. Geographically, Polish migrants are mainly found in areas with a larger agricultural and process industry sectors. The Netherlands is also becoming more popular for Polish students. The number of Polish students was quite stable the last couple of years, until 2018, when the number of students doubled in one year, with 910 female and 865 male students from Poland.

Figure 7

Distribution of Polish migrant motivation in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).


Western European migrants (German, Italian & British)

Neighbouring Germany forms the second largest immigrant group in the Netherlands with 10.965 migrants arriving in 2018. In that same year, Italian and British migrants were respectively the 5th and 6th largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands, with 8.465 and 7.715 people coming to the country. When looking at the distribution of why these western European migrants come to the Netherlands, you see a similar migration motivation pattern for British and Italian migrants, with significant amounts of people coming here to work as seen in figure 8. However, German migrants seem to alter from this motivational pattern, as there are almost as many German students as there are labour migrants. In 2011 and 2012 there were even more than twice as many German migrants here to study compared to labour migrants. However, the German migrant motivations are also very much characterized by the large amount of uncertainty there is about this group. For some reason, especially after 2012, German nationals haven't registered as much at the municipality or IND. Italian migrants are a group which have seen their numbers significantly rise in the Netherlands, especially after 2010 which corresponds with the financial crisis which hit Italy particularly hard. However, it is not so that this has also coincided with a significant relative increase of labour migrants. The share of Italian labour migrants has more or less stayed the same over the years, which has almost always been about 36% of the total number of Italian immigrants. This is also true for the other motives of migration, although more and more Italians are coming to the Netherlands, it doesn't seem to affect the distribution of their motivation much.

British migrants have a longer significant migratory history in the Netherlands. Although the number of British immigrants started to decline at the beginning of this century, it somewhat recovered after 2006. However, British migration really started to increase again after 2016. Although Brexit hasn't fully come into fruition yet, from these numbers you might argue that it did have an effect already as early as 2016.

Figure 8

Migration motivation for western European migrants in the Netherlands, 2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).


Romanians

Romania joined the European Union in 2007 (the year the country entered the dataset). As of 2014, Romanian migrants no longer needed a work visa when applying in the Netherlands (Engbersen et al., 2011). The same was true for Bulgarian migrants that year. Since 2014, the number of Romanian migrants has therefore significantly increased as seen in *figure 9*. This visa liberalisation has importantly led to an increase in the share of Romanian labour migrants coming to the Netherlands. Before this implementation, labour migration never took up more than 20% of the total share of migrants. Since 2014, this has more than doubled, as shown in *figure 10*, making labour the most important migration motivation for Romanians. In total, there are more male migrants from Romania than there are females, but this is true for most other nationalities. Females are slightly more represented in migration for family purposes, also common for other nationalities. However, female family migration was particularly large in the period before Romanian entry into the EU, after this, in 2014, the number of family migrants for men and women converged. Also, Romanians increasingly come here to study, women slightly more than men.

For Romanian migrants' patterns, it can easily be distinguished in two patterns, before and after entry to the EU. Although Romania is one of the newest members of the EU, migration patterns to Western European countries is not something new. It's well documented that Romania is a large supplier of seasonal agricultural workers in other European countries. There is a large diaspora in Southern European countries, with Spain hosting the most Romanian migrants (OECD, 2020). However, these patterns have shifted in recent years, with the traditional Southern European arrival countries seeing declining numbers of Romanian migrants, while the Netherlands and other Northern European countries seeing increasing numbers. Romania has the highest expatriation rate to European countries. In 2018, Romania saw 16 departures per thousand people. This could be indicators for a significant labour and brain drain from Romania.

Figure 9


Romanian migration motivations in absolute numbers in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).

Figure 10

Distribution of Romanian migrants in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).

Non-EU Migrants

About 42% of all immigrants who come to the Netherlands are from outside the EU. In 2018, the five largest immigrant groups were Indian, Chinese, American, Turkish and Syrian migrants.

Indians


Migration of Indians to the Netherlands really came into fruition in the early 2000s, when in 2005 for the first time more than a thousand people immigrated from India. Since then, Indian migration has been steadily increasing, well reflected in *figure 11*. From 2010 till 2018, the number of Indian migrants arriving in the Netherlands even tripled, from 3.155 to 10.585 people. This makes them the largest group from outside the European Union.

About 50% of all migrants come here to work, this is clearly shown in *figure 12*. Unfortunately, it was only from 2005 that the Central Bureau of Statistics started to differentiate between ‘highly skilled’ migrants and the non-highly skilled, or ‘other’. Before 2005, when migrants from India were relatively sparsely represented in the Netherlands, the main reason for migrating was for family purposes. Family reunification, where family members migrate after the arrival of a principal migrant who sponsors their admission, is a far more significant migration group than family formation is. That the family ties predate the arrival of the principal migrant has especially been occurring with the arrival of the many highly skilled migrants. Most of these migrants are male, the reunification group also comprises more females than males. Family formation numbers have stayed relatively stable during the whole recorded period, averaging around 100 people per year.

When the number of Indian migrants started to increase it was mainly due to the increases of labour migrants. Most of these labour migrants, about 92% of all Indian labour migrants, are in fact highly skilled, finding work in especially the IT industries. For Indian women, they still most often come to the Netherlands for family reunification purposes. Interestingly, Indian communities live concentrated in a few areas in the Netherlands. Mainly, near areas which are known for having large IT industries, such as Eindhoven and Amstelveen.

Figure 11


Indian migration motivations in absolute numbers in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Figure 12

Indian distribution of migration motives to the Netherlands, 1999-2018.




Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Chinese

Chinese migration to the Netherlands is not an entirely new or recent phenomenon. The first time that significant amounts of Chinese settled in the Netherlands was in the early parts of the 20th century, and it mainly concerned Chinese shipmen. Making it one of the earliest migration groups outside Europe in the Netherlands (CBS, 1998). What strikes immediately when looking at Chinese migration motives in figure 13, is that student migration is a very significant group. Chinese students form the largest foreign student group in the Netherlands with 3.025 students in 2018. About 67% of all these students are female. Another statistic which stands out is that there are significantly less highly skilled labour migrants compared to all other labour Chinese labour migrants. An explanation for this might be the special regulation for the employment of cooks in the Asiatic hospitality industry. This regulation allows Chinese restaurants a special employment permit for their cooks due to shortage in the country.

Figure 13

Chinese migration motivation in absolute numbers in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).


Americans

Migration from the United States has also increased across the board. Family migration (both reunification and formation) always was the most important reason for migrating to the Netherlands. Since 2016, the annual student migration has become the largest group of American migrants in the Netherlands. Family, labour, and student migrants are however quite similar in absolute size the last few years. The distribution is all about the same, as seen in *figure 14*. Interestingly, there are significantly more female students than there are male students from the United States. The last couple of years the ratio was always more than 60% in favour of American women enrolled in Dutch universities. American female migrants make up 55% of all US migrants in the Netherlands anyway.

That there are many American migrants in the Netherlands with a degree also shows in the number of highly skilled labourers, showing in *figure 15*. In 2018, about 63% of all American labour migrants were highly skilled. There are in fact more male labour migrants (58%) than there are women. The sex ratio is opposite for family migration, common for other nationalities as well. Family reunification is the more important reason for migration here. Interestingly, there are also American migrants who came to the Netherlands to seek asylum. In 1999 there were even 70 American asylum migrants, sporadically there were 5 more (more often women than men). In 2017 and 2018, there were another 10 US asylum migrants in the Netherlands. So far, no explanation or specification could be found on these American asylum migrants.

Figure 14


American migration motivations in absolute numbers in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Figure 15

Distribution of American migration motivations in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.




Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Turkish

Migrants from Turkey are recognized in the Netherlands as being from ‘one of the classic migration countries’, together with Indonesia, Surinam and Morocco. Turkish migrants are the only of these groups which are still represented in these 10 largest migrant groups research. Family migration is by far the largest reason for migration among Turks. Family formation is a significant group within this category. It can be assumed that these formations largely take place within the already present Turkish migrant population who find their spouse in their country of origin. Men and women are both strongly represented in this category. Turkish students are also increasingly coming to the Netherlands. Historically, Turkish migration was defined by male ‘guest worker’ migration, who were most often less educated. A shift in this historical pattern has now occurred, with annual arrival of highly skilled labour migrants now being more numerous than their counterpart. Study and labour migration from Turkey in 2018 consisted of 40% of the total Turkish migrant population, in 1999 this was only 5% of the Turkish migrant population, shown in *figure 16*. There is also a significant group of asylum migrants from Turkey, making up 10% of the group in 2018.

Figure 16

Distribution of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.




Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Syrians

Syrian migrants were an almost non existing group in the Netherlands until the civil war erupted in the country in 2011, with the first large refugee populations arriving from 2013 onwards. In 2015, people spoke of a refugee crisis in the whole of Europe, especially due to the large numbers of Syrian refugees. In 2016, the Syrian migration peaked with 25.185 people. Family reunification is now also occurring regularly, with about 15% of Syrian migrants coming to the Netherlands for reunification purposes.

Figure 17

Syrian migrant motivation in absolute numbers in the Netherlands, 1999-2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Sub-questions

With the analysis of the compositional history of the ten largest migrant groups in the Netherlands in 2018, important sub-questions or hypotheses can be asked helping to answer the main question of this study. These sub-questions will not be answered for all large groups in the Netherlands, but for four more notable ones in the results section, where they will be further unravelled. These hypotheses will then be used to answer the main question of this study, of what impact migrants have in challenging societal ageing.

As seen with migrants from the EU from those countries who have more recently joined the union, is that they have larger shares of labour migrants among them, compared to other European countries Germany, the UK and Italy. Given this, a question arises if these mostly Eastern European labour migrants have a tendency to also return more often, as they enjoy a high legal mobility under the right of free movement provided by the Schengen agreement. So, here it is *hypothesised* that, compared to labour migrants from outside the EU, EU migrants out of countries from the more recent enlargements are more likely to be labour migrants, who stay for relatively short periods of time due to their high mobility.

Labour migration was further divided for non-EU migrants into highly skilled- and other or lower skilled labour migration. It is the first category which most governments are actively trying to attract for perceived economic benefits. Is the Netherlands successful in actually binding these migrants to the country? Or do these highly skilled professionals more resemble strong transnational characteristics, where they show strong bonds with both countries in accordance with Engbersen et al. (2011) their model, because their significant income allows for high mobility. So, from this it can be *hypothesised* that highly skilled labour migrants have a higher tendency to stay than less skilled labour migrants, if in fact these can be integrated into the country.

As anticipated by the available literature on the matter, and observed from the data, women are in general more likely to be family migrants than men. Whether these female migrants can therefore also be characterized as tied stayer is unfortunately outside the scope of this data set. But is this gendered effect within family migration also present the tendency to remain in the country, therefore

characterising women more as established migrants than men in accordance with Engbersen et al. (2011) their model?

What is the effect of for example age, in categories, on the chances of being family or labour migrants? Do relatively older migrants, who are over 40-years old, have more or less chance of being a family migrant for example. Where this study hypothesises, that they are less likely to be family migrants because this age group would in general be past family formative years and can therefore be characterised less as established migrants than the younger age categories.

And for the labour category, are relatively younger migrants, between the 18- and 30-year-olds, more likely to be lower skilled as this category is depended on one's income in the knowledge worker scheme. So, relatively younger migrants (18-30) have more chances of being lower skilled migrants compared to older migrants.

Results

With the unravelling of ten important migrant groups in the Netherlands, it is important to make a further distinction of which groups will be unfolded further to assess their impact on ageing structures. Again, a discrepancy will be made between EU and non-EU migrant groups. On the one hand, for EU migrants the most evident group would be Polish migrants, sheerly due to the absolute number of individuals residing in the Netherlands, making it by far the largest migrant group. While for non-EU migrants, Indian migrants are a prominent group, also due to their considerable quantity, but also because their numbers have significantly increased over the last decade or so. Another national group which has recently become a considerable group in size, although still smaller than the western European migrants from Germany, Italy, and Britain, are Romanian migrants. As mentioned before, the number of Romanian migrants has significantly increased since their entry into the EU in 2007 and have promptly become one of the largest national groups in the country. The final group which will be reviewed further are American migrants; they also form a large migrant group with a somewhat equal distribution of migration motivations among them. Relatively little research exists about this group, and what studies do exist almost exclusively focus on the United States as a receiving migratory country. The larger Chinese migrant group has been excluded because migration from China has developed to be of an almost entirely educational nature. Similarly, Syrian migrants are excluded because of their solely irregular migration motives. Turkish migrants are also not further considered in this study because an abundance of literature already exists on this group. So, the characteristics of Polish, Romanian, Indian and American migrant groups will be further elaborated upon, where a further focus will be put on age structures of each migration motivation as well as the duration of stay.

Age structure

In 2018, a total number of 25.285 Polish, 9.410 Romanian, 5.780 American, and 10.575 Indian migrants came to the Netherlands. Looking into the different age structures of the four national groups at the final year of the dataset, as shown in the *figures 18, 19, 20 & 21*, you see structural differences between the groups. For migrants from the European countries however, a remarkably similar distribution of age can first be observed. Of all Poles and Romanian arriving in 2018, around 50% were of the 18-30 age group (50,2% and 51,1% respectively), around 25% were between 30-40 (24,8% and 24,3%) and around 19% were over 40 years old (18,6% and 19,4%). Labour is the most important reason to come to the Netherlands, for both this is around 42% in 2018. Notably, it is more often male labour migrants than females who come to the country, and they are mostly young: 24% of

all Poles and 20% of all Romanians are 18- to 30-year-old labour migrants. Labour migration reduces in quantity the older the adult age group, an exception here being Polish women, who see a slight increase over 40, mainly because more Polish women migrated within this age group compared to 30-40.

Family motivation is the second most important reason to migrate: although it is of less significance for Romanians than it is for Poles, with around 26% of all Poles and 18% of all Romanians migrating for this purpose. These family migrants are more often women than men. Of note is that there are more Polish males than females in the 30-40 age group who migrate for family purposes, but still within the age group a higher percentage of women migrate for family purposes than men (31,3% and 26,3%).

It is clear however, that these Eastern European migrants are most likely to migrate for labour reasons with men more so than women, but when looking at the odds and odds ratios there is however a subtle change of this likelihood over age compared to other migration categories. For example, 30- to 40-year-old Polish males are already 1,5 times more likely to be family migrants compared to 18- to 30-year-olds, for Romanians in the same age category this chance is about 1,32 times more likely. And although seemingly women are more likely to be family migrants, Polish women between the ages of 30 to 40 are 1,58 times more likely to be family migrants compared to 18- to 30-year-olds. This is only 0,08 (Odds Ratio= 1,58 - 1,50) more likely than Polish males in the same age group. This is mainly due to fact that in all specific categories over migration category, age category and sex, it is only for Polish women in the 30- to 40 age category that there are more family migrants than labour migrants: with the odds of being a family migrant compared to being a labour migrant being 1,08 for Polish women in this age group. The odds of being a family migrant is for women always higher than for men in all age groups, this is true for both Romanian and Polish migrants. So, the hypothesis that women are more likely to be family migrants than men, holds true for these two specific national migrant groups coming to the Netherlands in 2018.

The share of migration for study purposes is around 7% for all Poles and 10,5% of all Romanians. Study related migration is rather absent for adult Polish migrants: only around 0,5% of all adult men and 1,3% of all adult women migrate for reasons of study. It is mostly Polish minors who come here to study: around 96% of minors moving are study related. Romanian adults are far more likely to migrate for reasons of study: 8% of all Romanian adult men and 9% of all adult women migrate to study. For Romanian minors, studying is not the most important reason to migrate, it being family reasons (57%), still 38% of all Romanian youths come here to study.

The other, or unknown motive category is quite considerable for the two Eastern European migrant groups residing in the Netherlands. It is unknown what the exact reason for migration is for about 24,8% of all Polish and 29,4% of all Romanian migrants arriving in 2018. This is because, although officially required, but mostly without penalty, some fail to register with the bureau of immigration (IND) or register at all at the municipal level. This is of course not the case for American or Indian citizens, who are outside the Schengen legislature.

Figure 18

Population pyramid on migration motives of Polish migrants coming to the Netherlands in 2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).

Figure 19

Population pyramid on migration motives of Romanian migrants coming to the Netherlands in 2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b).

The age structures of the American and Indian migrants, coming to the Netherlands in 2018, show less similarities than the Eastern European ones. When observing the age structure of migrants from the United States, it is remarkable that all age groups, except those between 18 and 30, are of somewhat similar size. Also of note is that there were in fact more women than men who came to the Netherlands that year: for every male migrant there were about 1,2 female migrants. Indian migration is characterized by a much larger male population than female one, for every Indian woman that came in 2018 there were about 1,4 Indian male migrants. This ratio was the lowest for minor migrants (1,07), and highest for migrants in the ages between 30 and 40 (1,7).

American motives for coming to the Netherlands are remarkably equally distributed, in about a third each: with labour combined being about 32,95%, family combined 33,3% and study 32,8% of all migrants coming in 2018. However, large differentiations exist between the age groups, clearly shown

in *figure 20*. By far the largest age group is the relatively young migrant group between 18-30, which is being dominated by students. It's especially female students who come to the Netherlands: about 72% more female American students enrolled in 2018. Labour migration is being characterized by highly skilled labour migrants with 63% being highly skilled, and who are more often male: 71% more so than females. Seemingly, lower skilled American migrants are also more often relatively young, 41% of all being between 18 and 30. The odds of being relatively lower skilled compared to being a highly skilled migrant is 0,40 times lower for American male migrants older than 30 years. These men have 0,58 times less chance of being lower skilled migrants compared to 18- to 30-year-olds. American female migrants being less often highly skilled labour migrants, gives different odds, for example: relatively older American female migrants (30+) had 1,1 times more chance of being lower skilled labour migrants compared to 18- to 30-year-olds. So, although seemingly the younger the more likely to be a lower skilled labour migrant is true for American male migrants but not for American female migrants, who had in 2018 a slightly higher chance of being a lower skilled migrant. And although relatively young labour migrants, between 18 and 30, form a significant group in American labour migration to the Netherlands, their odds are far lower due to the sheer number of American students who come here. The odds of being a highly skilled labour migrant compared to being a student is 0,23 times lower for this young group (18-30). While the 18- to 30-year-olds American migrants only have 0,05 times less chance of being a highly skilled labour migrant compared to 30- to 40-year-olds. So, the hypothesis that younger labour migrants are less likely to be highly skilled holds true for American migrants, although very slightly so.


Family migration from the United States is particularly present in the minor age group, with almost 40% of all family migrants being under 18. For family unification, migration where a migrant follows a family member or partner who has already settled in the country, the representation of under aged migrants is even more present, with 97,3% of all U.S. children migrating to the Netherlands, move for this reason. Family unification is also a very significant reason to move for relatively older female American migrants (between the age groups 30 to 40 and 40+), almost 40% of them move to be united with their partner or family members in the Netherlands. For American male migrants this is only 19% of all moves within the ages of 30 to 40 and 40+. The odds of being a family unification migrant, compared to being a highly skilled labour migrant were 1,75 times higher for American female migrants in these older age groups. American male migrants in this same older age group were 0,40 times *less* likely to be family unification migrants, compared to highly skilled labour ones. Within family formation migration, also more American women than men migrate for this reason, particularly in the relatively young age group between 18 and 30 (40% of all family formation migration from the United States. Seemingly, for American migrants there is a strong gendered effect on family migration, particularly in the unification of families, where it is more often women than men who follow their partners abroad. Consequently, this will perhaps give difficulties in labour market integration if these women are in fact tied migrants.

Indian migration to the Netherlands has been the quickest growing national group in size in the last decade. It is being largely characterized by labour migration and more particularly highly skilled labour migration, with about 48% of all Indian migrants coming for labour reasons, with 92% of these being highly skilled in 2018. As mentioned before, there is a stronger tendency for Indian male migrants to come to the Netherlands than for females, and this is especially true within labour migration. Almost 39% of all Indian migrants in 2018 were highly skilled male labourers, which is 60% of all male migrants and almost 80% of all highly skilled migrants. The odds of being a female highly skilled labour migrant compared to being a male highly skilled migrant is in fact 0,25 times lower. Relatively younger Indian females between 18 and 30 are the largest group within labour migration, for males this is the older cohort between ages 30 and 40. Still the odds of being a family

migrant compared to being a skilled labour migrant is still 1,37 times higher for female migrants within the 18 to 30 age group. Family migration, and more particularly family unification, is a more significant reason for migration than labour is for Indian women. It is however far less important for Indian adult male migrants, only 4,2% of all Indian males migrated for family reasons. The odds of being an adult family migrant (both reasons) compared to being a highly skilled labour migrant is 0,07 times lower for Indian adult male migrants. A strong gendered effect on family migration is present for Indian migrants in 2018. For under aged Indian migrants, as all other national groups, family migration is by far the most important reason to move: 98% of all minors move for this reason. The migration among minors comprised 14,3% of all Indian migration in 2018, the highest of the four highlighted national groups in this study. Study migration also forms a large group, although not as many as the amount of U.S. students coming in 2018 to the Netherlands (1.870 as opposed to 1.735 students), here in contrast there are in fact more male Indian study migrants than there are females.

Figure 20


Population pyramid on migration motives of American migrants coming to the Netherlands in 2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).

Figure 21

Population pyramid on migration motives of Indian migrants coming to the Netherlands in 2018.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021c).


Staying rate

Migration on itself will have little effect in solving potential problems associated with ageing if these people don't tend to stay in the country. Therefore, this study also looks at the departure rates, or better its reverse, *staying rates* of the migrant groups. In *figure 22* the average staying rate in the Netherlands is shown, ten years after migration of the four national migrant groups Poles, Romanians, Indians, and Americans. The ten-year threshold is chosen because after this period migrants will have had enough time to work and settle in the hosting country. Migrants will have built extensive networks, should be able to show some language proficiency and have integrated in some sort of way in the Netherlands. Therefore, the staying rate is used as an important proxy for assessing the impact migrant groups have on ageing structures in the Netherland. The data set allows for migrant information from 1999 to 2018. The staying rate will therefore be measured for migrants who immigrated prior to 2009, allowing for ten-year residency. A strong limitation to this is that migration patterns, as seen in the data analysis have changed over the years. Indian migration was for example, of a far smaller size than it has been in more recent years. Another problem of using the ten-year threshold is for the Romanian migrant group, as the data set only has information about them from 2007 onwards (with Romania's entry into the EU). For Polish migrants a similar issue occurs, as their entry into the dataset also coincides with their entry into the EU in 2004. In total the number of individuals taken into this staying rate measurement is: 52.840 Poles, 7.010 Romanians, 32.760 Americans, and 16.330 Indians.

It is migrants from Poland who are most likely, and Americans who are least likely to still reside in the country, ten years after migration. About 45,2% of all Poles, 33,6% of all Romanians, 30,8% of all Indians, and 14,7% of all Americans who migrated between 1999 and 2008 are still living in the Netherlands.

Figure 22

Migrants' average staying rate in percentages, ten years after migration to the Netherlands.



Note: adapted from CBS (2021b) & CBS (2021c).


Of course, within these national migrant groups, varying staying rates exist between age categories, sex, and migration motivations. First, in *figure 23*, the discrepancy between the two highest and the

two lowest outliers of the average staying rate has been determined. Evidently, large differences exist in migrants' staying rate. Those groups who are most likely to stay are often minor migrants who have either come here to study or for family reasons. For under aged study migrants, a further distinction has been made whether the people migrated and lived at home (study home) or migrated and went to live by themselves (study self). Polish underaged women who initially migrated to study and were living by themselves are such a group who are most likely to stay out of all other Polish migrant categories, with about 75,4% of them still residing in the Netherlands. For Romanian migrants, it was also female underaged study migrants, followed by underaged men, who were most likely to stay, but these Romanian minors initially still lived at home. However, these two groups are very small in size, 105 out of 7.010 migrants. Indian family formation migrants (both sexes) have the highest staying rate within their national migrant group with 80,6% still residing after ten years. Followed by male family unification migrants between the ages of 30 and 40 with 71,1% staying, although this group consists of a very limited number of people (only 140 individuals out of a total Indian migrant population of 16.330), but many of them stayed. American minors who migrated to form a family, so children who migrated with one of their adult family members who formed a family, have the highest staying rate. These underaged American migrants however were also of a very limited number (335 out of 32.760 American immigrants). Polish female family migrants between the ages of 30 and 40 are of a more substantial group however, with 2.405 of them still having a staying rate of about 69,9%. This would suggest that these migrant groups are more likely to be established migrants in Engbersen et al. (2011) their model than for example transnational or even circular migrants, in accordance with the set hypothesis.

The lower staying rates are mostly male migrants who come for study reasons. Polish and Romanian male study migrants between the ages of 18 and 30 are quite unlikely to stay over ten years, with a staying rate of 15,2% and 14,8% respectively. Again, Romanian migrants do form a quite small group, however. Their male countrymen who come for labour reasons are a bit more likely to stay for the Eastern European countries: 30,2% of Polish male labour migrants over 40 and 28,6% of Romanian male labour migrants between 18 and 30. These relatively young Romanian male labour migrants, who now form a quite insignificant group, but have over more recent years formed a very large migrant group, are unlikely to stay longer than ten years. This could suggest that this group and the Polish one, now forms an important group which has characteristics of being circular migrants in Engbersen et al. (2011) their model. The Indian groups with the lowest average staying rate form relatively small groups in this measurement, however highly skilled labour migration from India has seen an enormous increase in more recent years. The lowest average American staying rates are also for this highly skilled labour group, with only 3,3% of over 40-year-old males and 5,5% of all women in this group still residing after ten years in the country. It is particularly highly skilled labour migrants which see an international competition for their labour, however it is these, in the case of Indian and American migrants, who are least likely to stay for longer periods of time in the Netherlands.

Figure 23

Outliers of the two highest and the two lowest average staying rates in percentages, ten years after migration to the Netherlands.



Note: Absolute number of migrants in the category is displayed inside pillar. Adapted from CBS (2021b) & CBS (2021c).


Labour migrants' staying rates

Labour migration is an important form of migration as it reduces labour shortages in specific sectors enabling economic development. Some forms of labour migration are more encouraged than others however, particularly within the international competition to attract highly skilled migrants. Here the staying rates, ten years after migration to the Netherlands is measured specifically for such labour migrants.

The highest staying rate for labour migrants from the countries Poland, Romania, India, and the United States are Polish women between the ages 30 to 40, as seen in *figure 24*. Besides being the largest migrant group, Polish migrants are also in general more likely to have higher staying rate than the other national groups, this is also true within the labour category. Within labour migration too, there is a structural gendered effect in the staying rates, with women tending to have a higher staying rate than men. Also, age seems again to have a positive effect on the likelihood that people stay, the older people get the higher their chances are for a prolonged residence. What is also remarkable is that labour migrants from outside the EU; Indians and Americans, have considerably lower staying rates than their Eastern European counterparts. The Indian and American migrants' highest staying rates, 18,7% for Indian lower skilled males and 21,3% for American highly skilled females, are still lower than the lowest staying rates of their Eastern European counterparts. Although seemingly highly skilled labour migrants (high) are less likely to stay than lower skilled labour migrants (other), this is not true for the previously mentioned highly skilled female labourers from the U.S. as their staying rate is the highest among all American labour migrants (both groups). For Indians, all lower skilled migrants however have higher staying rates compared to highly skilled Indian labour migrants.

Figure 24

The average staying rate of labour migrants in percentages, ten years after migrating to the Netherlands.




Note: Absolute number of migrants in the category is displayed inside pillar. Adapted from CBS (2021b) & CBS (2021c).

Family migrants' staying rates

Migration for family reasons is mostly the second most often cited reason for migration, for all national groups. In general, a higher staying rate is observed among family migrants compared to labour migrants. In *figure 25*, family migrant' staying rate is shown, where the average staying rate of all family migrants within its national group is put besides significant groups who are further categorized by sex and age group. In almost all cases, a gendered effect of the staying rate can be observed, where women have higher staying rates than men. The only time this does not hold true to itself is for Indian 40 year or older women who have a lower staying rate than Indian underaged boys. Young Eastern European men have a considerably lower staying rate than the average of all family migrants. For those Indians and Americans who migrate to form a family in the Netherlands, the staying rate is in fact always higher than the average staying rate for all family migrants within their national group.

Figure 25

The average staying rate of family migrants in percentages, ten years after migrating to the Netherlands.




Note: Absolute number of migrants in the category is displayed inside pillar. Adapted from CBS (2021b) & CBS (2021c).

Study migrants

Students' staying rates are highest among the few migrants who moved to the Netherlands during their underaged years. These underaged migrants were only present among the Eastern European migrants, and almost all of them had staying rates above 72%. An exception being underaged migrants who went to live by themselves, who show similar staying rates to their adult countrymen. Between European study migrants a large difference exists in staying rates between women and men, men are quite unlikely to stay with among the lowest staying rates for male European study migrants. Also compared to the non-European Indian and American male study migrants, with about 15% of the European and 18% of the non-European male study migrants still staying ten years after migration. Female study migrants have a higher tendency to stay, with around 22% of Indian female students, 29% of Romanian women, and 38% of Polish women still residing after ten years. There is one large exception with American female study migrants, who form a very considerable group, being less likely to stay, with average staying rates of 8,5%. Still, attracting foreign students is, besides being prestigious for the educational institutions, also important for country settlement as the not insignificant numbers of these study migrants do settle in the country with around 10% of all American students and 17,3% of all Indian students. Romanian and Polish migration has not really come into fruition, and it's especially the study migrants who live at home who stay.

Figure 26

The average staying rate of study migrants in percentages, ten years after migrating to the Netherlands.



Note: Absolute number of migrants in the category is displayed inside pillar. Adapted from CBS (2021b) & CBS (2021c).

Discussion

Summary key findings

For European migrants from Poland and Romania, a similar distribution of age can be observed, but also migration motivations. This could allow for more generalization on similar integration patterns between these groups but maybe also other Eastern European migrant groups. Labour is the most important reason to move particularly among relatively young men, however it is often these young men who have relatively low staying rates and therefore not allow for further settling and integration. Arguably, these young men can be considered as having characteristics of circular migrants, at least according to Engbersen et al. (2011) their model.

Eastern European women labour migrants, both older and younger, on the other hand tend to have much higher staying rates. Women labour migrants from these countries have also become a very considerable group and tend to be of less circular and more established migratory character. With seemingly stronger bonds with the Netherlands women labour migrants can be considered as transnational or settled migrants. The highest staying rate observed among labour migrants were among 30- to 40-year-old women, however it decreased again among the older age group 40+. So, staying rates do not solely increase with age, but after reaching the highest age category decreases again, suggesting that when eventually reaching retirement ages, people are less likely to stay, therefore perhaps positively influencing societal ageing in the Netherlands.

Labour migration from outside the EU, from India and the United States, differs from within the EU in age structure but especially in reduced staying rates. So, although the mobility of European migrants has considerably increased with the entry into the Schengen agreement, they tend to have

much stronger established migration characteristics than Indian and American migrants. It is especially highly skilled labour migrants from these countries who have very low staying rates. So, although the Dutch government internationally competes for the services of these migrants, among other things in the form of tax reductions for employers, they do not provide a sustained solution for structural labour shortages as these groups display the lowest staying rate of all. Highly skilled migrants have, of course, high levels of mobility due to the considerable compensation for their employment, therefore these can also be classified as migrants who have a small bond with the hosting country and are to be considered circular migrants.

Moreover, the very low staying rates among these highly skilled migrants is contrary to the assumption made in Engbersen et al. (2013) own study. Here it was argued that better-educated migrants, would be more presented in the transnational and established categories because they can more easily attain a stable position thanks to their higher human capital. However, the low staying rates among these Indian and especially American labour migrants could also point to a strong footloose tendency because their high competence allows them to more easily choose where they want to establish themselves.

That older labour migrants have more chance of being highly skilled labour migrants compared to younger migrants holds not necessarily true for female American labour migrants. Although lower skilled labour migrants from outside the EU have higher staying rates than their highly skilled counterparts, these rates are still much lower compared to Eastern European labour migrants. Study migration is a very significant group among non-EU migrants, especially compared to the two Eastern European countries who have relatively very few study migrants. These study migrants do not have insignificant staying rates, with around 10% of all American and 17% of all Indian migrants still residing in the country after 10 years.

Family migration is however still the second most important reason to migrate, and for women more so than men, with the odds of being a family migrant compared to being a labour migrant always being higher for women than for men, although not always positive, true for all migrant groups. Family migrants also have the highest staying rates among the other migration motivations. Again, a strong gendered effect can be observed. Women are both more likely to be family migrants, as well as being more likely to stay compared to men. Almost all female family migrants can be characterised as being of the settled migration type. Most male migrants can also be characterized as the same, however some exceptions exist, an example being Romanian males between the ages 18 and 30. American family migrants, also display relatively low, compared to the other countries, but high compared within the American migrant group, average staying rates. These 'Western' migrants show such low staying rates that they can be characterised as migrants with low bonds with the host country, tending to be either circular or transnational migrants.

Policy implications

With societal population ageing becoming a more prominent issue, migration will undoubtedly be part of its solution as migration indeed helps to solve labour market shortages in specific occupations, sectors and regions. As seen, these shortages are readily being filled by a wide variety of migrants, including and not limited to Polish, Romanians, American and Indian migrants. Seemingly, immigration from these new European countries has become more prominent, but these non-European countries are still to be strongly considered for their labour potential, as seen with special programs to attract some of these highly skilled professionals. Migration policies are, of course, still among the high priorities due to irregular moves, although now seemingly decreasing with COVID-19 closure of national and international borders. Migration management is still a balancing act between attracting

those desired migrants and controlling the inflow of non-selected migrants. Population ageing will function as a strong pull factor for and give priority to perhaps restructure contemporary Dutch migration policy.

International migration can definitely help to solve labour market shortages, but as seen with the high departure rate among mainly younger labour migrants, it may not reverse ongoing trends of population ageing. Some recovery in fertility levels can occur, with increased migration, as female family migrants show higher tendencies to stay. However, an overall societal change which is more child- and family orientated, would be needed to truly reverse declining fertility rates. International migration has however already become the main driver of population growth in the Netherlands. With the enlargements of the EU, migration from within Europe has gained importance, as seen in this study with the increasing numbers of Romanian and Polish migrants. This form of migration can play an increasingly important role in solving labour market shortages related to population ageing (CBS, 2019). But as these countries will also experience societal ageing and perhaps population decline themselves, not to mention a potential significant brain drain, intra-EU migration may not suffice, which will trigger further immigration from outside Europe. Therefore, the competition for highly skilled migrants will perhaps further increase. However, this study has shown that it is particularly these highly skilled professionals who have the lowest tendencies to stay. And although these individuals can in the short term be an important factor in economic development, it would not be a long-term solution to labour market shortages. Also, population decline, and labour shortages will not be equal in the whole country, but instead will have a stronger manifestation at the regional level. Most likely, it is not these shrinking regions that will be the destination of migrants, let alone highly skilled ones.

Migration is evidently not the only strategy to solve problems associated with societal ageing. Raising the retirement age and promoting labour participation has been mentioned. But investing in education and lifelong learning can also help to enhance productivity and increase human capital. With our diminishing workforce, it could be worthwhile to stimulate quality, making more and better use of the available working-age population by investing in people's education and skills, as an effective response to the demographic challenges facing the Netherlands. And rather than trying to focus on attracting the best and brightest labourers, it could be wise to also stimulate migration in sectors and regions where the severe shortages exist. Building upon this research will elucidate current migrant groups, and by emphasising improvement of integration of already present people, educating especially within those subgroups that have a high potential of solving labour shortages that impact societal ageing.

Limitations and future directions

The data was quite limited with the available variables. The data did not allow for much further statistical analysis because there was no individual micro data for each migrant, nor where they tracked over time, only whether they were still present in the country or not. Moreover, Romanian migrants just recently joined the sample in 2007 with their entry into the EU. The small sample allows for little representative for the entire contemporary migrant population. Also, Indian migration has come much more into fruition in more recent years, the ten-year threshold for staying rates is therefore also not very representative as the distribution has changed much over the years. Also, the fact that people are characterized of having one certain migration motive is major flaw in this research. People could be accompanying their partner in their labour migration, identifying them as family migrants, but could as well have found employment before their move, or at least well into their ten years of stay. However, these family migrants do display higher staying rates than their labour counterparts. Suggesting that family bonds and networks are advantageous for tying migrants

and their labour potential to the country. Another limitation is the fact that highly skilled labour identification is linked to the knowledge worker scheme which sets a certain minimum yearly income, of around 50.000 euros, as a condition. This requirement is very subjective and can change overnight, endangering the future relevance of this study on this particular group.

Another serious impediment to obtaining insight in migration from within the EU is the fact that many migrants are classified as unknown in the population statistics. As many do not register with the local authorities, resulting in an underrepresentation in the survey. In 2018, almost 25% of all Poles and almost 18% of Romanian were unaccounted for what their exact reason for migration was. To gain further insight into the nature of contemporary migration patterns, it would therefore be important to draw also draw on other sources because they overemphasise the documented reality and have little to say about the undocumented reality of migration within the EU.

Using the theoretical model of Engbersen et al. (2011) to define a groups' migration pattern was useful to give context to otherwise subjective indications of their influence on societal ageing. However, much needed information, to truly assess one's bond with the country let alone their actual impact in resolving societal ageing issues is missing. This research was more explorative to find potential nuances in the otherwise enormous body of data with migrant groups which are often overgeneralized. Shedding lights on the nuances within and between groups can benefit migration management.

This explorative nature of this study has been helpful in examining the data and finding nuances in different migration groups. However, it only allowed for strong hypotheses after the data analyses was concluded. The study was not designed to give strong generalisable explanations. Future quantitative research could analyse the quantitative significance and correlation between the staying rates, different migrant groups and their impact in challenging societal ageing. That is, if more data on this subject becomes readily available. Therefore, this research is a good preliminary study on which future research can be based and be expanded upon. This study has shown the importance of looking at the current migration stock, and what effects different migration groups have on challenging population ageing in the Netherlands. Examples of future research could be the delving into the notion of tied stayer among women. As seen here, that there are for example high numbers of family unification migrants among American and Indian groups who are also much more likely to stay than their male counterpart. But does their labour market participation also improves after so many years, do they in fact integrate properly? Qualitative measures would also be helpful in gaining more insight into these otherwise numeric individuals.

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