



university of
 groningen

faculty of spatial sciences



Universitat
 Pompeu Fabra
 Barcelona

Attitudes towards immigration in Germany and the United Kingdom: differences and the role of immigration policy context

Faculty of Spatial Sciences | Population Research Centre | University of Groningen

Department of Political and Social Sciences | Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona

Master Thesis | DDM Social Demography

February 2019

Student

Rick Oostendorp

S2183145

r.g.oostendorp@student.rug.nl

Supervisors

Prof. Dr. L.J.G. van Wissen

Prof. Dr. P. Baizan Munoz

Prof. Dr. M. Lubbers

Abstract

This thesis investigates differences in attitudes towards immigration and the role of immigration policy context. It examines the extent to which level of education is related to a negative opinion on immigration based on an economic interpretation or a cultural interpretation, and whether this differs depending on the policy context for Germany and the United Kingdom. Analysis of the eighth round of the European Social Survey reveal three main findings. First, educational level offers an explanation for anti-immigration attitudes. Higher educated tend to be more favourable towards immigration because higher educated experience less cultural – and economic threat. When controlling for perceived economic threat, the effect of education becomes less strong. Second, the effect of perceived cultural threat offers a better explanation for anti-immigration attitudes than perceived economic threat. Third, this thesis finds that differences in immigration policy context have not been able to explain differences how to explain anti-immigration attitudes in Germany and the UK. It did however find that German respondents are less supportive of anti-immigration attitudes.

Keywords: attitudes | immigration | policy | threat perception | Germany | the United Kingdom

Table of contents

1. Introduction.....	p.1
2. Previous research, theoretical framework and conceptual model.....	p.2
2.1 Cross-country differences in attitudes towards immigration.....	p.2
2.2 Immigration policy.....	p.4
2.3 Immigration policy in Germany and the United Kingdom.....	p.4
2.4 Immigration attitudes in Germany and the United Kingdom.....	p.6
2.5 The impact of education/skill on immigration attitudes.....	p.7
2.6 The impact of culture on immigration attitudes.....	p.7
2.7 Hypotheses and conceptual model.....	p.9
3. Methodology.....	p.10
3.1 The ESS Dataset.....	p.10
3.2 Method.....	p.10
3.3 Measures.....	p.11
4. Results.....	p.12
4.1 Descriptive statistics.....	p.12
4.2 Educational level and anti-immigration attitudes.....	p.12
4.3 Perceived cultural – and economic threat	p.13
5. Conclusion.....	p.16
References.....	p.18

1. Introduction

Ever since the peak of Europe's biggest influx of migrants and refugees in 2015-16, tension between European Union (EU) member states over how to cope with irregular migration is rising. While some countries plea for harder external border controls, others argue for a fairer distribution of new arrivals. Due to increasing prosperity in combination with a range of other economic and political developments, Europe has changed from a continent of emigration to a continent of immigration in the past century (Boswell, 2005). With immigration increasing in size and complexity in recent decades, the impact of immigration is heavily debated. Immigration is welcomed as a source of labour, adding cultural diversity and for addressing contemporary population issues such as ageing and decline. Immigration also raises concerns about effects that can be detrimental on national welfare systems, increasing competition for jobs and national identity (Joppke, 1999). There is a distinction between wanted (highly-skilled labour) and unwanted migration (Geddes, 2003). Although most countries agreed to develop and implement a common immigration policy at the EU level, countries do vary in the immigration policies they develop, adopt, and implement (Davidov & Semyonov, 2017). These different views on immigration and related immigration policies not only are affected by public opinion, but in their own right also are thought to result in different attitudes towards immigration within and across countries.

Previous research on differences in attitudes towards immigration has applied micro – and macro perspectives. Empirical analysis shows that the attitudes towards immigration differ depending on micro level factors as personal demographic characteristics and perceptions and macro level factors as country's characteristics (Paas & Halapuu, 2012). Important micro factors found in previous research for explaining attitudes towards immigration are level of education, skill composition, place of residence, ethnic background and political preference. Research shows that lower levels of education are related with a more negative opinion about immigration (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Important macro factors are GDP per capita, the unemployment rate and migrant-stock and flow for explaining attitudes toward immigration (Mayda, 2006; Luedtke, 2006; Mau & Burckhardt, 2009). Cross-country research often accounts for individual level factors, by which macro level differences can be explained (Gang et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006; Facchini & Mayda, 2006). That kind of research often also investigated to what extent micro-level explanation differ between macro-level contexts. For example, it is found that in developed countries higher skilled people are less opposed to immigration than lower skilled people (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Research combining micro – and macro level characteristics finds attitudes towards immigration are shaped by both the attributes of the country and the characteristics of the individuals residing in it (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). Research using national immigration policy frameworks for comparing countries find that immigration policy is connected with attitudes towards immigration (Bauer et al., 2001; Schlueter et al., 2013; Ueffing et al., 2015). There is an interaction between public opinion and immigration policy (Ford et al., 2015). Public views about immigration are shaped in response to changes in immigration levels and differences between migrant groups. Policymakers are sensitive to these changes and develop policy, in order to satisfy the public opinion. There appears to be a reciprocity between the impact of public opinion and immigration policy. Based on the works of Bauer et al. (2001), Schlueter et al. (2013) and Ueffing et al. (2015) this thesis will explore the role of a country's immigration policy framework for explaining cross-country differences in attitudes towards immigration. Ueffing et al. (2015) found that for two

countries from different ends of the policy spectrum, Australia and Germany, differences in attitudes occurred, which could be related to their immigration policy framework. To further investigate the relationship between immigration policy and attitudes towards immigration, I intend to analyse differences in attitudes towards immigration in Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) round 8 of 2016. The timing of the ESS Round 8 in 2016 allows to examine attitudinal differences between Germany and the UK in a period that has been characterised by tension between member states of the EU and sparked the debate about immigration. Germany and the UK are historically amongst the countries with the highest numbers of immigrants. In 2016 Germany reported the largest number of immigrants (1.029.900) in Europe, followed by the UK with a total number of 589.000 immigrants (Eurostat, 2018). Bauer et al. (2001) defines both countries to be in the same category of post-colonial and active recruitment immigration countries, but their responses in terms of immigration policies differ. To add to previous research, this thesis wants to distinguish itself by researching explanations of attitudes towards immigration in two different countries, with different immigration policy contexts. Since previous research has argued that education and threat perception play a crucial role in understanding attitudes towards immigration (Scheepers, Coenders & Gijssberts, 2002), I will study the extent to which level of education is related to a negative opinion on immigration based on an economic interpretation or a cultural interpretation, and whether this differs depending on the policy context.

2. Previous research, theoretical framework and conceptual model

2.1 Cross country differences in attitudes towards immigration

Recent studies have demonstrated that attitudes towards immigration vary across countries (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Mayda, 2006; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Past research focusing on anti-immigration attitudes and anti-foreigner sentiment has found strong public reactions to immigrants and immigration, from restrained acceptance to clear rejection. Unfavourable attitudes can be the result of differences in immigration policies, differences in the meaning of – and the interpretation of what constitutes an immigrant and different immigration histories. Based on the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) of 1995 and 2003, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) compare the mean levels of preferred immigration for countries over time. The authors find, regardless of a country's immigration history or policies, a preference for reduction in the admitted number of immigrants over time for all countries. Even traditional settler societies as Australia, Canada and New-Zealand, who apply less restrictive immigration policies, have a preferred level of a little reduction of admitted immigrants. The United States of America have a preference level which is similar to non-traditional immigration countries as the Western European countries and Japan. In these countries people's preference to reduce immigration increased over time. In Eastern European countries people favour a higher level of reduced immigration compared with Western Europe (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010).

Using the Eurobarometer survey, Gang et al. (2002) focused on the attitudes of citizens of EU countries towards non-EU people. Between 1988 and 1997 anti-foreigner sentiment increased in the EU. The results indicated that people who compete (or had competed) directly in the labour market with immigrants held more negative sentiment. The unemployed, who felt that their employment opportunities declined, the employed, who felt that their wages declined due to competition, and the retirees, who may have felt

that they have been hurt by the labour market competition in the past, all contributed to the increase of negative sentiment towards foreigners. This research is in line with findings of Scheve and Slaughter (2001) on determinants of individual preferences over immigration policy in the United States. Less-skilled people prefer a more restricted immigration policy, whereas more skilled people prefer a less restricted immigration policy.

In line with the findings of Gang et al. (2002), research of Semyonov et al. (2006) find an increase of anti-foreigner sentiment over time for all European countries researched. Using the same dataset, but for four waves between 1988 and 2000, the results demonstrate an increase in mean values of anti-foreigner sentiment for all countries. Anti-foreigner sentiment is higher in places with large concentrations of foreigners and where economic conditions are less favourable. Semyonov et al. (2006) argue that a larger immigrant group gives rise to increased perceived group threat. Continuing on this line of research Malchow-Muller et al. (2009) find that a larger share of cross-country differences can be explained by differences in perceived consequences of immigration. Perceiving immigration as having negative consequences, factors both economic and socio-cultural, can lead to a preference for restrictive immigration policies. The growing influence of political parties with anti-immigration attitudes at its core serve as an example. Even in liberal countries as Denmark and Sweden right-wing political parties gained more electoral power. The perceived consequences of immigration appear to be a threatening prospect for the economic and cultural status quo (Czaika & di Lillo, 2018).

Ceobanu & Escandell (2008) investigated the link between feelings of national identity and anti-immigrant sentiment by using the dataset of the ISSP from 1995 and 2003. The authors results showed regional differences among European countries in the mean levels and effect caused by civic and ethnic feelings over time. Both Eastern and Western European countries experience a general trend of convergence of the actual mean levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. In former socialist states in Eastern Europe institutional and political systems have changed, making nativism a weaker predictor for anti-immigrant sentiment. Moving towards democratic values and joining the EU in 2004 has led to a renewed trust in the institutions of the state. This resulted in a slight decrease in anti-immigrant sentiment for Eastern European countries. Using the same dataset of the ISSP, Facchini and Mayda (2006) researched the role of individual-level economic costs and benefits of immigration in shaping attitudes towards immigration. The authors identified that individuals' attitudes are influenced by the way immigration has a direct effect on their earnings. Migrants change relative wages (the labour market effect) and migrants change the burden of taxation (welfare state channel effect). These two effects have been found to be more pronounced in countries with larger immigrant inflows. In countries with lower GDP growth and more immigration over time it is shown that citizens become less favourable to immigration. The findings lend support for the idea that micro level indicators are highly relevant to understand immigration attitudes, and that the role these micro-level indicators play may be dependent on the macro context of a country.

Previous research shows that negative attitudes towards immigration are found for all countries researched. A preference for reducing immigration is found for both less – and higher skilled people in receiving countries. This is related to the size – and skill composition of the migrant population. Economic conditions, larger visibility of immigrants in neighbourhoods, greater feelings of national identity and perceived consequences of immigration are important factors for explaining anti-foreigner

sentiment. These perceived consequences of immigration can be related to a country's implemented immigration policy. It is therefore of importance to analyse the context of a country's immigration policy in order to better understand differences in anti-immigration attitudes between countries.

2.2 Immigration policy

Both economic and noneconomic factors are important for explaining cross-country differences in attitudes towards immigration. On the one hand, economic indicators as fear of job competition, unemployment rates and decreasing wages. On the other hand, cultural indicators as losing shared values, customs and traditions, national identity, political influence and preferences for ethnically homogeneous societies. An angle in relationship to immigration attitudes that has not been researched frequently, is the relationship between immigration policy and immigration attitudes. Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) find that in most European countries with restrictive immigration policies, the inhabitants prefer reduced levels of immigration. In countries with less restrictive immigration policies, as Australia and Canada, the population has a more favourable attitude towards immigration. Bauer et al. (2001) researched the association between immigration policy and the effect on labour market assimilation of immigrants and the sentiment of natives towards immigrants. In countries that received mainly refugee migrants, natives tend to be more concerned about the social impact of immigrants, whereas in countries that mainly receive economic migrants, natives tend to be more concerned about labour market competition. Bauer et al. (2001) concluded that these findings indicate that respondents in countries with an immigration policy based on skill showed more favourable attitudes towards immigration. Schlueter et al. (2013) investigated the influence of immigrant integration policies and their association with perceptions of threatened group interests. Evidence was found for the expectation that immigration integration policies are associated with perceptions of group threat. More permissive integration policies were associated with stronger perceived group threat. Elaborating on this topic Ueffing et al. (2015) compared immigration attitudes for two countries, Australia and Germany, based on the country's immigration policy frameworks. Both countries developed different immigration policies in response to large immigration movements. The skill-based immigration policy of Australia proved to influence people's perceptions of the cultural and economic impacts of immigration and therefore their attitudes towards immigration. In Australia people tend to display more favourable attitudes towards immigration. The authors prove that immigration policy is a strong indicator of attitudes towards immigration. Where previous research mainly focuses on the cultural and economic impact of immigration, this paper takes an approach that suggests that differences in the context of immigration policy lead to different ways for explaining attitudes towards immigration.

2.3 Immigration policy in Germany and the United Kingdom

Most European countries adopted restrictive immigration policies during the 1970s, in the hope to prevent Europe from maintaining increasing immigration from either economic or labour migrants, political asylum seekers or for reunification with family members (Castles & Miller, 2003). After the Second World War, Germany experienced mass immigration mostly due to the labour recruitment programmes. These programmes were installed as a measure to fill temporary labour shortages, but instead led to the transformation of Germany into an ethnically diverse country of immigration (Ellerman, 2015). Unwanted mass immigration, alongside social and political conflict over these new

ethnic minorities induced debate about the immigration policy in the country. In 1973 the recruitment programmes were stopped. With no explicit immigration policy, policymakers acted under the narrative that Germany was not a country of immigration and not a country interested in permanent immigrants (Joppke, 1999; Hess & Green, 2016). Despite the debates and the recruitment stop in 1973, German Government in the 1990s decided to execute new temporary migrant workers programmes. The ‘no-immigration country’ paradigm led to challenges for policy makers and the restart of recruitment programmes was at odds with policies that would not infringe the no-immigration paradigm. The initiation of new recruitment programmes was a process of learning, trying to create programmes that recognised that the post-war recruitment system had resulted in large scale settlement due to the failure of rotary workers and the lack of prevention in family unification. Important new features of these programmes were that recruitment workers could not claim rights to permanent residence. Recruitment numbers were subject to annual quotas per country, carefully time-managed projects and therefore ruling out family reunification (Ellerman, 2015). After the turn of the millennium, the narrative of immigration changed. German policymakers realised that the country faced demographic challenges due to trends of low fertility rates, an ageing population and emerging shortages in highly skilled professions (Hess & Green, 2016). The perception of no-migration country changed. The Green Card initiative of Chancellor Schroder, which provided temporary immigration of IT specialists between 2000 and 2004, demonstrated the gradual liberalisation for qualified immigrants. This initiative helped pave the way for Germany’s first immigration law in 2004, which on the one hand retained the 1973 recruitment stop, but on the other hand exempted highly skilled workers (Ellerman, 2015).

Nowadays, Germany faces two challenges with regard to migration and integration. On the one hand, pressures towards liberalisation because of economic considerations and an imminent demographic crisis. With an ageing and shrinking population, and shortages in the labour force, both skilled and unskilled, opening up to migration could offer a solution. On the other hand, pressures towards restriction exist because of challenges around integration. Integration is an important part of their immigration policies and with a large number of foreign-born populations in Germany, natives experience cultural differences with their culturally homogenous societies. Levels of asylum claims have been rising, gaps between the population with and without a migration background increased in areas such as poverty and education, and structural problems of integration tend to affect non-labour market active migrants (Hess & Green, 2016).

In the years following the Second World War, the UK started to see an increase in the influx of immigrants. For approximately two decades the British government desired to remain strongly connected with former colonies and maintained an open door to immigration from the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, tension about coloured immigration grew in social and political debates, and long before other European countries, the UK closed their migrant labour recruitment programs (Boswell & Hampshire, 2017). In the late 1990s migration emerged as an issue of public debate. In 1997 the Labour government inherited an immigration policy framework that was both exclusionary (with regard to entry of immigrants) as inclusive (on integration of immigrants). However, in contrast with Germany, the UK portrayed themselves as an open, tolerant society with a long tradition of welcoming foreigners (Boswell & Hampshire, 2017). Between 1998 and 2003 the UK witnessed a significant increase in humanitarian migration: from 2000 on student – and labour migration from outside the EU and from 2004 on an increase in

labour migration from within the EU, especially from Poland (Katwala & Somerville, 2016). Under the Labour governments at the beginning of the century, the UK economic immigration policies transformed from being one of the most restrictive to being one of the most liberal in Europe (Consterdine & Hampshire, 2014). Three important factors combined caused these changes. First, the strong economy with labour – and skill shortages, second, the governmental change in ideology of globalisation and third, institutional reforms that introduced new actors into the immigration policy field. Immigration policy changes were made such as allowing new citizens from the A8 countries of the EU, full access to the UK labour market in 2004 and the liberalisation of immigration policy towards workers from outside the EU. The government opted for on the one hand presenting liberalisation of policy as a necessary response to structural global changes in the economy, with a competition for talent and skill and on the other hand, maintaining the British historical standard of being open towards – and tolerant of immigration (Boswell & Hampshire, 2017). Since the UK general election in 2010, immigration continued to play a key role in politics. The new coalition government pledged to reduce net migration. The government installed a series of policy changes to restrict non-European migration and reach their target of bringing down net migration to under 100,000 annually. Free movement from the EU made this target almost impossible to achieve. Under pressure of anti-immigration concerns the government introduced the 2014 Immigration Act, which created a hostile environment for unauthorised immigrants. It imposed restrictions on unauthorised immigrants' access to services and their rights to appeal. Ahead of the EU referendum in 2016 the coalition government strategy was to negotiate a new deal with the EU, especially on behalf of migration. This renegotiation focused on restricting the rights of migrants, including work benefits, like limiting unemployment benefits for migrant jobseekers and sending child benefits abroad (Katwala & Somerville, 2016). The government acts under the belief that immigration is comprehensively opposed by the public, whereas in reality the public appears to be disgruntled about the way the government has been handling immigration in the past decades. With the Brexit being negotiated, the future of migration in the UK remains uncertain.

2.4 Immigration attitudes in Germany and the United Kingdom

When researching attitudes towards immigration for the UK in the period 2002-2014, Ford and Lympelopoulou (2017) found that attitudes of the public have become more positive over time. The proportion believing that immigration was bad for the economy in 2002 outweighed those who thought it was good by 16%, whereas in 2014 the proportion who thought that immigration was good for the economy outweighed the negative view with four percentage points. However, it appears that the public is deeply divided over immigration. When controlling for sociodemographic characteristics, younger, higher educated and higher-class individuals tend to be more positive about immigration. The education gap consists of 39%. There appears to be a social divide, where lower educated view immigration as more negative. This could be related to the tolerant immigration policies, through which immigrants access the UK searching for better job opportunities. Lower educated people experience an economic threat, where immigrants take away jobs. Another important characteristic of public opinion change is that of attitudes, which have become more selective. The public has not become keener on restricting immigration but feel that important criteria for selecting immigrants should be the ability to speak English (87%), be committed to the British way of life (84%) and possessing skills that are needed in the country (81%). Germany is the second largest country of immigration in the world after the US. During the summer of 2015, the number

of immigrants increased, when Germany became the European destination for most refugees and migrants from outside the EU. Research of Talo (2017) showed that the expected general increase in anti-immigration sentiment did not occur. Between 2014 and 2017 the percentage of people stating that immigration of people from non-EU countries evoked positive feelings increased from 30% to 39%.

Compared with other EU countries, the UK saw the largest positive change (+20%) in views of the economic impact of immigration in the period between 2002 and 2014. In Germany the net view about economic impact of immigration increased from +7% points in 2002 to +23% in 2014 (Ford & Lymperopoulou, 2017). With regard to the cultural impact of immigration, the UK are less positive than most of their European neighbours. The UK experienced a change of -8%, Germany experienced a negative change of -2%. The authors results showed that overall Germany, Sweden and Switzerland are on the side of the table being positive about economic effects and very positive about the cultural impacts of immigration. On the other side of the table France, Slovenia, Czechia and Hungary are negative about the economic impact and neutral or negative about the cultural impact of immigration. In the middle, countries as the UK, Austria, Ireland, Portugal and Denmark are neutral or negative about both the impacts, economic and cultural. The results show that even though the UK is socially divided in opinions about the impact of immigration, internationally the UK is not different from other EU countries (Ford & Lymperopoulou, 2017).

2.5 The impact of education/skill on immigration attitudes

In order to understand differences in attitudes towards immigration certain factors have been introduced over the years, trying to explain these differences. Education seems to play a crucial role, with large educational gaps in attitudes towards immigrants. Both economic concerns over immigration and cultural concerns over immigration have been proposed to understand why lower and higher educated people differ in their attitudes. The research of Ueffing et al. (2015) showed that immigration policy can be an indicator that moderates the role of these explanations for attitudes towards immigration.

A series of studies ascribes the connection between education and immigration attitudes mainly to economic factors. Economic factors can lead individuals with different personal characteristics to support different kinds of migration. Economic models, as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, predict that a composition of immigrants who are relatively less skilled (less educated) than natives of the receiving country, reduces the supply of skilled labour and therefore produces higher wages for the more skilled workers of the native country (Borjas et al., 1996). In their research Scheve and Slaughter (2001) found that less-skilled individuals are more likely to prefer restricted immigration. Using data from the American National Election Studies (NES) for the years 1992, 1994 and 1996 the authors measured skill by average wage in the individual's occupation and educational attainment. The authors split their estimation sample into labour force participants and non-participants in order to determine whether labour market competition between immigrants and natives would explain their findings. If immigrants are more likely to be low-skilled and education predominantly measures labour market skills, a negative correlation between education and anti-immigration attitudes only holds for labour force participants.

These findings are in line with research of Mayda (2006), who, using the ISSP, found that correlations between pro-immigration attitudes and individual skill are related to the skill

composition of natives relative to immigrants in the destination country. Skilled individuals favour immigration in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants, and otherwise, oppose immigration when immigrants are more skilled due to fears of labour market competition (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Facchini & Mayda, 2006). O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) support the idea that economic theories of migration are quite useful for explaining individual level attitudes towards immigration. Using data from the ISSP survey of 1995, the authors find that in more developed countries there is a positive correlation between a country's wealth and higher skilled people being less opposed to immigration than lower skilled people.

2.6 The impact of culture on immigration attitudes

Another series of studies ascribes the connection between education and pro-immigration attitudes towards non-economic factors. Research of Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) argue that education is a key determinant in explaining attitudes towards immigration, regardless of the skill composition of immigrants. The authors analyse data from the ESS of 2003, testing for educational attainment and occupational level in relation to attitudes for four groups of country of origin: poor/rich European and poor/rich non-European. The authors argue that if labour market competition between immigrants and natives by skill level is a critical determinant of immigration preference, education should be more positively related with poorer countries and more negatively related with richer countries. The authors hypothesize that low skilled individuals are more opposed to immigration as they fear job competition with immigrants, has not been proven by their results. Higher educated are more likely to favour immigration regardless of the immigrants' country of birth. The authors argue that higher education is associated with having different cultural values and perceptions, higher educated are more open in their beliefs. The authors research indicated that higher educated people were less racist, placed more value on cultural diversity and were more likely to support the idea that migrants form a benefit for the economy.

These findings are corroborated by Facchini and Mayda (2006) who found that differences in educational level are expressed in differences in individuals' ethnic tolerance. Higher educated people have a different notion of culture, they are more open to other cultures and internationally oriented. Being higher educated is related to having a less strong feeling of immigrants undermining the cultural identity of a country. In rich countries, higher educated people tend to be more favourable towards immigration, because mostly low-skilled immigrants are received and fill in the gap of complementarity in the labour market (Facchini & Mayda, 2006). Chandler and Tsai (2001) argue that most studies identified a positive correlation between education and pro-immigration attitudes. Also, there is a positive correlation between education and tolerance of various kinds of diversity, especially racial.

Research of Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) shows little evidence of immigration attitudes being strongly correlated with personal economic factors, instead the authors find that immigration attitudes are shaped by concerns about the cultural impact on the nation. Non-economic factors emphasise socio-cultural factors like the impact of foreigners on national identity and ethnical homogeneous societies in host countries. Card et al. (2005) argue that perceptions of immigrants from different ethnic and racial groups with different culture, language or religion may be experienced as threatening for the status quo. Czaika and Di Lillo (2018) find that the cultural perceptions about immigrants are stronger among people who have a strong nativist mindset, feelings of national

identification and a desire for ethnically homogeneous societies. Research of Ben-Nun Bloom et al. (2015) argues that culturally threatened individuals prefer immigrants akin to themselves, whereas materially threatened individuals prefer immigrants who are different and of whom can be expected not to compete for the same resources. Cultural threat refers to the perception of people that immigrants form a risk for the positive status of a country's establishments and its ethnic and cultural heritage due to increasing numbers of people of different races, who speak different languages and share other norms and values. O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) find that racism, xenophobia and a great sentiment of nationalism lead to a perception of cultural threat by immigration. Larger concentrations of foreigners in neighbourhoods, political party affiliation and ideology are important factors for explaining these perceptions. Whether and how immigration affects politics depends to an important extent on the immigration attitudes of the native-born majority groups. Natives in countries that receive predominantly refugee migrants are relatively more concerned with immigration impacts on social issues. Natives in countries with mostly labour migrants are more concerned about the economic consequences, such fear of increased job competition. Natives may view immigration more favourably if the immigrants are selected according to the needs of the labour market, this way immigration can be used as a moderator for social tensions and contribute to a better economic performance of the respective country (Bauer et al., 2001).

2.7 Hypotheses and conceptual model

The theoretical approach in this paper focuses on four factors which determine attitudes towards immigration: immigration policy, level of education and cultural/economic threat. Bauer et al. (2001) argued that people's attitudes towards immigration are a reflection of a country's immigration policy. Elaborating on this work, Ueffing et al. (2015) found that immigration policy is a strong indicator of attitudes towards immigration. The different immigration policy contexts of Germany and the UK are expected to result in differences in attitudes towards immigration between the countries.

Education appears to be a determinative factor in explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) argue that being higher educated leads to a more favourable view of immigration, because higher educated people have a better perception of the consequences of immigration. Therefore, it is expected that higher educated people are more favourable towards immigration and towards the cultural and economic threat within both policy contexts.

H1: The higher the level of education, the less unfavourable towards immigration.


H2: The higher the level of education, the less strong the perception of cultural and of economic threats from immigrants.

In the UK a liberalised immigration policy led to the increase of labour migrants since the beginning of the 2000s, which is thought to be associated with greater economic consequences of immigration than in Germany, where, in contrast, policy focused on the reduction of immigration. German policy makers largely disregarded skill-oriented immigration until the beginning of the 21st century. After the ban on recruitment workers, most immigrants arrived through family reunification, asylum requests and immigration from mostly Eastern European States after the fall of the Soviet Union. A current important challenge for Germany is the issue of integration of migrants. On the one side Germany opts for liberalisation of immigration policy, to deal with demographic

challenges and economic considerations, on the other side, the no-immigration measures for restricting migration are wanted. Germany’s immigration policy has been developed within the view of Germany as a culturally homogeneous society, with shared values and traditions. Schlueter et al. (2013) researched the relationship between immigrant integration policies and the perceptions of group threat. With the large foreign-born population in Germany, it is expected that due to their restrictive immigration policy a stronger perception of cultural threat of immigration exists. In contrast, it is expected that less favourable sentiments towards the economic impact of immigration are present in the UK. With the opening up of the borders in 2004 and the liberalisation of immigration policy, a competition for skills and talents occurred combined with the inflow of labour workers from both in – and outside the EU. With the current Brexit discussion, immigration appears to be one of the most important arguments for leaving the EU. Less-skilled people experience immigrants as job competitors and feel negative about immigration. Hence, it is expected that the role of perceived economic threat and viewing immigration as bad for the country is larger in the UK, whereas in Germany the role of perceived cultural threat and viewing immigration as bad for the country is larger. The conceptual model of this research summarizes the hypothesis made.

H3: In Germany the role of perceived cultural threat and viewing immigration as bad for the country is larger, due to their restrictive immigration policy context.

H4: In the UK the role of perceived economic threat and viewing immigration as bad for the country is larger, due to their liberalised immigration policy context.



3. Methodology

The primary goal of this research is to determine to what extent level of education is related to a negative opinion on immigration, based on a cultural – or an economic interpretation and whether this differs depending on the immigration policy context of a country. This research uses quantitative indicators to measure country level differences and uses individual level survey data collected in 23 countries. The data include questions that measure attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies.

3.1 The ESS dataset

To test the theoretical expectations of this research, this study will use the European Social Survey. In this analysis, data will be used from the eighth round of the ESS fielded in 23 countries between August 2016 and December 2017. The ESS is a biennial cross-national survey that conducts face-to-face interviews and is executed to administer representative samples from mostly European countries. To make each sample representative, individuals are selected by strict random probability methods at every stage of the sampling process. Each sample is representative of all persons aged 15 and over, and resident within private households for each country. In this analysis data are

being used for Germany and the United Kingdom. The German sample consists of 2,852 cases, with a response rate of 30.6, which have been collected between August 2016 and March 2017. The UK sample consists of 1,959 cases, with a response rate of 42.8, which have been collected between September 2016 and March 2017. All non-nationals have been excluded from the samples. The analysed sample size consists of $N_g=2,453$ for Germany and $N_{uk}=1,547$ for the UK, which makes a total of $N=4,000$.

3.2 Method

Data from the respondents on individual level will be used to test for differences between countries; I will test to what extent the UK and German population differ in their attitudes as measured by the average attitude in the population. To test the hypotheses, this research estimates a series of multiple linear regressions, which are built incrementally. Table 1 consists of percentages and means of the control variables, age and gender. Table 2 consists of descriptive statistics of the dependent – and independent variables. Table 3 estimates the association between education and the dependent variable, controlled for by gender and age. Table 5 and table 6 give the estimation of the association between the independent variables for cultural – and economic threat perception and the dependent variable. Table 7 accounts for the associations of all independent variables and the dependent variable. Tables 4, 8 and 9 include interaction effects, with which is tested to what extent the effects of education, cultural – and economic threat perception vary between Germany and the UK.

3.3 Measures

As described in paragraph 3.1, the initial dataset of the ESS contains observations for 23 countries. All respondents not born in or not a citizen of the countries Germany and the United Kingdom are left out of the analysis. The missing values in all variables consist of less than 5% of the sample and are therefore not included in the analysis.

The dependent variable, ‘anti-immigration attitude’ is built from questions in the ESS dataset, using the respondent’s answers to three statements. The respondent is asked to answer the statements: (1) “allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe”, (2) “allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority” and (3) allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority”. The answer categories to these questions are: ‘allow many to come and live here’, ‘allow some’, ‘allow a few’, and ‘allow none’. Besides these four answering categories the dataset provides additional categories ‘refusal’, ‘don’t know’ and ‘no answer’. These answer categories are treated as missing values and therefore not included in the analysis. The conduction of a correlation test shows that these three variables have a considerable correlation. The performance of a reliability test proves this, with an internal consistency between the variables measured as Cronbach’s alpha >0.8 . Out of the three allow many/few variables described above a new variable has been created: “anti-immigration attitude”, which is the mean of the answers to the three questions. In this new dependent variable people can score from 1 to 4. The variable is coded as: 1= ‘allow many to come and live here’, 2= ‘allow some’, 3= ‘allow a few’ and 4= ‘allow none’. The variable is coded in this order, to have higher scores reflect a higher degree of anti-immigration attitude.

Education, a central independent variable, is measured as the international standard classification of education (ISCED), which allows for comparisons of educational level within and across countries. ISCED is a categorical variable which has seven categories:

‘Less than lower secondary’, ‘lower secondary’, ‘lower tier upper secondary’, ‘upper tier secondary’, ‘advanced vocational’, ‘lower tertiary education’, and ‘higher tertiary education’. The dataset also provides answering categories: ‘other’, ‘refusal’ and ‘don’t know’. The categories ‘other’, ‘refusal’ and ‘don’t know’ are treated as missing values and left out of the analysis. A new variable is created ‘education’, which has seven categories: 1= ‘less than lower secondary’, 2= ‘lower secondary’, 3= lower tier upper secondary’, 4= ‘upper tier secondary’, 5= ‘advanced vocational’, 6= ‘lower tertiary education’ and 7= ‘higher tertiary education’.

Perceived economic threat is measured through the respondents answer on the statement whether “immigrants are bad/good for the country’s economy”. The respondents could answer on a scale from 0 ‘bad for the economy’ to 10 ‘good for the economy’. The dataset shows that the variable has 42 missing values for answering categories ‘don’t know’, ‘refusal’ and ‘no answer’ which have been left out of the analysis. The answering categories have been re-coded in reversed order, to have higher scores reflect a higher degree of perceiving economic threat. Perceived cultural threat is measured through the respondents’ answer on the statement whether “country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants”. The respondents could answer on a scale from 0 ‘cultural life undermined’ to 10 ‘cultural life enriched’. Answering categories ‘don’t know’, ‘refusal’ and ‘no answer’ have been left out of the analysis and are treated as missing values. The answering categories have been re-coded in reversed order, to have higher scores reflect a higher degree of perceiving cultural threat.

Measures that control for individual socio demographic characteristics are age and gender. Age is a continuous variable measured from age 15-94 and ‘no answer’ observations. These ‘no answer’ observations are treated as missing values and have been left out of the analysis. Gender is a nominal variable with three categories ‘male’, ‘female’ and ‘no answer’. The reference category ‘no answer’ is treated as missing values. The variable is coded as a dummy variable with 0= ‘male’ and 1= ‘female’.

4. Results

4.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 states the percentages and means for the control variables of the respondent’s backgrounds. The control variable gender is almost equally divided for both countries around 50%. The differences within the countries are bigger, where in Germany more respondents are male, and in the UK more respondents are female. The mean age of the respondents in Germany is 49.95 years and, in the UK, the mean age is older, 52.24 years.

Table 1 Percentages and means of respondents’ background variables

	Germany	United Kingdom	Both
<i>Percentage</i>			
Gender			
Male	52.38	45.38	50.32
Female	47.62	54.62	49.68
<i>Mean</i>			
Age	48.95	52.24	

The simple means of the measures of respondents' anti-immigration attitude, educational level, perception of economic threat and perception of cultural threat are reported in table 2. As described in the methodological part of this research, the dependent variable 'anti-immigration attitude' is a combined variable of three statements regarding immigration. A mean value of 2.5 describes the point where respondents change from favourable towards non-favourable attitudes of immigration. The reported mean value shows a more favourable attitude towards immigration in Germany (2.3) than in the UK (2.5). On average, the respondents of the German sample have a higher educational level. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics show that the respondents in the British sample also have a higher mean for perceived economic – and cultural threat. The mean value for perceived cultural threat between Germany and the UK shows a bigger difference than for economic threat.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics: distribution of dependent and independent variables

Variable	Germany		United Kingdom	
	Mean	SD.	Mean	SD.
Anti-immigration attitude	2.325	0.852	2.472	0.850
Educational level	4.262	1.691	3.807	2.052
Perceived economic threat	4.174	2.330	4.445	2.368
Perceived cultural threat	4.039	2.511	4.419	2.563

4.2 Educational level and anti-immigration attitudes

A first regression analysis to estimate the difference between the UK and Germany in the mean anti-immigration attitudes, while controlled for differences in gender and age composition shows a positive coefficient of .147 for the UK, which is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. In the UK, the respondents hold a stronger anti-immigration attitudes than the respondents in Germany. The results for the second regression analysis with the independent variable 'educational level' and the control variables, age and gender, are presented in table 3. In the UK respondents still have a stronger anti-immigration attitudes than in Germany. The difference reduced to .0673, which is statistically significant at 5% confidence level. But we can conclude that when controlled for educational level, age and gender, the British sample still scores .0673 higher than the German sample for anti-immigration attitudes.

Table 3 Parameter estimates: the effect of educational level on anti-immigration attitudes

Anti-immigration attitude	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	95% CI.	
Country (Germany)						
United Kingdom	.0673	.0266	2.54	0.011**	.0153	.1194
Educational level	-.115	.0070	-16.59	0.000*	-.129	-.102
Age	.0087	.0006	12.69	0.000*	.0073	.0100
Female	-.022	.0256	-0.84	0.401	-.072	.0287
_cons	2.402	.0498	48.22	0.000	2.304	2.450

*significant at 1% confidence level

**significant at 5% confidence level

Educational level has a negative coefficient of -.115, which is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. Educational level is negatively linked with anti-immigration attitudes, which means that a higher level of education is associated with less support for anti-immigration

attitudes. The first hypothesis: the higher the education, the less favourable towards anti-immigration attitudes is therefore accepted. To test whether the effect of educational level is similar in both countries, an interaction variable has been added in table 4. The effect of educational level shows a strong negative association of -.1094, which represents the effect of education in the German sample. The interaction variable reports a negative coefficient, which means that the effect of educational level is $-.1094 + -.0124$ higher for the British sample. Based on the insignificant values of the variables, it cannot be stated that the difference is existing. It could be that these differences are due to chance.

Table 4 Regression with the interaction effect of country and educational level

Anti-immigration attitude	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	95% CI.	
Country (Germany)						
United Kingdom	.1178	.0631	1.87	0.062	-.0058	.2415
Educational level	-.1094	.0070	-11.25	0.000*	-.129	-.102
Age	.0086	.0006	12.35	0.000*	.0073	.0100
Female	-.0205	.0256	-0.80	0.423	-.072	.0287
Country*Education level	-.0124	.0141	-0.88	0.378	-.0402	.0152
_cons	2.381	.0551	43.20	0.000	2.273	2.489

*significant at 1% confidence level **significant at 5% confidence level

4.3 Perceived cultural – and economic threat and anti-immigration attitude

From the results in table 5 can be seen that perceived cultural threat has a positive coefficient of .172 and is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. The positive linkage between cultural threat perception and the dependent variable, indicates that a higher perception of cultural threat is associated with more support for anti-immigration attitudes.

Table 5 Parameter estimates: the effect of perceived cultural threat on anti-immigration attitudes

Anti-immigration attitude	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	95% CI.	
Country (Germany)						
United Kingdom	.0364	.0227	1.60	0.110	-.008	.081
Educational level	-.0533	.0062	-8.65	0.000*	-.065	-.041
Age	.0066	.0006	11.33	0.000*	.0055	.0078
Female	-.012	.0219	-0.57	0.566	-.0055	.0304
Perceived cultural threat	.172	0.004	38.17	0.000*	.1628	.1805
_cons	1.54	.0482	31.88	0.000	1.444	1.634

*significant at 1% confidence level **significant at 5% confidence level

The dummy variable of country has turned insignificant, which shows that people in the UK have higher anti-immigration attitudes due to perceived cultural threat. This confirms the mean values of table 2, where the UK had a higher mean value for perceived cultural threat. The effect of educational level becomes less negative, which can be related to previous research stating that higher educated people have a different notion of culture and are more open to other societies. Higher educated people experience less cultural threat.

The parameter estimates in table 6 show that perceived economic threat has a positive coefficient of .173 and is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. The positive association between economic threat and the dependent variable, shows that higher economic threat is related to support for anti-immigration attitudes. The differences between the samples

of Germany and the UK in anti-immigration attitudes cannot be explained by differences in perceived economic threat. The dummy variable is significant at 5% confidence level. The effect of education is also in this model reduced in strength (it became closer to zero), but less so than in the model when cultural threat was included. Remarkable is that the coefficient of gender becomes significant at 1% confidence level. The effect of perceived economic threat shows that the sample of men experience more economic threat than women though they are less negative towards immigration.

Table 6 Parameter estimates: the effect of perceived economic threat on anti-immigration attitude

Anti-immigration attitude	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	95% CI.	
Country (Germany)						
United Kingdom	.051	.0232	2.19	0.028**	.0054	.0956
Educational level	-.061	.0062	-9.79	0.000*	-.073	-.049
Age	.008	.0006	12.79	0.000*	.0064	.0088
Female	-.059	.0224	-2.63	0.008*	-.103	-.015
Perceived economic threat	.173	.0049	35.02	0.000*	.1630	.1823
_cons	1.519	.0503	30.17	0.000	1.420	1.618

*significant at 1% confidence level

**significant at 5% confidence level

The complete model in table 7, consists of all the independent – and control variables. The table shows that the coefficients for both perceived cultural– and economic threat are positive and statistically significant at a 1% confidence level. Higher perceptions of cultural – and economic threat are associated with more support for anti-immigration attitudes. Compared with table 6 the coefficient of perceived economic threat has decreased from .173 to .095. The effect of perceived cultural threat is stronger. The dummy variable has turned insignificant in this model, which indicates that perceived cultural – and economic threat explain differences in anti-immigration attitudes between the samples of Germany and the UK. When both perceptions of threat are added to the model, educational level’s coefficient is further reduced and thus interpreted by the perceptions (to -.043) but is also shows that higher education still leads to more support for immigration, regardless of perceived cultural – and economic threat. Hypothesis 2: higher educated more strongly hold perceptions of cultural and economic threat, is accepted.

Table 7 Regression model including all dependent – and independent variables

Anti-immigration attitude	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>	95% CI.	
Country (Germany)						
United Kingdom	.0372	.0221	1.69	0.092	-.006	.0804
Educational level	-.043	.0060	-7.21	0.000*	-.055	-.032
Age	.0067	.0005	11.83	0.000*	.0056	.0078
Female	-.036	.0213	-1.70	0.089	-.078	.0056
Perceived cultural threat	.117	.0055	21.10	0.000*	.1060	.1277
Perceived economic threat	.095	.0059	16.06	0.000*	.0837	.1071
_cons	1.327	.0498	27.29	0.000	1.231	1.422

*significant at 1% confidence level

**significant at 5% confidence level

To test for differences between Germany and the UK, two interaction effects have been added into the regression analysis, which can be seen in tables 8 and 9. In table 8 an interaction effect between the variables country and perceived cultural threat has been

added. Cultural threat remains strongly positive with a coefficient of .173, which is the effect of cultural threat in Germany. The differences between the countries are not large, with a coefficient of -.003; which is the deviation for the effect in the UK. Based on the insignificant value of the interaction variable, it cannot be stated that the difference between Germany and the UK is existing. Therefore, hypothesis 3: in Germany the role of perceived cultural threat and viewing immigration as bad for the country is larger, due to their restrictive immigration policy context, is rejected.

Table 8 Regression with the interaction effect of country and perceived cultural threat

Anti-immigration attitude	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	95% CI.	
Country (Germany)						
United Kingdom	.0515	.044	1.17	0.241	-.0346	.1377
Educational level	-.054	.0062	-8.65	0.000*	-.066	-.041
Age	.0067	.0005	11.33	0.000*	.0055	.0078
Female	-.012	.0219	-0.57	0.569	-.055	.0305
Perceived cultural threat	.173	.0056	30.72	0.000*	.1620	.1841
Country*cultural threat	-.003	.0088	-0.40	0.687	-.021	.0138
_cons	1.534	.0499	30.68	0.000	1.436	1.632

*significant at 1% confidence level

**significant at 5% confidence level

Table 9 reports the interaction effect for the variables, country and perceived economic threat. Perceived economic threat shows a strong positive coefficient of .1685. The effect of perceived economic threat is slightly larger in the UK. The difference between the countries in the effect of perceived economic threat is .0109. Based on the insignificant value of the interaction variable, it cannot be stated that the difference between Germany and the UK is existing. Therefore, hypothesis 4: in the UK the role of perceived economic threat and viewing immigration as bad for the country is larger, due to their liberalised immigration policy context, is rejected.

Table 9 Regression with the interaction effect of country and perceived economic threat

Anti-immigration attitude	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>t	95% CI.	
Country (Germany)						
United Kingdom	.0039	.0483	0.08	0.935	-.0905	.0985
Educational level	-.0607	.0063	-9.62	0.000*	-.0731	.0483
Age	.0076	.0006	12.73	0.000*	.0064	.0088
Female	-.0588	.0224	-2.62	0.009*	-.1028	.0148
Perceived economic threat	.1685	.0061	27.24	0.000*	.1564	.1807
Country*economic threat	.0109	.0098	1.11	0.266	-.0083	.0301
_cons	1.535	.0523	29.35	0.000	1.432	1.637

*significant at 1% confidence level

**significant at 5% confidence level

5. Conclusion

The starting point of this thesis was to explain differences in attitudes towards immigration and the role of immigration policy context for Germany and the UK. These two countries developed different immigration policies in response to increasing migration flows. Post-war labour recruitment programmes in Germany led to an ethnically diverse society. After the stop of the programmes in the 1970s, German policymakers acted under the narrative that Germany was not a country of immigration.

This paradigm was at the centre of a more restrictive immigration policy with a focus on viewing Germany as a culturally homogeneous society. In contrast to Germany, the UK portrayed themselves as an open society. A more liberalised immigration policy and the opening up of borders in the 2000s led to increasing labour migration and competition for skills and talents. The extent to which these different policy contexts affect the understanding of unfavourable attitudes towards immigration was unknown and therefore at the centre of my research. Previous research has argued that education and threat perception play a crucial role in understanding attitudes towards immigration (Scheepers, Coenders & Gijssels, 2002). To this end, this thesis focused on the extent to which level of education is related to a negative opinion on immigration based on an economic interpretation or a cultural interpretation, and whether this differs depending on the policy context.

With regard to level of education, the results show that educational level is negatively linked with anti-immigration attitudes. Higher education is associated with less support for anti-immigration attitudes. The effect of education seems to be more negative in the UK, however it cannot be stated that educational level explains differences in anti-immigration attitudes for Germany and the UK differently. The results show that the effect of education becomes less strong when controlled for cultural- and economic threat perception; educational differences are mediated by threat perceptions with which my findings replicate earlier research. Nevertheless, a higher education still leads to more support for immigration, regardless of perceived cultural – and economic threat; threat perceptions cannot explain all the differences in the unfavourable attitude to immigrants that I found.

Looking at the effect of perceived cultural threat, the results show that a higher perception of cultural threat is associated with more support for anti-immigration. In the UK the effect of perceived cultural threat is slightly stronger, albeit insignificant, which indicates that there is a small tendency that people in the UK hold stronger anti-immigration attitudes due to perceived cultural threat than people in Germany. The effect of perceived economic threat is also positive, indicating that perceived economic threat is related to support for anti-immigration attitudes. The differences in the effect of economic effect between the UK and Germany was close to zero and statistically insignificant. For both the UK and Germany, the effect of perceived economic threat is less strong than the effect of perceived cultural threat in understanding unfavourable attitudes to immigrants.

The most important finding of this thesis is that differences in immigration policy context have not been able to explain differences how to explain anti-immigration attitudes in Germany and the UK. The theoretical expectation that in Germany the role of perceived cultural threat for viewing immigration as bad for the country would be larger due to their restrictive immigration policy could not be statistically proven. In a similar vein, because the effect of economic threat was similar between the countries, the policy context cannot have impacted how perceptions of economic threat affect immigration attitudes differently between the countries. Hence, for the UK, the role of perceived economic threat for viewing immigration as bad for the country cannot be explained by their liberalised immigration policy context. I did find however that German respondents are less supportive of anti-immigration attitudes. The average difference between the UK and Germany was explained by average differences in their perceived cultural threat. In the UK, the population holds on average stronger cultural threat and, therefore, on average also a more unfavourable attitude towards immigration. However, persons who perceive

cultural threat in the UK and Germany translate that equally likely to unfavourable attitudes to immigration in both countries.

A second important finding is that educational level offers an explanation for anti-immigration attitudes. Higher educated tend to be more favourable towards immigration because higher educated experience less cultural – and economic threat. When controlling for perceived economic threat, the effect of education becomes less strong. This is in line with previous research stating that higher educated people have a different notion of culture and are more open to other societies (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). A third important finding is that the effect of perceived cultural threat offers a better explanation for anti-immigration attitudes than perceived economic threat. This finding is in line with previous research stating that not economic considerations, but cultural considerations are more important for explaining attitudes towards immigration (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Card et al., 2005; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006).

Explanations for anti-immigration attitudes vary, with one strand of literature focusing on cultural and another strand on economic explanations. This indicates that there is not one explanation. The research of Ueffing et al. (2015) made a start with looking at different angles for explaining differences in attitudes towards immigration, by focusing on the role of immigration policy. This thesis recognizes that immigration policy offers a strong theoretical perspective, but that in practice immigration policy is hard to measure as an explanation for differences in anti-immigration attitudes. For future research a dataset that contains measurable variables of the strictness of a country's immigration policy would be interesting to further test the effect of immigration policy context for explaining anti-immigration attitudes. Currently immigration is a heavily debated topic and with anti-immigration attitudes increasing in countries all over Europe, the debate is far from over.

References

- Bauer, T.K., Lofstrom, M. & Zimmerman, K.F. (2001). Immigration Policy, Assimilation of Immigrants and Natives' Sentiments Towards Immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD Countries. *Working Paper No. 33. Centre for Comparative Studies*: UC San Diego.
- Ben-Nun Bloom, P., Arikan, G. & Lahav, G. (2015). The Effect of Perceived Cultural Threat and Material Threat on Ethnic Preferences in Immigration Attitudes. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 38, 1760-1778.
- Borjas, G., Freeman, R. & Katz, L. (1996). Searching for the Effect of Immigration on the Labour Market. *American Economic Review*, 86(2), 1335-1374.
- Boswell, C. (2005). *Migration in Europe*. A Paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM).
- Boswell, C. & Hampshire, J. (2017). Ideas and Agency in Immigration Policy: A Discursive Institutional Approach. *European Journal of Political Research*, 56, 133-150.

- Card, D., Dustmann, C. & Preston, I. (2005). Understanding Attitudes to Immigration: The Migration and Minority Module of the First European Social Survey. *CReAM Discussion Paper Series*, 03/2005, 1-43.
- Castles, S. & Miller, M. (2003). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Pelgrave.
- Ceobanu, A.M. & Escandell, X. (2008). East is West? National Feelings and Anti-Immigration Sentiment in Europe. *Social Science Research*, 37, 1147-1170.
- Ceobanu, A.M. & Escandell, X. (2010). Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Towards Immigrants and Immigration. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36, 309-328.
- Chandler, C.R. & Tsai, Y. (2001). Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: a Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey. *The Social Science Journal*, 38, 177-188.
- Consterdine, E. & Hampshire, J. (2014). Immigration Policy under New Labour: Exploring a Critical Juncture. *British Politics*, 9(3), 275-296.
- Czaika, M. & Di Lillo, A. (2018). The Geography of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Across Europe, 2002-2014. *The Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(15), 2453-2479.
- Davidov, E. & Semyonov, M. (2017). Attitudes toward Immigrants in European Societies. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. 58(5), 359-366.
- Ellerman, A. (2015). Do Policy Legacies Matter? Past and Present Guest Worker Recruitment in Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(8), 1235-1253.
- Eurostat, (2018). Migration and migrant population statistics. *Statistics explained*. Consulted on 24/10/2018 via: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf>
- Geddes, A. (2003). Migration and the Welfare State in Europe. *The Political Quarterly*, 74(1), 150-162.
- Facchini, G. & Mayda, A.M. (2008). From Individual Attitudes Towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence. *Economic Policy*, 23(56), 651-713.
- Ford, R., Jennings, W. & Somerville, W. (2015). Public Opinion, Responsiveness and Constraint: Britain's Three Immigration Policy Regimes. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(9), 1391-1411.
- Ford, R. & Lymeropoulou, K. (2017). Immigration: How Attitudes in the UK compare with Europe. In: *British Social Attitudes* (pp. 1-30). London: NatCen Social Research.
- Hainmueller, J. & Hopkins, D.J. (2014). Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 17, 225-249.
- Hainmueller, J. & Hiscox, M.J. (2007). Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe. *International Organization*, 61, 399-442.

Halapuu, V. & Paas, T. (2012). Attitudes Towards Immigrants and the Integration of Ethnically Diverse Societies. *Norface Migration*. Discussion Paper 23.

Hess, C. & Green, S. (2016). Introduction: The Changing Politics and Policies of Migration in Germany. *German Politics*, 25(3), 315-328.

Joppke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great-Britain*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Katwala, S. & Somerville, W. (2016). *Engaging the Anxious Middle on Immigration Reform: Evidence from the UK Debate*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

Luedtke, A. (2005). European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy. *European Union Politics*, 6(1), 83-112.

Mau, S. & Burkhardt, C. (2009). Migration and Welfare State Solidarity in Western Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 19(3), 213-229.

Mayda, A.M. (2006). Who is Against Immigration in Europe? A Cross-country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(3), 510-530.

O'Rourke, K.H. & Sinnott, R. (2006). The Determinants of Individual Attitudes Towards Immigration. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 22, 838-861.

Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M. and Coenders, M. (2002). Ethnic Exclusionism in European Countries. Public Opposition to Civil Rights for Legal Migrants as a Response to Perceived Ethnic Threat. *European Sociological Review*, 18(1), 17-34.

Scheve, K. & Slaughter, M. (2001). Labour Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 83(1), 133-145.

Schlueter, E., Meuleman, B. & Davidov, E. (2013). Immigrant Integration Policies and Perceived Group Threat: A Multilevel Study of 27 Western and Eastern European Countries. *Social Science Research*, 42, 670-682.

Semyonov, M. Raijman, R., & Gorodzeisky, A. (2006). The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sentiment in European Societies. *American Sociological Review*, 71(3), 426-449.

Talò, T. (2017). Public Attitudes to Immigration in Germany and the Aftermath of the Migration Crisis. Working Paper Migration Policy Centre 23.

Ueffing, P., Rowe, F. & Mulder, C.H. (2015). Differences in Attitudes towards Immigration between Australia and Germany: The Role of Immigration Policy. *Comparative Population Studies*, 40(4), 437-464.

List of abbreviations

American National Election Studies (NES)

European Social Survey (ESS)
European Union (EU)
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
United Kingdom (UK)